Economic Review

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  • CHILE: How to manage expectations in Bachelet’s second term

    LatinNews 25 February 2014 Hits: 741

    The latest (11 February 2014) economic expectations survey published by the Banco Central de Chile (BCC – the central bank) was downbeat. Respondents are looking for an easing of policy this month: economic growth is slowing at a time that inflation is moderate. The overall environment is not germane for the education and tax reforms proposed by President-elect Michelle Bachelet, who will take office on 11 March.

    One of the key features of global financial markets in January was an (aggressive) tightening of monetary policy by a number of emerging market central banks in response to current account deficits, slumping currencies and deteriorating perceptions. This did not include the BCC. At its meeting on 16 January, the BCC kept its key policy rate unchanged at 4.50%.

    Moreover, the accompanying comments had a decidedly dovish tone. The BCC noted that “the Chilean economy has continued to lose strength. Domestic output and demand have grown somewhat less than assumed in the latest [December 2013] Monetary Policy Report, particularly in investment-related sectors. … Meanwhile inflation expectations remain around the target [of 3.00%] over the projection horizon and the pace of nominal wages’ growth shows a moderation in recent months.”

    The BCC’s latest survey of economic expectations, published on 11 February, found respondents in a similarly downbeat mood. They are now looking for real annual GDP growth of 3.8% and 4.3% in 2014 and 2015 respectively, having revised down their expectations over several months. The consensus expectation is that the central bank will cut the benchmark rate by 25 basis points to 4.25% at its February meeting. This is at a time that the central bank’s IMACEC index of economic activity slipped to 2.60 in February, down from 3.00 in January. The index has fallen consistently on a month-to-month basis since October 2013, when it stood at 4.40, and more generally since March 2013, when it stood at 5.40 (see chart 1).

    Table 1: Chile: Expectations - Selected Items - %
    Survey Month Policy rate, current month Policy rate, next month IMACEC, One Month Ago GDP Growth, 2014 GDP Growth, 2015 Dec 2014 Inflation
    Mar' 13 5.00 5.00 5.40 5.00 4.80 3.0
    Apr' 13 5.00 5.00 4.80 5.00 5.00 3.0
    May 13 5.00 5.00 4.80 4.80 5.00 3.0
    Jun' 13 5.00 4.75 4.50 4.70 4.75 3.0
    Jul' 13 5.00 5.00 4.00 4.50 4.70 3.0
    Aug' 13 5.00 4.75 4.30 4.50 4.50 3.0
    Sep' 13 5.00 5.00 4.10 4.50 4.50 3.0
    Oct' 13 5.00 5.00 4.40 4.40 4.50 3.0
    Nov' 13 4.75 4.50 4.00 4.10 4.50 2.7
    Dec' 13 4.50 4.25 3.50 4.00 4.40 2.8
    Jan' 14 4.50 4.25 3.00 4.00 4.30 3.0
    Feb' 14 4.25 4.25 2.60 3.80 4.30 3.0
    Source: Banco Central de Chile, Expectations Survey

    As the BCC itself recognised, both the reality and expectations about the strength of the economy have fallen short of the official forecasts in the last Monetary Policy Report. For some time, most of the main macro-economic indicators have been moving in the wrong direction. Thanks in part to a steady fall in the global price of copper, Chile’s main export, the balance of trade has been deteriorating, and at a time that domestic demand has also been softening (see chart 2).

    Table 2: Chile: Official Forecasts, December 2013

    2012 2013f 2014f
    (Annual change, %)
    GDP 5.6 4.2 3.75-4.75
    National Income 6.3 5.2 4.4
    Domestic Demand 7.1 3.9 4.8
    Investment (GFCF) 12.3 3.9 4.1
    Consumption 5.8 5.4 4.7
    Goods & Services Exports 1.0 5.3 3.1
    Goods & Services Imports 4.9 4.4 4.6

    (% of GDP)
    Current Account -3.5 -3.2 -3.7
    National Savings 21.4 21.1 20.6
    GFCF 24.1 24.4 24.3

    (Other)
    LME Copper Price (US cents/lb) 361 332 310
    December CPI Inflation (%) 1.5 2.6 2.5
    Source: Banco Central de Chile, Monetary Policy Report - December 2013

    As we discussed in the December 2013 edition of Latin American Economy & Business, President-elect Michelle Bachelet has identified three main priorities for her incoming administration. One is a hike in the corporate tax rate from 20% to 25%. A second is wholesale education reform: this includes the introduction of free university education, even though this is rare (or non-existent) in most other countries. Bachelet believes that the increase in the corporate tax rate could boost government revenues by about US$8.2bn annually (in the context of a country whose 2012 GDP amounted to US$268.2bn) and fund her planned education reforms. The third priority is constitutional reform.

