Shaping the future?

Introduction

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The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean face massive challenges over the next five-to-10 years. To put it bluntly, they do not look particularly well equipped and ready to respond to them. Sluggish economic growth, a lack of competitiveness, inadequate infrastructure, continuing poverty and inequality, accelerating climate change, corruption, and drug cartel-led violence all make up a ‘perfect storm’ of problems that require urgent and sustained attention. But at the same time public confidence in the ability of governments, political parties, legislatures, and other traditional institutions to provide solutions appears to have gone into a downward spiral. Populist leaders of left and right have won elections by blaming the establishment, and by promising quick and apparently pain-free solutions to complex problems. But behind the triumphalist rhetoric, the political noise, and the barrage of ‘fake news’, the problems have not gone away; by some measures, they have worsened.

Could improvements and new ideas come from somewhere else? Might they emerge from outside existing institutions, from the so-called ‘third sector’? Academics have described the public (government) and the private (business) as the first and second sectors. Definitions vary, but the ‘third sector’ is seen as being composed of everything else that is in-between, including charities, think-tanks, and community associations, all coming together under the umbrella term ‘non-governmental organisations’ – NGOs. The ‘in between’ area may also include quasi-non-governmental organisations (known as quangos) – institutions which although funded by governments exercise a significant degree of autonomy. The Brazil-based think tank, Instituto Igarapé, speaks of a “civic space” which it calls “the layer between the state, business, and family”.

What are the reasons for optimism about the role of NGOs? At first glance there are many potential upsides. An over-arching hypothesis is that healthy democracies require a vibrant third sector. NGOs, with their independent focus on a wide range of single issues ranging from human rights through to educational quality, corruption, and the protection of the Amazon, help provide vital democratic checks and balances to the actions of governments. Usually, they campaign for long-term change and are not distracted, as governments frequently are, by the pressing need to win the next elections.

NGOs often provide more credible data – on everything from inflation to annual homicide rates – than what is made available by governments. They directly help many people in need, for example during and immediately after natural or man-made disasters. They try and hold governments accountable for the protection of human rights, and for the defence of political refugees and migrant workers. They provide a centre of expertise for dealing with complex problems and a potential source of advice to complement and enrich the governmental policy-making process. NGOs help make heard the voice of those who are excluded - among them the poor, indigenous and ethnic communities, and the victims of crime.

It is also the case that NGOs are obviously less than perfect. Many have business models which involve fund-raising in the rich, northern hemisphere, to provide services to the poor in the southern hemisphere. This often leads to accusations of a top-down approach which imposes the values of the rich donors. Despite publicly supporting an ethos of collaboration and solidarity, NGOs can be intensively competitive among themselves, fighting for limited funding and offering overlapping and poorly coordinated services. Like governments, they too are vulnerable to the abuse of power. Writing in 2016, US-based activist Michael Edwards warned that at a global level NGOs needed to rethink their role, since they were “too small to be agents of economic transformation; too big and bureaucratic to be social movements; banned from politics because of their charitable status, and structurally removed from the societies they are trying to change”.

The historical background

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There is no single universally accepted estimate of the number of NGOs active in Latin America, and no single taxonomy of the different types of NGO. However, everything indicates that the last decades have seen a significant expansion of NGO numbers and activity, and that NGOs as a group are extremely diverse. A United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco) paper published in 2001 noted the existence of over 200,000 non-profits in Brazil. The paper also cited a census conducted in the early 1990s in Colombia which revealed there were 42,582 non-profits there, with over 2.5m affiliated members, as well as 5,437 NGOs employing around 50,000 paid staff and 700,000 volunteers. Estimates also indicate that there were around 10,000 NGOs in Mexico. According to the UN Development Programme (UNDP) funding from ‘northern’ NGOs (those based in rich countries) to ‘southern’ NGOs (those in the developing world) rose from around US$1bn in 1970 to US$7.2bn in 1990. If the trend continued, it is reasonable to assume funding flows must now be running at various tens of billions of US dollars.

Apart from ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ NGOs, there are many other proposed classifications. Some analysts make a political distinction between ‘neo-liberal’ NGOs – those said to support market-facing reforms and structural adjustment - and ‘progressive’ NGOs, said in contrast to be more inclined to challenge the economic and political status quo. The NGO world is extremely dynamic. Rather like the private sector eco-system, where companies are born, grow, merge, and die, so do the fortunes of individual NGOs ebb and flow over time. Some larger NGOs are established, healthy, and sustainable, but others are part of a more chequered story. Some smaller NGOs come into existence purely to pursue one or two funded projects, becoming inactive once the associated revenue streams dry up. It is suggested that the number of genuinely active NGOs may be significantly lower than the total number registered. Registered NGOs cover wildly differing organisations including cultural and sporting associations and even commercial consultancies posing as non-profits. Some analysts have sought to describe the core entities as Non-Governmental Development Organisations (NGDOs) and suggest they represent around 10% of total registered NGOs.

It is generally agreed that the first Latin American NGOs became active in the early 1950s. An initial focus was on economic development and on calls for modernisation articulated by the region’s ruling political elites. There was a strong emphasis on the kind of charitable and disaster-relief activities supported by the Catholic Church, through organisations such as Caritas. In the 1960s however, many NGOs became more critical of governments, particularly over their response to issues such as poverty, social exclusion, and economic dependence. In part this reflected the emergence of more radical ideas within Catholicism such as liberation theology. As authoritarian and military-backed governments spread in the 1970s, NGOs tended to attract activists from the Church, universities and opposition political parties. Many remained highly critical of governments, seeing themselves in contrast as representatives of civil society.

