LatinNews Daily - 02 March 2020

On 1 March Luis Alberto Lacalle Pou was sworn-in as president of Uruguay.

Analysis:

Lacalle Pou’s investiture breaks the 15-year stranglehold on power enjoyed by the left-wing Frente Amplio (FA) coalition. But while the three FA administrations held majorities in both chambers of congress (internal disputes between the FA’s different factions were mostly set aside when it mattered), Lacalle Pou faces a different scenario entirely. Lacalle Pou is entirely reliant upon a disparate five-party governing coalition, ranging from the centre-left to the radical right, hanging together.

• During his 30-minute address to congress yesterday, Lacalle Pou focused on security, education, and the economy. He also underscored his commitment to preserving “the rights of everyone”, maintaining that if, when he leaves power, Uruguayans enjoy more freedoms than now then he would have done his job well.
• Lacalle Pou promised that his government would take urgent measures to address insecurity, which was one of the deciding factors in the FA’s electoral defeat last November, and “recover control of every corner of our country, including our prisons”. He said that his government would introduce tougher security measures to combat rising crime and drug trafficking, such as more police powers and longer prison sentences.
• Lacalle Pou said his government would overhaul the education system. He bewailed the decline of teaching standards in Uruguay, claiming the country had fallen from “the vanguard in Latin America to among the laggards in the percentage of children finishing secondary education”.
• On the economic front, Lacalle Pou announced that his government would introduce austerity policies and stringent fiscal rules, expressing concern that the fiscal deficit in 2019 had climbed to 4.7% of GDP. He also said it would move to open a debate on an urgent reform of the social security system and pensions. Lacalle Pou said he would be prepared to work with all political parties and civil society to make it a “sustainable system”.
• This is a vexed issue. It is worth recalling that the outgoing FA administration’s decision to reform the Caja Militar military pension system so incensed then army commander Guido Manini Ríos that, after a few twists and turns, he ended up running for the presidency at the head of the fledgling right-wing Cabildo Abierto (CA) party, which now forms an integral part of Lacalle Pou’s ‘multi-colour’ coalition.
• Lacalle Pou’s centre-right Partido Nacional (PN, Blancos) can be reasonably certain of preserving a governing alliance with its traditional rival, the Partido Colorado (PC, Colorados), and could afford to lose the support of the small Partido Independiente (PI) and Partido de la Gente (PG), but the CA is an unknown quantity and an essential partner.

Looking Ahead: Manini Ríos might be a political liability, but Lacalle Pou will need to humour him. Without the CA’s three senators and 11 deputies, Lacalle Pou will be unable to muster a majority in either chamber of congress to win approval for his legislative agenda, his government will be ineffective, and the FA will be back in power in 2025.

On 29 February, at least six people were injured in the city of Barquisimeto, Lara state, during an armed attack on a demonstration led by opposition leader Juan Guaidó, recognised as Venezuela’s interim president by over 50 countries.

Analysis:

The attack received widespread condemnation from the international community, after opposition officials attributed it to ‘colectivos’ (armed militias supportive of Nicolás Maduro’s government) seeking to assassinate Guaidó. If Maduro wanted Guaidó dead, he undoubtedly has the military capacity to do so, but the extent of the reaction to this incident demonstrates why he is wary of making a martyr of the opposition leader. Regardless of whether the Maduro government was directly responsible for this attack, its rhetoric against Guaidó and the opposition has contributed to this violent political climate, the principal victims of which are not heavily guarded opposition politicians, but civilian protesters.

• A group of masked men opened fire on the demonstration, injuring at least six people and leaving bullet marks on Guaidó’s armoured vehicle. Guaidó condemned this as an assassination attempt, and identified several of the attackers as being associated with local pro-government political groups.
• The international reaction was immediate. Statements from the Lima Group of Western Hemisphere countries and the Organization of American States (OAS), as well as a range of national governments, condemned Maduro for fuelling this violence and for undermining a democratic solution to the crisis in Venezuela, although most have so far stopped short of accusing the Maduro government of directly orchestrating the attack.
• The Maduro government has offered little reaction to this development. Guaidó’s international prestige has so far been sufficient to exempt him from the violence faced by the rest of the Venezuelan opposition, and Maduro is well aware that assassinating the opposition’s emblematic figurehead would be a strategic disaster. However, this broader climate of violence has likely contributed to the declining attendance at opposition demonstrations, as the dangers of protesting alongside Guaidó are made abundantly clear.

