Regional Economy Review

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  • Argentina: Industrialists concerned over China agreements

    LatinNews 02 March 2015 Hits: 2563

    Having signed agreements with the Chinese government in February enabling what she described as “the most important country-to-country investments in history” President Cristina Fernández appeared both surprised and angry when a group of local industrialists said they were unhappy with the terms of the deals. The background to the controversy highlights interesting issues of trade and investment policy.

    Although President Fernández may be guilty of a degree of hype, there is no doubt that the cooperation agreements signed during her state visit to China on 3 - 4 February were very significant. After meeting China’s President Xi Jinping, a total of 15 agreements were signed, covering cooperation in areas like tourism, culture, health, science, mining, nuclear energy and its peaceful use, penal affairs, communications, space exploration, information and finance. Fernández said that at their earlier meeting in July 2014, she and Xi had agreed to elevate the bilateral relationship to the rank of an “integral strategic alliance”, a move that implied a qualitative step-change.

    The list of concrete Argentina-China agreements reached to date is substantial, and includes the following:

    • A US$11bn currency swap agreement between the central banks of the two countries, which came into operation last year and has bolstered Argentina’s dwindling foreign currency reserves (because of its dispute with US holdout creditors, Argentina is considered to be in partial default and has limited access to international capital markets). Under the terms of this agreement, Argentina last year received over US$2.3bn. According to Mauro Roca, an economist at Goldman Sachs, the currency swap “helped to reduce the perception that the country may be heading for yet another currency run”.
    • Chinese funding totalling an estimated US$4.5bn for two major hydroelectric dams, the Néstor Kirchner and Jorge Cepernic projects in Santa Cruz province in the south of the country. China’s Gezhouba Group of Wuhan has secured the contract for the civil engineering work.
    • Chinese funding and technology to build two new nuclear reactors in Argentina. (Argentina currently has three reactors: Atucha I and Atucha II in Buenos Aires, and Embalse in Córdoba. Atucha II, where China helped complete the engineering work, came on-stream this month). Under the terms of this agreement, China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) will provide the technology, while Argentina’s Nucleoeléctrica will be in charge of the design and construction work.
    • Chinese funding for the modernisation of the Belgrano Cargas freight rail service.
    • China’s Sinopec has signed agreements for joint oil and gas exploration with Argentina’s state-owned Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF), including exploration of part of the country’s giant shale oil and gas deposits in Vaca Muerta, Neuquén province.
    • An agreement to build a space observation and research centre in Neuquén province, which will support China’s space programme, designed to land three astronauts on the moon in 2016.

    According to preliminary figures, Argentina’s exports to China totalled US$5.1bn in 2014 (7% of total exports), while imports from China were valued at US$10.8bn (16.5% of total imports). These figures confirm China as Argentina’s second most important trading partner after Brazil. Of particular importance are Argentina’s soya exports to China, which last year totalled just under 8m metric tonnes.

     

     

    So bearing the importance of the relationship in mind, President Fernández seems to have been caught off-guard on her return to Argentina by criticism from the main manufacturers’ association, Unión Industrial Argentina (UIA), and from the exporters’ lobby, the Cámara de Exportadores de la República Argentina (CERA). The UIA focused on a framework agreement signed on 18 July last year, which in early February was still awaiting congressional approval. It said that this ‘Economic Investment and Cooperation Agreement’ gave China too many advantages. Article 5 of the agreement allows contracts to be assigned directly to Chinese companies without competitive bidding, when China is offering funding at subsidised interest rates. Article 6 also allows favourable conditions for the use of Chinese labour on projects in Argentina. A further article allows additional agreements to be reached without the need for congressional approval on the Argentine side.

    In a comment attributed by the daily La Nación to Techint, a leading Argentine civil engineering group, there is “a very high risk when our industry competes with centrally planned economies, with distortionary price and subsidy policies, which do not follow the principles of fair trade”. Techint managers are also said to have warned against “de-industrialisation’ – a situation whereby Argentina becomes relegated to the role of raw materials exporter, importing manufactured goods from China.

    The president condemned these comments, which she said were like “spitting at the sky”. She said she had difficulty understanding Techint’s position, since the company was benefiting from a US$400m credit from China. “It’s almost as if we should tell the Chinese not to lend them the US$400m and for them to find it elsewhere” she said. Sources in the company said the project in question is the El Tamboral hydroelectric complex, an extension of two earlier projects (Punta Negra and Caracoles). Techint’s contract is not directly with the Chinese, but with EPSE, a provincially owned entity in San Juan. As for the comments about jobs and Chinese workers, the President insisted that “I went [to China] with 112 Argentine companies, and those companies employ workers. If anything characterises this government it has been the defence of labour and business people, and I think we deserve a vote of confidence”.

