Climate change - understanding security challenges
There has long been speculation about the degree to which climatic variation affects security and conflict. Now, there is a growing body of evidence that demonstrates where these links, and there are links, lie. It is now possible to map variations in climate and identify these fluctuations alongside the outbreak of violence.
It would, of course, be entirely wrong to attribute the outbreak of conflict to climatic variation. But the causes of tension and the reasons for the timing of the breakdown in security can be thought of, to some extent, as separate issues. If a population has been repressed by a brutal regime for years, even decades, why did they rise up against their rulers at a particular time? Why not five years earlier, or five years later?
Climate change may not be the sole answer to these questions, but an increasing amount of highly credible research that shows it has a strong influence.
It is already well recognised within the security community that climate change presents significant risks to the delivery of national, regional and global security goals. Sea level rise, shortages of food and water, and severe weather events are predicted to have significant impacts on all countries, and seriously affect their social stability and economic security.
There are, as always, caveats that must be placed on the conclusions of the research. There is an inherent danger in extrapolating future events from past occurrences, especially in a field as complex and nuanced as security. Furthermore, any research that makes sweeping generalisations in its conclusions should immediately be treated with suspicion. Security is a highly politicised subject; statements and reports released to highlight a rhetorical point do not always leave room for subtle distinctions.
It is critical, when looking at these issues, to recognise exactly what the researchers are studying, and there for what situation their conclusions can be applied to. A study looking at the effect of local weather patterns on inter-tribal conflict in a small region in sub-Saharan Africa cannot be used to predict social conditions in a prolonged heat-wave over a much larger area. Still less can it be used to predict when violent uprisings will occur in a different part of the world; each situation has its own subtleties. Research such as, for example, the 2009 study by Burke et al, which concluded that the probability of armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa was about 50% higher than normal in some unusually warm years since 1981, cannot be used as a model for events in East Asia.
The research that has been done looking specifically at climatic variations’ effects on the security situation can broadly be categorised as: those studies that look patterns associated with long-term climate fluctuations; studies into the effect of short climate an weather cycles; and those that look at events over a small area where regional weather fluctuations may be quite different from the predominant trends in the environment overall.
There is not sufficient room in this article to discuss all the research, but studies which provide the most food for thought are those looking at patterns of violence where they align with well recognised cycles in weather patterns.
- “There is little scientific dispute that if we do nothing, we will face more drought, more famine, more mass displacement – all of which will fuel more conflict for decades”. President Obama, from his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech.
El Niño
In their article Civil conflicts are associated with the global climate, Solomon M. Hsiang et al discuss the identifiable effect of El Niño/La Niña Southern Oscillation (ENSO) on conflicts in countries severely affected by the phenomenon and have reached some astounding conclusions.
With previous research, such as Burkes et al’s study (see page 6), some critics have highlighted statistical problems, such as the fact that linking possibly random local temperature and rainfall variations with outbreaks of civil war may create a false appearance of causality.
To obviate this problem Hsiang et al studied the relationship between conflict and the changes in the global rather than local climate.
They looked at regions strongly affected by the ENSO (the tropical parts of South America, Africa and the Asia Pacific region, including parts of Australia), and regions only weakly affected by it. They then searched for a link between climate and armed conflicts that arose in the first group between 1950 and 2004.
The results from this study were astonishing. The researchers concluded that the risk of annual civil conflict doubles, from 3% to 6%, in countries of the ENSO-affected group during El Niño years relative to La Niña years.
“Using data from 1950 to 2004, we show that the probability of new civil conflicts arising throughout the tropics doubles during El Niño years relative to La Niña years,” writes Hsiang. “This result, which indicates that ENSO may have had a role in 21% of all civil conflicts since 1950, is the first demonstration that the stability of modern societies relates strongly to the global climate.”
The researchers are keen to point out, however, that El Niño was not the root cause of the conflicts. Rather, that it was violence that might well have broken out anyway, but that it occurred earlier owing to the effects of the change in climate.
Trouble ahead?
Taking this research at face value, and so far there has been no other research to contradict it, it could indicate some troubling times ahead. The Venezuelan situation, for example, could be an interesting one to watch. President Hugo Chávez is gravely ill, with presidential elections due in the autumn. The exact nature of his illness is unclear, but there have been rumours about the extent of his cancer. Due to the Venezuelan government’s refusal to comment none of it can be confirmed, but the one constant to all the rumours and leaks is that the president is indeed gravely ill, and has a poor prognosis. External analysts are rapidly drawing up risk scenarios. Chávez has not nominated a successor and plans to stand for re-election himself despite his declining health. The fear is that if dies suddenly the military could step in with the likely declared aim of ‘maintaining stability’. Even if Chávez does decide to put forward a preferred heir, at this late stage they are unlikely to have time to bed-in. Chávez rules very much by force of personality, and there is little chance that the next president would be able achieve the same domination as his predecessor.
El Niño develops in Latin America approximately every five years. The intensity varies from peak to peak with no way to predict when a significant ENSO event will occur. The last event began in 2007 and peaked in 2008, so the next one is due this year or next year. Should the security situation in Venezuela deteriorate, Hsiang’s research suggests that the climatic conditions could well be at their most influential in terms of encouraging the outbreak of conflict.
Evidence base
Research into climatology and how weather patterns on a local, regional and global scale affect other fields such as security is in its infancy. As our understanding of these complex relationships improves it will be possible to include such factors in risk assessments and conflict resolution plans at all levels, from individual countries’ national security strategies to multinational UN interventions.
The January 2012 report Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict: Addressing complex crisis scenarios in the 21st Century from the Center for American Progress begins by noting: “The costs and consequences of climate change on our world will define the 21st century.” Increasingly, all situations, particularly those involving complex security issues, will have to be viewed through the prism of the effects of climate fluctuation. In some circumstances it could be useful to monitor a situation more closely when it coincides with a set of climatic conditions that would indicate an increased risk of a deteriorating security environment.
Alternatively, as suggested by the Center for American Progress report, prolonged adverse weather conditions leading to, say, drought and famine, or rising sea levels, could cause mass migrations. As the report notes, there are increasing numbers of examples where the impact of local or regional climate change is placing major stress on weak or conflict-prone states with potentially disastrous results.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London stated in a 2011 report to the European Commission (EC), The IISS Transatlantic Dialogue on Climate and Security, that “in areas with weak or brittle states, climate change will increase the risks of resource shortages, mass migrations and civil conflict.”
The most important point to recognise is there is a growing understanding that issues such as climate change can have a substantial effect on security. Some of these effects will be obvious; it is intuitively correct, for example, that a mass migration of hundreds of thousands of people into a neighbouring area due to drought, creating a significant strain on already scarce resources in the receiving region will be a driver for unrest. But the more subtle effects, such as those from cyclical fluctuations such as ENSO, are not necessarily as intuitive, and there is a risk their level of influence will be under-represented in risk assessments.
It is inevitable that some will seek to discount issues such as these on the grounds that they ‘muddy the water’, and distract people from the actual security situation. New fields of understanding, such as climatology, must be allowed to take their place among the other risk factors that are used for constructing policy and risk strategies, along with the intrinsic subtleties of the science. The penalties for underestimating their influence could be severe, and global in reach.