    A slowing economy and higher taxes are not the only challenges facing Chile’s corporate sector. A wave of industrial unrest in the public sector (especially) in the final quarter of 2013 means that employers are having to sustain real increases in pay costs that are not necessarily being matched by higher productivity. In any event, labour productivity in Chile is lower than in any other country in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), apart from Mexico. Low labour productivity is one consequence of the deficiencies of Chile’s educational system. According to the World Economic Forum’s 2013-14 Global Competitiveness Report, Chile is the 34th most competitive country (out of 148 rated): however, it is in 74th place for the overall quality of its education system.

    The demands of Chile’s students, which Bachelet hopes to meet with her education reforms, and the demands of workers, which have been partially met with pay rises, are symptomatic of a key structural problem: the inequality of income in the country. With a Gini Index* of 0.52, the distribution of income in Chile is less equal than in any other OECD country. (*The Gini Index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution, with 0 representing perfect equality and 1 representing perfect inequality). Meanwhile, expectations have been boosted by the steady economic growth – the result of years of good governance and, prior to 2013, high or rising copper prices.

    For now, there is a policy-making hiatus until the new administration is inaugurated on 11 March. Thereafter, Bachelet will have to try to fulfil the expectations of workers and (especially) students at a time that the economy is clearly weaker than it was on 15 December, when she won the second round presidential run-off vote in a landslide. One challenge for the new government arises from the fact that it will likely take years for new education reforms to be seen to be beneficial. Another arises from the possibility that higher corporate tax rates may have an adverse impact on jobs. As of December 2013, the official unemployment rate was 5.70%, on BCC data.

    One possibility is that Bachelet attempts to buy time with a fiscal boost to the economy. The budget is broadly in balance. Total government debt, at about US$34bn, is low and is held overwhelmingly by domestic investors. As noted above, inflationary pressures (and expectations) are low. An increase in public sector consumption or investment would underpin overall economic growth until Chile begins to derive benefit from the clear recovery in the US and other developed economies. It could well be that economic conditions in Chile are much more conducive to the reforms that Bachelet envisages towards the end of her four year term. In the meantime, she will have to work assiduously to manage the (high) expectations of various sectors.

    • Copper, peso

    Copper was trading at US$3.25/lb. on 13 February, compared to just over US$3.7/lb. a year ago. The Chilean peso was trading at about CHP546.75/US$ on 17 February, from CHP525.43/US$ on 31 December 2013.

  • BRAZIL: World Cup 2014: are the worries justified?

    LatinNews 25 February 2014 Hits: 1639

    With the Fifa 2014 World Cup now just four months away (kick-off is on 12 June), in business and political terms it is still not clear if the event will be a ‘net positive’ or a ‘net negative’ for the administration led by President Dilma Rousseff. Here we look at some of the arguments raging around the rights and wrongs of hosting one of the world’s top sporting events for a month.

    The World Cup is about lots of things including money, television rights and football: but for the government led by Dilma Rousseff perhaps one single issue stands out above all others: it is about Brazil’s image on the global stage. Ever since the country won the right to host the 2014 World Cup back in 2007 – seven years ago – it has been clear that the whole event has been envisaged as an opportunity to put the country on the map, both as an emerging economic power and as a key business, investment and tourism destination. The decision to distribute the competition between 12 stadiums in 12 separate cities was part of this approach, to give visitors and the TV cameras a taste of the diversity of Brazil’s vast geography and different cultures.

    Measured purely in terms of global marketing impact, to date the World Cup has had mixed results, at best, for the government in Brasília. The key negative was the outbreak of major anti-government protests in June 2013, with complaints about the World Cup spend featuring large. These protests have continued at reduced intensity since then, but with general elections due on the heels of the World Cup (in early October), things are starting to rumble again.

    The diverse protest movement has made a point of contrasting the government’s big spend on building World Cup stadiums and other facilities (which are meant also for the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro) with its poor performance in delivering health, education and public transport services. This is a message that has been widely broadcast and it has dominated international press coverage of the run-up to the competition.