Looking Ahead: A major demonstration is planned in Caracas for 10 March, and Guaidó has called for the public to respond to this attack by rallying around him, despite the likelihood of further violence.

* Colombia’s national statistics institute (Dane) has reported that unemployment rose to 13% in January, compared to 12.8% in the same month last year. Dane emphasised that urban unemployment fell from 13.7% to 12.9% in this period, but this was outweighed by soaring rural unemployment. Jorge Bedoya, president of agricultural producers’ association Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia (SAC), attributed this to the effects of climate change on agricultural output, in particular the severe frosts that hit the sector in January and February.

On 1 March, military police (PM) officers in Brazil’s north-eastern state of Ceará agreed to end an almost fortnight-long strike and return to work.

Analysis:

Demands for salary increases had led parts of the PM force in Ceará to launch protests from 18 February, in defiance of the law which prohibits them from striking, and leading what the authorities described as acts of mutiny and vandalism. It now appears that the protesting PM have largely bowed to the terms offered by the state in agreeing to end their strikes.

• An agreement was reached yesterday after several days of negotiations in a committee created on 26 February, which included representatives from the three branches of Ceará’s state government, the state public prosecutor’s office (MP-CE), the armed forces, the Brazilian bar association (OAB) and members of Ceará state capital Fortaleza’s 18^th PM battalion, representing the demands of the force. 
• The state government has agreed to invest R$495m (US$111m) into police salaries by 2022. Governor Camilo Santana has refused to give amnesty to the mutineers, but the agreement minimises reprisals for PM officers involved in the strike, and guarantees them fair judicial proceedings, which will be overseen by a specially created independent committee. In counterpart, the striking PM officers agreed to end their occupation of police stations and return to work today (2 March).
• The federal justice & public security minister, Sérgio Moro, celebrated the end of the strike on Twitter. “Common sense prevailed, without radicalisations. Congratulations all”, he wrote. The federal government had provided security reinforcements to the state, which included sending in the armed forces for a period which was extended to 6 March last week.
• Despite these reinforcements, Ceará suffered from a spike in lethal violence during the PM mutiny. The state public security secretariat recorded 170 homicides between 19 and 24 February, while data gathered by news site G1 points to a total 364 homicides in the state in February, a 138% increase on last year.  

Looking Ahead: The Ceará state government’s relative victory in this face-off with its police force may be taken as a positive sign by other states, many of which are also involved in negotiations over police salary increases.   

* Brazil’s national statistics institute (Ibge) has released the latest unemployment figures, which show that unemployment continues to fall in the country, although it remains high. Brazil’s unemployment rate for the rolling quarter November 2019-January 2020 stood at 11.2%, down from 12% in the same period last year, and 11.6% in the previous rolling quarter (August-October 2019). The unemployed population totalled 11.9m people (down 3.7% on the previous rolling quarter), while the employed population remained stable, at 94.2m.

On 28 February El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele vetoed a new bill on transitional justice, reparations and national reconciliation relating to the country’s civil war (1980-1992).

Analysis:

Bukele had already said he would veto the bill which the 84-member unicameral national legislature approved last week, arguing that it would result in impunity for war crimes and was unconstitutional. Human rights groups such as Fundación de Estudios para la Aplicación del Derecho (Fespad), along with the regional Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), had also rejected the initiative, not least for its failure to consult with the representatives of the victims. However, some human rights activists warn against Bukele’s use of the veto, warning it provides him with the opportunity to portray himself as a champion of the victims at a time when his own commitment to democracy has been seriously questioned, following his recent deployment of the security forces to congress.

