Weakening the BWC may have long term fallout
December will see the seventh Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). The decisions made at the meeting will help to shape the future of the regulation of the ownership and handling of deadly pathogens, and may also have a knock-on effect to other frameworks. But reluctance to commit to deeper discussions could weaken the initiative, just as the increasing pace of development in the life sciences demands it be strengthened.
We are not referring to the oft-maligned lack of verification protocols, but rather the threats that could be created as an unlooked-for consequence of scrapping the intercessional process. It has often been suggested that a robust verification protocol would be the ultimate confidence-building-measure (CBM), but we believe that if it is ever put in place it will be as a consequence of CBMs – an end rather than a means. Besides, there is unlikely to be a change on that front for a very long time; the debate on the subject was effectively ended in 2001 when White House officials abruptly withdrew from almost seven years of negotiations aimed at creating an inspections protocol. The Bush administration decided that such a system would prove ineffective at increasing confidence in adherence to the international agreement, and would be financially burdensome to the US. The Obama administration kept the same position when it announced its approach to the Convention in 2009.
Poignant breaking news As this article was being written, news broke that in South Africa a truck transporting polio samples was hijacked, and the samples stolen. The official line is that the material was only stool samples and therefore does not constitute a biohazard, and cannot be used maliciously. But privately, experts have questioned the assertion that the material was only stool samples, and suggest that it could indeed present a threat. It seems unlikely that this particular incident will have lethal consequences, but South Africa’s handling protocols for dangerous pathogens are not known to be particularly weaker than in other countries, and indeed may be stronger than in many developing nations.
Progress
The BWC has a review conference every five years, but it was recognised that the
pace of scientific development is now so fast that only meeting as infrequently
as twice a decade could mean the Convention would be unable to evolve fast
enough to keep pace. So an intercessional process was proposed, the aim of which
was to allow limited meetings to take place in between the main conferences
which would help to boost the rate of development of the Convention.
Next December’s conference chairman, Paul van den Ijssel, noted, “I think there is no other field of science and technology which is growing so fast as the area of life sciences, which is directly related to the Convention.” The question he wants the delegates to address at this year’s meeting is “What does the immense progress, especially in the field of life sciences, mean for the Convention and the entire framework of the Convention?”
After the sixth review conference in 2006 the United Nations in Geneva began a system of hosting two Convention meetings each year (summer and winter), on a trial basis, which focused on different topics ranging from natural disease outbreaks to the prevention of bioterrorism. 2010 saw the final set of intercessional meetings of the trial process.
In the summer sessions experts met to give and hear presentations related to a particular topic. In the winter conference representatives from member states evaluated the conclusions of the summer meeting and passed along recommendations, or ‘common understandings’, for the next review conference.
Progress and decisions are essential at this year’s conference. An Implementation Support Unit (ISU) was set up, comprising three people and headquartered at the UN’s Disarmament Affairs Office in Geneva, to provide administrative support to the intercessional meetings as well as implementation of the pact itself; the mandate that established the ISU will expire with this year’s review conference. If the intercessional process is discontinued then the ISU may not have its mandate renewed, and if that happens then what little enforcement of the Convention is currently possible may fall by the wayside.
Van den Ijssel, staunchly committed to keeping the ISU, argues that the unit is “the spine of the treaty,” because it disseminates knowledge to member states and has helped them prepare for the annual meetings and the upcoming review conference. “It would be unwise to stop having an ISU,” the Dutch diplomat said. He pointed out that some countries believe the office should be expanded in the future rather than scrapped, and should have more personnel.
In the past the US has been the biggest obstacle to the continuation of both the ISU and the intercessional process; in the case of the ISU citing an understandable objection to creating a new international bureaucracy. However, there are hints that the Obama administration could soften its stance on the subject at December’s conference. With the intercessional process, concerns have been raised that the effectiveness of the trial process has been limited by some states’ insistence (including the US) that the annual meetings serve only to facilitate exchanges of information and best practices between BWC member states.
Enforcement
Although the BWC doesn’t have a verification protocol, as a CBM the member
nations are required to make certain declarations. The forms for the
declarations, originally prepared in 1986 and last updated in 1991, disclose
data on a range of subjects including infectious diseases outbreaks and similar
occurrences caused by toxins, and information on vaccine production facilities.
However, the requirement to make these declarations is only ‘politically binding’ and not legally binding, and as such there are large gaps in the information available to the Convention. According to the ISU’s website, in 2010 only 72 of the Convention’s 163 members submitted an annual report. Of those 72 documents, only 15 are accessible online and, in the case of the United States, the report is a public version of a classified submission.
Van den Ijssel acknowledges that participation could be better. “It is very appropriate to examine the CBMs with a critical eye and look at a number of things. First of all, is this really helping to create confidence? Is this not overly burdensome? If you ask for a lot of information, but don’t do anything with it, then why do you need the information in the first place?”
Concerns have been noted that some nations, the US included, have greatly expanded their biological defence programmes since the September 11th terrorist attacks, raising concerns that some countries could conceal offensive biological weapon development behind their defensive efforts (or may already be doing so).
Stagnation
The biggest threat to the BWC at this point is inactivity. Inactivity would be
demonstrated most clearly by an unwillingness to engage; especially if it is
from a ‘leader’ nation such as the USA. Developing nations seeking to engage
with other countries on the world stage on subjects such as biosecurity need to
be encouraged, and CBMs are vital. Critics of the intercessional process may
point to a perceived lack of tangible progress from the meetings since 2006, and
their observations may not be without veracity. But what is harder to quantify,
yet still extremely important, is that the annual meetings function as a CBM.
States’ parties can become used to the interaction on potentially sensitive
subjects, which is critical if the Convention is to play a useful role. If five
meetings are required for a nation to fully engage to the point that progress
can be made, it is better that it happens over five years and not 25 years.
Increased engagement, however, could see the Convention changing rapidly, and
possibly drastically, over the next decade. That change in itself could give
first world countries pause for thought. But the BWC will always be shaped by
the countries that are engaging with it the most, so as more nations seek to
increase their influence on the world stage the Convention will change to
reflect this. The format of the meetings may need to be experimented with
further, but reducing the level of international engagement as the rate of
development in the life sciences increases seems unwise.
Points to watch
* Expect to see opinion pieces appearing in journals and
magazines in the run up to the December conference setting out different sides
of the arguments.
* If the intercession process is discontinued expect to see developing countries questioning the usefulness of the intiative.
* If the intercession process is retained, expect to see the format of the various meetings, and potentially the structure of the Convention itself, changing rapidly over the next decade.