Part II: Expectations for the next four years

Items

• Mexico and Central America

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  Mexico and Central America loom large in US policy towards Latin America, for various reasons. Mexico is particularly important because it is the second largest economy in Latin America (after Brazil) with the added factor that it shares a long border with the US and is closely integrated into the North American supply chain. Over the last three decades links between the two countries have intensified. Mexico has a population of 126m, but as we have seen there are an electorally important additional 37m people of Mexican descent living in the US. Issues of drug trafficking and migration also loom large in the relationship between Central America, Mexico, and the US.

  Mexico: annual trade with US and China US$bn

  

  Source: International Trade Centre (ITC)

  US presidents have four-year terms in office, while Mexican presidents serve six years, known as a sexenio. This means that every Mexican president must expect to deal with more than one US administration. Amlo took office in December 2018 nearly two years after Trump had moved into the White House. The political chemistry between the two men has been complex. They are at opposite ends of the political spectrum but there are many nuances (Amlo for example is also a social and fiscal conservative).

  Both are populists with a cavalier attitude to expert opinion. Both have managed the Covid-19 crisis poorly. Both are climate change sceptics and enthusiasts for fossil fuels. Surprisingly perhaps, the relationship between the two has been relatively amicable. This is largely because Amlo has gone out of his way to avoid confrontation, and yielded to US demands, for example over the “remain in Mexico” Migrant Protection Protocols. He has also remained low-key on President Trump’s build-a-wall rhetoric. This accommodative position may reflect Amlo’s relative lack of interest in foreign policy, and his overriding focus on domestic issues.

  Traditionally, Mexican presidents have tended to find a Democratic Party-occupied White House easier to deal with than a Republican one. That might lead to an expectation that if Biden wins the US election, the US-Mexico bilateral relationship might in some senses improve. This may in fact prove true, but a number of points of friction are likely to remain. Illegal migration and drug trafficking are complex and ongoing issues. The Obama administration (2009-2017), during which Biden served as vice-president, failed to get congressional support for major immigration reform and ended up deporting nearly 3m undocumented migrants, a higher annual rate than during the subsequent Trump administration.

  Under a Biden presidency there will also be continuing potential for trade and environmental disputes, within the framework of the USMCA, particularly because both countries will be trying to recover from Covid-linked record levels of recession and unemployment. While adopting a different tone and approach, Biden too will want to be seen as protecting US jobs from the perceived threat of offshoring.

  Of particular importance to the Central American countries will be Biden’s promise of a more joined-up approach to the problem of illegal migration. The Democratic Party candidate, who was involved in negotiations with the Northern Triangle countries during the tail-end of the Obama administration, has outlined a US$4bn proposal which would focus on attacking the root causes of illicit migration, mobilising private investment, improving security and the rule of law, addressing endemic corruption, and prioritising poverty reduction and economic development.

• The troika: Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua

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  Under Donald Trump, Washington has identified three Latin American countries which are considered to be fundamentally hostile to US interests: Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. The administration’s objections to the three governments have been based on a) their anti-democratic nature and poor record on human rights and b) on their alignment with global rivals to US hegemony such as China and Russia. The impression given is that a) has weighed more heavily than b). As mentioned, an additional factor has been the desire to appeal to conservative Hispanic voters, mainly of Cuban and Venezuelan origin. In November 2018 the-then National Security Adviser, John Bolton, referred to the three as the “troika of tyranny” (after leaving the administration Bolton nevertheless was highly critical of what he described as Trump’s limited understanding of international affairs).

  The Trump administration intensified already-existing economic sanctions against Venezuela and reversed the Obama administration’s policy of engagement with Cuba, introducing a range of renewed sanctions on travel, remittances, and the oil trade. As political unrest flared in Nicaragua from 2018 onward, the State Department also introduced targeted sanctions on individuals close to Daniel Ortega due to his government’s human rights abuses or involvement in corruption.

  Seen from the perspective of the incumbent governments in Caracas, Havana, and Managua, a re-elected Donald Trump is likely to maintain or tighten economic sanctions and even threaten some kind of military action. However, despite sabre-rattling, such as through an increased US naval presence in the Caribbean, a second-term Trump is unlikely to take direct military action against members of the troika. But a second-term Trump would be likely to remain somewhat volatile. It is not inconceivable that he would open direct negotiations without preconditions with Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, in the same way that he met with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un (indeed, Trump has referred to the possibility).

  A Biden administration is not likely to suddenly lift economic sanctions, but it may be more prepared to ease them back a little as part of a negotiation process and in return for concessions from the other side. Biden has indicated that, if he were to be elected, he would extend TPS status to undocumented Venezuelans in the US, protecting them from deportation and giving them the right to work. The Democrats believe Trump’s failure to offer TPS to Venezuelans is an electoral weak point. In September Biden commented: “Time and again, when it comes to taking real action, President Trump and his Republican allies have failed to support the Venezuelan people. As president, I will immediately grant TPS to Venezuelans already in the United States.”