• In a presidential statement Bukele objected to various provisions of the bill which was passed by 44 deputies, mainly from the right-wing opposition Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Arena) party, which emerged from the civil war along with the other main opposition group Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), which did not support the bill. These include Art. 67 which allows the commutation of a sentence due to age or health concerns, regardless of a perpetrator’s cooperation as well as the limited amount of time assigned for the attorney general’s office (FGR) to investigate potential cases.
• In an opinion piece published in national daily El Diario de Hoy on 26 February, Arnau Baulenas Bardia, coordinator of the judicial process team at the Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas’ human rights institute (IDHUCA), expressed concern about Bukele’s potential vetoing of the law. He argues that “you can’t ask someone who has interpreted the constitution in his own interest to act as its guarantor and establish whether the articles guarantee minimum rights in favour of the victims” – a reference to the deployment of the security forces to congress, which was widely slammed.

Looking Ahead: While the bill was passed by 44 votes, 56 votes would be required to override the presidential veto.

* Honduras’ tourism minister, Nicole Marrder, and Belize’s tourism & civil aviation minister, Manuel Heredia, have signed an agreement to reduce tariffs on flights between the two countries. The agreement will connect Belize with eight Honduran destinations: Roatán, the largest of Honduras’s Bay Islands, Utila (another Bay island), La Ceiba and Tela (Atlántida department), San Pedro Sula (Cortés), the capital Tegucigalpa, Copán Ruinas (Copán) and Gracias (Lempira). Belizean airline Tropic Air has already shown interest in operating between Belize, Útila, and Copán Ruinas. The agreement will incentivise airlines and tourism companies to unite the attractions of the Mayan world and the diving centres of Belize and Honduras. As part of Honduras’ President Juan Orlando Hernández’s policy of open skies for Central America, Honduras and El Salvador will also sign an agreement to facilitate air operations between the two countries, which Guatemala will join.

On 29 February Mexico’s foreign ministry (SRE) issued a statement denying that it received any formal request from the US government to impose entry restrictions on their shared border to control the coronavirus (Covid-19) outbreak.

Analysis:

The statement came in response to remarks by US President Donald Trump that he was considering imposing restrictions at the US-Mexico border to stop the spread of Covid-19 after Mexico confirmed the first cases of the disease in the country. There are concerns in Mexico that the imposition of restrictions at the border could significantly affect its domestic economy, undermining the chances that there will be an economic recovery in Mexico this year following the GDP contraction registered in 2019.

• The Mexican authorities confirmed the first Covid-19 case in the country on 28 February after reporting of a suspicious case a day earlier. Since then four more confirmed Covid-19 cases have been reported in the southern state of Chiapas, the north-eastern state of Sinaloa, and in the northern border state of Coahuila. This has been taken as a sign that the virus is starting to spread across Mexico in what could become a major outbreak (the local media says that as many as 400 individuals have been infected).
• The Mexican government insists that there currently is no national health emergency over coronavirus as the outbreak is being contained. However, during a 29 February press conference President Trump said that his administration was considering imposing restrictions on the US southern border to try to contain the coronavirus outbreak in the US (where 15 case have been confirmed so far). After announcing restrictions on travel from areas badly affected by the outbreak such as China, South Korea, and Italy, Trump said that “We are thinking about the southern border”.
• Trump did not give more details, but the speculation is that this would involve entry restrictions on individuals and goods. But the SRE statement is clear that there has been no formal proposal for imposing border restrictions, adding that the two governments maintain “close communication” over the issue.  

Looking Ahead: Following the release of the SRE statement, US Vice President Michael Pence, who has been tasked with coordinating the US response to the coronavirus, said that the US is still discussing what further actions it will adopt to contain the virus.

* A statement by international credit ratings agency Moody’s Investors Service notes that it expects Mexico’s state-owned oil company Pemex to increase production by 1% in 2020, replacing about 50% of its proven reserves.

* Chile’s national statistics institute (INE) released new figures showing that the national unemployment rate for the November 2019-January 2020 rolling quarter stood at 7.4%, 0.3 percentage points higher than in the comparable quarter of 2018-2019. This is the highest unemployment rate in nine years and has been attributed to the ongoing and widespread social protests against inequality that erupted in October 2019, which have significantly impacted economic activity. According to the INE data, the increase in the unemployment rate was driven by a 9.6% increase in layoffs and an 8% fall in the amount of people looking for work. “We think that the increase in unemployment reflects what we have been saying in the past few months…that job creation has deteriorated as a result of the social discontent”, Labour & Social Security Minister María José Zaldívar commented, while adding that the rise in the unemployment rate is nevertheless “lower than expected”.