    It is not unusual for major sporting events to be preceded by bad publicity (there were riots in London a year before the 2012 Olympics; the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics were also preceded by criticism of Vladimir Putin’s Russia over corruption and human rights issues). It is still possible that a dazzling and successful football championship will figuratively wipe the slate clean, more than offsetting the earlier bad press and making the whole enterprise worthwhile for Dilma Rousseff’s administration. But it remains to be seen whether that will actually happen.

    For one, the organisation and planning of the event has prompted serious questions. Andrew Zimbalist, an economics professor at Smith College in the US, has noted that “the obstacles are severe: they include labour shortages, bureaucratic encumbrances, political corruption, legal entrapments, insufficient funds, incompetence and inadequate infrastructure.”

    Fifa, the world football federation, required all stadium construction work to be completed by the end of 2013: only six of the 12 stadiums were in fact ready by that date, and the organisers are still scrambling to finish the work. Curitiba’s Arena da Baixada stadium was a source of particular concern, and risks being dropped from the competition entirely. There was also a dispute over the funding of temporary facilities at the Beira-Rio stadium in Porto Alegre. Following a number of fatal accidents on stadium construction sites (particularly in Manaus), there has also been criticism of health and safety standards. Fifa’s president, Sepp Blatter, went on record earlier this year as saying: “No country has been so far behind in preparation since I have been at Fifa”.

    There are also severe delays in construction projects for roads, airports and hotels. According to government report in November 2013, 22% of 148 World Cup-related energy projects were running behind schedule; there are still worries about the national grid’s capacity to handle a surge in electricity demand during the competition. Given the protests and concerns over security, the government has created a new 10,000-strong special riot police squad.

    It has become evident that an intended by-product of World Cup preparations – an improvement in public transport and airport infrastructure – has suffered serious delays. Some projects planned for 2014 will now only be ready for the Rio Olympics in 2016. New metro lines in Salvador and São Paulo, airport upgrades in Salvador and Natal, and tramways in Brasília and Cuiabá, all face potential delays. The proposed bullet train service linking Rio and São Paulo has effectively been shelved and will not be ready for 2016. Inevitably, costs have escalated. A total of BRL25.6bn (US$10.6bn) has been earmarked for the World Cup – intended as a combination of public and private investment. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the government’s share of that total is rising (to around 80%, according to some estimates), and there are serious cost overruns in the works.

    Some members of the business community already consider the World Cup an expensive distraction in a difficult year. A joke 2014 calendar circulating on social media sites suggests that because of summer holidays in January-February, a late Carnival (due in March this year), public holidays in April, the World Cup in June and July, the general elections in October and summer holidays starting again in December, there will only be around three months’ worth of work done in Brazil this year (August, September, and November).

    However, to put things in context, it is worth remembering the importance of football as a national sport in Brazil, along with the view taken by many that the successful 2010 World Cup in South Africa did indeed attract more tourism and investment to that country. In a Datafolha survey published in October 2013 63% of Brazilians supported the World Cup, significantly ahead of President Rousseff’s approval rating of 41% at that time.

    And while Rousseff’s image has suffered as a result of controversies over the handling of the World Cup, she remains the front-runner in the presidential race. David Sonter, head of the Brazil group at international lawyers Freshfields, Bruckhaus and Deringer, is optimistic: “If Brazil does win the World Cup, the resulting energy and enthusiasm will mean 2015 will be a cracking year for business.”

    • Banco do Brasil

    In spite of a poor final quarter, the state-owned Banco do Brasil, the country’s largest lender, reported a record net profit of R$15.75bn (US$6.5bn) in 2013, up 29.5% higher on 2012 (and just above Itaú’s R$15.69bn profit for the year). The bank’s results mean that its profits for last year are the highest ever recorded by a Brazilian bank. In December 2013 Banco do Brasil’s volume of assets reached R$1.30bn (US$536m); an annual growth rate of 13.5% and up 3.5% on the previous quarter, thanks mainly to the expansion of its loan book. The bank’s loan portfolio reached R$692m in late December, an annual increase of 19.3%. The strongest growth area was in property. The bank’s default rate, which measures the percentage of debts payable over three months in arrears, fell from 2.06% at the end of 2012 to 1.98% in December. Banco do Brasil is controlled by the government, but some of its shares are traded on the São Paulo stock exchange.

  • BRAZIL: The spectre of recession?

