War in Colombia demands greater involvement, says US military study
The Uribe administration has launched `Plan Patriota', a major military offensive aimed at completely eradicating the presence of the Farc guerrillas in the centre and south of the country. Officials have privately said this drive is crucial to the resolution of the war. US military sources, however, have been arguing that victory in the Colombian war, realistically redefined, will not be possible without much greater US involvement - and that of the neighbouring countries.
Publicly, the Colombian government has been playing down the magnitude of Plan Patriota and the hopes attached to it: the official line is that it is just expanding upon a strategy tested on a limited scale last year. The outgoing chief of the US Southern Command, General James Hill (who has spent much time lately lobbying the US Congress for the increase in US troops and mercenaries recently requested by President George Bush Jr) has said that Colombia has put into effect `an operational and tactical plan that will literally take the battle to parts of Colombia where there has not been a troop presence for 15 or 20 years'.
The newspaper El Tiempo, citing defence sources, reports that Plan Patriota involves mobilising 14,000 to 17,000 troops in an effort to seize guerrilla strongholds in four departments strung south of Bogotá all the way to the border with Ecuador: Meta, Guaviare, Caquetá and Putumayo. All the forces involved will be highly mobile units that have been trained in jungle-warfare tactics; the larger ones will concentrate on seizing territory - an endeavour that could demand up to a year - while commando teams will penetrate deep into Farc territory to concentrate on `high-value targets' (a continuation of what has been described as the `decapitation' campaign).
This offensive is an enlarged version of the Libertad 1 campaign conducted in mid 2003 in Cundinamarca, the department surrounding Bogotá. The `decapitation' effort there yielded five Farc unit commanders; the broader drive greatly reduced the presence of the Farc around the capital and along its old `safe' routes south.
The Farc has reported a deployment towards the south and southeast of military forces `in a chain formation' plus the despatch of a mobile brigade and the opening of a `corridor' - all of which, the Farc assumes (probably for public consumption), is aimed at rescuing the `prisoners of war', or hostages, held by the guerrillas.
A candid assessment
How much of a difference will this offensive make? To judge from a study recently published in the US army's Military Review, it may add to the Colombian government's advantage, but will still leave it far from victory. The study, entitled `Expanding Roles and Missions in the War on Drugs and Terrorism: El Salvador and Colombia', was penned by General Alfred Valenzuela and Colonel Victor Roselló. The former is commander of the Texas-based US Army South; the latter, deputy commander-operations.
Valenzuela and Roselló say, `The ultimate military victory would be Farc's destruction, the dismantling of its entire coca drug network, and the end of the war on drugs in the United States. These will be achieved only when Colombia, neighbouring Latin American states, and the United States are totally committed to defeating drug traffickers. The job is simply too large for the Colombian military alone.'
In the mean time, they argue, `winning the war on drugs can only be measured by sporadic battlefield victories resulting in guerrilla casualties, the successful chemical spraying of coca fields, or the seizure of large drug shipments'. They do not mean to dismiss efforts like Plan Patriota. Rather, they say, `Taking on Farc militarily is not a question of winning, but of keeping Farc from winning [...] If the Colombian military does not take the battle to Farc, Farc will completely dominate rural Colombia and major urban population centers.'
Drawing on Salvadorean experience
The authors of the study use the US involvement in the conflict in El Salvador in the 1980s and early 1990s as a template to assess what is needed to win in Colombia. They are quite candid in some of the comparisons. A common feature, they note, is that of `trying to keep US military involvement a secret from the American public and media'; in Colombia they find the `same disguised, quiet, media-free approach' as in El Salvador.
They also say that `the average Colombian citizen in Bogotá regards the current US administration's commitment to Colombia as tentative and insincere'.
The decisive difference between the conflicts, says the study, is that the Salvadorean guerrillas were nothing like the Farc today: `Farc has evolved from a classic guerrilla group to a terrorist and drug-trafficking organization. This is significant because with substantial drug-financed resources, Farc is better equipped and supplied than El Salvador's FMLN was. Farc can purchase state-of-the-art communications equipment, weapons, and ammunition through international black markets and even keep its members in new uniforms and boots.'
Moreover, add Valenzuela and Roselló, `It is no exaggeration to say that all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have a permanent Farc presence or that Farc influences them in one way or another.' They say they obtained this information through their discussions with Latin American military counterparts, underlining that their `perspective on the regional threat from Farc and its foreign liaisons is in direct contrast to the view that the Latin American area is a safe, benign environment posing no immediate threat to the United States and its national interests.'
From this they argue that it follows that `there can be no final victory until all Latin American countries put pressure on Farc transit routes, and the United States and Europe's insatiable demand for drugs subsides.'
Involvement spelt out
The study claims that the US army can make `considerable contributions to improve all aspects of the art of warfare through the advisory program'. After reviewing what was done in El Salvador (`a success'), it recommends much greater involvement in the Colombian conflict. The study proposes:
- Including US army advisers at the military joint command level within the Colombian military and, perhaps, even to Colombia's police forces.
- Placing US army combat, combat support, and combat service support colonels or lieutenant colonels in [most sections of Colombia's joint general staff] to ensure support to personnel and logistics matters as well as to operations and intelligence matters. These officers would form the nucleus of an ad-hoc advisory task force headquarters, the US Military Advisory Task Force-Colombia (USMATFC), charged with managing the day-to-day advisory operations for the commander of the US Military Group (USMILGP) in Colombia.
- Placing military advisers with the rank of major or lieutenant colonel, fluent in Spanish, at the Colombian army's general headquarters.
- Creating a military intelligence analytical advisory effort for Colombia's joint and army intelligence centers by assigning two to three US intelligence personnel (captains, lieutenants, warrant officers, or senior NCOs); veterans `with multiple tactical unit tours, combat experience, and even extensive training center rotational experience'.
- Posting advisers all the way down to the 6 Colombian army combat divisions and approximately 20 brigades, with one operations adviser (combat arms or SF captain or major) and one military intelligence adviser (captain or major) assigned to each combat division and subordinate brigade headquarters. This would be done on a rotation basis which would ensure the ability to fill one-third, two-thirds, or all of the Colombian army's infantry divisions and brigades with advisers as the mission dictated. This approach follows the current one in support of Plan Colombia
- Making the US military advisory programme in Colombia more joint-service and interagency in nature than it was in El Salvador: airforce, navy and marine personnel should provide advice from the service headquarters level down to specific locations and units. The National Security Agency, DEA and CIA are also seen playing significant roles.
Taking to the field
The study says that in El Salvador, `by not participating in field operations, US advisers had difficulty establishing their reputations and remaining a viable part of operations'. Consequently, `To enhance US advisers' influence and professional standing with their Colombian counterparts, US advisers should accompany their host-nation counterparts when they take the field'.
The authors recognise that even limited deployments would probably result in US advisers being killed or wounded in action in numbers greater than in El Salvador. `Nonetheless,' they say, `US advisers would certainly be more effective, viable, and responsive, and Colombians might regard anything less than adviser participation in combat operations as a less-than-firm US commitment to the war against drug trafficking and terrorism.'
Even all this, the study says, `might not bring the Colombian war to a negotiated settlement as it did in El Salvador, nor will it ensure an ultimate military victory for the Colombian military.' The consolation is that `it can buy time to achieve victory by preventing the destruction of Colombia's political, economic, and social infrastructure by an armed, well-organized criminal group.' And, they say, `if this safeguards US national interests in Latin America, then the mission is worth executing'.