Argentina: On 24 February US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo received Argentina’s ambassador to the US, Jorge Argüello, at the US State Department where they discussed the possibility of a meeting between the countries’ two presidents and said that the two countries would “work together to promote democracy and economic prosperity in the region”. Speaking to Argentine news outlet Infobae, Argüello described the meeting as “very productive” and said that Pompeo showed himself to be interested in Argentina’s situation and influence in the region. According to Infobae, amongst the principal matters discussed, were Argentina’s plan for tackling its debt crisis and the need for a democratic solution to the situation in Venezuela. Argüello also told Pompeo that Argentina doesn’t back the re-election of the Secretary General of the Organisation of American States (OAS) Luis Almagro owing to President Alberto Fernández’s divergence of opinion with him on regional matters. Pompeo responded that the US does back Almagro. Argüello went on to thank the White House on behalf of Argentina for its support of Argentina’s debt restructuring plan with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Regarding a potential meeting between US President Donald Trump and President Fernández, Argüello said Pompeo didn’t reject the request but clarified that he would need to consult Trump.

Bolivia: On 25 February an unnamed senior US Department of State official gave a press briefing on US engagement in Bolivia in which he said that the US government is working with “the international community – our partners in the EU[European Union], the UN [United Nations], the OAS [Organization of American States] – to help ensure free, fair, and transparent elections that would help bolster democracy”. General elections are scheduled for 3 May following the vote that was cancelled in October 2019 amid allegations of fraud. According to the US official, the US “wants a positive relationship with the new government of Bolivia, whatever government that is put in place”. The official also noted that US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale visited La Paz in January, and on 21 January announced the US’s intent to resume an ambassadorial relationship with Bolivia. US-Bolivia relations soured under the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) government led by former president Evo Morales (2006-2019), with both ambassadors expelled from their respective posts in 2008.

Mexico: On 26 February Mexico’s foreign ministry (SRE) issued a statement in response to a US Supreme Court ruling issued the previous day which stated that the family of 15-year-old Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca is not entitled to sue for damages the US Border Patrol agent who fatally shot him in 2010. The Supreme Court ruled that it cannot extend Constitutional protection nor apply US federal law in claims for actions of US agents causing effects in other countries. The SRE statement expresses “deep concern” on behalf of the Mexican government “for the consequences of this decision on similar cases involving Mexican citizens killed by gunshots fired by US agents towards Mexico”, warning that this precedent could limit the ability of claimants to obtain justice and reparations for damages in US courts. Hernández died in the border town of Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua state, in June 2010, when a Border Patrol agent from el El Paso, Texas, shot at him from US soil. The SRE had filed amicus curiae briefs before the US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and three times before the US Supreme Court. Underlining Mexico’s strong condemnation of “situations when law enforcement authorities use disproportionate and sometimes extraterritorial use of force, particularly at our common border”, the SRE statement notes the creation in 2014 of a High-level Border Violence Prevention Group by both countries which has “held six meetings and achieved progress on issues such as accountability and transparency, as well as preventive actions”.

Panama: On 21 February the interim head of the US embassy in Panama, Philip Laidlaw, and Panama’s security minister, Juan Manuel Pino, participated in a ceremony in which the US handed over equipment worth US$6.4m to strengthen Panama’s anti-narcotics operations both on land and sea. According to a series of tweets by the US embassy in Panama, this included three Boston Whaler boats, communication equipment, helmets and bullet-proof jackets, and thermal binoculars, among other things. According to the US embassy, since 2016 the US has financed US$195m worth of training and equipment for the security forces in Panama. The ceremony took place two days after US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun met Panama’s foreign minister, Alejandro Ferrer, in Washington DC, during which the two discussed, among other things, the “importance of the US-Panamanian partnership and the need to continue countering irregular migration and combatting the flow of illegal narcotics”. Other topics discussed included “transparent investment for economic growth, the upcoming election for the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, and the ongoing political crises in Venezuela and Nicaragua”.