    Yet the controversy looks set to continue. Luis Palma Cané, an economist at Fimades, a local consultancy, says that on the surface Article 5, allowing direct contracting of work to Chinese companies when the project is being funded with soft loans from China, may appear reasonable. “But this is misleading” he notes. “When a country offers Argentina long term financing at a 3% annual interest rate, in a situation where the rest of the world won’t lend to us at less than 20%, then it is clear that something else must be involved. That something else means we are tied in to using their technology, and we can’t control the price of the work.” Dante Sica, of consultancy Abeceb.com, agrees. “We can only use Chinese technology, where there may be German or French suppliers who might offer better quality”, he points out. Palma Cané adds that because of Article 6, it is possible that the Neuquén space observation and research centre will be entirely staffed with Chinese scientists.

    It is not just parts of the business community that see a downside to the China agreements. A number of labour unions, including Uocra, the construction workers’ union, and UOM (engineering workers) wrote to Planning Minister Julio De Vido to express their concern over jobs. De Vido appears to have reassured them, saying that the major Chinese-funded infrastructure works would create between 20,000 and 25,000 new jobs for Argentine workers over the next three years, and that large quantities of Chinese workers would not be flown in to do the work instead. But some say negotiations can be tough. La Nación quoted a source close to the interior and transport minister, Florencio Randazzo, who said that the contract to modernise the Belgrano Cargas freight railway was valued at US$2.47bn. The Argentine government has been required to pay a deposit equivalent to 15% of this amount, with the People’s Bank of China (PBC, the central bank) providing the rest via a 15-year loan, with an initial 5-year grace period, at annual interest rates of less than 4.5%. “What do the Chinese do?” the source asked: “Well they lend you the money, but then they demand 80% Chinese content for the work. We managed to get them down to 50%”.

  • Guatemala: The problems of a small budget

    LatinNews 02 March 2015 Hits: 2361

    Strengthening government revenues will be essential if Guatemala is to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth.

    Many aspects of Guatemala's economy are favourable. The UN’s Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in its Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, released in late 2014, put real GDP growth at 4.0% for the year, accelerating from 2013, when the economy expanded by 3.7%. In output terms, ECLAC estimated that activity in the mining and quarrying sector rose by 27.1% year on year. It put growth in the financial and business services sector at 4.8%. Growth in private services, retailing and manufacturing was below the headline figure but nevertheless ECLAC suggested that each sector rose by at least 3.0% in 2014.

    According to the Banco de Guatemala (BanGuat), annual consumer price inflation fell from 4.0% to 3.0% over the course of 2014, and was just 2.3% in January 2015. Looking forward, ECLAC expects the economy to expand by around 4.0% in 2015, “given expectations of continued growth in exports and domestic demand, the latter primarily attributable to private consumption.”

    Consumption is being driven by credit growth - from a level that is low in the context of the economy as a whole. According to latest estimates from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), nominal GDP was about US$58.3bn in 2014. BanGuat noted that total credit from commercial banks to the private sector amounted to GTQ153.9bn (US$20.1bn) as of 12 February 2015. Of this amount, about one third, or GTQ54.7bn (US$7.1bn), was foreign currency-denominated (i.e. US dollars). BanGuat data indicated that year-on-year growth in local currency lending was 6.9%, with foreign currency lending up 18.4%. Total deposits with commercial banks amounted to QTQ160.8bnn (US$21.0bn): this indicates that deposits, very largely, are being recycled as loans. Over the past year, Guatemala's financial system has benefited from the general abundance of liquidity globally. Average one-week lending rates in local currency have trended down from about 20% to just over 17%. In foreign currency, equivalent rates have moved down from about 6.5% to 6.0%.

    Developments outside Guatemala have also been positive. ECLAC noted that remittances from expatriate workers in the US and elsewhere amounted to US$4.65bn in the first 10 months of 2014, up 8.6% over the corresponding period of 2013. ECLAC also estimates that foreign direct investment (FDI) in to Guatemala was up 8.0% year on year over 2013 (when FDI flows expanded by 5.2%). FDI in the first half of 2014 amounted to US$713.4m. It came mainly from Canada (destined for the agriculture and mining & quarrying sectors), the US and the UK (mainly retailing) and Colombia (financial services).

    The latest IMF data highlights additional strengths, notwithstanding that the Fund’s projections for economic growth in 2014 and 2015 are slightly less optimistic than those of ECLAC.

