Exerting power by proxy
Iran's alleged involvement in a range of terrorist activities in Latin America has drawn accusations that Tehran is seeking to use its relationship to the Lebanese-based Shia radical movement Hezbollah, to build up a terrorist network designed to counter US and Israel.
It is the perception that Iran's policy under Ahmadinejad has been crafted to using Latin America as a strategic base for terrorist activity, executed via Hezbollah, that has drawn the attention of Washington and Tel Aviv.
The Bush administration's identification of Iran as its number one global enemy meant that Iranian military or strategic ambitions in Latin America were viewed as part of a grand strategy to foment terror as a tool of state policy in the region. This ideological prism remains in place, despite the change of guard in Washington.
The two large terrorist incidents in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994, allegedly the work of Hezbollah operatives, suggested to many that Iran was the mastermind behind the attacks. Though these attacks have not been repeated, Iran's enemies believe it has not ended its interest in the region.
According to Israel's Foreign Affairs Deputy Minister Daniel Ayalón, the close ties with Venezuela form part of a plan to create an Iranian forward base in the region. Concern that Iran is intent on using Venezuela to circumvent international financial restrictions on terrorist financing, and even planning to site weapons and exploit Venezuela's uranium reserves, are frequently aired.
The accusations reflect a paranoia that is fed by the opaqueness of Iran's foreign policy making mechanisms, and the suspicion that Tehran is seeking to use its links to militant groups such as Hezbollah to assert itself in theatres where Western interests have hitherto prevailed.
The US media in particular paints a dramatic picture of Iran as a font of terrorist financing, linked to guerilla groups and organised crime networks. The Washington Times reported in March 2009 that Hezbollah “is strengthening its ties to Mexican drug cartels". Interpol Secretary General Ronald Noble said in April 2009 that cocaine trafficking in the Americas was being used to finance Hezbollah. In March 2009 congressional testimony, Admiral James G. Stavridis, then-commander of the US Southern Command, said that the main concern about Iran's increased activity in Latin America is its links to Hezbollah, maintaining that there was Hezbollah activity throughout South America and in the Caribbean Basin.
When evidence of malfeasance has been uncovered, the response from the US authorities has tended to be swift. In June 2008, the US Department of Treasury froze the assets of two Venezuelan nationals with suspected ties to Hezbollah. Fawzi Kanaan, who lived in Venezuela and operated two travel agencies, allegedly brought Hezbollah operatives to Venezuela and discussed kidnappings and terrorist attacks with senior Hezbollah officials in Lebanon.
Another Venezuelan national, Ghazi Nasr al-Din, a diplomat based in Lebanon, was alleged to have used his connections in the Middle East to raise funds for Hezbollah.
However, the consistent theme within Iran's relationships with Latin American states - of reality failing to conform to the hype - is evident within the framework of the region's security relationship with Tehran. The wilder accusations levelled at Iran, of building a bridgehead for an anti-American terrorism effort, have foundered on the reality that Iran lacks the resources and wherewithal to mount such an operation - even accounting for the possibility that it should seek to achieve this ambition.
Reports that emerged in the US in 2009 about Iran building a massive embassy in Nicaragua, allegedly the largest diplomatic mission in the city, have, on closer inspection, been revealed to be unfounded. In reality, this mega embassy, which was said to have supported 400 Iranian agents acting as sleeper cells, appears to be the product of the fertile imaginations of Washington's anti-Iranian constituency. Journalists have failed to find a large building, and the Iranian ambassador continues to reside in a rented house.
The gaps between myth and truth should not suggest that Iran does not seek to manipulate its connections to its Hezbollah proxy to its advantage. Rather, that Iran's critics may have misjudged the country's motives in supporting non-state actors like Hezbollah. In any case, since the Buenos Aires attacks of the early 1990s, Hezbollah priorities have moved away from attacks on Israeli or Jewish targets in overseas locations.
Concerns are not just isolated to the activities of Hezbollah. Official Iranian military cooperation has also come under the microscope. US officials suggest that Iranian military advisors have been embedded with selected Venezuelan army units since 2006, with Iranian Revolutionary Guards assisting in organising popular militias.
