The future of the Colombian Peace Process
The circumstances for the current Colombian Peace Process are favourable, and the possibility of a peaceful solution has never been more likely. However, recent developments have the potential to hinder progress: first, the congressional and presidential elections may affect governmental support for the process, and second, negotiating the more controversial items on the agenda may cause the Farc to splinter.
In previous negotiations, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc) has not negotiated with earnest. During the last round of peace talks in 1999-2002, for example, the Farc was negotiating from a position of strength, so its efforts to compromise were half-hearted. The Farc had defeated the Colombian military on several occasions and, according to the 1982 Farc Strategic Plan, had ambitious plans to divide the country into two and threaten Colombia’s capital, Bogata. The Farc was a powerful organisation and so negotiation was not a priority.
Indeed, the Farc exploited the 1999-2002 negotiation process to its advantage. It used the time to further strengthen its forces because the government temporarily stalled its military operations. The Farc also exploited the creation of a demilitarised zone in southern Colombia to import arms, export drugs and display its alternative government project. The Farc, therefore, has ‘form’ for manipulating negotiations in the past.
The circumstances for the current Peace Process are very different, however. The Farc now has a much smaller territorial influence and military capability than before. Its command structure has weakened with the death of leaders such as Alfonso Cano (November 2011), and its units have broken down with high levels of desertion. According to a May 2013 Insight Crime Report, 3,500 guerrillas deserted in 2008, and another 1,000 in 2012. The Farc’s waning military presence has meant that negotiating has become an appealing, and perhaps necessary, option.
The Colombian government has also learnt from past negotiations. It has not stopped its military operations during the current peace process, so the Farc cannot regain strength; although the government is being more cautious in its military approach. President Santos, for example, said recently that he knows the location of the ‘Londono’, the leader of the Farc, but will think twice about killing him because he does not want to jeopardise progress. Nevertheless, the government has not stopped military operations entirely.
The circumstances for the current Peace Process are therefore more favourable than in the past, and this has meant that a successful solution is now more likely. However, this report explores two recent developments that have the potential to hinder progress.
First, the March 2014 congressional elections altered the dynamics within the government’s negotiating force. President Santos’s National Unity centre-right party still maintains the most seats overall, with 46 (out of 100) in the upper house (the Senate), and 92 (of 166) in the lower house (the House of Representatives). But the far right-wing Centro Democratico (CD), backed by former president Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) emerged as a prominent opposition, with 19 seats in the Senate and 12 in the House.
There is also a growing concern that the CD may form an alliance with the right-wing Partido Conservador (PC) in order to build its support within Congress. The recent unification of the left-wing Polo Democratico Alterativo (PDA) and the Union Patriotica (UP) parties may prompt this move. Divisions between the left and right are therefore becoming more entrenched, and divisions within the left and right appear to be becoming less nuanced (see sidebar).
- Political union
On 12 March, following the legislative elections, Colombia’s leftist opposition parties Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA) and Unión Patriótica (UP) announced an agreement to present a unified presidential slate ahead of the 25 May presidential elections. Although the opposition does not seriously expect to contend for the presidency, the consolidation of the left is intended to provide a broader platform for political alliance in the future. Since the revival of the UP (originally the Farc’s political wing, not unlike Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland) in 2013, the PDA, Colombia’s main leftist party, has been trying to forge an electoral alliance. But the more radical UP insisted it would prefer to go at it alone and take advantage of the opportunity to once again present its own candidates. However, the UP appears to have changed its mind after the 9 March legislative elections. The two leftist parties presented separate lists of legislative candidates, splitting the leftist vote, which resulted in a disappointing performance for both parties as they finished well behind all the members of the ruling coalition; the far-right opposition (comprising the Centro Democrático [CD], Partido Conservador [PC] and Opción Ciudadana); and even the Left’s one-time allies, the Partido Verde ‘green’ party. Given that the legislative results confirmed the PDA’s standing as the leading leftist party, it is expected that UP presidential candidate, Aída Abella, will now renounce her candidacy to become the running mate of the PDA’s Clara López. The consolidation of a united leftist front could prompt the far-right opposition to seek to follow suit. The PC and the CD have been toying with the idea of banding together to challenge Santos’s re-election bid. Both parties performed well in the legislative elections, with CD receiving the second highest number of votes behind Santos’s Partido de la U, while the PC came in third. However, as with the Left, negotiating a deal will not be easy and time is running out. The new leftist alliance might find, however, that it spends too much time fighting internally than opposing the right; a new right-wing alliance would face the same difficulty.