The big surge in NGO activity came in the 1980s because of various factors, including the ‘re-democratisation wave’ in the region, a perceived failure of the public sector to provide adequate support for the urban and rural poor, the emergence of grass-roots campaigning, and an increase in funds provided by what could be called rich-country donors. It was in these years that many donors came to believe that funding NGOs directly, to implement development programmes, offered better impact and value for money than the more conventional foreign aid route, where project management was left to government departments and agencies and where varying degrees of corruption were suspected. An important factor dating from the 1990s onward was the increasing global concern over climate change and the need to protect the environment. While green activism was and remains a global phenomenon, it is particularly important in the region because of Latin America’s rich and threatened natural resources and biodiversity.

NGO success story: soft drinks in Mexico

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One interesting example of the positive role that NGOs can play, and the way they can interact with other political institutions, was given by the introduction of a tax on high sugar-content soft drinks in Mexico, which came into force in the country in January 2014. The tax on what are called sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) was set at one peso per litre, or around 10% of the price per bottle. Those who supported the introduction of the tax argued that it was necessary and appropriate to counteract the alarming increase in obesity and the prevalence of diabetes in the Mexican population. Subsequent studies have shown that the tax was indeed successful, increasing revenue for Mexico’s finance ministry (Secretaría de Finanzas y Crédito Público – SHCP), and reducing overall SSB consumption by between 6% and 10%.

The tax was the result of the interplay of rival interest groups and lobbies, and of changing political opportunities and circumstances. Soft drinks manufacturers such as Coca Cola remained powerful and influential in the country and opposed the tax. Vicente Fox, who served as president in 2000-2006, was himself a former Coca-Cola chief executive. As a public relations exercise the company had co-sponsored events with the Mexican Diabetes Association and helped fund campaigns to raise awareness of childhood obesity. Also ranged against the tax were groups and trade bodies such as soft drinks industry association Anprac, sugar cane producers (Unión Nacional de Cañeros – UNC), SSB bottling companies, and retail outlets, represented by consumer product industry council CONMexico. They argued that the tax would harm small businesses and employment, was regressive in its effects on the poor, and would not actually reduce the obesity rate.

Ranged in favour of the tax was an NGO, El Poder del Consumidor (Power of the Consumer), which had put together a coalition of 22 other NGOs and civil society groups known as the Alianza por la Salud Alimentaria (Alliance for Food Health). Another alliance of around 40 civil society organisations was known as Contrapeso (Counterweight) and took a public-health perspective, mobilising health specialists and researchers to make the case for reducing sugar consumption. These groups were assisted in 2012 by a US$10m grant from the US-based Bloomberg Philanthropies fund, which allowed them to hire a political strategy and lobbying firm to organise their campaign. This was critical to the eventual success of the campaign. In October 2013 the bill introducing the tax was passed by 317-164 in the Chamber of Deputies and 73-50 in the Senate.

A research paper on the Mexican SSB tax by Erin James, Martín Lajous, and Michael R Reich seeks to apply a conceptual framework originally developed by John Kingdom to analyse how agendas are set in the US federal government. It holds that real changes occur when there is a confluence of three separate streams of activity and analysis – the ‘problem’ stream (recognition that there is an issue that requires a solution), the ‘politics’ stream (background factors and positioning of interest groups which may or may not be favourable), and the ‘policy’ stream (where ideas take shape and options for action are formed). Where these streams come together a window of opportunity for change is created.

According to the analysis, these streams did in fact come together in the Mexican case. The problem was framed as falling oil prices which were reducing the country’s fiscal revenues. The SSB tax, it was argued, would both help raise revenues and at the same time address the underlying health concerns. A new government under President Enrique Peña Nieto had taken office in 2012 promising fiscal reform. NGO strategists therefore positioned the SSB tax as part of that reform and identified Peña Nieto’s first year in office as the optimal period in which to propose changes. They also focused their efforts on the finance ministry, rather than on the health ministry because the new health minister was known for her close links with the soft drinks industry. The NGOs organised public demonstrations and a high-impact advertising campaign which among other things targeted parents, asking if they would give their children “12 spoons of sugar” (the amount contained in a soft drink).

Guardians of the Amazon

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The argument in favour of NGOs is that they may be able to change the world for the better, or, at least, to play a significant role in protecting it. Perhaps the clearest example of the potential soft power of the third sector is its role in seeking to preserve the biodiversity of the Amazon. This particular story also highlights the policy dilemmas and conflicts that many of these organisations end up facing. NGOs have been active in the Amazon for well over half a century. Now, in the 2020s, global warming is being seen as an existential threat to humanity. If governments and civil society fail to reduce carbon and greenhouse gas emissions, and to limit cumulative temperature rises since the start of the pre-industrial age to 1.5 degrees Celsius, the scientific consensus is that the world is going to become increasingly uninhabitable. Fairly or unfairly, what happens to the gigantic Amazon biome will play a large part in determining whether the world avoids ecological disaster. It is therefore not excessively reductionist to say the interplay of NGOs, Brazilian governments, and other international lobbies and interested parties may hold the key to our future.

The key role of the Amazon basin in the current global debate is hard to overstate. The Amazon covers 6.869m square kms, or roughly 40% of the South American continent. It covers nine countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, French Guyana, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela. Brazil has the largest share of the Amazon – about 69% of its total area. The biome is considered one of the most biodiverse areas of the world, with 30,000 species of plants, 2,000 species of fish, as well as reptiles, mammals, and 1,800 species of birds. Critically the Amazon rainforests act as a carbon sink, sequestering CO2 which would otherwise be dispersed into the atmosphere to accelerate the global warming process. The Amazon also regulates cloud convection across the Latin American region. Clouds originated in the Amazon have been called “rivers in the sky” because of their ability to distribute rainfall to remote locations.

The key point is that deforestation – the felling and burning of rainforest for logging, or to make way for mining, hydroelectric dams, cattle ranching, commercial agriculture, highways, and human settlements - has been surging ahead at unsustainable rates. In the years to 2012 it has been estimated that a total of 757,662 square kms of the Brazilian Amazon were deforested, representing 18.6% of Brazil’s total. Estimates of deforestation in the non-Brazilian Amazon are also high. Across both the Brazilian and non-Brazilian Amazon cumulative deforestation was estimated at 1.299m square kms, an area somewhat larger than the entire territory of Colombia. These numbers exclude a subsequent new surge in Brazilian deforestation, experienced during the four-year presidency (starting January 2019) of Jair Bolsonaro, notorious for his climate-change scepticism and his encouragement of accelerated economic development in the Amazon.

