The LatinNews Podcast

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  Richard McColl: This is The LatinNews Podcast. I'm your host, Richard McColl, here in Bogotá, Colombia. This week's episode, we'll be discussing the Malvinas or the Falkland Islands. We're going to refer to them as the Islands just to avoid any unnecessary tensions out there and we're talking to Klaus Dodds, who's professor of geopolitics at Middlesex University, London, and senior research fellow at RAND Europe, and has a very strong background the strongest background in polar regions the islands and beyond.

  So welcome on The LatinNews Podcast.

  Professor Klaus Dodds: Thank you very much. A real pleasure to be with you, Richard.

  Richard McColl: No, the pleasure is ours, of course. Yes, it's the Islands. This topic comes up, obviously it's an issue of national sovereignty and pride for Argentina, and of course, we've got President Javier Milei in power and making all of the right sounds for his electorate, I imagine, with presidential elections coming up in October 2027.

  But there's so much more to debate surrounding this, and of course, we get into the oil exploration or the planned oil exploration down there. This is, I would say I love Borges's quote about the Falklands conflict back in 1982, but was it two bald men fighting over a comb? It... Home to fewer than 4,000 people in this isolated corner of the South Atlantic's ocean, but center of the geopolitical debate, I'd say, in this part of the world.

  So perhaps we could just jump in with an overview.

  Professor Klaus Dodds: Yes. I remember that quote and thinking it was a, it was very witty, and yet at the same time, I think underestimated what former British Prime Minister James Callaghan used to say, which was when he was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in the 1970s, he would recommend all colleagues that they needed to be mindful what he called dots on the map.

  And when Callaghan was Prime Minister, there were two dots on the map in terms of Latin America that were preoccupying him. One was British Honduras, later to become Belize on independence, and the other was the Islands. And in 1977 Callaghan was very concerned about a possible Argentine operation against the Islands and instructed a nuclear-powered submarine to travel to the Southwest Atlantic and to act as a deterrent.

  Now, the funny thing is, it's not clear whether the Argentine military regime were aware that there was a nuclear-powered submarine going far south. But nonetheless, it was cited as an example that when you're dealing with dots on the map, you have to be aware that they can have a stunning capacity to flare up and become issues of exaggerated importance.

  And you're right, who would have thought that the United Kingdom would dispatch a task force in April 1982 to recover those islands given the relative inaccessibility and that on the face of it, there appeared to be no more in 1982 than about 2,500 residents. But Callaghan's point was, the whole point about dots on the map is you often end up doing things that would seem to defy the size and the relative importance of them

  Richard McColl: I never thought we'd be bringing in Callaghan into a conversation, but it's absolutely fascinating to be able to extend so far back and of course thinking, we need to look at the history. Argentina has laid claim to, as they call the Malvinas for two centuries. We've had the 1982 war that we've had the 2013 sovereignty referendum.

  And now let's bring it up to the current date. We have a president in power in Argentina who is, overwhelmingly I would say in support of US policy. And of course Donald Trump himself has made comments about the islands themselves. Where do- where does that put us?

  Professor Klaus Dodds: We're actually in relatively uncharted waters in the sense of, you're right, if you were to take the long view, there's a story to be told about these islands that from Britain's points of view dates back to 1833 when the islands become formally incorporated into the British Empire.

  They become a colony. Now, from Argentina's point of view, over the intervening period, say from 1833 to 2026, the Republic has raised the issue of the islands at times with great vigor and enthusiasm, at times very dramatically, of course, through the 1982 task force operation, and has used international organizations like the United Nations to raise the profile of Argentine, the Argentine historic claim to these islands.

  In 1982, one of the things Argentina and Britain learnt was that whoever had the support of the United States was likely to come out of this conflict, this six-week conflict, in a better state. And decisively, the United States backed the United Kingdom, and when we had the ceasefire in June 1982, Argentine forces were told to withdraw from the islands.