    LatinNews 25 February 2014 Hits: 1065

    Retail sales fell in December for the first time in nine months, resulting in a full year result of 4.3%, the weakest in a decade (in 2003 the sector rose 3.67%) according to latest data from the national statistics institute (Ibge). Sales unexpectedly fell 0.2% month-on-month (in volume terms) ahead of the Christmas season, though they were still up 4.0% in volume terms over the previous December. The IBC-Br economic activity index compiled by the central bank also fell sharply in December, raising the possibility that Brazil was in recession in late 2013.

    Brazilians have lost their lust for shopping amid slowing job growth, rising interest rates and the impact of higher inflation on their take-home pay. Consumer confidence in January fell to its weakest level since mid-2009, according to the main ICC index compiled by the Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV). The FGV polls 2,000 families in the seven main cities for the ICC, which measures the willingness of families to make purchases of a basket of consumer goods and gauges expectations about employment, income and economic opportunities. The index ranges from 1-200, with 100 considered an indicator of neutral sentiment. It ended January 2014 at 108.9 points, down from 112.5 in December. That was the lowest since June 2009, when it dipped to 108.7 points in the midst of the global economic crisis. A wider Ibge retail sales index including the automotive and construction sectors fell 1.5% month-on-month in December after car sales dropped sharply (3.4%). That index rose 3.6% overall in 2013.

    Critics of the government of President Dilma Rousseff say that its policy focus on tax breaks aimed at stimulating consumption have run out of mileage. The government argues that these polices were only ever intended as temporary measures to prop up growth during the crisis and that its new focus is on investment-promotion polices so as to facilitate private sector-led domestic economic output over the medium term.

    The IBC-Br economic activity index fell 1.35% in December over November, in seasonally adjusted terms. The IBC-Br, a GDP proxy, rose 2.57% in calendar 2013 as a whole, however, it fell for two straight quarters in the third and fourth quarters (-0.21% and -0.17% respectively), which amounts to a technical recession. The broader official GDP data compiled by the national statistics institute (Ibge) is due out on 27 February. Real GDP contracted 0.5% in the third quarter of 2013, on the Ibge measure.

    Primary surplus target cut to measure

    On 20 February Brazil’s treasury, led by the externally-discredited finance minister Guido Mantega, announced a cut in the official primary surplus target to 1.9% of GDP for 2014, from 2.3% previously. The government said it would freeze R$44bn (US$18.44bn) in public spending to meet the primary surplus target, up from R$38bn last year. “Our projections are attainable and realistic and conservative, so we should deliver this result in December," Mantega stated at a press conference. The latest projection is based on real GDP growth of 2.5% year-on-year in 2014 (down from a previous forecast of 3.8%), with inflation of 5.3% (down from 5.8% previously).

    Markets welcomed the ‘reality check’ and the Real rose 1% in response to close the day at R$2.37/US$, its strongest level since 21 January. Yet fiscal analysts remain slightly sceptical as to whether the government will be able to deliver on its promise ahead of President Dilma Rousseff’s bid for re-election in October. Steadily shrinking primary surpluses mean that the overall budget deficit hit a three-year high of 3.2% of GDP in 2013, up from 2.48% in 2012.

    • Forecasts deteriorate

    The consensus forecast on real annual GDP growth in 2014 fell to 1.67% in the 21 February Focus Report compiled by the central bank, down from 1.91% four weeks previously. The end-year benchmark Selic rate was forecast at 11.25%, with year-end inflation of 6.0%. The current account deficit was forecast US$75bn.

  • MEXICO: Pepsi not put off by soft drinks tax

    LatinNews 25 February 2014 Hits: 1322

    Since 1 January 2014, soft drinks have become more expensive in Mexico. As part of fiscal reforms introduced by the government led by President Enrique Peña Nieto, and reflecting health concerns over the spread of diabetes in the country, a one-peso tax has been added to the retail price of soft drinks (equivalent to a duty of around 12%), while an 8% tax is being applied to high-calorie processed foods such as potato chips, chocolate and ice cream. Major bottling companies opposed the soft drinks tax, but this did not stop PepsiCo from announcing, at the end of January, a major new US$5.0bn investment programme in Mexico, which is expected to create 4,000 new jobs.

    PepsiCo likes Mexico, and it is not too hard to see why. The country has the highest per capita consumption of carbonated drinks in the world (last calculated at 163 litres per head per annum). Although PepsiCo’s traditional rival, Coca-Cola, has a giant 71% market share of the Mexican soft drink sector, PepsiCo’s smaller 14% is still an important source of sales. PepsiCo’s Frito Lay division also has a big share of the local snack market through brands such as Doritos, Cheetos and Sabritas.