Brazil’s thinking about the Amazon has changed over the decades. In the 1950s governments and the wider society were proud of the vast resources in the Amazon and saw the economic potential of the region as something to be celebrated and developed. Governments sought to encourage the population to move away from coastal areas and develop the country’s vast interior (the reasoning behind the opening of a new capital city, Brasilia, in 1960). The military governments of 1964-1985 urged settlement and economic development as a strategic priority. The official view was that the diverse indigenous inhabitants of the biome should be absorbed into modern society, benefiting from education and health services. For nationalists, the Amazon was there to be developed.

In the late 1970s however, a different narrative began to emerge. This was that the Amazon and its inhabitants constituted a unique and valuable eco-system that needed to be protected from unregulated and destructive commercial development. Indigenous communities particularly those which had limited contact with the modern world, needed to be protected, not forcibly integrated. Photographs of forest fires and reports of rampant deforestation caused the post-1985 civilian governments to take a more nuanced position. President Jose Sarney (1985-1990) successfully lobbied for Rio de Janeiro to become the host city for the milestone 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), which helped raise awareness of global warming and was one of the precursors of the Paris climate change conference of 2015 (COP21), which set global GHG reduction targets, and of the follow-up Glasgow Conference in 2021 (COP26).

In the 1980s and 1990s a number of Amazon-focused environmental NGOs were founded in Brazil. Many were home grown organisations such as SOS Mata Atlántica (1986), SOS Amazonía (1988), Fundação Vitória Amazónica (FVA- 1990), and Instituto Socioambiental (ISA – 1994). International environmental NGOs also began to open offices in Brazil. They included The Nature Conservancy (TNC-1988), Friends of the Earth (1989), Greenpeace (1992), and the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF – 1996). This large group of domestic and international organisations became the informal guardians of the Amazon. To a certain extent so too did a range of government agencies with a semi-autonomous role in environmental and indigenous protection, such as Ibama (Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis) and FUNAI (Fundação Nacional do Índio).

Brazilian environmentalist Luiz C Barbosa has produced an interesting classification of the participants and policy position in the Brazilian debate on the Amazon. In essence, he identifies what he calls three political blocs. Bloc one includes all those who prioritise the economic development of the region above all other considerations, for example those that say building large hydroelectric power plants in the Amazon is the best route to reduce the country’s dependence on fossil fuels. This pure development approach is shared by big business, farmers, and many politicians. President Bolsonaro represents a particularly extreme version of this group, as evident in his attempt to dismantle environmental regulation, his support for mining in protected indigenous territories, and his frequent complaints that foreign NGOs are interfering in Brazil’s domestic affairs. Traditionally Brazil’s military strategists have also been part of this group, favouring any measures that build greater presence and economic strength in border and remote locations. They also argue that only Brazilians, and not foreigners, should determine the pace and extent of Amazon development.

Bloc two is formed by opposing leaders and organisations who place a high priority on preserving the environment. It includes scientists and NGOs who value the Amazon’s role as ‘the lungs of the world’ and who want to preserve its biodiversity. As in the other blocs there are some internal differences of emphasis. International NGOs such as Greenpeace and WWF call for zero deforestation while indigenous groups and some small scale extractivists – such as rubber tappers and nut gatherers - argue that both their livelihoods and the forests need to be protected in a balanced manner.

Bloc three attracts a group in the middle that argues for sustainable development, a more explicit combination of conservation and low-harm economic activity for the benefit of current and future generations. Some NGOs are also present in this bloc, along with farmers’ associations. A number of Brazilian governments have, at a rhetorical level at least, spoken of sustainable development but critics say it has been used more as a slogan than as a practical policy. There are differences in how sustainable development should be defined. The three blocs are relatively fluid, and it is possible for lobby groups to move between them. One example of evolving coalitions might be Brazilian farming interests. While many farming groups have been members of Bloc 1 and in favour of the rapid expansion of commercial farming in the Amazon, others, conscious of changing consumer sentiments in key export markets, are more likely to move into Bloc 3, framing their commodity exports as being environmentally friendly.

NGOs and the commodity value chain

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An important development in the various Amazon environmental protection campaigns has been the growing ability of activists to identify, understand, and track global commodity or value-added chains. These chains, part of a globalised economy, have been defined in different ways. They have been characterised as a network of labour and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity or product. The chain is said to link primary production units through a series of ‘boxes’ or ‘nodes’, each performing different aspects of additional processing or distribution, often in different parts of the world, and eventually leading to where the ultimate buyers or consumers are located. As part of their campaign to preserve the Amazon from deforestation or other harmful practices, NGOs have politicised different links in the chain. They have for example highlighted the various phases, locations, and export destinations for the illegal logging of mahogany, or drawn attention to the harmful side-effects of unrestrained commercial expansion of soya production and export.

At present, there is a significant environmental focus on the role of beef and leather produced from cattle raised on illegally deforested land. Particularly in Europe, investors, consumer groups, supermarkets, and retail outlets have become more aware of the deforestation issue, and less prepared to buy products tainted by being linked to deforestation at some points in the commodity chain. In January 2022 those taking distance included the Norwegian government pension fund, which said it would consider de-investing in Marfrig, Brazil’s second largest meat producer, and some European supermarkets such as Sainsbury’s (UK), Carrefour (France), and Lidl and Albert Hejin (Netherlands), all of which announced decisions to remove or restrict the sale of meat cuts from Brazilian suppliers suspected of using cattle grazed on deforested land.