  And that told us something important, that when the chips were down, Mrs. Thatcher's relationship with President Ronald Reagan was a stronger one than the corresponding relationship with the Argentine military regime. Between 1982 and about 2025, '26, the United Kingdom has had the benefit of a benign relationship with the United States.

  In other words, the United States has been neutral on this issue, and neutrality always favors the status quo, and the status quo at the moment favors the United Kingdom. And this is the way I think Argentina would view things. Milei has done something quite different. He's been able to cultivate a personal relationship with Donald Trump, who after all has described Milei as his favorite president.

  When Milei came into office in 2023 actually thought quite hard about recasting the relationship with the United States, used lobbyists, for example, to build a relationship with Donald Trump, and that appeas- that appears to be paying dividends. So we have an Argentine president, member of the Board of Peace, who's politically savvy enough to realize that Donald Trump is somebody he can potentially do business with.

  And that's why the United Kingdom should be very concerned, because Donald Trump has also been very clear that he doesn't necessarily hold the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom in quite the same way, for example, previous American presidents might have done. So that's a real game changer.

  Richard McColl: It is definitely. A lot has come out. Obviously Prime Minister Andy Burnham has been speaking out on the shoulder-to-shoulder relationship, between, let's say, mainland United Kingdom and the British overseas territory of the islands. It's a knee-jerk reaction and a, I would say a predictable statement from the Prime Minister, but what do you, how do you feel that he, his his policy towards the Islands will evolve in coming months?

  Because it's all to play for right now.

  Professor Klaus Dodds: It does feel that way, doesn't it? Because again, if you are an observer of the United Kingdom and you're asking questions about how does the United Kingdom engage with its portfolio of overseas territories? So on the one hand, you've seen the United Kingdom make a really quite important shift towards the way in which it thinks it's going to treat other territories, like British Indian Ocean Territory.

  And one of the things that Margaret Thatcher, all the way back in the 1980s, was very attentive to was be careful about what you do in other overseas territories, because Argentina will watch carefully, and if, for example, we were to, quote-unquote, "Go soft over Gibraltar," and for example, negotiate an agreement with Spain, then Argentina would say, "Aha, the British are flexible."

  So if they can do this with Gibraltar, if they can do this with British Indian Ocean Territory, why can't they do this with the Islands in the Southwest Atlantic? People watch the United Kingdom carefully, particularly if you claim a territory and you think it's yours rather than theirs.

  The second thing Argentina will have watched very carefully is quite how critical at times Donald Trump has been of the United Kingdom, particularly in the midst of the military campaign against Iran, for example. And then the third element that will give President Milei some solace of hope is Trump's comments about Western hemispheric dominance, about greater North America And anybody who's familiar with the map will know that the United Kingdom has a large number of overseas territories in the Americas.

  And so if Donald Trump is trying to do the Monroe Doctrine for the 21st century, then you might ask questions about, for example whether you want the United Kingdom to retain all these overseas territories scattered from Bermuda to the north, to the islands to the south. So I think that's why President Milei and his supporters will think this is a propitious moment.

  And by the way, of course, we ought to acknowledge that this president has had his own issues with unpopularity, with corruption scandals. It's not been straightforward. So you can see also a familiar pattern in Argentina, which is, if nothing else, let's turn to those islands again when the one, when one's political fortunes are looking less secure.

  Richard McColl: So we would be wrong to suggest that it's essentially, and as many people would have placed it it's Milei stoking the fires of nationalism for political gain towards October next year. It's not just about that. The... the jigsaw is in favor, I would say, of Milei under a Trump presidency in the United States.

  Professor Klaus Dodds: Yes. If I, if, if I found myself in a position where I would have 10 minutes conversation with President Milei, if I was being a completely neutral observer about this, I would say there does appear to be a moment here where the geopolitical chips, you might say look a lot more favorable.

  And the other thing that President Milei has, I think, going for him, and British observers will be, I'm sure, reflecting on this as I speak The United Kingdom, in terms of its military readiness, feels very stretched at this moment in time. We're hugely preoccupied with the High North, which after all is 8,000, 9,000 miles away from those islands.