    Sabritas has an 80% share of Mexico’s salty snack market. In fact, Mexico was the company’s number three source of global revenue in 2012, after the US and Russia. It generated US$4.0bn, or 6% of global PepsiCo sales.  The company’s Latin American Foods (LAF) division has outstripped all others in terms of annual growth rates.  Announcing the latest investment, Pedro Padierna, president of PepsiCo Mexico, stated: “Mexico is an important market for PepsiCo and we believe there is a tremendous opportunity for growth and expansion throughout the country. This investment reflects our confidence in Mexico’s future”.

    Company executives also said that they expect Mexico’s middle classes to expand, pushing up consumptions of soft drink and snacks. Significantly, the new investment will not just go into increased food and beverage production, but also into locally-based research and development, through, among other things, the creation of a ‘Global Baking Category Innovation Centre’ to be based in  Monterrey. In the end, the higher taxes do not seem to have been a big deterrent. According to Marisol Huerta, an analyst at Grupo Financiero Banorte SAB, PepsiCo still sees strong sales: “the consumer will feel it, but will most probably absorb it,” she concluded.

    Others have also seen the opportunity. Coca-Cola itself earlier announced a US$5.0bn investment programme, while the Switzerland-based Nestlé is investing US$1.0bn over the next five years to build new factories including an infant nutrition production plant at Ocotlán and a pet food plant in Silao.

  • PUERTO RICO: Old problems, new investors…

    LatinNews 25 February 2014 Hits: 1085

    The downgrading of Puerto Rico’s sovereign rating to below investment grade by the three major agencies merely confirms the perceptions of market investors. A financial crisis is not imminent, just as it wasn’t in October last year, when there was widespread comment in the mainstream media about the government’s financial problems. In essence, the government’s funding costs have risen – and it is increasingly being supported by High Yield, rather than US Municipal Bond investors. The main problem remains stagnation in an economy that has enjoyed only one year of growth since 2006.

    In the first half of February 2014 the three major ratings agencies – Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s Investor Service and Fitch Ratings – all downgraded the general obligations (GOs) of the government of Puerto Rico, and related securities, to below investment grade. In some cases, securities were downgraded by two notches.

    The box below summarises how the agencies explained their decisions. The financial position of the government of Puerto Rico has been deteriorating for some time, principally because of the general stagnation of the economy since 2006. The latest data in this respect is uninspiring: the Economic Activity Index (EAI) published by the Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico (GDB) fell by 1% month-on-month and 5.2% year-on year in December 2013. Further, the government has less access than previously to funding from the GDB. This is at a time that its ability to raise money by issuing bonds has been reduced – thanks in part to the assessments of the agencies themselves.

    Puerto Rico is an unincorporated US territory. Accordingly, the government and its agencies could readily sell bonds into the US$3.7trn US municipal bond market, not least because their interest payments were exempt from federal, state and local taxes. In mid-October 2013, there was widespread commentary about the government’s financial problems. This was partly because the GOs had fallen in price by around a fifth since the beginning of 2013, and were trading on yields normally associated with High Yield (i.e. sub-investment grade, or junk) bonds. This meant that they had grossly underperformed other municipal bonds. It was also because of the publicity surrounding the mid-July filing for Chapter 9 bankruptcy by the City of Detroit. For its part, the government published a comprehensive ‘Update on Fiscal and Economic Progress’ on 15 October.

    In the October 2013 edition of Latin American Economy & Business, we argued that a financial crisis was not, in fact, imminent. This was partly because the outstanding debt of the government and its agencies, which amounted to around US$70bn, was manageable in relation to public sector budgets of around US$29bn annually, if high relative to GDP of around US$100bn. It was partly because the government and its agencies did not have to access to capital markets for the remainder of the fiscal year to the end of June. In any event, the government could borrow from the GDB. At the time, the GDB had about US$2.8bn in liquid and high quality securities (e.g. US treasury bonds, agencies, and mortgage-backed securities). In theory, the GDB’s balance sheet could also have been boosted by the transfer of public sector deposits with private sector banks, and by other measures.

