Security & strategy in the Haitian `solution'
With Aristide gone and a UN-mandated force on the ground, the priority in Haiti is to restore order, which means removing the weaponry of the armed rebels and the pro-Aristide gangs. This is no simple proposition: local politics and US strategic formulas for the region are involved. In the background, the international force has emerged at the stage where several actors, from within and beyond Latin America, are reaffirming their commitment to multilateralism in the handling of crises.
The dénouement was swift. On 29 February, in an episode that remains controverted, Jean-Bertrand Aristide signed a letter of resignation and was whisked into exile by the US. The UN promptly authorised an interim international force, led by the US and France, to enter the country and stabilise it. Initial constitutional proprieties were observed: the presidency was taken over by the president of the supreme court, Boniface Alexandre. Within a couple of weeks, a council of `wise men' appointed Gérard Latortue, a former UN official who spent most of his life outside Haiti, as prime minister. Latortue installed a cabinet of `technocrats' with no party affiliation.
The intervention force did not embark immediately on a drive to disarm the rebels and the pro-Aristide gangs known as chimí¨res. Partly this was due to simple logistics: initially the force could do little more than secure key installations in the capital. Another reason was that they did not seem to know how to deal with the rebel force commanded by Guy Philippe, in which the decisive component had been recruited among former members of the army disbanded in 1994.
After proclaiming himself `commander-in-chief' in the wake of Aristide's departure, Philippe had blown hot and cold on the issue of disarming his force. US officialdom dismissed all suggestions of including the armed rebels in the talks leading to the formation of a new government; they were openly written off as `thugs' comparable to the pro-Aristide gangs.
Among the politicians who opposed Aristide, however, there were many who openly admitted that it was thanks to Philippe and his men that the Aristide régime came to an end. Several prominent figures were sympathetic to the idea of reestablishing the army, aware that Philippe's ex-soldiers had been received warmly in many parts because they quickly imposed order. On the streets, nobody used the fancy title the rebel front had assumed: they simply called them lamé, Creole for l'armée — the army.
While killings among Haitian factions continued for some time, raising the death toll since last October to about 130, violent incidents involving the international force were minimal. Up to 19 March six Haitians were known to have been killed in clashes with the foreign troops, and one US Marine had been injured by gunfire.
Two-step engagement
Initially the US troops were confined largely to defensive positions and what could best be described as perimeter patrolling. They had been ordered not to get involved in incidents between Haitians, such as looting or destruction of property. It was only on 10 March, after they had come under fire several times, that they received orders to open fire if necessary to prevent killings, and to seize weapons they chanced upon while patrolling. General James Hill, head of the US Southern Command, said this had not happened earlier because the international force had not yet built up sufficient strength. The orders also included seeking out and seizing caches of weapons held by any of the armed groups.
The first raid specifically conducted in search of weapons, a joint operation by US Marines and Haitian police with French military backup, took place in the capital on 11 March. It yielded nothing.
The first, largely symbolic, surrender of weapons took place on 17 March in Cité Soleil, a slum district of Port-au-Prince next to the sea. Local residents were coaxed by French troops to hand over an assortment of about 60 firearms, ranging from pistols to submachine guns. Léon Charles, director-general of the Haitian police, formally took delivery. By 19 March the US contingent had collected a couple of shotguns, and the Chilean troops, three firearms.
`In-house' security
One important factor behind these meagre results is that in many places order had been restored before the arrival of the foreign troops. In Gonaí¯ves, visited briefly by a US patrol on 5 March, security had been in the hands of the Front that had emerged from the alliance of the old Armée Cannibale led by Buteur Métayer and the former soldiers led by Guy Philippe. By mid-April those visibly in charge were Métayer and former soldier Jean Tatoun. They had organised regular patrols which, in a remarkable display of confidence, went about unarmed. They both said they would have no difficulty with a disarmament drive — if the chimí¨res were disarmed first.
At Les Cayes, Haiti's third-largest city, US Marines found security in the joint hands of the Haitian police and former soldiers led by rebel Captain Guy André Antoinier Clerval. The latter announced, `We have given guarantees that we will cooperate with the international force and the police.'
The only known discordant note came from the eastern city of Hinche, controlled by rebel forces under former army Sergeant Joseph Jean Baptiste, who told the press that his men would neither collaborate with the foreign troops nor surrender their arms.