  The second thing is we shouldn't forget that Argentina and the United States have spoken about developing a integrated naval base in the Argentine city of Ushuaia, so that's something very interesting to reflect upon. And thirdly, there is a shared analysis that China's growing presence in the South Atlantic and the Antarctic is a source of potential concern if President Trump is committed, as he appears to be, to exercising Western hemispheric dominance.

  So if his analysis, it holds for Greenland, for example, then why wouldn't it hold for the Southwest Atlantic and the Antarctic? So all of this is to say that if you're President Milei, you will think that there is a moment here, and every year Argentina lets, in a sense, the status quo prevail, it means that Britain's narrative, which is the islanders self-determining their future, just looks stronger and stronger.

  So in essence, Argentina, to be perfectly blunt, has little to no incentive to be nice about this issue. And if nothing else, the 1994 Constitution says every president has the imperative to try and recover those lost territories

  Richard McColl: Yeah, I was going to mention the Constitution, but I want to talk then quickly, you've mentioned how stretched U- UK military capacity would be.

  Is there a possibility of maneuvers or even some more conflict-related activity in the South Atlantic, British British, I don't know, frigates being sent down, submarines being sent down or further aircraft? I what is Argentina's military capacity at this point in time as well?

  Professor Klaus Dodds: Yes. I don't think candidly Argentina is going to pose a direct military threat to the United Kingdom.

  So to be very clear, I'm not predicting an April 1982 playing out again. However, there are also ways in which, as Donald Trump showed when it came to Greenland and Denmark, you can impose costs. And one of the ways in which a country, particularly when the said country, Argentina, claims or counterclaims a territory can use to its advantage is relative proximity.

  So for the United Kingdom, supporting and enabling the Falkland Islands, and I will use the term this time round because it's a very particular community, and of course, directly elected government requires actually a whole series of things to be in place for, in order for that government and community to function well.

  Amongst other things, the islands are really dependent on the benevolent presence of Uruguay and Chile on the one hand. Any air link between the islands and Chile relies on crisscrossing Argentine airspace. The economy of the islands depends on a fishing licensing regime. Tourism plays a part, but fishing licensing is fundamentally where the money comes from.

  That depends on Argentina and also other players, including China, which is perfectly capable of engaging in illegal fishing at an industrial scale, particularly in Latin America, of not destroying the very resource, namely squid, that makes that fishing licensing regime possible. And I just, would draw you, draw your attention, anyone listening to this, back to 1998 and 1999, General Pinochet was detained in London And one of the reactions by the Chilean government at the time was to suspend the air link between Chile and the islands.

  And for six months, the islands felt really isolated because they were dependent on that route the British, the Royal Air Force maintained via Ascension Island, and there was even doubts at some stage whether the emergency diversion landing rights that exist in Brazil and Uruguay, for example, would be retained, and then Argentina showed solidarity with Chile.

  It was a really tense period, and I think it was a reminder that the UK and the islands fold into a broader regional picture. It's never just been a bilateral dispute. That's the thing I think is really worth remembering.

  Richard McColl: I remember that well. It was Foreign Minister Jack Straw. And then of course Pinochet was having his visits from Margaret Thatcher there just off Wentworth Golf Course where he was under house arrest.

  Now when I went, when I visited the Falkland the islands all those years ago, but after the '98, '99, there was, there, it had been reestablished that we would land in Rio Gallegos, I think it was, on the way out. And it was no one got on, no one got off. We were-- It was just a flight that was acknowledged, and then would then continue on to the islands from there.

  That has since been suspended, I believe hasn't it? There's no... so what is the relationship between Uruguay and let's say the islands and their and the political situation?

  Professor Klaus Dodds: So the the important element of this relationship between the United Kingdom and Uruguay and the Islands is that Uruguay provides amongst other things, medical support.