    As the agencies have indicated, there have been a number of positive developments in the recent past. The administration of Governor Alejandro García Padilla has undertaken necessary reforms of the pension systems for public servants and teachers (and in face of industrial action by the latter). The administration has increased the Sales and Use Tax (SUT) from 2.75% to 3.50%. As highlighted by S&P, the “administration [has] just announced an intention … to reduce the current year deficit and to introduce a balanced budget in April for fiscal 2015, which would be the first balanced budget in many years”. Crucially, the US economy has continued to strengthen.

    In the meantime, the fall in the price of the GOs (and other related bonds) through the first three quarters of 2013 indicates that investors, collectively, have made allowances for the risks and problems. On 12 February 2014, Fitch noted that, over the last seven months of 2013, single-state municipal bond mutual funds had reduced their average exposure to Puerto Rico securities from 4.7% to 1.5%. Municipal Bond funds investing across the US had cut their exposures from 2.0% to 0.8%. Fitch thinks that the municipal bond funds that had retained exposure to Puerto Rico securities had tended to reduce their exposure by selling bonds of COFINA – an agency of the GDB through which SUT revenues are channelled: this was because the COFINA bonds were more highly rated than the GOs and losses realised on sales would have been less.

    Fitch suggests that the enactment of the 2013 Puerto Rico Investment Company Act (PRICA) could result in further sales of GOs and other government-related securities by Puerto Rico-based mutual funds, which had assets under management (AUM) of over US$11bn at the end of last year. “Mutual funds operating out of Puerto Rico currently invest almost exclusively in Puerto Rico municipal debt. If they adopt the new PRICA, they would be allowed to diversify their portfolios outside of the Commonwealth or into local corporate exposures. Selling municipal bonds could further stress prices of the island’s debt.”

    In practice, though, the prices of GOs and other government-related bonds have not been adversely affected by the downgrades. On February 12, Fitch noted that the price of GO pension funding bonds maturing in 2016 had bounced by around 14% from lows in the first week of the month. The price of COFINA SUT bonds had recovered by about 9% from lows in December 2013.

    In essence, the latest announcements from the ratings agencies confirm changes that have already taken place. The government’s funding costs have increased. Whereas previously, it was being financed by municipal bond investors, it is now reliant significantly on High Yield bond investors. Although some of the metrics are alarming (such as the US$37bn unfunded actuarial liability in the public servants’, teachers’ and judicial pension schemes identified by S&P), a financial crisis does not appear to be imminent. In the short-term, the government’s planned issue of bonds to refinance GDB borrowings will provide a useful indicator of the views of investors. Over the medium-to-long term (i.e. six to twelve months), the key factor will be the growth trajectory of the US economy. If the recovery is faster than generally expected, perceptions of the GOs of the government of Puerto Rico (and related securities) could improve significantly.

    Ratings agencies’ comments

    ‘The downgrades follow our evaluation of liquidity for the Commonwealth, including what we believe is a reduced capacity to access liquidity from the Government Development Bank (GDB) of Puerto Rico. In a related action, we downgraded the GDB to BB, and the rating remains on CreditWatch with negative implications. We also believe that the Commonwealth’s access to liquidity either through GDB or other means will remain constrained in the medium term, even in the event of a potential issuance of debt planned next month. We believe that these liquidity constraints do not warrant an investment grade rating. … That the rating is not lower is due to the progress the current administration has made in reducing operating deficits, and what we view as recent success with reform of the public employee and teacher pension systems, which had been elusive in recent years. We view the reform as significant and could contribute to a sustainable path to fiscal stability.’ Standard & Poor’s, 4 February 2014.

    ‘The problems that confront the Commonwealth are many years in the making, and include years of deficit financing, pension underfunding and budgetary imbalance, along with seven years of economic recession. These factors have now put the Commonwealth in a position where its debt load and fixed costs are high, its liquidity is narrow and its market access has become constrained. In the face of these problems, the administration has taken strong and aggressive actions to control spending, reform the retirement systems, reduce debt issuance and promote economic development. Despite these accomplishments, however, in our view the Commonwealth’s credit profile is no longer consistent with investment grade characteristics. While some economic indicators point to a preliminary stabilisation, we do not see evidence of economic growth sufficient to reverse the Commonwealth’s negative financial trends.’ Moody’s Investors Service, 7 February 2014.