At the Glasgow Climate Summit (COP26) in November over 100 countries, including Brazil, had pledged to end livestock farming on deforested land by 2030, although there was some doubt over the seriousness of Brazilian government’s commitment given the Bolsonaro administration’s pro-economic development stance and the fact that it was already coming to the end of its four-year term in office. A major issue for firms and consumers is that Brazil’s agro-commodity supply chains are complex and loosely regulated, enabling a high level of ‘cattle laundering’. There are an estimated 2.5m cattle ranchers in Brazil, many in isolated areas. Typically, cattle are bought, sold, and moved around different pastures between two and six times before being slaughtered. This makes it is easy to mix ‘dirty’ beef (raised on illegally deforested land) with ‘clean’ beef. Relevant paperwork is also often forged. Major Brazil-based producers such as JBS (the world’s largest meat processor) say they have taken steps to ensure beef bought from direct suppliers is ‘clean’. However, they are less able to vouch for the significant volumes of beef the company acquires from indirect suppliers.

Consumer pressure for ‘deforestation free’ products from Brazil is likely to increase in the next few years, placing much greater demands from supermarkets and others for credible verification processes. The European Commission has drafted a bill to exclude goods produced on illegally deforested land from its supply chains. If approved, this could heavily hit Brazilian exports of beef, wood, soyabeans, coffee, and cocoa; Brazil is the largest supplier of soya, beef, and coffee to the EU. EU parliament members are also seeking to widen the bill’s scope to include not only the Amazon but also additional Brazilian regions where development is threatening biodiversity, such as the Cerrado and Pantanal wetlands.

JBS and other companies will continue to gradually improve their monitoring, including through digital tracking tools and blockchain technology. However, critics say the industry is still too reliant on beef of uncertain origin and has resisted ideas such as obligatory cattle-tagging at birth. Brazil’s meat industry will face the greatest pressure. The extractive and energy sectors can also expect rising levels of scrutiny. The current Brazilian government has a sceptical or even denialist position on climate change, but the next government (due to take office in January 2023) will likely move to a more mainstream approach and will require farmers and others to tighten their environmental and sourcing controls.

Surviving the Bolsonaro years

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In many ways the election of Jair Bolsonaro, a climate-change sceptic and far right-wing nationalist, as president of Brazil for the 2019-2023 term in office was a fundamental challenge to most Brazilian NGOs, and specifically to those campaigning for increased environmental protections. Bolsonaro sought to roll back the clock to the nationalism of the 1970s, where developing the Amazon was seen as essential to strengthen national security. His government sought not only to marginalise the role of NGOs, but also to limit and reduce the work of government-funded quangos created to protect indigenous groups and to control illegal activities such as deforestation and unauthorised mining. A sign of his relative success in achieving these aims was the rapid increase in forest fires and deforestation.

The spread of Amazon fires in 2019 had a major diplomatic impact. French President Emmanuel Macron said his country would not ratify the European Union-Mercosur free trade agreement if Brazil abandoned its Paris Agreement environmental protection objectives. In a notorious incident in that same year, the president claimed that NGOs were themselves setting fire to Amazon rainforests to discredit his government. Bolsonaro said “everything indicates” the NGOs were seeking to “set fire” to the rainforest in retaliation for reductions in government funding, adding “these people are missing the money”. Marcio Astrini, a senior member of Greenpeace, retorted that “this is a sick statement, a pitiful statement…increased deforestation and burning are the result of his anti-environmental policy”.

Bolsonaro’s environment minister, Ricardo Salles, consistently argued for unrestricted Amazon development, but he had to resign in June 2021 after being investigated by Federal Police on charges of illegal logging. According to a report by the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Salles initiated 57 legislative measures to weaken conservation efforts and favour agricultural interests. During his time in office, he cut staffing and budgets at key environmental bodies, including the environmental protection agency (Ibama), the national institute of space research, and the Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (ICMBio). Notoriously Salles also blocked the activities of the Amazon Fund, a green investment agency part-funded by Germany and Norway.

Bolsonaro did not attend the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow in November 2021, but at least partly due to the actions of NGOs, the Brazilian delegation appeared to be willing to make some concessions. The country said it would raise its target for greenhouse gas emissions reduction to 50% by 2030, up from 43% previously. It would also bring forward the deadline for achieving a net zero carbon economy to 2050 and eliminate illegal deforestation by 2028. During the conference Brazil also pledged to help cut global methane emissions by 30% by 2030. However, there was scepticism over the government’s commitment since there was little explanation of how these goals would be achieved. These suspicions were boosted when, just after the conference, INPE, Brazil’s space research agency, reported that annual deforestation of the Amazon rose by 22% to reach 13,235 sq kms in the year to July 2021. Local media reported that the government had deliberately delayed the data release until after COP26. Environment Minister Joaquim Leite said the data showed the challenge ahead and that the government needed to take “more forceful” action against deforestation. But these statements appeared to do no more than reflect the government’s strategy of promising to improve its management of the Amazon while taking little actual action.

Haiti and the NGO global debate

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On 12 January, 2010 Haiti was struck by a catastrophic earthquake that killed well over 100,000 people and affected the lives of at least 3m. In a country with already extreme levels of poverty and inequality, around 250,000 homes and 30,000 commercial buildings were destroyed. Many countries and NGOs sought to respond rapidly with humanitarian aid. However, resources were limited compared to rebuilding needs, and economic recovery was slow. As late as 2017, seven years after the quake, the UN was reported saying at least 2.5m people were still in need of humanitarian aid.

Although not immediately evident at the time, the Haiti earthquake also posed a major threat to the reputation of a number of international NGOs, and particularly to Oxfam, the UK-based charity focused on poverty reduction, humanitarian aid, and economic development. In 2018 allegations emerged that some members of Oxfam had sexually abused victims of the earthquake. Based on evidence from a whistle-blower, it was alleged that Oxfam employees, including a former country director, had used prostitutes, some as young as 12 or 13. Four people were sacked and three resigned. A subsequent report by the UK Charity Commission published in 2019 confirmed the allegations and was severely critical over the way Oxfam had responded to them, accusing it of “mismanagement” and of tolerating “a culture of misbehaviour”.