  So for example, there is, if you have a complex medical issue with, say, a resident on the islands, the the hospital in Montevideo the British Hospital becomes that emergency port of call. So it's incredibly important for the islands. It's part of the, if you like, the support system. And the other thing worth noting about the air link with Chile is that of course that air link has also brought more business opportunities to Punta Arenas that has also been a town with its own economic woes and concerns about its sort of vitality, in the far south of the country.

  So it's not to say, by the way, it's all one way. Some of those connections have also been useful to those southern communities. But you are quite right, that link with Rio Gallegos, for example, came about under a very particular joint statement that Tony Blair negotiated, which saw a series of concessions that was trying to normalize, in inverted commas, the relationship between the three parties actually, the UK, Argentina and the directly elected Falkland Islands government.

  So it was a really important milestone, and the Argentine foreign minister Guido Di Tella, for example, was really instrumental in trying to create a more collaborative relationship. But the point to bear in mind is that from Argentina's point of view, being nice arguably strengthens, whether you like it or not, the status quo in favor of the United Kingdom and the Falkland Islands government.

  And that's always been the dilemma Argentina has because the Constitution is clear, you don't get to say, "We're no longer interested." It'd have to be a constitutional change for a president to say, "It's fine. We're not going to recover these territories."

  Richard McColl: Yes. I don't see that happening anytime soon.

  Let's let's move into the technicalities a bit now of this the proposed oil... the Sea Lion Oil- Oil Field project. We know we have an Israeli company, Navitas Petroleum, and the UK's Rockhopper Exploration, and they have a plan to bin- begin extracting oil by, I guess it's 2028, and hopefully at estimates of 50,000 barrels a day for 35 years.

  But of course, this has led to President Milei saying he's very good at the statements, "The illegal plundering of our resources," and so on. And he wishes to take this matter to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Perhaps we could go into this a little bit. So tell us about the oil resources down there and Argentina is not doing badly from the exploitation of its, let's say, southern regions.

  I imagine it sees the islands as, an extension as well.

  Professor Klaus Dodds: Yes. I think we need to be very clear that when the the United Kingdom launched its task force in 1982, there was a very commonly held view in Argentina at the time that the reason why the task force was being launched was because Britain knew that there were substantial oil and gas reserves in and around the islands, and that it was nothing to do with responding to the direct threat to the residents of the said islands.

  And when, of course, Margaret Thatcher at the time was very clear that these were British citizens in distress that needed saving, that was something, as I say, that was treated with a great deal of skepticism. It can't possibly be that you would you would go to all this effort, cost, and we shouldn't forget, nearly 1,000 people died on both sides just for 2,500 people.

  Now, the truth of the matter is Argentina was right that in the 1970s, there was the famous Shackleton report that did indeed speculate about oil and gas resources, but it also said, isn't it surprising that this sheep-based economy had never ventured offshore and thought about developing a fishing industry?

  So that was another element to all of that. Now, fast-forward into the 1990s onwards, and you start to get the first concerted effort to think about what oil and gas exploration could look like. The Sea Lion project itself, which is the most advanced of all the prospecting areas, is to the north of the islands started in 2010, and as you said, quite rightly, the aspiration is that production would start in 2028 that there was, you know- 500 million, I think, recoverable barrels of oil or something like that was cited, and there was a aspiration that the islands might benefit to a tune of about £4 or £5 billion over the lifetime of the project.

  So a real game changer, in other words. Now that for President Milei, of course, that is absolutely a red line, and that would be a red line for any Argentine president. It's bad enough the islands exploiting fish, for example, circulating around the Southwest Atlantic. But it's always been a hugely sensitive and controversial issue around oil and gas.

  One thing worth noting Richard, going back to this joint statement that Blair negotiates in 1999, there was actually an element in the joint statement that talked about a joint exploration zone between the two countries. It was something that I was at the time very surprised that Argentina would've would've signed up to.

  But you've got to bear in mind there were lots of concessions on either side, and this was seen as a kind of confidence-building mechanism. So Sea Lion is an absolute proverbial red rag to a bull. It'- there's got an additional complexity to it all 'cause you mentioned the partners. Navitas is an Israeli o- operation, and the one thing worth noting is President Milei has a very special relationship with Israel, and he's been very clear that this is a country he admires and he sees both Israel and Argentina at the forefront of protecting Western civilization.