Iran's Defence Minister Mostafa Mohammed Najjar met Venezuela's vice president and acting defence minister Ramón Carrizález in March 2009 to discuss greater defence cooperation between the two states. Najjar toured Venezuelan defence centres, and explained that bilateral cooperation between Iran and Venezuela would strengthen their deterrent capabilities.
Iranian military manuals discussing asymmetric warfare - adopted as an official doctrine of the Venezuelan military - were also reported to have been uncovered in a Colombian army raid on a camp used by Raúl Reyes, of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Farc) in 2008. Other press reports suggest that Venezuela has, at various points, indicated a willingness to re-sell its US-made F-16 fighter planes to Iran, though military analysts do not take this seriously.
AMIA and after
The ballooning in Argentina's exports to
Iran since 2008 highlights the many contradictions in the country's relationship
with Iran. Formerly close, the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos
Aires, in which 30 people were killed, and the 1994 bombing of a Jewish
Community Center (AMIA) in the Argentine capital, in which 85 people were
killed, undermined relations between Buenos Aires and Tehran. Investigations by
Argentine judicial authorities concluded that the attacks were masterminded and
orchestrated by Hezbollah with Iranian backing.
In October 2006, Dr Alberto Nisman, Argentina's attorney general, revealed the findings of the special team that investigated the terrorist attack that destroyed the AMIA community centre building in Buenos Aires, which said that the decision to attack the building was taken by the 'highest instances of the Iranian government', and that Iran has requested Hezbollah carry out the attack. The investigation concluded that the fundamental reason was the Buenos Aires government's unilateral decision to terminate the nuclear materials and technology supply agreements that had been concluded previously between Argentina and Iran.
International arrest warrants were duly issued for seven Iranians and one senior Hezbollah operative. In March 2007, Interpol's Executive Committee endorsed arrest notices for six individuals: Imad Mughiyeh (a Hezbollah military leader assassinated in Damascus in 2007), Ali Fallahijan, Mohsen Rabbani, Ahmad Reza Asghari, Ahmad Vahidi and Mohsen Rezai. But the Executive Committee withdrew warrants on the former president of Iran, Ali Rafsanjani, the former minister of foreign affairs, Ali Akbar Velayati, and the former Iranian ambassador to Buenos Aires, Hadi Soleimanpour.
Iran has remained steadfast in its refusal to accept the verdict. In the wake of Ahmadinejad's election victory in June 2009, the president's appointment of the suspect Vahidi as defence minister caused outrage, particularly in Israel and Argentina. Vahidi, who has a background in the Revolutionary Guards, received more votes than any other nominee. Such an overwhelming endorsement drew heavy criticism from the US, which said the country was “taking a step backward". “We find today's action disturbing, and, for Iran, it is sending precisely the wrong message," said a US State Department official.
- Iran and Hezbollah
Iran's relationship with Hezbollah dates back to the historic ties between Iranian Shiites and Lebanon's large Shiite community. The formation of Hezbollah in 1982 came in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon that year. Forces were trained and organized by a contingent of Iranian Revolutionary Guards, camped out in the Bekaa Valley. Iranian influence over Hezbollah is exercised through a variety of relationships, including senior Iranian clerics and most importantly, the Ministry of Intelligence & National Security, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and its elite unit, the Qods Force. The IRGC is largely responsible for arming and training Hezbollah's paramilitary forces.
Hezbollah allows Iran to apply pressure by proxy on its key global strategic enemies, the US and Israel, using both covert and overt means. According to the Jamestown Foundation, Iran uses Hezbollah as an instrument to pressure foreign elements that represent a national security threat, while giving Tehran plausible deniability. The relationship is not of puppet master and puppet, as is sometimes portrayed. Reports of coolness between Lebanese Hezbollah and Tehran emerged in 2008 as a result of regional policies adopted by the Ahmadinejad government which caused embarrassment for Hezbollah within Arab circles.