     

    Chart 1: Guatemala's economy: as the IMF sees it
    2013 2014e 2015e 2016e
    Gross domestic product, constant prices (% change) 3.7 3.4 3.7 3.6
    Gross domestic product, current prices (US$bn) 53.8 58.3 62.6 66.8
    Gross domestic product per capita, current prices (US$) 3,475 3,674 3,850 4,007
    Inflation, average consumer prices (%) 4.3 3.5 4.3 4.2
    Total investment (% GDP) 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5
    Gross national savings(% GDP) 11.5 12.2 12.2 12.2
    Volume of imports of goods and services (% change) 4.8 4.5 6.6 6.3
    Volume of Imports of goods (% change) 4.2 6.4 6.9 6.8
    Volume of exports of goods and services(% change) 4.6 2.4 4.1 4.8
    Volume of exports of goods (% change) 5.8 4.3 4.4 5.2
    Population mn 15.48 15.87 16.27 16.67
    General government revenue (% GDP) 11.7 11.2 11.2 11.2
    General government total expenditure (% GDP) 13.8 13.3 13.4 13.3
    General government net lending/borrowing (% GDP) -2.1 -2.1 -2.2 -2.1
    General government primary net lending/borrowing (% GDP) -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.6
    General government gross debt (% GDP) 24.6 24.8 25.3 25.7
    Current account balance (US$bn) -1.5 -1.2 -1.4 -1.6
    Current account balance (% GDP) -2.7 -2.0 -2.2 -2.3
    Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2014

     

    In both years, total investment and gross national savings are forecast at 14.3% and 12.2% of GDP respectively. The resulting annual current account deficits, of about US$1.2-US$1.4bn (or 2.0%-2.2% of GDP) are easily financed. Given the likely robustness of domestic demand, imports are set to grow faster than exports. However, net foreign reserves held by BanGuat amounted to US$7.7bn as of 12 February 2015, equivalent to just over four months of imports of goods and services, as per the ECLAC 2014 preliminary figures. Over the last year or so, the GTQ has been allowed by BanGuat to appreciate slightly, rising from US$1:GTQ7.851 in January 2014 to US$1:GTQ7.6505 on 12 February 2015.

    Meanwhile, the government's overall budget deficit is running at around 2% of GDP. The primary deficit (i.e. before interest payments) is about 0.6% of GDP. Gross government debt is around 25% of GDP: given the nearly-balanced budget and an environment of low interest rates, the ratio is rising slowly. However, the debt is high relative to government spending, which is 13.3% of GDP. This is a major source of weakness for the economy as a whole. The other problem is widespread poverty, in a country where the per capita income is a little under US$3,900.

    In its 2014-2015 Global Competitiveness Report, the World Economic Forum (WEF) rated Guatemala the 78th most competitive country of 144 assessed. In 2013-2014, Guatemala was rated at 86/148. In the two preceding years, its rating had been 83/144 and 84/142 respectively. In the context of Latin America and the Caribbean, Guatemala is a mid-ranking country. For instance, it is less competitive than Mexico (61), Peru (65) or Colombia (66). However, it is more competitive than Uruguay (80), El Salvador (84) or Jamaica (86). Its overall macro-economic environment, the level of development of its financial market and the efficiency of its goods market, boosts Guatemala’s overall competitiveness.

     

    Chart 2: Guatemala's ranking for global competiveness

    Out of 144 countries assessed



     

    Overall Global Competitiveness Index

    78

     


     

     

    Basic requirements (40% weighting)

    84

     

    Institutions*

    109

     

    Infrastructure

    67

     

    Macroeconomic environment

    64

     

    Health and primary education**

    100

     


     

     

    Efficiency enhancers (50% weighting)

    76

     

    Higher education and training***

    103

     

    Goods market efficiency

    45

     

    Labour market efficiency

    85

     

    Financial market development

    45

     

    Technological readiness

    88

     

    Market size

    78

     


     

     

    Innovation and sophistication factors (10% weighting)

    62

     

    Business sophistication

    52

     

    Innovation

    95

     

     

     

     

    *Includes wastefulness of government spending (128), diversion of public funds (127), crime costs (142), organised crime (144), investor protection (123) and reliability of police (124)

    **Includes quality of primary education (130),

    ***Includes quality of the education system (127)

    Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2014-2015

     

    In recent years, successive governments have taken steps to improve the ease of doing business in Guatemala. According to the World Bank's Doing Business 2015 report, Guatemala's global business environment ranking fell slightly to 73rd, of 189 countries assessed, having placed 71st in 2014.