The report said Oxfam had initially tried to cover up the extent of the sexual exploitation and the involvement of a senior manager. Inappropriate behaviour had not been limited to Haiti, with evidence that there had also been abuse in Oxfam’s network of UK charity shops, where there had been at least 16 incidents involving volunteers under the age of 18. Charity Commission chief executive Helen Stephenson said, “Over a period of years, Oxfam’s internal culture tolerated poor behaviour, and at times lost sight of the values it stands for.” The report said Oxfam had placed its own reputation and its relationship with donors above the need to protect victims.

At one level the events at Oxfam could be seen as unexceptional: abuse of power, sexual exploitation, bullying, misogyny, and racism have been detected to differing degrees in almost all types of organisations, and there is nothing to say the NGO sector is somehow exempt from such harmful behaviour. At another level, however, the revelations were truly shocking, precisely because Oxfam, in line with other NGOs, claim to conform to a higher ethical standard. The scandal set off a domino effect of negative outcomes: Oxfam was banned from Haiti, suffered significant drops in member-generated revenue, and saw a reduction in government funded income. Authoritarian governments already suspicious of the work of NGOs gained a further excuse to limit their activities.

More widely, the Haiti case set off a degree of soul-searching among NGOs. A number, including Oxfam, Save the Children, and Amnesty International have made internal changes designed to improve their work culture and strengthen personnel management. Most remained convinced they continue to have a positive role to play providing essential support and services, security and rights, and by doing so, contributing to strengthening democracies.

But there may be greater awareness of weaknesses and shortcomings. Those involved in the debate have cited the dangers of excessive bureaucracy, self-promotion, and of becoming too distant from the people they are supposed to serve. They also highlight that NGOs have unequal access to funding and that the desire to maintain those revenue flows can distort their priorities. NGOs reliant on funding from the richer north may, for example, impose certain values and approaches on aid recipients in the poorer south. At worst, NGOs may be seen as modern-day agents of old-style colonialism.

Among discussions of potential solutions some activists have suggested greater ‘localisation’ – where decisions should be taken closer to the communities in need of assistance, and for more to be done horizontally through coalitions of NGOs and other groups. It remains unclear how fast NGOs may respond to these challenges. Analyst Michael Edwards reaches the conclusion that “to achieve their stated goals of abolishing poverty, curbing inequality, ending injustice and addressing the climate emergency, NGOs will have to accept a smaller role in a larger system, since that it the only way that enough pressure for change can be mobilised and exerted”.

Argentina fighting for the disappeared

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Home grown NGOs also encountered difficulties as they grew or adjusted to changing circumstances. This has applied, for example, to the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, one of the most iconic and long-lasting civil society organisations in the region. The organisation came into existence in Argentina over four decades ago in April 1977 when a group of mothers of young victims of the Argentine military dictatorship began demonstrating every Thursday, wearing white headscarves, in the square in front of government house (Plaza de Mayo). Their main demand was that their children, many of whom had been kidnapped and tortured and whose fate was unknown, be returned to them alive. They served as a rallying point for opposition to the military regime, accused of killing up to 30,000 citizens (the number is disputed). The government responded by calling them the Plaza de Mayo locas (literally, madwomen, but the word is also used in slang to mean prostitutes). Some of the original Mothers were themselves kidnapped and murdered by clandestine military units.

After the return of democracy in 1983 the mothers continued holding their weekly marches, lobbying for the prosecution and sentencing of members of the former military government on charges of crimes against humanity (the key leaders were eventually sentenced, many to life imprisonment, in 1985). The Mothers were also intensely active in the search for their grandchildren, many of whom had been given away for adoption after their parents were killed by the military.

In 1986 the movement split into two separate groups. One, called Madres de la Plaza de Mayo-Línea Fundadora focused on developing human rights legislation, continuing to search for and identify the bodies of their disappeared relatives, and to trace adopted grandchildren. The other, called Asociación Madres de la Plaza de Mayo and led by Hebe de Bonafini, one of the higher profile leaders, took a more activist political line. A third group is known as the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo. Bonafini’s wing of the movement aligned itself closely with the faction of the Peronist party known as kirchnerismo, loyal first to President Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and then, after his death, to his widow and successor in the presidency, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015).

Bonafini in particular earned a reputation for outspoken and controversial views, attacking Argentina’s centrist or centre-right governments and reacting to the 11 September 2001 attack on the twin towers in New York by saying she was “happy” that the United States, which she described as “one of the most terrorist of all countries”, was for once on the receiving end of acts of violence. She also spoke out in support of ETA, the Basque separatist guerrilla group in Spain. Her friendship with president Fernández de Kirchner also led to a rapid, and with the benefit of hindsight, imprudent expansion of the organisation, which had developed radio and TV programmes and the beginnings of a university.

In 2005-2011 it was involved in running a large government funded social housing programme called Sueños Compartidos (Shared Dreams). Bonafini subsequently claimed that the financial side of the operation was entirely managed by Sergio Schoklender, a former convict she had befriended and treated almost like a son. Schoklender, along with his brother Pablo, had been tried and sentenced in the 1980s for murdering their parents in a high-profile case. Schoklender left the organisation in 2011; after that, Bonafini accused him of financial fraud. According to a subsequent investigation only 822 homes were built, despite the Mothers having received funding for 4,757 units. A report by the national audit office suggested at least US$52m had been illicitly diverted. Bonafini was briefly declared bankrupt in 2016 but legal proceedings against her have been inconclusive. She accused Schoklender of betrayal and the subsequent centre-right government of Mauricio Macri of trumping up charges against her for political reasons. The chequered history of the association is for some an indication of the dangers of excessive politicisation of NGO activity.

