Israel's nuclear calculation

Almost nobody – Iran, Russia, the US, the Europeans, or even most Israelis – believe that Israel is about to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.  The recent upsurge in Israeli rhetoric about the need to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons programme was intended to stiffen the backbone of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ahead of the publication of its latest assessment of Iran’s nuclear activities, and to focus minds on the subsequent debate about hardening sanctions against Iran.  However, our own sources say that it would be a mistake to assume that a failure to turn words into action this time means that Israel will never act against Iran.  The reasons why Israel cannot tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran are even more compelling than most observers realize, or than Israel itself publicly admits – and there may come a time when these reasons will outweigh all the arguments against a strike.

In addition to the undoubted fact that the current round of Israeli sabre-rattling was aimed mostly at the IAEA, and at those who will now decide on the level of additional sanctions, the assumption that Iran is not about to face an Israeli military attack is based on six main points, most of which are well known but are worth repeating:

                - From a military perspective, an Israeli attack would be fraught with difficulty and far from guaranteed to succeed.  By most assessments, a delay in Iran’s nuclear programme rather than its elimination is the best that could be hoped for from a military strike.

                - The Israeli policymaking establishment is divided not just over the efficacy of an attack but also the costs that would be incurred in the form of massive missile retaliation from Iran and its allies such as Hezbollah.

                - The US knows that supporting an Israeli strike would put at risk its forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.          - The US and other Western powers know that a military strike against Iran would lead to the massive disruption of oil supplies through the Strait of Hormuz at a time when the Western economy is exceptionally vulnerable.

                - China and Russia are strongly opposed to military action against Iran.  On Monday (7 November), Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned that a military attack on Iran’s nuclear installations “would be a very serious mistake fraught with unpredictable consequences...there can be no military solution to the Iranian nuclear problem”.  Israel and the US will also have noted the language used by Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on 7 November at the meeting of the heads of government of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  He referred to Nato and the West as “these arrogant world powers”.  ‘World arrogance’ is, of course, a favoured term of abuse used by Tehran for America and its allies.

                - Finally, a military confrontation with Israel would almost certainly consolidate the power of the Iranian regime by inflaming nationalist sentiment and rallying it behind the ayatollahs.  This is not something that the US and Israel would want to happen when there are still lingering hopes that the effects of the Arab Spring could yet be felt in Iran.

The logic of the above seems compelling, however our own sources are warning that there are three major counter-considerations that need to be kept in mind and which will ensure that an Israeli military strike remains a serious option.

The first is that Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu does appear to be genuinely obsessed by the Iranian threat.  As far back a 1996, Netanyahu warned that Iran poses the greatest threat to Israel since its foundation in 1948, and he means it.  Furthermore, he appears to see the neutralization of the Iranian threat as his historic role.

The second important point is that the strategic squeeze on Israel is daily getting worse.  We have written much about this in recent months, particularly about Egypt and Turkey turning away from Israel, and the point needs little further elaboration except perhaps with regard to the Jordanian question.  Jordan was a non-participant in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, a fact that may well have saved Israel, and it has been officially at peace with Israel since October 1994.  Now there are two worrying, inter-linked, concerns.

The first is that the Muslim Brotherhood will gain progressively more influence in Jordan, forcing Amman into a more hostile stance with regard to Israel.  The rapprochement between Jordan and Hamas, for instance, appears to be gathering pace.  The second fear is that, following the US withdrawal from Iraq, Iran will be able to bring its influence to bear much more strongly on Jordan.

As of today, Israel faces a negligible threat from Jordan.  But as Iran consolidates its influence in Iraq so Jordan will be the only physical barrier between Israel and Iran, and if the Arab Spring were to bring the Muslim Brotherhood to power in Jordan then Iran’s influence, and even physical presence (perhaps in the form of the Revolutionary Guards), could come right up to Israel’s border. 

It is this prospect that moved Israeli military chief Benny Gantz to warn on 8 November that Israel now faces the possibility of having to fight “on all fronts”.  He said: “It is possible that we will once again have to mobilize all our forces to fight on all fronts for the security of the State of Israel.”

Then there is the nuclear question itself; and very few analysts appear to understand the true significance of a nuclear-armed Iran.  Israel has an interest in playing up the possibility that a nuclear-armed Iran could attack not just Israel but the whole region and Europe.  Former Israeli chief of staff Shaul Mofaz warned this week: “Iran’s missile umbrella already covers most European capitals.  Anyone who thinks he is safe is making a mistake...A nuclear Iran is not just a Jewish problem.”  There is, of course, a theoretical risk that Iran could launch a nuclear first strike against Israel or other perceived enemies in the region, but the history of nuclear weapons is that they are unusable against anyone who can retaliate in kind, and it is inconceivable that even the Iranian ayatollahs would take such an irrational action.

The real significance of a nuclear-armed Iran is a different one – but of perhaps even greater significance to Israel.  It is that an Iranian nuclear deterrent would prevent Israel from using its own nuclear weapons to defeat an overwhelming conventional attack from its Arab neighbours.  Israel came close to doing exactly this during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and (as chief of staff Benny Gantz has admitted) Israel’s strategic environment could soon become worse than in 1973, with the possibility of Jordan, Hezbollah, the Palestinian territories, Turkey, and Iran all being added to Egypt and Syria in the balance against Israel.

As this hostile environment develops, Israel will increasingly believe that its survivability depends upon its ability and willingness to use nuclear weapons if it is faced with defeat on the conventional battlefield.  The significance of a nuclear-armed Iran, standing behind a conventional Arab assault, is that it would remove this option – or at least make it suicidal – which is why Israel will do everything in its power to prevent such an outcome.

Israel’s sabre-rattling has achieved its first objective: a tough IAEA report.  Now Israel will be pushing for the toughest possible increase in sanctions, including on the Iranian central bank and the oil industry.  But, in the meantime, the winter will be spent intensifying plans, and gaining internal consensus, for a possible military attack on Iran in the spring or summer.  It should not be assumed that because Israel’s sabre-rattling on this occasion has proved to be a bluff that that will always be the case.  It is only necessary to understand how dramatically a nuclear-armed Iran diminishes Israel’s own defensive capabilities to understand the lengths to which Israel will go to prevent such an outcome.  The likelihood of an Israeli military strike against Iran cannot be assessed using normal cost-benefit criteria.  JdeC.

NOTE: Even though it is fully understood in Israel that a military strike against Iran would spark a wave of retaliatory missile attacks from Hezbollah and Iran itself, and even though highly influential former service chiefs have been warning against a military strike, it is significant that the Israeli public appears prepared to accept the dangers.  An opinion poll published on 3 November showed that 41% of Israelis support a military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, while 39% are against and 20% are unsure.