    Chart 3: Guatemala's ranking for ease of doing business
    Out of 189 countries assessed
    2014 2015 Movement*
    Overall ranking 71 73 -2
    Starting a business 107 98 9
    Dealing with construction permits 116 122 -6
    Getting electricity 20 18 2
    Registering property 64 65 -1
    Getting credit 10 12 -2
    Protecting minority investors 174 174 0
    Paying taxes 66 54 12
    Trading across borders 104 102 2
    Enforcing contracts 141 143 -2
    Resolving insolvency 154 155 -1
    * A negative sign indicates a deterioration in ranking out of 189 countries assessed
    Source: World Bank Group, Doing Business 2015

     

    However, this is in the context of other countries' also having taken steps to improve their business environments. In Guatemala, significant progress has been made in two areas: the processes involved in starting a new business; and facilitating the payment of taxes. Details are shown in chart 4.

     

    Chart 4: Improvements to the business environment in Guatemala 2013-15

    2015

    Elimination of certain company registration fees

    Reducing time to publish notice of incorporation

    Improvement to ease of paying tax through enhancement of electronic systems for filing.

    Reduction of capital gains and corporate income tax rates

     

    2014

    Introduction of online platform that permits simultaneous registration of a company with several agencies

    Streamlining of processes for dealing with construction permits

    Introduction of new electronic filing and payment systems to facilitate payment of taxes

     

    2013

    Introduction of a risk based aproval system to facilitate issuance of construction permits

     

     

    Source: World Bank Group, Doing Business Reports

     

    Many of WEF’s basic requirements for a competitive economy are (very) deficient in Guatemala. In the WEF's latest assessment, Guatemala was rated at 109/144 for the quality of its institutions. The rating was dragged down (weak) investor protection standards (where it was placed at 123/144), the reliability of the police force (124), the diversion of public funds (127), the costs of crime and violence (142) and organised crime.  In terms of health and primary education - another basic requirement, the country's overall rating was 100. However, within this the rating for the quality of primary education was a low 130. Across all those factors that the WEF considers to be efficiency enhancers, Guatemala's rating was 76, or broadly in line with its overall competitiveness rating. However, the country was rated at 103 for higher education and training: this included a rating of 127 for the quality of the education system.

    These areas were among the factors identified by the WEF survey respondents as being the biggest problems for doing business in Guatemala.

     

     

    By quite a margin, the two largest challenges were identified as crime and theft (by a weighted 20.4% of responses) and corruption (16.4%). Lesser but still significant challenges include inadequate infrastructure (11.4%), inefficient government bureaucracy (11.0%) and an inadequately trained workforce (10.4%).

    In theory, some progress could be made in addressing the most serious problems if the government had a greater ability to spend more on law & order, primary education and tertiary/technical education. In 2012, the government sought a major tax reform, have broadened corporate and personal income taxes and increased vehicle taxes, while removing a number of VAT exemptions and streamlining customs duties. The reform sought to boost fiscal revenues by 1%-1.5% of GDP over the course of 2013 and 2014. However, as the IMF noted in its September 2014 Article IV consultation, the reform efforts have been disappointing. Legal challenges in the Constitutional Court from vested interests have slowed collections. Meanwhile, administrative problems at the customs and tax agencies have also resulted in revenue shortfalls.

    Organisational changes at the customs and tax agencies are necessary but not sufficient moves for Guatemala's government to reach a point where it has substantial room to ease fiscal policy in the event of a cyclical downturn; and an ability to greatly increase investment in education and law and order. In the meantime, the key metric to monitor remains the ratio of government revenue to debt.

  • Venezuela: The government seeks to nationalise the parallel currency market

    LatinNews 02 March 2015 Hits: 2418

    In mid-February 2015, the left-wing government led by President Nicolás Maduro introduced a new, and third, official currency trading system, the Sistema Marginal de Divisas (Simadi). The main ambition behind the Simadi is that it provides an incentive for parties who would otherwise trade US dollars through the so-called ‘parallel’ (i.e. black) market to deal through institutions regulated by the government. The move by itself is unlikely to resolve the fundamental problems facing the Venezuelan economy, however.

    Individuals and companies in Venezuela wanting foreign currency have been able to go through two official channels. Importers of food, medicine, certain agricultural products (and the manufacturers of these) are eligible to buy US dollars through the Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV) at the main (Cencoex) rate of BF6.3/US$. Other productive sectors could buy currency at two secondary Sicad rates, sold via central bank auction, in which the BCV has set the quantity and the price. The Sicad rates have been BF12/US$ and BF50/US.