Spreading out
Only after mid-March did the foreign troops start deploying in earnest, albeit slowly, beyond the confines of Port-au-Prince. There, the airport was entrusted to the Chileans, and the US troops, apart from guarding key public buildings, began to conduct regular patrols. A forward US unit also moved into the southern city of Les Cayes. The French moved north to Gonaí¯ves and Cap Haí¯tien, where they secured the airport and began to conduct patrols. Their ostensible aim was to make the two cities safe for the delivery of water, medicines and food.
Not like 1994
In 1994, when US troops invaded Haiti to reinstate Aristide as President, it took an occupation force of more than 20,000, and a combination of checkpoints, dragnets and monetary enticement to collect more than 20,000 weapons in just under two years. This was only a relative success: a former security official in the Aristide administration at the time readily admits that a considerable quantity of weapons remained in circulation. This is corroborated by veterans of the US intervention force. Moreover, over the ensuing years there was a substantial inflow of arms, legal and illegal, via Haiti's lightly monitored ports and land border crossings. Much of that weaponry ended up in the hands of the gangs that would evolve into the present-day chimí¨res.
New police chief Léon Charles (hitherto commander of the coastguard) has ruled out following the same pattern now. Indeed, he has warned that money handed out to bring in weapons would only be used to buy new ones. He believes that the public will only cooperate with a disarmament drive when it feels safe — and this cannot be achieved solely or lastingly by foreign military forces.
Return of the army?
The man brought back from exile by Latortue as his minister of interior and national security, retired General Hérard Abraham, has already said he believes a credible Haitian force is needed to disarm the rival political groups, and in his view the formula for this is to reestablish the army. A commission is being set up to study how to achieve this — probably against the wishes of the US, whose prescription for the region is precisely the elimination of conventional armies. Of all the former members of Haiti's military, Abraham is perhaps the one least associated with the excesses of the previous military régime. He is remembered as the commander of the armed forces in 1988-91 who kept at bay those of his comrades-in-arms who wanted to block Aristide's election in 1990, and for having thwarted a coup attempt against Aristide in 1991.
For many in Haiti, the sign of the times (perhaps even a hint at the inner workings of Aristide's ouster) was provided by the embrace between the returning Abraham and rebel leader Philippe — the two advocates of restoring the army.
The intervention force
On 29 February the UN Security Council, at the request of France and the US, authorised the deployment in Haiti of an interim force, to be replaced by a UN force three months later.
Actually, even before this force arrived there had been a build-up of foreign contingents sent to provide protection to embassies and expatriate communities, and conduct evacuations if necessary. Before Aristide stepped down the US had already sent 50 Marines, the Dominican Republic another 50, Canada had deployed a further nine, France had a group of gendarmes on the way and Argentina had said it was sending `security personnel'. The Dominican Republic had also doubled, to 3,000, the number of troops stationed on the Haitian border (prominent among them were the soldiers just back from serving with the international brigade in Iraq).
For the UN-authorised interim force, the US has sent some 1,600 troops to Haiti, of which about 1,500 are Marines. The French have deployed 800, mainly legionnaires that had been stationed in France's Antillean overseas departments. Chile has contributed 340, and the Canadians have begun to build up from an initial 50 to a target 850. The Pentagon had calculated that an international force of about 3,000 (troops and police) would suffice.
Chile takes lead
Chile, currently a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, adheres to a policy of taking part only in multilateral forces mandated by the UN. Once that basic condition was met, Chile made a point of demonstrating its ability to field a force swiftly. A first contingent of 120 commandos with supplies for a fortnight was flown in by 3 March; the rest arrived five days later. Two colonels were despatched to Miami to liaise with the US Southern Command.
It is worth noting that Chilean defence minister Michelle Bachelet publicly justified sending troops to Haiti saying that Chile `could not remain indifferent to the humanitarian crisis that could occur.' Local commentators suggested that this was meant to render the decision palatable to a public largely unconvinced that the Haitian crises merited risking the lives of Chilean soldiers. [The Chilean government had quietly conducted a casualty risk assessment, concluding that it was much lower than in the Middle East. The study noted that in 1994 the US intervention force didn't suffer a single fatality.]
It has been suggested that with its participation alongside the US, the Chilean government was seeking to patch up the ill will created by its opposition in the UN Security Council to the US war against Iraq. Foreign ministry sources insist, however, that Chile is actually underlining the difference between the two situations — the Haitian force having been authorised by the UN — and reaffirming its commitment to multilateral conflict handling. The Chilean military, it must be noted, are recent converts to the idea of taking part in peacekeeping operations.
