Legitimising criminality: Mexico’s cartels
The Mexican drug cartels are still recognised by the public, particularly in the US, as organised crime groups. If people have thought about it at all, few are likely to have questioned whether or not they qualify as terrorist organisations rather than crime groups. But the evolving tactics of the groups, and more importantly the evolving strategy of the authorities, make this an increasingly important question.
Who are the Cartels?
Mexican cartels, in this article (and for the purposes of most discussions of the collective organisations), are the six main drug trafficking groups operating in Mexico. These are: the Arellano Félix Organisation; the Beltrán Levya Organisation; the Gulf Cartel; Los Zetas (formerly the protection wing of the Gulf Cartel); La Familia Michoacán / Knights Templar; and the Sinaloa Cartel.
The cartels are mostly non-ideological organisations whose aims are purely business oriented; the principal business being the trade in illegal drugs.
- The term ‘cartel’, once widely used in Latin America, has largely been replaced by ‘Drug Trafficking Organisation’ (DTO). Strictly, a drug cartel is an organisation that controls every single step of the business from initial production through to the final point of sale, and the laundering of the proceeds, and very few groups now control all stages of the enterprise. Even though it is not completely accurate, ‘cartel’ is still commonly used to refer to Mexican groups, largely because it is the term they use for themselves.
Combating these groups can be thought of in terms of the traditional three tier strategic, operational and tactical approach. Strategically, the aim is to protect the public by preventing the cartels from operating. Operationally, the aims have been to stop the flow of drugs (and precursors) and firearms from flowing in and out of Mexico. Tactically, there are myriad options available, and this arsenal of countermeasures can be increased through intelligent manipulation of definitions.
Choosing to categorize a group challenging the peaceful workings of a state as a criminal or terrorist is not as clear cut as it may seem, as a group is unlikely ever to be wholly one or the other. A criminal organisation may sometimes use terrorist tactics, that is to say deliberately creating a sense of fear, and a terrorist group may need to use more stereotypically criminal tactics such as drugs trafficking or money laundering to generate funds.
Besides which, there are many similarities in how the authorities view the threats from terrorism and organised crime, particularly transnational organised crime. As Forest observed in the journal Terrorism and Political Violence earlier this year, effective strategies for combating both kinds of organisation require an integration of a nation’s tools, including: the application of diplomatic pressure; the use of intelligence apparatus; the use of the military; application of financial and economic pressure and sanctions; and the use of legal measures.
The crossovers are clear to see by comparing the US’ National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organised Crime and the National Strategy for Counterterrorism. Also, groups do not operate in isolation. Vera Eccarius-Kelly has discussed the fluid interactions between terrorist groups and criminal networks, and the sharing of knowledge about, and even resources for, smuggling, money laundering, forgery and covert communication.
Given the makeup of some of the cartels, particularly Los Zetas, it is hardly surprising that the line between criminality and terrorism is blurred. Los Zetas splintered off from the Gulf Cartel, for whom they were the protection arm. The reason they are so effective is that they largely comprise former Mexican special forces soldiers, lured away from the military by the perks on offer in organised crime. Their training and expertise is in military tactics and use of weaponry to best effect, useful skill-sets in the circumstances.
Definitional conundrum
How to construct a definition of terrorism is a problem that has challenged experts for a long time, and it has not yet been achieved. The origins of what we would recognise as terrorism are in the French Revolution, La Terreur, creating and using a sense of fear in the population as a whole to affect lasting political change. In the build-up to the Russian Revolution Vera Zasulich attempted to assassinate Colonel Trepov, Governor of St. Petersburg, but having shot him threw down her weapon rather than use it to kill anyone else or keep it to defend herself with; her explanation being that she was a terrorist not a murderer.
These examples contain some of the most commonly cited definitional elements of terrorism: the intentional generation of a sense of fear, even in segments of the population who have not (yet) fallen foul of violence themselves; political goals; ideology; fanaticism.
The attempts at definition really began in earnest after the 1972 Munich Olympic Games, when eight members of Black September killed eleven Israeli athletes and coaches and a police officer, with five of the terrorists being killed as well. Various United Nations (UN) agencies attempted to construct a definition that was useful for their purposes, but as yet no conclusive definition has been agreed upon.
Academics such as Schmid have tried to construct definitions on a consensus basis by analysing individual organisations’ definitions and attempting to identify common elements. But fundamentally, what different organisations have found is that a definition that is useful for one purpose is only of real use for that purpose.
For the purposes of front-line law-enforcement a criminal justice model is of most practical use, as detonating a bomb is a crime regardless of motivation. In court and within intelligence organisations being able to label an individual as a terrorist gives the authorities additional powers.
A useful tactic
As Flanigan has noted, also in Terrorism and Political Violence, rebranding the violent activities of Mexican cartels as terrorism can be useful both legally and politically. In 2010 Mexican lawmakers approved legal reforms allowing them to classify the violent and extortionist acts of drug trafficking organisations as terrorism. In 2011 legislation was also introduced in the US Congress to classify the cartels named above as terrorist groups.
The changes in Mexico allow judges to give traffickers longer prison sentences. In the US the changes will give the US government powers to freeze assets, restrict suspects’ travel to a greater extent, and impose greater sanctions on people offering assistance to cartels.
In political and popular terms, ‘terrorist’ is a pejorative term. Many peoples’ perception of organised crime comes from fictional depictions like The Godfather; very different from reality. Labelling groups as terrorist organisations can demonise them in the eyes of a population otherwise largely indifferent to their existence.
Of course, two can play at that game. The Gulf Cartel, keen to generate popular support in Mexico, label rival cartels as terrorists.
A dangerous strategy
Labelling cartels as terrorists is not without its risks. Chief among these is that by referring to organisations that were previously thought of as criminal as terrorist, it elevates them in the eyes of the public and also of the organisations themselves to the level of a greater perceived threat. This risks boosting the confidence of the organisations and giving them the sense that momentum is with them, while state is seen to be on the back foot.
The consequence is that groups that may have shied away from terrorist tactics in the past could be pushed towards their use, thus justifying the elevated status as a more serious threat. Already it can be seen that in their structure and some of their tactics cartels are looking more and more like terrorist groups shaped in the 1980s and 1990s; violent groups, dominating a particular territory, engaging in criminality to dominate the region and fund their other activities. For a loose parallel one only need look at the groups operating in Afghanistan in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, dominating large territories through violence and using the opium trade to fund their activities.
The next step might be considered to be the injection of ideological political or religious rhetoric by the cartels, and it is disturbing to recognise it has already happened. La Familia are already using religious dogma to justify some of their most horrific acts of violence.
Strategies that seek to use terrorism definitions to combat cartels need to be managed very carefully, so that they allow authorities maximum scope to operate but without legitimising the target organisation. If the groups do find their cause becoming legitimised there is a risk they could become more fanatical, and this is far harder to counter than raw criminality.
Until now the cartels chiefly have been business oriented, with their violent acts focussed towards that end. Terrorists see themselves as the vanguard of a self appointed elite, and increasing fanaticism in a group can drive members further towards this perception. Individual and group identity is already an important factor within the cartels; by imbuing them with further characteristics more usually associate with recognised terrorist groups the Mexican and US states are gambling with a risky strategy, which could encourage cartel members to see their organisations in increasingly ideological terms.