    The new Simadi system has three elements. The cash retail element will operate through banks and exchange houses. Individuals will be able to buy or sell dollars at the rate determined the previous day. At exchange houses, purchases of US dollars by individuals will be limited to US$200 per day, up to a monthly limit of US$2,000 and/or an annual limit of US$10,000. The daily limit for individuals is US$3,000 at a bank, with a minimum transaction size of US$300. The cash retail rate will also be used for credit card transactions and customs duties.

    For companies using banks the minimum transaction size is US$3,000. Currency will be purchased or sold at the rate determined on the previous day. However, banks can only deal with their own clients and they cannot trade currency with each other. Furthermore, they cannot hold US dollars (or other foreign currencies) on their own account. If they are net buyers of US dollars from clients on a particular day, they must sell the excess US dollars back to the BCV.

    The third element involves the trading of US dollar-denominated securities through approved brokers. All deals need to be approved by the BCV. The securities are bought or sold at an agreed exchange rate. Again, brokers can only deal with their own clients and cannot trade currency with other brokers or banks. Banks and brokers are, however, allowed to take positions (i.e. they do not have to sell excess US dollars back to the BCV). Parties who receive US dollars from the sale of securities are required to keep the proceeds in a US dollar account with their own bank.

    Since the Simadi system began operating, the exchange rate set has been trading at around BF170|US$, which has been fairly close to the parallel rate (which in February was trading at about BF180|US$). However, the (illegal) parallel market remains in existence. Given that the parallel market provides a forum in which Bolivars can be bought or sold without any records being kept, it is unlikely to disappear entirely. However, the Simadi system should facilitate the supply of otherwise scarce US dollars, and through channels that are controlled and monitored by the government. To the extent that US dollars are sourced through Cencoex or Sicad and then sold through the Simadi system, there will be massive opportunities for arbitrage profits. Without the Simadi system, these profits would have been harder to achieve.

    The Simadi system represents formal recognition by the Caracas government that the currency is grossly overvalued at the Cencoex or Sicad rates. The introduction of the Simadi system can therefore be considered a massive devaluation. In most countries, a devaluation of this extent would be regarded, with good reason, as a sharp reduction in the purchasing power of all citizens with savings in Bolivars. It would also, in most cases, be highly inflationary.

    However, given the already acute shortages of consumer goods in Venezuela, and an already hyper inflationary situation, the introduction of the Simadi system is unlikely to have much of an impact on ordinary households. On 13 February, for instance, the BCV reported that consumer prices had risen by 5.3% in December 2014. For the year as a whole, the official inflation rate was 68.7%. Ominously, even the BCV recognises that prices have been rising most rapidly for basic food and beverage items.

    A major beneficiary of the devaluation may be the state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela SA (Pdvsa). Within Venezuela, Pdvsa typically has substantial net liabilities (i.e. amounts owing to the government, workers, suppliers etc) denominated in Bolivars. When the government devalued the official (Cencoex) rate from BF4.3/U$1 to BF6.3/U$1 in February 2013, Pdvsa had net liabilities equivalent to US$25bn or so. The US dollar value of those liabilities was reduced by US$7.8bn as a result of the devaluation: in Pdvsa’s accounts, which are kept in US dollars, this amount was booked as a gain in 2013. Assuming that the effective devaluation from the introduction of Simadi is treated in the same way, there should be a much more substantial gain recorded in Pdvsa’s books for 2015.

    Pdvsa is by far the most important source of export revenues in Venezuela. Its gross revenues fell from about US$125bn in 2012 to US$114bn in 2013. Given the slippage in the global prices of oil and gas through second half of 2014, revenues almost certainly will have fallen for 2014 and will do so again in 2015. Nevertheless, even if revenues in 2015 drop to say, US$60bn (given the approximate halving of the oil price), the amount of foreign exchange flowing through the company will still be substantial in absolute terms and relative to other metrics of Venezuela’s financial system. For instance, latest data from the BCV indicates that at end-November 2014, broad money (M3) amounted to just under BF1.9trn. Sight deposits accounted for some BF1.36trn of this, with only BF156bn made up of cash and banknotes in circulation. Given the rampant inflation, Venezuelans have been reluctant to keep their Bolivars in savings accounts, which amounted to just BF328bn. The official inflation figures suggest that M3 has been growing by 5%-6% per month, which means that, as of late February 2015, M3 should be in the order of VEF2.25trn. At the Simadi exchange rate of BF170/US$, that is equivalent to a little over US$13bn.