  So it's gonna be tricky to negotiate, and he's been very clear that where the unhappiness is being targeted, it's primarily towards the United Kingdom as opposed to this Israeli partner

  Richard McColl: Is there a way that he can manipulate this this relationship with Israel and have pressure placed on Navitas by let's say Israeli government interest?

  I'm, I only ask because it seems like a natural question here It has to be a reasonable question. So the question might be, for example, if you want Navitas to pull out what does that compensation package look like? Because clearly that relationship between Argentina and Israel is considered to be a strategic one, as well as a kind of ideological one.

  Professor Klaus Dodds: So it's really going to be something I think will become more important in the aftermath of the Israeli elections. So what we've also got to bear in mind is that Prime Minister Netanyahu is also up for election. Now, I think if he clings onto power yet again, then that's an interesting continuity that I think President Milei can absolutely then seek to advance, if you wish, potentially to his favor.

  If Netanyahu loses, then it seems to me at the very least he's got to build a different political relationship, whoever holds the office of prime minister. But I would have thought for, whatever the complexities around Rockhopper and Navitas' relationship, clearly from Milei's point of view, to get that Israeli firm out of the Sea Lion project has got to be seen as advantageous in terms of trying to derail, if you will, the Sea Lion project itself.

  Richard McColl: It's... Yes and of course Milei was recently at the United Nations and making the statements out there and but let's remember, let's also remember and raise the issue that this project, this Sea Lion project, did collapse twice previously, 2014 and 2020. financial trouble, oil prices, but this kind of puts...

  I would say, again, it puts Argentina in a strong position, to be able to negotiate and then to build on this, to expand, let's say, a scope of sanctions to affiliates of various companies and financial intermediaries, shareholders and suppliers. What do you feel on this?

  Professor Klaus Dodds: In essence what Milei will be looking at is in essence how does the United States do its business?

  So for example, one of the ways in which he will be looking at this with his advisors is, would be from the Trump playbook, which which you would start to trace out all the connections and actually start to ask yourselves where are the vulnerabilities.

  And we know that Argentina, on the face of it, as a resource-rich country Is likely to be more important in the future rather than less important. And if Milei can build powerful relationships with the United States on the one hand that have an enduring quality, and that's a real question, both short term building on the Trump era and longer term, the relationship with Israel is not insignificant given Israel's capacity to be a really important exporter of defense, high tech armaments, all of the above.

  Then that's the start of something. And if, for example, and this is always a concern for the United Kingdom, if the UK's relationships with neighboring states like Chile, Uruguay, Brazil for whatever reason deteriorate then yet again, the United Kingdom is under pressure. And of course, again I made that point earlier about imposing costs.

  So what Argentina will seek to do is impose costs. So for example, it says we're going to approach the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea." Now, I don't think the United Kingdom will be particularly worried about what the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea does or doesn't do. But what it does is potentially act as a deterrent, and it says to commercial entities and others, "Do you want the hassle?

  Do you want to get involved in this? How important is this really to you?" Because the government of Buenos Aires is signaling that it really bothers it that this Sea Lion project might come on stream, so to say, in 2028. So that's why I would expect the pressure to ratchet up because Milei will be thinking to himself, "I have got to act really in the next 12 months because I'm also having to think about re-election, and I want to stop this project," because no Argentine president wants to be the one that witnesses oil coming out of the North Falklands basin.

  Richard McColl: Now, they they've enacted or initiated sanctions against 60, I think, people involved in the Sea Lion project. And I've been reading about international suppliers and sh- and shipping companies refusing to supply the islands for fear of angering Argentina. then it seems that this is only likely, especially like what or as what you last referred to, is only likely to increase, especially in these, pivotal 12 months.

