The Farc: pressure increasing
Earlier this year we discussed the possibility of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) (Farc) splintering into factions due the pressures, both internal and external to the group, of the ongoing peace process. Now that the negotiations have moved beyond the initial demands and rhetoric, and the parties to the process are getting down to the nitty-gritty of constructing a peaceful future, we believe the chances of a split within the ranks of the Farc are greater than they have ever been. Regional commanders are getting their first proper look at what a post-conflict future might be like, what previous actions they might be held accountable for, and the consequences they could face.
Despite the abject failure of previous peace processes in 1998 and 2002, the Farc has been facing serious existential threats, and has been forced to try again, or risk annihilation. The Farc’s declining popular support, recruitment challenges, and rivalry with Colombia’s other main left-wing group, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) (ELN), have all left the group vulnerable.
Symbolic wins by government forces, including the rescue of high profile hostages and the killing of Farc commanders, have left the group looking weak.
With the death this year of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, and other left-wing leaders wanting their countries to be seen as politically stable with bourgeoning economies ripe for investment, the Farc is at risk of losing the tacit support of some of leftist regimes in Latin America unless it can show a willingness to move towards peace. None of these regimes wish to be unnecessarily associated too closely with ‘elements of instability’. Cuba, for example, still theoretically a communist state and a former ally of the Farc, is keen to boost its global political capital by sponsoring the peace process – after the initial talks in Norway, subsequent negotiations have been in Havana.
Peace talks between President Juan Manuel Santos’s government and the Farc resumed on 28 July after a 19-day break, during which tensions between the two sides increased significantly. Negotiations are entering a particularly complex and sensitive stage, with the question of legal responsibilities for a wide range of crimes after an eventual peace agreement is signed now moving sharply up the agenda.
In our February article we discussed some of the structural similarities between the Farc and the IRA, and some elements of the Colombian peace process are following the same tack as in Northern Ireland. Discussions of who should be held accountable for previous violence in Colombia, and the consequences they should face, are similar to those faced in the negotiation of the 1998 Good Friday agreements.
In the Colombia-Farc discussions that concluded in May, the two sides reached a draft agreement on rural development and land reform. It envisaged the creation of more special ‘peasant reserve zones’, an innovation introduced in the 1990s to channel agricultural aid to small scale farmers and to protect them from land grabs – so far so uncontroversial (although the implementation of the agreement is likely to be much trickier than its negotiation).
While the first phase of the negotiations covered rural issues on which both sides could find some common ground (a useful confidence building measure in itself), the second phase promises to be far more difficult. This portion of the talks will cover more overtly political topics, to do with how the Farc may, in the future, participate in political and civilian life. Humberto de La Calle, the government’s lead negotiator, described the negotiations in this phase as a discussion of how the Farc would be “transformed into a legal political organisation to exercise democracy from the opposition”.
Most recent press coverage discussing the challenges to the peace process has looked at issues such as the Farc’s support of the violent peasant protests in the Catatumbo region near the Venezuelan border – on 22 July the Farc publicly offered to supply the peasants with weapons to support the protest, leading many on the government side to conclude that the guerrillas had orchestrated the entire protest. Separately, the Farc carried out two attacks in Arauca and Caquetá departments, killing a total of 19 soldiers.
There has also been much coverage of the Farc’s grandstanding over the release of kidnapped former US marine Kevin Scott Sutay. The Farc is offering to release him if President Santos sends a “commission of top people” including a former left-wing senator (Piedad Córdoba), to pick him up somewhere in Colombia. Santos has refused, on the grounds that the guerrillas are seeking to create a ‘media circus’ and gain publicity: he says Scott should simply be handed over to the Red Cross.
These are important issues. One way to view them is as necessary actions for the Farc to maintain its image during the negotiations. What is not yet clear, however, is to what degree they are actions mandated by the Farc’s secretariat, and how much of it is independent action by regional commanders looking to derail the peace process and/or bolster their own local power-base.
Two documents have a particular bearing on what will happen next, both in the negotiating chamber and also on the ground. The first is a report written by the Centro de Memoria Histórica, an office specially set up by the executive. It is a detailed analysis of the long decades of violence in the country. The report, Basta Ya! Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad, details that: 218,000 people died as a result of the fighting in 1958-2012, of whom 81% were civilians and the remainder combatants from the security forces, the guerrilla organisations, and the right-wing paramilitaries; selective murders were mainly performed by the paramilitaries, who also carried out the greatest number of massacres; the guerrillas were responsible for most of over 27,000 kidnappings, for the greatest number of attacks on the security forces, and for the greatest number of ‘indiscriminate terrorist actions’; during the conflict there were over 25,000 forced disappearances, 1,754 victims of sexual violence, over 10,000 victims of anti personnel mines, and 5.7m people displaced since the mid-1980s.
President Santos has accepted the report and acted quickly on one of its 30 recommendations: that the government should apologise for its part in what happened. How the Farc responds will be telling – if the secretariat hangs too many sub-commanders out to dry it will only encourage splits.
The second document is a draft law before the Constitutional Court for a decision on whether it can be enacted. The Marco Legal para La Paz (MLP), or Legal Framework for Peace, sets the parameters for how rebel forces might be demobilised, and how the courts – military and civil – will deal with crimes committed during the conflict. It upholds the controversial concept of “selective and alternative justice” which implies that only the most serious crimes and leaders will be prosecuted. Critics of President Santos have suggested it goes too far, and potentially grants impunity to murderers, military and guerrilla.
The government must also seek to retain popular support, so cannot agree to let too many violent criminals escape justice lest it faces punishment at the ballot box. Yet this issue may prove absolutely critical to the future of the peace process. The government position, according to Colombia’s leading centre-right newspaper El Espectador, is that while “legal formulas” could be found to allow those guilty of some crimes not to go to prison, it draws the line at crimes against humanity (including disappearances, kidnap, and murder) which demand investigation, trial, and conviction. Farc leaders on the other hand support the granting of a wide amnesty or a pardon; failing that they would consider a mechanism whereby trials could go ahead, but with a prior agreement that there would be suspended sentences.
This arrangement might be favoured by the Farc, but there will be a significant portion of the Colombian public who would baulk at the lack of justice, both perceived and actual, in letting violent criminals off scot-free.
Alternatively, the Farc’s top commanders could opt to remain in Cuba, passing leadership of its post-peace agreement successor organisation to a coalition of middle-ranking commanders, with peasant and left wing activists. However this is likely also to be unpopular, who view the secretariat as bearing ultimate responsibility for past atrocities.
And therein lies the rub. If the government is too lenient in its approach to the Farc’s past crimes the popular reaction could derail the peace process and prolong violence. If the Farc accepts accountability for crimes and regional commanders believe they are under serious threat of facing sanction, they could refuse to be bound by the agreement, splintering the Farc and again prolonging violence.