    ‘Fitch placed the general obligation (GO) and related ratings on Negative Watch in November 2013, citing the challenge facing the Commonwealth in maintaining financial flexibility in light of the deterioration in capital markets access. Recent downgrades have triggered new liquidity requirements and lowered expectations for the market available for the Commonwealth’s finances or economy since November. In the context of other credit challenges related to a weak economy and elevated liability levels, Fitch believes that these additional hurdles preclude … an investment grade credit profile. … Fitch believes that the ultimate success of efforts to put the Commonwealth’s finances on a sustainable path will be dictated by the performance of the economy.’ Fitch Ratings, 11 February 2014.

    • “In essence, the latest announcements from the ratings agencies confirm changes that have already taken place. The government’s funding costs have increased. Whereas previously, it was being financed by municipal bond investors, it is now reliant significantly on High Yield bond investors. Although some of the metrics are alarming (such as the US$37bn unfunded actuarial liability in the public servants’, teachers’ and judicial pension schemes identified by S&P), a financial crisis does not appear to be imminent.”
  • BARBADOS: A tough position, but not an impossible one

    LatinNews 25 February 2014 Hits: 1153

    The International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s latest Article IV Consultation with the government of Barbados has highlighted the challenges that the island government faces. After years of economic stagnation and soaring public debt, the Bridgetown government needs to promote growth and put its finances on a stable footing, within the constraints of a fixed exchange rate regime. Fortunately, Barbados’ reasonably competitive US$4.0bn economy is one in which relatively few new investments could have a positive impact – especially as the UK and US economies are recovering.

    Data published on 12 February by the IMF do not show Barbados in a good light. Thanks mainly to the weakness of the economies of its main trading partners (the UK, the US and other Caribbean countries); the local economy has stagnated for the last five years. Low inflation in the past two years has gone hand-in-hand with a contraction in bank lending to the private sector, with both financial institutions and their customers remaining cautious. The government’s fiscal deficit has been rising, and stood at a little over 7% of GDP in 2013. Since 2010, the ratio of outstanding government debt to GDP has risen from about 70% to over 90%: the figures are even more alarming if one includes government debt held in the investment portfolio of the National Insurance Scheme (NIS – the island’s social security system). The current account deficit has been running at around 10% of GDP – although inwards Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been sufficient to cover this. International reserves have been falling, in part because the central bank has been monetising some of the government’s spending, and now cover about three months of imports. The major ratings agencies downgraded the Barbados government to below investment grade in 2012 (see table 1).

    Table 1: Barbados: Selected Economic Indicators
    Fiscal year to 31 March 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
    Annual Change %
    Real GDP 0.2 0.8 0.0 -1.7 -1.2
    CPI Inflation (Ave.) 5.8 9.4 4.5 2.3 2.0
    Exports (Goods & Services) 7.9 6.7 -6.6 -3.1 2.5
    Imports (Goods & Services) 9.5 2.6 -7.8 -0.8 -4.0
    Broad money 3.9 -2.9 6.3 1.2 1.7
    Private sector credit 1.5 2.7 10.5 -2.5 -2.8
    Percentage of GDP %
    Central government revenues etc 25.8 29.4 27.6 23.9 24.9
    Central government spending 34.6 33.9 35.6 33.5 29.5
    Interest on debt 5.7 6.1 6.6 7.3 7.5
    Balance -8.8 -4.4 -8.0 9.6 -4.9
    Gross government debt [1] 70.3 78.0 85.8 92.0 94.7
    Gross government debt [2] 96.7 106.1 118.2 126.4 129.8
    Current Account -5.8 -11.4 -10.1 -11.4 -7.8
    Overall External Balance -0.6 -0.1 0.3 -3.9 -1.3
    Memo: L/T Private Flows 4.9
    7.7 1.8 8.0
    US$mn
    Net International Reserves 718 712 729 563 509
    Nominal GDP 4,434 4,369 4,225 4,284 4,316
    [1] Excludes bonds held by National Insurance Scheme (NIS)
    [2] Includes bonds held by NIS
    Source: IMF, Press Release 14/51, 12 February 2014.

    As the IMF highlighted, the government has not been sitting by idly. In the second half of 2013, the government announced a 13% reduction in the number of civil servants, “further downsizing by attrition, wage cuts for elected and appointed officials, and a two year nominal wage freeze”. The IMF thinks that these measures could reduce the fiscal deficit to 4.9% of GDP. This should enable the debt-to-GDP ratio to stabilise from 2015/2016 and to decline slowly thereafter. For its part, the IMF believes that the government can also take steps to boost revenues, “by broadening the tax base, reducing tax exemptions and improving tax and customs administration”. The IMF also sees potential for improvement in the performance and oversight of the main public enterprises (PEs), many of which have not reported on their results to the finance ministry for several years.