Brazil for second phase
Brazil is also loudly signalling its commitment to multilateral action with its announcement that it is willing to contribute a contingent of about 1,100 to the UN force due to take over from the interim force in three months' time — and that it is willing to take command of that force, a suggestion made by French prime minister Jacques Chirac and reportedly welcomed by UN secretary-general Kofi Annan.
Brazil's participation also appears to have the blessing of the US. During an early-March visit to Brazil, General Richard Myers, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated, `Brazil wanting to participate is welcomed not only by the US, but by all the nations of the hemisphere. [We have] talked about the current situation in Haiti and the willingness to provide whatever help in regard to planning that the Brazilian military may need.'
Brazil is a veteran of UN peacekeeping operations: it has taken part in 22; in some places — Angola, Uganda, Mozambique, former Yugoslavia — more than once, in different phases of the operations. On six occasions a Brazilian commanded the UN forces.
General Augusto Heleno, spokesman for the Brazilian army, indirectly gave away an extra motivation for his country's willingness to play a leading role in Haiti, when he told journalists that participation in peacekeeping operations `does not guarantee' that Brazil will gain its coveted permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
The troops for Haiti will most likely be drawn mainly from the 19th battalion of motorised infantry based at São Leopoldo, which was set up eight years ago specifically for missions of this kind. The Haiti mission will provide an opportunity for the Brazilian army to test a new operational structure, that of the Batalhao de Força de Paz (peacekeeping battalion). Training of the selected units under the `standard peacekeeping programme' has already begun.
Other participants
André Singer, Brazil's presidential spokesman, has said that the UN force will include units from Argentina and Caricom, as well as from France, Canada and the US. Caricom is actually still pondering the matter; indeed, it has not yet decided whether to recognise the new Haitian government.
Two Central American countries have announced their willingness to contribute to the UN force. One is Nicaragua, which has a unit of 115 soldiers recently trained to go to Iraq, but not sent because no donors were found to foot the bill (in a UN force, the tab would be picked up by the UN).
The other is Honduras, which has offered its veterans just back from a tour in Iraq. Back in 1995, Honduras sent 120 soldiers to Haiti to serve with the UN peacekeeping force. It has also taken part in the UN forces in the Dominican Republic and Western Sahara. The outgoing government of El Salvador, the most enthusiastic Latin American participant in the international brigade, also hinted that it would do likewise. With the candidate of the ruling Arena, Tony Saca, now President-elect, this is highly likely to be confirmed. The Dominican Republic, facing elections, has yet to make up its mind.
The dénouement was swift. On 29 February, in an episode that remains controverted, Jean-Bertrand Aristide signed a letter of resignation and was whisked into exile by the US. The UN promptly authorised an interim international force, led by the US and France, to enter the country and stabilise it. Initial constitutional proprieties were observed: the presidency was taken over by the president of the supreme court, Boniface Alexandre. Within a couple of weeks, a council of `wise men' appointed Gérard Latortue, a former UN official who spent most of his life outside Haiti, as prime minister. Latortue installed a cabinet of `technocrats' with no party affiliation.
The intervention force did not embark immediately on a drive to disarm the rebels and the pro-Aristide gangs known as chimí¨res. Partly this was due to simple logistics: initially the force could do little more than secure key installations in the capital. Another reason was that they did not seem to know how to deal with the rebel force commanded by Guy Philippe, in which the decisive component had been recruited among former members of the army disbanded in 1994.
After proclaiming himself `commander-in-chief' in the wake of Aristide's departure, Philippe had blown hot and cold on the issue of disarming his force. US officialdom dismissed all suggestions of including the armed rebels in the talks leading to the formation of a new government; they were openly written off as `thugs' comparable to the pro-Aristide gangs.
Among the politicians who opposed Aristide, however, there were many who openly admitted that it was thanks to Philippe and his men that the Aristide régime came to an end. Several prominent figures were sympathetic to the idea of reestablishing the army, aware that Philippe's ex-soldiers had been received warmly in many parts because they quickly imposed order. On the streets, nobody used the fancy title the rebel front had assumed: they simply called them lamé, Creole for l'armée — the army.
While killings among Haitian factions continued for some time, raising the death toll since last October to about 130, violent incidents involving the international force were minimal. Up to 19 March six Haitians were known to have been killed in clashes with the foreign troops, and one US Marine had been injured by gunfire.