The emergence of the CD as a prominent opposition is significant because the CD is critical of the Peace Process. The CD opposes amnesty and the integration of the Farc into politics, and Uribe even insists that the Farc should be militarily defeated. Although the CD does not have enough seats to block the Peace Process, it can still wield influence.
The CD might threaten to obstruct the daily legislative process in return for concessions on issues regarding the peace talks. Alternatively, the CD may rouse popular sentiment in order to disrupt the negotiation process. For example, polls have found that while a majority of Colombians support the Peace Process, many do not support granting impunity to the Farc members, or its political integration into public office. The CD may choose to focus on these issues.
The upcoming presidential elections, due to take place on 25 May 2014, may further disrupt the peace process. It cannot be assumed that President Santos will win in May because Colombians may change their votes upon reflection of the congressional elections. Hence, the continuation of the Peace Process is at the whim of the electorate. Indeed, many Colombians view the presidential election as a referendum on the Peace Process.
Second, on the other side of the table, there is some evidence that the Farc is fracturing. If this continues and the Farc splinters into multiple groups, finding an agreement will become increasingly difficult.
In November 2013 a spate of reports claimed that the police had uncovered a plot by members of the Farc to assassinate Uribe. Subsequently, questions were raised as to the validity of these reports; The Farc dismissed the allegations as “black propaganda” (see 2013 Latin American Special Report: Colombia). Such controversy highlights the tensions and fractures that are building within and between the negotiating parties.
These tensions are likely to increase as the negotiations turn to the more complicated items on the agenda. The first two items were successfully negotiated because both parties were willing to compromise. They were (relatively) uncontroversial as far as the negotiating parties were concerned and common ground could be found, so they were a useful confidence building measure. These first two items were: (1) rural development, and (2) political participation (which, it should be remembered, is viewed as controversial by the electorate, if not so much by the negotiating team).
However, as the negotiations move onto the next phase, more controversial and emotive issues are being addressed: (3) ending the conflict (demobilisation and transitional justice), (4) finding a solution to the problem of illicit drugs, and (5) implementation, verification and legislation of accords.
It will be much more difficult to reach a compromise on these items, both between government and the Farc, but crucially within each negotiating party. Two significant sticking points will be: the discussion of prosecuting violent perpetrators within the Farc; and ending the illicit drug trade.
Whilst the Colombian government is under considerable public pressure to prosecute violent perpetrators, the Farc will not accept any punishment. The situation is particularly difficult because the Farc negotiators themselves are culpable. Conceding to prosecution will be extremely unpopular within the Farc, and will almost certainly cause the organisation to splinter into factions.
Similarly, many within the Farc will refuse to negotiate giving up the drug trade. The Farc have a status within their predominantly rural communities. They act as a parallel state authority in some regions, collecting taxes from the drugs in return for maintaining order. The idea of becoming subsistence farmers will hold little appeal. It is therefore increasingly likely that the Farc will splinter, because some groups will be unwilling to give up their involvement in the lucrative drug trade.
If the Farc splinters, it will mutate into a more elusive and divided force. The Farc as we know it may disband, and in its place multiple, and less understood, enemies could take form. As a result, it is possible that by some measures the Peace Process may actually make Colombia’s internal conflict worse; certainly more complicated.
Both negotiating parties have agreed that the full content of the negotiations will be kept confidential until the final agreement is reached. Only briefing details will be released explaining the areas on which they have concurred. This is intended to prevent the Farc from splintering, and avoid adverse public reaction to sensitive details before the talks have concluded.
