Peru wonders if defeated Humala will go for rebellion
Peruvians will soon see whether their immediate future will bring an insurrection led by the defeated nationalist Ollanta Humala, or an attempt by him to bring about what he has called 'the great transformation' by playing within the rules and building upon his very strong position in congress.
Humala's brother Antauro, on trial for the bloody and abortive January 2005 revolt in Andahuaylas, stated in March that if Ollanta were to be defeated, what would follow would be an armed uprising, the protagonists of which would be the followers of the Etnocacerista movement; the 'reservists' who accompanied him in Andahuaylas. The 'reservists', unemployed young men who have done their military service, are the core of the Etnocacerista movement, inspired by the ideology formulated by Ollanta's father, Isaac, and espoused by Antauro.
Ollanta Humala has repeatedly dissociated himself from the Etnocacerista ideology, from his brother's uprising and from his political ideas. Moreover he has made public his distaste for the mass mobilisation tactics upon which Morales built his ascent to power in Bolivia.
However, as has been noted by the former interior minister, Fernando Rospigliosi, this does not prevent many from attributing to Ollanta the ideas advocated by Antauro, and in many cases this has translated into more, not less, support for Ollanta. According to Antauro, Ollanta's profession of democratic orthodoxy is merely 'tactical'.
In the presidential run-off, from the point of view of geographic spread, Ollanta's performance was far more impressive than that of the victor, Alan García. Ollanta won in 15 of Peru's 24 departments — mainly in the impoverished central and southern Andean ones where most of Peru's indigenous population lives, and in the jungle areas east of the high Andes, which include the coca-growing areas where the remnants of the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas are still active. In Ayacucho (which fits in both categories) and Apurímac (in the second category), support for Ollanta was close to 80%.
In congress, Humala's Unión por el Perú (UPP; the formal suffix 'Partido Nacionalista' has tended to be omitted in the latter stages of the campaign, for obvious tactical reasons) has the biggest bloc, with 45 of the 120 seats. Alan García's Partido Aprista Peruano (PAP) has 36; this is 25 seats short of a majority, whereas the UPP is only 16 seats shy. For García to muster a working majority he must strike alliances with several political parties, one of which has to be the conservative Unidad Nacional (UN), which has 17 seats. Ollanta could conceivably (given negotiating skills as yet to become manifest) mount an opposition alliance capable of blocking García's legislative initiatives.
It is worth recalling that, when questioned during the campaign about how he would cope with the opposite scenario — a hostile opposition majority preventing him from carrying out his programme — Ollanta said he would resort to a constitutional provision allowing the president to dissolve congress and call new elections. Whether García would have the inclination or the wherewithal to do likewise is unclear.
There is, of course, the possibility that Ollanta might try a two-track approach, using unrest prompted by 'overzealous' followers as a means of persuading potential partners in congress that, with their support, he would be able to rein them in.
García, as his first-round rival Lourdes Flores, of UN, has been emphasising, won the runoff on 'borrowed' votes. His first-round performance, which attracted 24% of the vote, certainly shows him up as the second-best choice and hence facing a legitimacy problem. This need not be fatal: Argentina's Néstor Kirchner won the presidency on a similar proportion of the vote and, after having built up a following of his own in mid-term legislative elections, is now seen as likely to win re-election. Humala attracted just over 30% of the vote in the first round.