    All parties are committed to maintenance of the currency peg, which fixes the Barbados dollar to the US dollar at a rate of 2:1. One implication of this is that the IMF has argued that the central bank should stop financing the government and allow interest rates to rise in order “to reflect a credible risk premium”. In essence, maintenance of the peg should be, and be seen to be, the paramount aim of monetary policy conducted by an independent institution. The other implication is that Barbados’ economy could adjust to the current imbalances through falls in prices and wages – an internal devaluation. In the early 1990s, the government undertook a fiscal adjustment equivalent to 7% of GDP in one year, along with real wage cuts and other adjustments over a period of years. This had the desired effect – and the government sustained primary surpluses of 2%-4% of GDP for about a decade. However, the IMF notes that this approach would be much riskier now, given that growth is slower and the mountain of public debt much larger.

    In its Article IV consultation, the IMF identified a number of risks that “would aggravate vulnerabilities and could trigger a disorderly adjustment process.” These risks include delays to implementation of the government’s proposed fiscal adjustments. However, most of the risks emanate from outside Barbados. Volatility in global financial markets could hamper the government’s access to funds. The maturity profile of the government’s outstanding debt means that its total financing requirement is expected to rise from 39% of GDP in 2013/14 to 50% of GDP in 2018/19. Tourism receipts are vulnerable to future weakness in key markets. A fiscal shock in the US or a shock in the UK or Trinidad & Tobago – the country’s three biggest trade partners – would also hurt.

    However, we would highlight a number of positives. Although Barbados has been losing market share to other tourist destinations, its upmarket ‘brand’ is reasonably well established. According to the World Economic Forum’s latest (2013-2014) Global Competitiveness Report, Barbados is the 47th most competitive economy of the 148 surveyed, and compares favourably with similar economies except in terms of its macroeconomic environment and the absolute size of the market. Although the country’s international business/ offshore finance sector is smaller than others in the region (e.g. Bermuda and the Cayman Islands) it is substantial: the IMF notes that, in 2012, there were 4,000 licenced entities, including 45 offshore banks. The six domestic banks are well capitalised and are owned by foreign institutions. Subsidiaries of Canadian banks account for about three-quarters of total assets of the banking system.

    Most importantly, an economy that is only about US$4bn in size, but in which per capita incomes are a little over US$16,000, is one in which positive changes are relatively easy to engineer. In its analysis, the IMF identified 11 large capital investment projects that will be underway in 2014/15 and which have a combined face value that exceeds 10% of GDP (see table 2). The announcement over the next year or so of additional investment projects – probably related to tourism or offshore business, the two sectors in which Barbados clearly has a competitive advantage –would have a positive impact, both on the economy and on perceptions.

    Table 2: Investment Projects 2014-15
    Tourism Green Energy
    Sandals Resort Sustainable Energy Investment Program
    Cruise Ship Pier and Ancillary Facilities Public Sector Smart Energy Program
    Pierhead Marina Development Solar Electricity Roof Project
    Others Waste to Energy Facility
    Bushy Park Agriculture
    Low Housing Project Sugar Cane Restructuring Project
    Road Rehabilitation Project
    Source: IMF Country Report 1452, February 2012, p8.

    In short, we believe that the position of the government of Barbados is tough, but not impossible. Over the next six months or so, we believe there are three factors to monitor that will provide clues as to whether the position is improving. One is the health of the US and UK economies, the island’s key trading partners. The second is the extent to which the Bridgetown government is actually implementing measures to cut expenses and/or to boost revenue. The third is the extent to which the central bank is ceasing to act as short-term financier of the government. Progress in any of these three areas would be good news.

    • “The IMF identified a number of risks that “would aggravate vulnerabilities and could trigger a disorderly adjustment process.” These risks include delays to implementation of the government’s proposed fiscal adjustments. However, most of the risks emanate from outside Barbados. Volatility in global financial markets could hamper the government’s access to funds. The maturity profile of the government’s outstanding debt means that its total financing requirement is expected to rise from 39% of GDP in 2013/14 to 50% of GDP in 2018/19.”
    • “Most importantly, an economy that is only about US$4bn in size, but in which per capita incomes are a little over US$16,000, is one in which positive changes are relatively easy to engineer.”