Under attack in Mexico

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Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) a veteran politician of the Mexican left, took office on 1 December 2018, at the start of a six-year term. With his background as a long-standing critic of previous centrist and right-wing governments, as a supporter of human and migrant workers’ rights, and as a critic of heavy-handed militarised policing, there were reasons to believe his presidency might open up new opportunities for mutually beneficial collaboration between the government and civil society. As a presidential candidate AMLO had promised to expand social programmes to help the vulnerable. Yet for a variety of reasons the relationship between government and civil society worsened dramatically after he took office. In part this may have been due to what could be called the president’s pre-existing support for an authoritarian, populist, illiberal form of democracy. In part also, AMLO changed his own positions after coming to power – for example he moved to support the kind of militarised public security interventions that he had previously criticised. Policy failings by Mexico’s NGOs and quangos may have also had some degree of responsibility for the rapid cooling of the relationship.

As early as February 2019 relations became strained when the new president stated that his government would no longer fund NGOs. This was an important policy shift. A succession of previous governments had funded NGOs in effect as sub-contractors to deliver social programmes through a variety of mechanisms including donations, subsidies, work agreements, and social co-investment programmes, often coordinated by a government body, the National Institute for Social Development (Indesol). Government departments such as the ministry for the environment and natural resources (Semarnat) also traditionally worked closely with NGOs.

According to AMLO the new policy was designed to cut out all intermediaries. NGOs, he argued, harboured their own commercial interests, tended to misuse public resources, and were linked, through conservative and neo-liberal interests, to a right-wing agenda. An excessive number of intermediaries, in any case, were seen as creating opportunities for adding on costs, profiteering, and corruption. Instead, money would be distributed directly to individual beneficiaries and vulnerable groups. NGO activists noted that this approach - with cash sometimes handed out in brown envelopes to intended beneficiaries - could itself be vulnerable to similar or even greater risks of inefficiency, corruption, and politicisation. Coupled with this decision, and as part of the president’s commitment to budget austerity, the new government also began to cut the funding available for quangos, such as environmental protection agencies the National Commission for Forests (Conafor), the National Commission for Natural Protected Areas (Conanp), and the National Fund for Natural Disasters (Fonden), all of which suffered severe funding reductions.

The policy had some immediate downsides. There was insufficient federal support to fight a series of wildfires which broke out in natural reserves including La Encrucijada in Chiapas and the Sian Ka’an Reserve in Quintana Roo. The government however prioritised new high-profile multi-billion-dollar projects such as the Mayan Tourist Train (designed to help develop the impoverished south of the country but cutting through ancestral indigenous lands) and a massive new petrol refinery at Dos Bocas in Tabasco. Considering the negative impacts of these projects Greenpeace concluded that environmental protection was simply “not a priority” for the AMLO administration.

In early 2019 Juan Martin Perez, of REDIM, the Network for Infant Rights in Mexico, said that aid organisations helping low-income communities, the homeless, prisoners, and those with medical conditions had been “forgotten by the government”. Given the funding cuts he added “there is a risk that some NGOs may stop operating since the support granted by the state was completely vital for the continuation of their work”. Overall, the cut in government funding for NGOs was estimated at around US$321m per annum. NGOs responded by seeking out alternative funding streams, but the abrupt change nevertheless forced many to suspend some of their activities.

The government’s ‘go it alone’ approach to social programmes earned it some additional direct criticism. One of AMLO’s signature programmes, called Sembrando Futuro (Seeding the Future), pays farmers in southern Mexico to plant and maintain trees in recently deforested areas. The idea is that by being paid a regular income to replant trees, the farmers will be drawn away from illicit drug cultivation and membership of criminal cartels. The programme is therefore seen as simultaneously reducing poverty and conserving the environment. Total funding is reportedly in the vicinity of US$3bn, and AMLO has been arguing that his programme could be extended, with US assistance, to the Northern Triangle countries of Central America where it would help reduce illegal migration flows heading north to Mexico and ultimately to the United States. However, there have been numerous reports that the programme is not sufficiently monitored and from a technical point of view is poorly designed. Some of these reports suggest that, in a completely counterproductive manner, some farmers have been cutting down their forests, so that they can qualify to receive the re-planting subsidy.

The AMLO government took further action to squeeze NGO finances. In the federal budget ‘miscellany’ law for 2022 income tax regulations were modified to limit tax relief on donations by individuals to charities. Whereas before the rules allowed 15% of income used for certain personal expenses to be tax deductible, with an additional amount of up to 7% of revenue reserved for tax-free charity donations, the new approach sets an upper limit of 15% of income for both types of tax-free contributions. As a result, it is estimated that over 5,000 Mexican NGOs may see their income fall in 2022. NGOs say they are now suffering a form of financial asphyxiation as government officials have asked them to raise at least 50% of their income from private sources, but at the same time are making it more difficult for them to raise income from donations.

Also as part of the 2022 budget cutbacks the AMLO government decided to close down Indesol, since its main role, to distribute funds to NGOs, was deemed no longer necessary or required. Announcing the closure AMLO claimed, without producing any supporting evidence, that there had been waste and duplication and that most NGOs in Mexico and elsewhere do not produce auditable accounts (a claim denied by most). Indesol had been set up in 1994. The abrupt closure put a number of ongoing social programmes in doubt, including a programme designed to help women victims of domestic violence, to promote gender inclusion, and to train social workers.

At the political level, AMLO has been consistently outspoken in his attacks on NGOs. In May and June 2021, he focused on US-funding for Mexico based NGOs. “You cannot receive money from another country for political purposes. It is treason to your country. It’s interference, interventionism, and it is in favour of a coup” the president said in one of his daily press conferences. The foreign ministry formally asked the United States government to freeze funding for the investigative website Mexicanos Contra la Corrupción y la Impunidad (MCCI) and for Article 19, an international NGO which has a Mexico office and that campaigns in defence of press freedoms.