  Professor Klaus Dodds: Absolutely. The way to think about this is like a dragnet. So what President Milei has done is to say, "Look I'm signaling to shareholders, directors suppliers, anybody who has any connection to this project that in essence you're you- you're fair game." So the sanction proceedings have been expanded.

  There is scope, I think, to further expand civil and criminal liabilities that I think the Argentine parliament is going to or Congress is going to consider. So I th- I, what I think Milei is signaling, and it's not subtle, is, I'm gonna come after every entity or individual that I think may in some way or another, direct or indirect, be complicitous with the Sea Lion project."

  And I think that seems to be the direction of travel. And again, it comes back to my fundamental point that no Argentine president wants to be seen to be tolerating-

  Richard McColl: Yeah...

  Professor Klaus Dodds: oil and gas being extracted from the waters around the Falkland Islands or the Islands as we've called it earlier, because that has always been seen as an absolute red line that Argentina cannot be seen to be tolerating.

  And I think to be perfectly honest, so much of this has been emboldened and made easier by that relationship with President Trump, and it's not just that person-to-person element of it. It's precisely because Argentina has seen the way President Trump has appeared to treat, or at the very least speak to- Yeah

  allies that hitherto they would have considered to be almost untouchable in the sense of being treated in ways that look and feel at times just a little bit contemptuous, to be perfectly honest.

  Richard McColl: Yeah, I was gonna suggest untouchable. And what of this what of this letter sent to Interpol's headquarters as well, this Red Notice request from Argentina for the arrest of individuals including British nationals regarding investment and so on in the islands and their economy?

  Professor Klaus Dodds: Again, I think what it tells you is that every lever possible- Absolutely... is potentially going to be pulled. And it's really interesting, that of course, Britain has said this really should be ignored because from their point of view, there isn't a case to answer here.

  But I think the whole point about this is President Milei is making it clear to the islands, to the United Kingdom, to anybody else that I'm not going to be a passive observer, and I'm going to look at every possible lever, as I say, I can pull. And if it means sending a notice to Interpol in Lyon in France to say there's a case to answer here, I'm going to do so.

  And again, I just keep coming back to that point that I won't tire of making. What does this do? It forces the United Kingdom on the defensive. It means that diplomatic, political, time-based resource has to be devoted to fending off another initiative. And so the idea therefore is to exhaust the United Kingdom.

  It's to say that this is the new reality. We're done being nice to you. We're done being acquiescent. We're gonna, we're gonna, we're gonna raise the temperature. We're going to impose those costs on you because in the end, we're gonna test your resolve because we've seen that when you're tested, you're prepared to do a deal potentially on British Indian Ocean Territory, and if you're prepared to do a deal there, might you be prepared to do a deal in the Southwest Atlantic?

  And that I think is the kind of genuinely the geopolitical logic, if you will-

  Richard McColl: It'...

  Professor Klaus Dodds: that's driving some of this.

  Richard McColl: It's throw everything at it and as a, and exhaust the United Kingdom. I can see it entirely that. So if I want to summarize a lot of what we've said in this past few minutes, Argentina can deny permits and benefits and sanction those under its jurisdiction but cannot exercise coercive authority in this archipelago or another state without some, an independent legal basis or that cor- country's cooperation.

  So it's, for companies investing or or, using the region It's, it could be reputational and commercial damage to companies and so on. I just see it keep-- we keep coming back in this cycle of issues and legal terms and who has the titles and what resolutions can or cannot establish Argentine or for the islands themselves, Falkland licenses.

  It'- So what I'm getting at here Klaus is what kind of predictions can you lay down here October 2026, going into the next 12 months?

  Professor Klaus Dodds: So I think in the next 12 months it's going to be, candidly choppy. And I think we've got a number of things that from the UK's point of view, they're gonna have to really think about.

  So one of the things that the UK will have to think about, and this will be in Prime Minister Andy Burnham and Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband's in-tray, is to think about are there legislative and diplomatic measures that they can use to shield and protect businesses and individuals from what will look and feel like Argentine economic and jurisdictional coercion.