    In other words, the Simadi system makes it much easier for the government (or parties that it can direct) to control or reduce the Bolivar money supply by undertaking sales of US dollars. Currently, foreign exchange reserves held by the BCV amount to around US$22bn (but much of this is illiquid). In an extreme situation, the government could dollarise the economy by buying up all the Bolivars on issue. The main benefit of this would be that it would end hyperinflation and change expectations. However, it would be an extremely unpalatable move politically. It would also greatly increase the risk of a default by the government, in that its expenses would be denominated in hard currency.

    In short, the introduction of the Simadi system by itself does nothing to address the three core problems of the economy and the financial system. These include: the perpetual monetisation of fiscal deficits, which has caused hyperinflation; the shortage of US dollars that the government needs to meet its obligations over the next two years, which has been exacerbated by the slump in energy prices; and the distortions to markets from official controls on prices and quantities. These problems, and the resulting instability in financial markets, look set to continue.

  • Region: Energy subsidies: time for a change?

    LatinNews 02 March 2015 Hits: 3160

    A new paper from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) argues that the fall in energy prices provides an opportunity for governments in the region to reduce fuel and electricity subsidies.

    A February 2015 paper* published by researchers at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) found that across Latin America and the Caribbean, government fuel and electricity subsidies (to reduce costs for consumers) amounted to 1.8% of GDP, on average, over the three years to the end of 2013. Fuel subsidies were equivalent to 1.0% of GDP, while electricity subsidies were slightly lower, at 0.8% (see chart).

     

    Pre-tax energy subsidies

    (% of GDP, average for 2011-13)

    Total

    Fuel

    Electricity

    Low-ranked*, and oil producers

    5.1

    3.7

    1.4

    Venezuela

    8.9

    7.1

    1.8

    Ecuador

    7.5

    7.0

    0.4

    Bolivia

    6.2

    6.1

    0.0

    Argentina

    3.9

    2.1

    1.8

    Belize

    2.7

    0.0

    2.7

    Suriname

    1.7

    0.0

    1.7

    Low-ranked*, and oil importers

    1.5

    0.3

    1.1

    Guyana

    3.0

    1.7

    1.3

    Haiti

    2.9

    0.2

    2.7

    El Salvador

    2.2

    0.7

    1.5

    Nicaragua

    2.1

    0.0

    2.1

    Dominican Republic

    2.0

    0.1

    1.9

    Honduras

    0.9

    0.0

    0.9

    Grenada

    0.9

    0.4

    0.5

    Guatemala

    0.4

    0.0

    0.4

    Jamaica

    0.1

    0.0

    0.1

    Paraguay

    0.1

    0.0

    0.1

    High-ranked*, and oil producers

    1.2

    0.9

    0.3

    Trinidad & Tobago

    2.7

    2.0

    0.6

    Mexico

    1.8

    1.1

    0.7

    Brazil

    1.2

    1.2

    0.1

    Colombia

    0.4

    0.2

    0.2

    Peru

    0.2

    0.2

    0.0

    High-ranked*, and oil importers

    0.4

    0.2

    0.2

    Antigua & Barbuda

    1.2

    0.5

    0.8

    Bahamas

    1.0

    0.4

    0.5

    Panama

    0.8

    0.3

    0.5

    Barbados

    0.8

    0.6

    0.2

    St Kitts & Nevis

    0.6

    0.1

    0.5

    St Lucia

    0.3

    0.3

    0.0

    Dominica

    0.1

    0.0

    0.1

    Uruguay

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Chile

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Costa Rica

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    St Vincent & the Grenadines

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    REGION

    1.8

    1.0

    0.8

    Ex. Low-ranked* and oil producers

    1.0

    0.4

    0.6

    Low income** countries

    2.2

    0.5

    1.7

    *In terms of institutional aspects, such as budget transparency, rule of law, competitiveness and ease of doing business.

    **Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua.

     

    Source: IMF Working Paper 15/30 of February 2015

     

    A separate study by the IMF in 2013 entitled 'Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications’, found that, globally, energy subsidies typically ranged between 0.7% and 2.5% of GDP.

    The latest paper found that, by this metric, subsidies varied very widely across the region. At one extreme, the governments of Uruguay, Costa Rica, Chile and St Vincent & the Grenadines provided essentially no subsidies. At the other, subsidies amounted to 8.9% of GDP in Venezuela. The country’s massive subsidy for fuel, which is effectively free at the petrol pump, accounted for the vast majority of this, representing 7.1% of GDP.

    The IMF researchers classified the countries in four groups. The first group comprises oil producers with weak business operating and legal environments, as ranked by independent research institutes and non-government organisations (which consider institutional aspects like budget transparency, the rule of law, general competitiveness and the ease of doing business).