Pro-government media outlets have taken anti-NGO positions and identified leading civil society figures as political opponents. Among them there has been a particular focus on Claudio X González, a member of the MCCI NGO board who has led various civil society campaigns, including some criticising AMLO’s newly created National Guard and his project to build a new airport in Mexico City. AMLO has singled out González for criticism partly because he was a member of the preceding government of Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018).

News outlet SinEmbago, aligned with the government, has claimed that NGOs are controlled by a group of intellectual and business leaders close to the five presidents who preceded AMLO’s term in office. Alejandra Sala-Porras, a pro-government academic at state university UNAM, has asserted that Mexican NGOs are positioning themselves to become a direct alternative to AMLO’s government “because existing electoral alternatives are looking very weak”. She also claimed NGOs were close to taking political control in various states, building an alternative power network and seeking to thwart the government by challenging its actions in the courts and by securing obstructive injunctions.

The government has reacted with hostility to NGO and media criticism, particularly around issues such as corruption, which may explain why it has targeted MCCI and other anti-corruption campaigners so intensely. An example came in February 2022 when MCCI published two reports which directly angered AMLO. One stated that, mid-way through the AMLO presidency, eight out of ten government procurement contracts were still being awarded directly, without competitive bidding, increasing the risk of corruption and contradicting a specific electoral promise made by AMLO to reduce that proportion.

In association with investigative news outlet Latinus, MCCI also claimed that AMLO’s elder son, José Ramón López Beltrán, had been living in a luxurious house in Houston, owned by an executive at oil services company Baker Hughes, which in turn had multi-million-dollar contracts with Pemex, Mexico’s state oil company, therefore suggesting at least the possibility of a conflict of interest. Other members of the president’s family have also been implicated in potential improprieties. His brother, Pío López Obrador, continues under investigation after videos appeared showing him receiving stacks of cash during the 2018 election campaign. Following other press reports the government has also said contracts awarded by Pemex to a company linked to AMLO’s cousin, Felipa Obrador, have been cancelled after separate suggestions of a conflict of interests. AMLO responded by delivering a sharp personal attack on the prominent Latinus journalist Carlos Loret de Mola, who the president described as a “coup monger, corrupt, mercenary, without principles and without ideals”. Responding to negative stories by attacking journalists that report them is a regular feature of presidential press conferences

Dictators don’t like NGOs

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As has been seen, there are reasons to believe that a strong and vibrant civil society is positive for democracies in Latin America. That point, however, does not stand uncontested. NGOs, as has also been seen, like other parts of society, are prone to inefficiency, institutional weakness, over-politicisation, divisiveness, and even corruption and unfairness. While on balance positive, the presence of thousands of NGOs in most Latin American countries does not automatically preserve democracy or guarantee development and social inclusion. However, it is also interesting to turn that question around. There is strong evidence that Latin American dictators and authoritarian leaders invariably, or almost invariably, come into conflict with NGOs and end up persecuting them as perceived threats to their desired monopoly of political power. There is a large playbook on how dictators do this.

In El Salvador, for example, after winning a landslide election victory in 2019, President Nayib Bukele has shown increasingly authoritarian tendencies. Bukele has in fact adopted the approach taken by Vladimir Putin in Russia. Putin approved a ‘foreign agents’ law, turning employees of internationally funded NGOs into ‘suspect persons’. In 2021 Bukele used his majority in the legislature to pass similar legislation forcing NGO employees to register with the government and to become liable for a 40% tax on any funds received from outside the country.

In November of that year the national police (PNC) and the attorney general’s office (FGR), both controlled by Bukele loyalists, raided seven NGOs: the association of community projects (Procomes); women’s rights groups Mélida Anaya Montes and Asociación de Mujeres Tecleñas; democracy & social development NGO Fundaspad; Una Mano Amiga, an organisation which helps victims and those affected by gangs; humanitarian group Asociación Salvadoreña de Ayuda Humanitaria PRO-VIDA; and environmental group Fundación Ambientalista de Santa Ana. The FGR claimed it was pursuing “anomalies” in 32 agreements reached by the NGOs and government departments. The NGOs countered that they were the victims of political persecution. Separately, two US Representatives called for the repeal of the foreign agent’s law, arguing that it gives “limitless discretion to the executive branch to shut down independent organisations under a guise of protecting public order”, and adding it would also “impact independent journalism, while imposing crushing tax penalties on charity groups and faith-based organisations working to help the most vulnerable Salvadoreans”.

The left-wing authoritarian regime of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, under popular pressure since 2018, has also persecuted NGOs. In December 2021, for example the pro-government National Assembly withdrew legal recognition from a further nine locally based NGOs, bringing the total that had been banned to 61. On this occasion a diverse group was shut down, including tourism associations Cantur and Futurismo, federation of private universities Cosup, the association of Nicaraguan economists, and Fundación Veritas Humanas. The decision to withdraw legal recognition was supported by 84 of the 91 members of the legislature. The decision was justified by government officials who said the NGOs had not filed all the necessary paperwork including detailed accounts and financial agreements, as well as anti-money laundering and counter the funding of terrorism (AML/CFT) procedures and protocols. The government said it would seize all the assets of the affected NGOs. Earlier closures had included the local offices of foreign NGOs such as Oxfam Ibis (Netherlands) and the US National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.

Panama: civil society vs political parties

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An important question concerns the role that NGOs may be able to play in a situation where citizens are losing confidence in democracy and democratic institutions. Arguably, this is exactly what has been happening in the region over the last ten years. Traditional or mainstream democratic systems seem to have been unable to provide workable solutions to a range of problems including crime, corruption, unemployment, poverty, and inequalities of income. Even countries widely regarded as stable democracies such as Chile have suffered angry waves of street protests. The two largest countries in the region, Brazil and Mexico, have populist leaders who have displayed openly anti-democratic tendencies.