  So I think that's number one. So what's that package look like as a sort of countervailing measure to protect and to reassure that the UK is confident that the islands remain an overseas territory, it rejects Argentine overreach, and by the way, here's a measure or set of measures, sorry, that should offer that reassurance.

  I think secondly the United Kingdom will want to work very closely, particularly with the United States wherever possible, to make sure that however challenging the relationship is with President Trump doesn't do something that ends up being deeply unhelpful. And one of the things that I think the UK will be very mindful of is President Trump doesn't say something along the lines of, "Argentina's got a legitimate claim.

  Britain, you need to negotiate seriously." You don't want that. And so that's, that will be on London to make sure that even if the relationship doesn't feel quite as special with the United States anymore, it doesn't go poisonous. So that's number two. Number three, in the United Kingdom, there's gonna have to be a, I guess a question asked about military posture.

  Are we, i.e. we in London, the UK, content that the military posture currently based in and around Mount Pleasant Air Base is sufficiently robust to deter any misguided opportunistic action, whatever form that might take? And we, i.e. in London, the UK, will need to have that candid conversation at a time, as I said right at the start, we've got a strategic environment in the North Atlantic, the Arctic, that is quite reasonably taking up a lot of our time, and we shouldn't forget the war in Ukraine is in its fifth year, and we still haven't got a settlement for that either.

  So th- so there's gonna be I think in the next 12 months, some really important reflection about what does that deterrent, what does that military posture look like? Is it right? Is it appropriate? Does it change, for example, if the US and Argentina upscale their military collaboration? What do we feel, for example, if the US and Argentina conduct large scale military drills or exercises in the Southwest Atlantic?

  How does that change the kind of geopolitical configuration? And the final thing I will say is, whatever happens in terms of the next 12 months, the UK's relationship with Chile and Arg- sorry, Uruguay, beg your pardon, absolutely integral to the UK and the Falkland Islands communities/governments.

  What, in international relations we would call ontological security. In other words, if you want to feel safe, make sure that relationship with near neighbors, it feels secure. Otherwise, it -- you will look and feel very isolated

  Richard McColl: Wow. Do you think Prime Minister b- Andy Burnham is up to this challenge with Ed Miliband under his

  Professor Klaus Dodds: I th- I think one of the things we've learnt from 1982 onwards in the United Kingdom is the islands are an extraordinary dot on the map, and every prime minister, whether Labour, Conservative, part of a coalition government, has somehow found the resolve necessary to manage that relationship.

  I don't think it will change, and whether Prime Minister Burnham is in power or some other prime minister, I think you shouldn't underestimate, and people often do outside the United Kingdom, the extraordinary power of 1982, and you only have to remind people that 255 British service personnel died defending those islands or reclaiming those islands, you might say.

  And I think, whether a prime minister likes it or not, there is a weight of expectation that you don't buckle. And for now, thankfully, we have football matches to act as proxies for at least English-Argentine rivalry. But I think it's... I think whatever the costs are, I think Prime Minister Burnham, Foreign Secretary Miliband would just have to be very mindful that those costs are likely to increase in the next 12 months.

  Richard McColl: There's all to play for. Thank you so much for such an in-depth look at this geopolitical, for want of a better word, minefield in the South Atlantic that I do believe will remain on or very close to the front pages for the coming months. Certainly we know in Argentina, of course, but certainly in the United Kingdom as well.

  I've been talking to Professor Klaus Dodds professor of geopolitics at Middlesex University in London and senior research fellow at the RAND Europe. Of course, an expert on all things polar. It has been an absolute pleasure discussing this with you, and thank you for your time and for sharing such knowledge.

  Professor Klaus Dodds: thank you for the conversation.

  Richard McColl: I've been Richard McColl here for The LatinNews Podcast here in Bogotá, Colombia. We'll be back in two weeks' time discussing further issues from the region. Of course, you can always subscribe on Spotify, iTunes, YouTube, or wherever you choose to get your podcasts. Thank you for listening, and be sure to tune in two weeks' time.

  Bye-bye.