    The second group included oil-importing countries with weak business operating and legal environments. The third group comprised oil exporters with strong operating environments, while the final group comprised oil importers also ranked highly for their institutional aspects.

    As a general rule, fuel subsidies tend to be higher in countries that are oil producers. In this respect, the region is no different from other parts of the world. Globally, fuel subsidies are larger as a percentage of GDP in Saudi Arabia and Iraq than they are in Venezuela, with Algeria not far behind. The IMF paper also found that fuel subsidies tend to be higher in countries that are rated poorly for their institutional aspects. In the region’s oil producing countries, subsidies normally take the form of administered pump prices. In theory, this is a mechanism to spread the benefits of mineral wealth across society: in practice, it is usually the richer households (who consume the most fuel) that benefit disproportionately.

    In oil importing countries, subsidies often arise from price stabilisation mechanisms: at times of high and volatile prices, these mechanisms involve substantial costs to governments.

    Electricity subsidies, on the other hand, tend to be largest in low-income countries - and especially those in the Caribbean and Central America. In these countries, it is not uncommon for tariffs to be lower than generation and distribution costs. Moreover, fraud and non-payment for power by consumers is often also a problem.

    The IMF identified a number of challenges arising from energy subsidies. Across the region as a whole, governments generally ran fiscal deficits of about 3% of GDP in the three years to end-2013. In a number of countries, there were higher energy subsidies and a worse-than-average budget deficit. Venezuela, where the government was running an estimated fiscal deficit of nearly 15% of GDP, is an extreme example. However, other countries in which energy subsidies were exacerbating relatively large fiscal deficits included Haiti, Mexico, Dominica, Honduras, Guatemala, Argentina and El Salvador. Subsidies represented a sizeable portion of tax revenues in many countries that were rated poorly for institutional aspects and/or were low-income countries. Over the three-year period, examples included Argentina (14%), Bolivia (20%), Haiti (23%), Ecuador (55%) and Venezuela (85%).

    Sometimes, fuel subsidies are not accounted for in a transparent way: however, the IMF noted that stabilisation funds, whose balances adjust in response to changes in energy prices, normally provide a clear picture of what is happening. Sometimes governments are exposed to substantial contingent liabilities arising from the need to provide support power companies or state oil companies that are making low (or no) profits as a result of subsidies.

    Energy subsidies are normally damaging for state-owned oil companies. In Venezuela, the woes of Petróleos de Venezuela (Pdvsa) have been exacerbated by the requirement that it sell refined products on the domestic market at extremely low prices and supply fuel on concessional terms to regional members of the left-wing Venezuelan government’s discount oil scheme, Petrocaribe.

    In Brazil, Petrobras has suffered losses from its domestic refining and marketing operations in recent years, as it has been required by the government to sell refined products at below international prices. However, Petrobras has also enjoyed access to low cost funding through the state owned development bank, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES). In Trinidad & Tobago, the government’s arrears, in respect of subsidies, to the state-owned oil company Petrotrin amounted to 5% of GDP in 2013. However, most of the arrears were paid in 2014.

    Electricity companies have also suffered as a result of subsidies. Typically, the requirement that utilities provide power at below-cost results in underinvestment over the long-term. In Argentina's case, electricity companies have been unable to meet peak demand for power, with the result that blackouts have been common. The IMF also noted: “Haiti appears to be in a circle of high generation costs, low investment, poor service, and high levels of theft and de facto subsidy”.

    Resources allocated to subsidies are resources that are unavailable for other social purposes. The IMF paper observed that, across the region as a whole, energy subsidies were equivalent to around 45% of expenditures on health and education. For low-income countries, the equivalent figure was about 80%. It was 110% or so for oil exporting countries with weak institutions. Electricity shortages tend to have the greatest impact on low-income households, because they have no means to hedge against energy rationing (for instance through the purchase of their own generators).

    Finally, another IMF report, 'Getting Energy Prices Right: From Principle to Practice', published in 2014, notes that energy prices in much of the region are too low, even when there are low or no subsidies. In essence, the rates paid by consumers for power or fuel are too low given the externalities associated with energy use - such as environmental damage, traffic congestion and health problems. That study found that gasoline prices were too low in those countries with subsidies, as well as in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Panama. Countries in which the price of diesel did not include the costs of externalities included Chile, Colombia and, to a lesser extent, Brazil and Peru.

    The IMF argues that the current environment is generally ‘benign’ for the reduction of subsidies. This is partly because of the progress in poverty reduction in Latin America and Caribbean in recent years. It is also because some countries have already embarked on reforms. Furthermore, the fall in energy prices since mid 2014 has served to reduce the cost of many of the subsidies.

