The death of bin Laden does not mean the end of bin Ladenism
At moment's like this, when there is wall-to-wall media coverage and everyone has an opinion, it is helpful to keep focused on a few key points. For us, there are three:
1. The death of Osama bin Laden makes a victory for the Taleban in Afghanistan more not less likely. The domestic/financial pressure on the US to declare victory and leave will be huge, and the prime beneficiary will be the Taleban, which began a new spring offensive on the day that Bin Laden was killed. Already the Russians have decided that a negotiated settlement with the Taleban is essential, and that view will grow in strength. Immediately after the death of Bin Laden was announced, Afghanistan's President Hamed Karzai called on the US to stop the war on terrorism on Afghan soil. He said: "I call on Nato that war on terror should not be carried out in Afghan villages and houses. They should stop this. On yesterday's incident they found Osama in Abbottabad. Osama was not found in...[Afghanistan]. They found him in Abbottabad, Pakistan..."
2. The real battle between Osama bin Laden and the West has been for the future of the Middle East. Bin Laden believed in the expulsion of Western influence and the establishment of Islamic rule. The West, on the other hand, believed that Turkish-style secular democracies could be established - and, until that moment, secular dictatorships would be better than the Islamist alternative. Bin Laden did not achieve what he intended with his 9/11 attacks, but he will have died in the knowledge that the Arab Spring has decisively undermined the legitimacy of the secular and pro-Western Arab autocracies (although some will survive), and that it is no more likely that the future Middle East will be dominated by pro-Western secular democracies than by Islamist-oriented states more akin to the type for which he spent his life fighting.
Egypt is the key battleground. It may still be too early to say for certain whether the eventual outcome in Egypt will be closer to the Bin Laden vision for the Middle East or to the West's, but as of today the Muslim Brotherhood looks better placed than its opponents to become the dominant political force.
3. The third point concerns Israel. Bin Laden's ultimate goal was the destruction of Israel, and he lived just long enough to see the possible beginnings of a decisive strategic shift against Israel. Again, Egypt is the key, and Israeli concerns over Egypt were well put by a senior official on 1 May. He confided to The Jerusalem Post: "We are troubled by recent developments concerning Egypt. We are troubled by the voices calling for the abrogation of the peace treaty. We are troubled by the rapprochement between Iran and Egypt, and we are troubled by the upgrading of the relationship between Egypt and Hamas."
Israel has been unchallengeable since 1973, but it is now possible to envisage a strategic environment developing in which Egypt moves decisively away from Camp David; Iran survives the Arab Spring with its nuclear programme intact and with enhanced influence in Iraq, the Gulf States, Syria, and Lebanon; the Arab Spring pushes Jordan in a more Islamist and anti-Israel direction; and Syria (either under a surviving pro-Iranian Alawite regime or a successor Sunni regime) remains hostile to Israel. Further afield, a re-Talebanized Afghanistan could provide refuge for post-bin Laden al-Qaeda, with long-term instability in Libya and Yemen providing additional refuge and opportunities for recruitment.
The death of Bin Laden does not mean the death of Bin Ladenism or of his vision for the Middle East. On the contrary, it is possible that his cause will even be helped by his demise.
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