  Policy towards Venezuela is likely to figure prominently early next year whoever wins the US election. The question will be whether the US will continue recognising opposition leader Juan Guaidó as the country’s legitimate president, given the conclusion of the five-year term of the country’s opposition controlled National Assembly, and the likelihood that it will be replaced by a pro-government majority as a result of congressional elections scheduled for 6 December which the opposition describes as fraudulent. There are divisions within Venezuela’s opposition parties over whether or not to boycott the December election. Because it falls between the US elections (3 November) and the inauguration of the new US president (20 January 2021) the US response may be particularly sensitive.

• Brazil

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  Brazil’s current government, led by right-winger Jair Bolsonaro, identifies closely with the Trump administration’s ‘Make America Great Again’ (MAGA) agenda. Bolsonaro has described himself as a “tropical Trump”. Although an international alliance between nationalist and populist governments may seem a contradiction in terms, the Bolsonaro administration has clearly sought the role of being Trump’s closest ally in the Western Hemisphere.

  On a whole range of issues, the two political leaders see eye-to-eye. Both have portrayed themselves as heroic outsiders seeking to drain a “swamp” of corrupt lobbyists and establishment politicians. Both have attacked traditional communications media with claims that it disseminates “fake news”. Both have displayed disdain for the traditional checks and balances of liberal democracy and are subject to various investigations alleging impropriety. Both have mis-managed the Covid-19 pandemic and shown themselves ill-at-ease with a complex and rapidly developing health crisis which requires scientific engagement and does not lend itself to simple explanations.

  Brazil: annual trade with US and China US$bn

  Source: International Trade Commission (ITC)

  However, real progress towards building a special relationship between Washington and Brasilia has been lacking. There are various explanations for this. One is that Latin America as a whole has remained a low priority area for US diplomacy under this administration. The Trump administration has engaged with only a few key issues such as migration and drug trafficking which has led it prioritise only a handful of countries in the hemisphere. Bolsonaro was elected in October 2018 and took office in January 2019, at the mid-way point in the Trump presidency. Despite a chaotic start to his presidency, followed by mismanagement of the coronavirus pandemic, by the third quarter of 2020 Bolsonaro was able to reverse falling approval ratings, building popularity on the back of generous emergency pay outs to the poor and those employed informally (a programme known as the “corona voucher”). Despite ongoing political volatility in Brazil, at the time of writing Bolsonaro was rated a serious contender for re-election in October 2022.

  Even if Bolsonaro retains his current political ascendancy, and President Trump gets re-elected, there will be obstacles to closer bilateral relations with Washington. Brazil trades more with China than it does with the United States and despite anti-communist, anti-China campaign rhetoric, in office Bolsonaro has had to be more pragmatic about maintaining the important trade link with Beijing. His administration may authorise Chinese telecoms manufacturer Huawei to provide components for 5G roll-out, breaking ranks with Trump’s boycott of the company on national security grounds.

  Both Trump and Bolsonaro have talked about the desirability of a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) but little concrete planning or negotiation to make one happen appears to have taken place. Such a deal would require Brazil to either bring in its existing Mercosur partners (Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay), or to exit Mercosur entirely – a diplomatically complex choice. The Trump administration has also imposed tariffs on Brazilian products such as steel and aluminium, falling short of the special treatment the Brazilian authorities believe they deserve.

  Brazil-US relations under a Biden presidency could also turn out to have significant friction points. As we have already suggested, a Biden government will not immediately resume the cause of globalisation. Indeed, one of the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic has been a widespread reconsideration of the benefits of neoliberalism, free trade, and globalisation, with a greater premium now being placed on self-reliance and the protection of certain industries. Biden’s foreign policy advisers have spoken of a “new nationalism” and a “pro-American workers tax and trade strategy”. They have also talked of devising a foreign policy that serves the US middle classes, rather than the interests of top corporations.

  One area of difficulty is likely to be climate change and the protection of the environment. Brazil has come under increasing pressure from the European Union and major international corporations to take more robust measures to improve environmental protection in the Amazon and reverse a rising rate of deforestation. These have included a clear message from France that it will not ratify the EU-Mercosur free trade agreement, negotiated over two decades, if Brazil does not agree to further safeguards. Bolsonaro has reacted angrily, rejecting what he described as meddling in Brazil’s internal affairs. In his first televised debate with Trump on 29 September Biden suggested the US should invest in Amazon protection in return for concessions from Brazil. This led Bolsonaro to say his country would not be bribed. Next year, Brazil could find itself at odds with both the EU and the US on climate change issues.