Support democracy over all other forms of government
Latin America 1995 – 2020 (% of positive responses)

Source: Latinobarómetro

Latinobarómetro, the opinion polling company that has been periodically tracking attitudes to democracy since the 1990s across 18 countries in the region, shows that the proportion of respondents who agree with the view that “democracy is preferable to all other forms of government” peaked at 63% in 2010 and has trended down fairly steadily since them to reach 49% in 2020. This means that today, less than half the total population of the region supports democracy. Among those who don’t support democracy, 11% have no opinion, 13% say they prefer authoritarian governments, and 27% pronounce themselves indifferent to the form of government that they live under. The opinion polls also reveal that political parties – a key component of democratic institutions are among the least trusted of all.

Trust in political parties
Latin America 1995 – 2020 (% of positive responses)

Source: Latinobarómetro

Across the region there is what could be called a serious confidence deficit. The only institution trusted by more than half the respondents is the Church (61%). Beneath it come the military (44%), the police (36%), and the presidency (32%). Lower down come the electoral authorities (31%), the government (27%), the judiciary (25%), Congress (20%), and, least trusted of all, the political parties (only 13%). The political parties have suffered a long process of attrition and decadence, often fragmenting into smaller units, with politicians held in contempt for their perceived opportunism, corruption, and lack of new ideas, ethical standards, or credible policies.

This crisis in political representation is evident at many different levels. Truthfully or not, more and more politicians have tried to present themselves as outsiders not connected to the established political class. Abstention rates have gone up. Presidents have been increasingly prone to attempts at impeachment, some of them successful. Celebrities including TV and sports personalities have entered politics in an effort provide a less drab alternative to the discredited politicians. One candidate even ran for high office on the slogan that he was “neither corrupt nor a thief”.

Could the decadence of politicians create an opportunity for civil society to play a more active role? Clearly this is a possibility that could happen in many different ways. Elected governments could co-opt NGO policies and personnel to help formulate and deliver their policies. If actors, business leaders, football stars, former judges and comedians can be elected, it is not inconceivable that a leading figure from the NGO world might join them. Such an alliance would be complex, since NGOs are largely one-issue, specialised organisations, working with a medium to longer-term perspective, while politicians are generalists with a short-term focus on the next elections.

The case of Panama offers a glimpse of some of the issues that may be involved. By regional standards Panama is a wealthy country with solid institutions. It has enjoyed political stability for over three decades since the US invasion of 1989, which deposed General Manuel Noriega and allowed a restoration of civilian rule. In the first two decades of the 21^st century Panama experienced some of the fastest economic growth rates in the region. Despite this, however, there was (and still is) a sense of deep malaise. Corruption and crime are significant and apparently ever-advancing problems. Support for democracy has steadily eroded, from a high of 75% in 1996 down to 35% in 2020 (much lower than the regional average). Only 12% of the population trusts politicians. Elected leaders have repeatedly promised to crack down on corruption, to reform the electoral system, and to reform the constitution, but none of these things have been achieved.

In fact, in recent years various consultation exercises involving civil society designed to build support for change appear to have been blocked due to opposition from an entrenched political class in the legislature (Asamblea Nacional - AN). Ahead of the 2024 elections the national electoral reform commission (Comisión Nacional de Reformas Electorales – CNRE) a body in which political parties, the electoral tribunal (Tribunal Electoral – TE), business, trade unions, and civil society organisations are all represented, held 23 meetings and agreed a 323-article draft intended to be put forward to amend and improve existing electoral legislation. However, the AN immediately deleted 75 of the proposed articles, including provisions for better gender balance and specific rules to allow a larger role for independent (non-party) candidates. It also removed the obligation to submit campaign accounts, undermining election funding transparency and anti-corruption objectives.

A separate consultation process, known as Pacto Bicentenario ‘Cerrando Brechas’, was also expected to meet resistance. Conducted mainly through an online portal, it captured 175,000 citizen proposals for reform, which regional and national committees then refined into 187 action points. According to the government, it was the largest consultation process of its type in Panama's history and involved 215,000 people. Most proposals related to requests for better infrastructure, followed by improved health, water, and education services. Other action points are to do with decentralisation, crime, the need to reform the constitution, environmental sustainability, socioeconomic inclusion, and access to technology. Although on paper President Laurentino Cortizo's government holds a legislative majority, some deputies in his coalition who normally support him, along with their colleagues in other mainstream parties, are unwilling to support major reforms, which will limit what the president can achieve. The likely outcome is that the president will only be able to deliver piecemeal reform during the rest of his term.

The failure of mainstream politicians to deliver reform in Panama has led a proportion of the population to put their faith in independent candidates. In the 2019 presidential election Ricardo Lombana, an independent candidate, came third, with 18.8% of the vote. In addition, five independents were elected to the 71-seat legislature. Lombana is familiar with the NGO world, having been involved in an anti-corruption campaign called ‘Juego Limpio Panama’ (Play Fair Panama). He has declared his intention to run again in 2024 and has now created a political party, known as Movimiento Otro Camino.

Conclusion: civil society is delivering change

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NGOs operating in Latin America are so numerous and so diverse that it is difficult to arrive at conclusions that are applicable across countries and very different types of organisations, issues, and campaigns. This report mentions only some of those that have developed in the last few years. However, it does seem possible to make two main points.

The first is that civil society matters, particularly as far as new ways of thinking and addressing problems is concerned. The NGOs that focused on protecting the Amazon, or human rights organisations, have raised awareness and helped change the way societies think about things. While global warning remains an existential challenge, public opinion is now more aware of the problem, thanks in part to the NGOs. Likewise, while Latin American democracies are flawed, civil society activists have helped identify potential ways of repairing them based on respect for human rights and the development of responses to corruption and crime.

The second point is that the future role of NGOs is uncertain but still immensely important. Some may be crushed by authoritarian governments, and some may make errors of judgement. There is no guarantee that NGOs will help necessarily repair the ‘democratic deficit’ in Latin America, but in the next five years some may have an opportunity to try.

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