Russia, and the beam in Europe's eye
One of the constantly repeated refrains of European Union foreign policy is that the time of “spheres of influence” is past and that the attempt by Russia to enforce one around its periphery is illegitimate. Yet, in recent times, key EU policymaking bodies have themselves talked about the need to develop and defend an extensive EU sphere of influence.
A European Union Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) paper issued on 19 January was the latest statement from the EU about the impossibility of accepting a Russian sphere of influence. Amongst other things, the paper said: “Eurasian integration is a major foreign policy initiative and priority of Russia, but also has a direct impact on the scope of the EU’s economic relations with Russia’s integration partners, such as Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Armenia. Geopolitical and other considerations also need to be taken into account, including the non-negotiable principle of free choice for all partners in the common neighbourhood.”
Commenting on this paper, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) noted: “Russia wants to think of itself as a great power, and its definition of a great power includes having a ‘sphere of influence’ around its border…Understandably, the EU cannot enter a dialogue on these terms…the disagreement between the West and Moscow is a fundamental one.”
The European Union’s self-perception (and the external image it seeks to project) is that it is an entirely benign new form of power that eschews the old ways of great-power politics. But is Russia entirely mistaken in doubting this? The European Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) describes itself as “the Union’s agency dealing with the analysis of foreign, security, and defence issues”. In early 2013 it produced a major report entitled: “Enabling the Future – European Military Capabilities 2013-2025” in which it argued openly for two things: first, for the recognition of extensive “zones of EU privileged influence” and, second, for developing and maintaining “capable and well-functioning armed forces” to improve the EU member states’ “ability to temporarily project and even permanently extend their armed forces” into these regions.
And these “zones or EU privileged influence” are defined exceptionally widely as including “the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods; the ‘neighbours of the neighbours’ (from Mali to Somalia, from the Gulf to Central Asia), and the critical sea lanes in the ‘Indo-Pacific’ (from Suez to Shanghai) and the ‘wider North’ (around and across the Arctic).”
Among the objectives of European military power in this sphere of influence would be protecting supplies of energy and raw materials in overseas territories and “remote lands” from “exploitation or annexation by foreign players”, and maintaining regional balances of power “which favour European values and requirements”.
This is an ambitious document which foresees the development, within a relatively short period of time, of the European Union into a major power with an extensive sphere of influence and commensurate military capabilities, and with the willingness to defend the one with the other.
This may indeed be a rational development for the European Union, but it is not clear why European leaders should expect the Kremlin to accept that the development of spheres of influence, and planning for their defence by military force, is acceptable for the European Union but not for Russia.
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