Two-step engagement
Initially the US troops were confined largely to defensive positions and what could best be described as perimeter patrolling. They had been ordered not to get involved in incidents between Haitians, such as looting or destruction of property. It was only on 10 March, after they had come under fire several times, that they received orders to open fire if necessary to prevent killings, and to seize weapons they chanced upon while patrolling. General James Hill, head of the US Southern Command, said this had not happened earlier because the international force had not yet built up sufficient strength. The orders also included seeking out and seizing caches of weapons held by any of the armed groups.
The first raid specifically conducted in search of weapons, a joint operation by US Marines and Haitian police with French military backup, took place in the capital on 11 March. It yielded nothing.
The first, largely symbolic, surrender of weapons took place on 17 March in Cité Soleil, a slum district of Port-au-Prince next to the sea. Local residents were coaxed by French troops to hand over an assortment of about 60 firearms, ranging from pistols to submachine guns. Léon Charles, director-general of the Haitian police, formally took delivery. By 19 March the US contingent had collected a couple of shotguns, and the Chilean troops, three firearms.
`In-house' security
One important factor behind these meagre results is that in many places order had been restored before the arrival of the foreign troops. In Gonaí¯ves, visited briefly by a US patrol on 5 March, security had been in the hands of the Front that had emerged from the alliance of the old Armée Cannibale led by Buteur Métayer and the former soldiers led by Guy Philippe. By mid-April those visibly in charge were Métayer and former soldier Jean Tatoun. They had organised regular patrols which, in a remarkable display of confidence, went about unarmed. They both said they would have no difficulty with a disarmament drive — if the chimí¨res were disarmed first.
At Les Cayes, Haiti's third-largest city, US Marines found security in the joint hands of the Haitian police and former soldiers led by rebel Captain Guy André Antoinier Clerval. The latter announced, `We have given guarantees that we will cooperate with the international force and the police.'
The only known discordant note came from the eastern city of Hinche, controlled by rebel forces under former army Sergeant Joseph Jean Baptiste, who told the press that his men would neither collaborate with the foreign troops nor surrender their arms.
Spreading out
Only after mid-March did the foreign troops start deploying in earnest, albeit slowly, beyond the confines of Port-au-Prince. There, the airport was entrusted to the Chileans, and the US troops, apart from guarding key public buildings, began to conduct regular patrols. A forward US unit also moved into the southern city of Les Cayes. The French moved north to Gonaí¯ves and Cap Haí¯tien, where they secured the airport and began to conduct patrols. Their ostensible aim was to make the two cities safe for the delivery of water, medicines and food.
Not like 1994
In 1994, when US troops invaded Haiti to reinstate Aristide as President, it took an occupation force of more than 20,000, and a combination of checkpoints, dragnets and monetary enticement to collect more than 20,000 weapons in just under two years. This was only a relative success: a former security official in the Aristide administration at the time readily admits that a considerable quantity of weapons remained in circulation. This is corroborated by veterans of the US intervention force. Moreover, over the ensuing years there was a substantial inflow of arms, legal and illegal, via Haiti's lightly monitored ports and land border crossings. Much of that weaponry ended up in the hands of the gangs that would evolve into the present-day chimí¨res.
New police chief Léon Charles (hitherto commander of the coastguard) has ruled out following the same pattern now. Indeed, he has warned that money handed out to bring in weapons would only be used to buy new ones. He believes that the public will only cooperate with a disarmament drive when it feels safe — and this cannot be achieved solely or lastingly by foreign military forces.
Return of the army?
The man brought back from exile by Latortue as his minister of interior and national security, retired General Hérard Abraham, has already said he believes a credible Haitian force is needed to disarm the rival political groups, and in his view the formula for this is to reestablish the army. A commission is being set up to study how to achieve this — probably against the wishes of the US, whose prescription for the region is precisely the elimination of conventional armies. Of all the former members of Haiti's military, Abraham is perhaps the one least associated with the excesses of the previous military régime. He is remembered as the commander of the armed forces in 1988-91 who kept at bay those of his comrades-in-arms who wanted to block Aristide's election in 1990, and for having thwarted a coup attempt against Aristide in 1991.
For many in Haiti, the sign of the times (perhaps even a hint at the inner workings of Aristide's ouster) was provided by the embrace between the returning Abraham and rebel leader Philippe — the two advocates of restoring the army.
The intervention force
On 29 February the UN Security Council, at the request of France and the US, authorised the deployment in Haiti of an interim force, to be replaced by a UN force three months later.
