Assumption 1: North American free trade is a good thing
The two countries share a common border of 2,000 miles (about 3,200km). During the last century economic relations between Mexico and the US have become progressively closer. The border region (made up of ten US and Mexican states) now has a population of nearly 100m: in GDP terms alone it can be considered to be the world’s fourth-largest economy. Two-way trade is running at around US$1.4bn a day. Legal daily border crossings run into the hundreds of thousands. There are over 12m Mexicans living in the United States, and one million US citizens living in Mexico. Over 20m US citizens visit Mexico every year as tourists. The US is Mexico’s largest trading partner, far outstripping all other contenders. Mexico is the United States’ second-largest export market (after Canada) and it third-largest trading partner (after Canada and China). The accumulated value of investment in Mexico by US companies is US$101bn, while Mexican companies have around US$17.6bn invested in the US. Mexicans living in the US send home over US$20bn each year in remittances to friends and family.
The growth of this dense web of economic ties between the two countries has gone hand-in-hand with the belief that in an increasingly global economy, an open trading relationship between Mexico and the US is mutually beneficial, and helps both countries become more competitive. That view was formalised in the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which created a free trade zone between Canada, the US, and Mexico. Implicit in NAFTA is the belief that reducing obstacles to trade is ultimately beneficial to all parties, even those that might suffer some short-term losses or imbalances in the process.
The precise economic impact of NAFTA over the last two decades is still open to debate. But the pre-Trump consensus view was that it has helped both economies. Even NAFTA’s most ardent supporters accepted that there were imbalances. Many US companies took advantage of more competitive wage rates in Mexico to set up production plants there: this helped them become more profitable, but it also limited the growth of manufacturing employment in the US. As part of the ‘near shoring’ phenomenon, many moved production operations, previously based in Asia, back to Mexico to take advantage of both competitive wage costs (the cost of Chinese labour had grown to outstrip that of Mexican labour) and lower logistics costs. Mexico’s economy can be segmented into three areas: first, the undeveloped and poor south; second, the sluggishly growing domestic-focused market around the centre of the country; and third, the much-more dynamic north, closely integrated into the US and global economies. For Mexican policy-makers that dynamic north, closely tied into NAFTA and the US business cycle, was a core driver for the rest of the economy.