    The paper acknowledges that a reduction in or removal of subsidies often results in lower growth and higher unemployment in the short term, with the benefits often only achieved in the long-term. Also, reform is often opposed by vested interests. For this reason, a reduction in subsidies needs to be backed by an effective communications program to emphasise to the public that citizens will benefit over the long-term. Finally, reforms need to take into account political cycles. The paper suggests that reforms be undertaken gradually (and with measures to mitigate their impact on low income groups) and be accompanied by a strengthening of governance structures in state-owned enterprises.

    [*IMF Working Paper WP/15/30 - ‘Energy Subsidies in Latin America and the Caribbean: Stocktaking and Policy Challenges’, February 2015]

  • Commodities: Soya outlook: strong supply, weaker prices

    LatinNews 02 March 2015 Hits: 2564

    The immediate outlook for soybeans is of great importance to Argentina and Brazil, two of the world’s leading exporters. Both have strong reasons to need good export revenues this year. Argentina faces an economic crisis in an election year, while Brazil, where elections were held last year, is struggling to reduce its fiscal and current account deficits as a precondition for economic recovery.

    The global commodities outlook offers a mixed picture for exporters like Argentina and Brazil. The commodities boom is a thing of the past: 2014 was the fourth consecutive year of poor performance by commodities in general. As far as agricultural commodities are concerned, bumper harvests and high stock levels are continuing to hold prices down. On the upside however, it is clear that an adjustment has taken place, and further steep falls in price levels are unlikely. Slower growth in China is now priced in to forecasts; European demand remains poor, but the US recovery is cause for some cautious optimism.

    There may also be some upside from the strengthening US dollar, which has risen by around 17% on a trade-weighted basis since mid-2014. Since prices are set in US currency terms, a rising dollar increases profit margins for non-US commodity exporters (whose main costs are incurred in local currencies), and gives them the option to become more competitive, reducing prices while remaining profitable and therefore gaining market share. In Brazil, where depreciation of the Real against the dollar has also been significant, this has helped boost coffee exports. Brazilian soya exports should also benefit, and are expected to gain market share from US soya exports.

    In the 2014/15-crop year, the overall picture, however, is one of plentiful global grain and oilseed supplies. Soybeans are set for a second consecutive record world harvest. Soybean prices fell 22% in calendar 2014 to an average of 1,019 US cents a bushel. Most forecasters are talking of a similar fall to around 800 US cents per bushel in calendar 2015, but they expect a price recovery to begin to make itself felt in 2016.

    Brazil, now the world’s largest soya exporter, has been on track for a record harvest, but it is experiencing severe drought conditions. In the short term, a truckers’ strike in February has also disrupted export shipments. In the same month, the US Department of Agriculture  (USDA) cut back its estimate for the Brazilian harvest by 1m metric tonnes to 94.5m mt – lower, but still a record.

    Citing ample moisture and mild temperatures, the USDA at the same time raised its estimate for the Argentine crop by 1m mt to 56m mt. The Rosario Grains Exchange is more bullish, forecasting a record harvest of 58m mt in 2014/15, up from its previous estimate of 54.5m mt. The USDA’s figures, which put the global harvest at 315.2m mt, imply that Argentina and Brazil will together account for almost half of that (47.7%). A research note from US investment bank Piper Jaffray, based on a recent visit to soya-growing areas in both countries, says its analysts left with “increased confidence in producing a record crop in the region and a higher level of appreciation for the region’s ongoing drive to adopt technology”.

    The problem, however, is that if international soybean prices fall by around one-fifth this year, export volumes will need to grow by at least the same proportion to maintain the value of export earnings. That seems difficult to achieve, implying that soya export earnings in calendar 2015 will be lower than in 2014.

    According to Finsoport, an Argentine consultancy, the soya harvest there this year is likely to grow by 3% to 55m mt, while soya oil exports will decline by 7.2% in value terms to US$3.24bn, while soya flour exports will drop by 6.8% in value terms to US$11.71bn. Overall, Finsoport believes that Argentina’s maize, soya and wheat exports will drop by 9% in value terms in 2015 to US$22bn. According to Brazil’s ministry of agriculture, despite last year’s fall in soya prices, the ‘soya complex’ was able to achieve a 1.4% increase in the overall value of its exports to US$31.4bn. It will be hard-pressed to remain in positive territory this year. The conclusion for both countries seems to be that soya will remain a vital export commodity, but one that will not deliver increased dollar earnings until 2016.