Actually, even before this force arrived there had been a build-up of foreign contingents sent to provide protection to embassies and expatriate communities, and conduct evacuations if necessary. Before Aristide stepped down the US had already sent 50 Marines, the Dominican Republic another 50, Canada had deployed a further nine, France had a group of gendarmes on the way and Argentina had said it was sending `security personnel'. The Dominican Republic had also doubled, to 3,000, the number of troops stationed on the Haitian border (prominent among them were the soldiers just back from serving with the international brigade in Iraq).
For the UN-authorised interim force, the US has sent some 1,600 troops to Haiti, of which about 1,500 are Marines. The French have deployed 800, mainly legionnaires that had been stationed in France's Antillean overseas departments. Chile has contributed 340, and the Canadians have begun to build up from an initial 50 to a target 850. The Pentagon had calculated that an international force of about 3,000 (troops and police) would suffice.
Chile takes lead
Chile, currently a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, adheres to a policy of taking part only in multilateral forces mandated by the UN. Once that basic condition was met, Chile made a point of demonstrating its ability to field a force swiftly. A first contingent of 120 commandos with supplies for a fortnight was flown in by 3 March; the rest arrived five days later. Two colonels were despatched to Miami to liaise with the US Southern Command.
It is worth noting that Chilean defence minister Michelle Bachelet publicly justified sending troops to Haiti saying that Chile `could not remain indifferent to the humanitarian crisis that could occur.' Local commentators suggested that this was meant to render the decision palatable to a public largely unconvinced that the Haitian crises merited risking the lives of Chilean soldiers. [The Chilean government had quietly conducted a casualty risk assessment, concluding that it was much lower than in the Middle East. The study noted that in 1994 the US intervention force didn't suffer a single fatality.]
It has been suggested that with its participation alongside the US, the Chilean government was seeking to patch up the ill will created by its opposition in the UN Security Council to the US war against Iraq. Foreign ministry sources insist, however, that Chile is actually underlining the difference between the two situations — the Haitian force having been authorised by the UN — and reaffirming its commitment to multilateral conflict handling. The Chilean military, it must be noted, are recent converts to the idea of taking part in peacekeeping operations.
Brazil for second phase
Brazil is also loudly signalling its commitment to multilateral action with its announcement that it is willing to contribute a contingent of about 1,100 to the UN force due to take over from the interim force in three months' time — and that it is willing to take command of that force, a suggestion made by French prime minister Jacques Chirac and reportedly welcomed by UN secretary-general Kofi Annan.
Brazil's participation also appears to have the blessing of the US. During an early-March visit to Brazil, General Richard Myers, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated, `Brazil wanting to participate is welcomed not only by the US, but by all the nations of the hemisphere. [We have] talked about the current situation in Haiti and the willingness to provide whatever help in regard to planning that the Brazilian military may need.'
Brazil is a veteran of UN peacekeeping operations: it has taken part in 22; in some places — Angola, Uganda, Mozambique, former Yugoslavia — more than once, in different phases of the operations. On six occasions a Brazilian commanded the UN forces.
General Augusto Heleno, spokesman for the Brazilian army, indirectly gave away an extra motivation for his country's willingness to play a leading role in Haiti, when he told journalists that participation in peacekeeping operations `does not guarantee' that Brazil will gain its coveted permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
The troops for Haiti will most likely be drawn mainly from the 19th battalion of motorised infantry based at São Leopoldo, which was set up eight years ago specifically for missions of this kind. The Haiti mission will provide an opportunity for the Brazilian army to test a new operational structure, that of the Batalhao de Força de Paz (peacekeeping battalion). Training of the selected units under the `standard peacekeeping programme' has already begun.
Other participants
André Singer, Brazil's presidential spokesman, has said that the UN force will include units from Argentina and Caricom, as well as from France, Canada and the US. Caricom is actually still pondering the matter; indeed, it has not yet decided whether to recognise the new Haitian government.
Two Central American countries have announced their willingness to contribute to the UN force. One is Nicaragua, which has a unit of 115 soldiers recently trained to go to Iraq, but not sent because no donors were found to foot the bill (in a UN force, the tab would be picked up by the UN).
The other is Honduras, which has offered its veterans just back from a tour in Iraq. Back in 1995, Honduras sent 120 soldiers to Haiti to serve with the UN peacekeeping force. It has also taken part in the UN forces in the Dominican Republic and Western Sahara. The outgoing government of El Salvador, the most enthusiastic Latin American participant in the international brigade, also hinted that it would do likewise. With the candidate of the ruling Arena, Tony Saca, now President-elect, this is highly likely to be confirmed. The Dominican Republic, facing elections, has yet to make up its mind.