We argue, however, that if it is the case that the Peace Process is truly doomed to failure, these measures will only serve to delay its collapse. When the details are released, not all Colombians will be satisfied. If the government is perceived to have been too lenient in its attitude to violent criminals, popular reaction could derail peace and prolong violence. If elements within the Farc believe that the agreement is unsatisfactory, they may think that continuing the armed struggle is preferable. Or, after demobilisation of the Farc, elements may criminalise and return to the same illegal activities as before. Whichever of these is the outcome (and they are not necessarily mutually exclusive), the conflict is likely to continue in some form.
Politicians have drawn parallels between the Colombian Peace Process the Northern Ireland Peace Process. Indeed, President Santos met Martin McGuiness (Northern Ireland’s Deputy First Minister) on 1 April 1 2014 in order to learn from the peace negotiations with the IRA. The situation in Northern Ireland similarly involved a conflict between the government and a terrorist organisation, thought to be incapable of resolution, and the IRA also splintered into numerous factions during and after the final agreement (see Courcy’s Future Treats – February 2013). In Northern Ireland, diplomacy was found to be adaptable, persistent, and for the most part, successful at ending the conflict.
The balance fell the other way, however, in the case of the 1991 peace agreement with another of Colombia’s left-wing guerrilla groups, the Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL), which seems a more appropriate comparison to the Farc. Throughout the EPL’s peace process, the guerrillas were divided. Whilst over 2000 EPL members turned themselves in, a large faction refused to take part in the talks. Under the leadership of Caraballo many deserted, taking their weapons with them. Progress was therefore made towards peace, but the conflict was not completely resolved.
- EPL
The Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación, EPL), is a Colombian guerrilla group created in 1967. The EPL was founded by the Communist Party of Colombia (Marxist–Leninist), (PCC(ml)), which split with the main Colombian Communist Party in 1967 over ideological differences. The offshoot party created the EPL and began to implement its strategy of promoting socialist revolution from a rural base, with a view to launching future offensives against urban centres. The EPL attempted to insert urban cells, while engaging in sabotage and other terrorist activities.
Although the EPL is still known to be active, it is currently the least powerful of the various guerrilla/paramilitary groups active in Colombia.
At the very least, the EPL’s 1991 peace agreement set the precedent for further negotiations. It established a dialogue with the government, and brought the option of negotiation to the table. It paved the way for the initial (unsuccessful) talks with the Farc, the abortive peace talks with the ELN a few years later. Indeed, it is more than coincidence that after the Farc agreed to the current Peace Process, the ELN asked to join in.
- ELN
The National Liberation Army of Colombia (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) was founded in 1964 by Fabio Vásquez Castaño and other Cuban-trained Colombian rebels. After Castaño’s death the group was headed by a series of Roman Catholic priests, exponents of Liberation Theology.
Although the ELN did not participate in the original peace negotiations conducted between the Colombian government and the Farc (1998-2002), it did enter separate negotiations subsequently (2002-2007). As part of these negotiations the Colombian government attempted to grant the ELN a demilitarised zone in the southern region of the Bolívar Department, but this failed due to the activated of Colombia’s main right-wing paramilitary group, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).
Although nominally rivals, the ELN has occasionally operated alongside the Farc. It has also mooted merging with the Farc – most recently in July 2013. This latest proposed merger was almost certainly spurred by President Santos’ statement that while he was open to peace negotiations with the ELN, the talks should be held separately from those with the Farc. While the ELN certainly wields influence and is capable of committing terrorist acts, it is not as powerful as the Farc. The ELN’s fear is that if it is negotiating on its own there will be less political will to make negotiations succeed, as it is less of a threat than the Farc.
This report has discussed the influence on the Colombian Peace Process of the congressional and presidential elections, and of the more controversial items on the negotiation agenda; all have the potential to disrupt the balance within both negotiating parties. They are likely to cause stalls in the negotiations, and even if a final agreement is made, it will face significant opposition. The current peace process may therefore prove very similar to the outcome of the EPL’s in 1991: it is likely that progress will be made towards peace, but the conflict will not be completely resolved.