Brazil joins airspace denial scheme
Brazil, Peru and Colombia have joined forces to contain the spillover from the Colombian conflict, ostensibly concentrating on the spread of the drugs trade. For Brazil, this is a projection of its own strategy to place Amazonia at the centre of its defence efforts. One of the results of the agreement will be the adoption of standardised rules of engagement for the interdiction of unauthorised flights over the region.
On 11 February, at Tabatinga, the Brazilian town on the Solimíµes branch of the Amazon that overlooks the points where the three borders meet, a memorandum of understanding was signed by Brazil's defence and justice ministers, José Viegas and Márcio Thomaz Bastos; Colombia's defence minister, Jorge Alberto Uribe; and his Peruvian peer, Roberto Chiabra. Also present on the Colombian side was the commander of military forces, General Carlos Alberto Ospina.
As underlined by Uribe, the accord was not about increasing the presence of the military in the area, but rather to extend the scope of cooperation between the three countries, specifically as regards fighting the drugs trade. `We believe,' he said, `that by improving coordination we will render unnecessary an increase of armed footing; with a united front we will strengthen our capability to confront the illegal traffic.' As defined by the memorandum, the common aim is to `combat the illicit traffic on border or common rivers, contributing to dismantle the criminal networks that threaten peace and security in the region.' The term `illicit traffic' embraces weapons and explosives as well as drugs and precursor chemicals.
Both Viegas and Chiabra said they did not envisage a threat from the Farc guerrillas entering Brazilian or Peruvian territory. Viegas said, `I don't believe that the Farc have any intention of approaching Brazilian territory, and if they did, they would get the reception they deserve.' This was less than candid, as both countries are already having to deal with cross border activities of the Farc.
Formally, the Tabatinga agreement incorporates Peru into an arrangement already struck between Brazil and Colombia last year, publicly visible in the presence of Colombia's then-minister of defence, Marta Lucía Ramírez, together with Viegas, at joint exercises of air, ground and river forces held in June 2003.
Interdiction: state of play
The presence of Brazilian justice minister Bastos at Tabatinga indicated that there was a very particular issue at stake: working towards a common policy on the interdiction of aircraft involved in drug trafficking or gunrunning. Not only is the area dotted with clandestine airstrips from which hundreds of light aircraft operate across the borders transporting drugs, or engaged in drugs-for-arms trades, but there have been incidents, like the one that provoked the downfall of Peruvian intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos, involving larger aircraft engaged in airdropping large shipments of arms to the Colombian guerrillas.
Colombia only resumed in August last year its US-backed aerial interdiction programme, after a two-year gap following the accidental downing of a civilian aircraft carrying US missionaries in Peruvian airspace. In mid-January the Colombian air force (FAC) reported that in the previous five months it had destroyed 34 aircraft, `some on the ground and some in the air'. Apart from these, another 23 aircraft were `immobilised', meaning that they were forced to land or seized on the ground. In 2002, when the US contribution was suspended, the FAC had destroyed five aircraft and `immobilised' another five.
Under the joint programme with the US, the latter use their radar and intelligence coverage to inform the FAC of illegal flights, and the Colombian air force scramble units to interdict them, aiming primarily at forcing them down but with the option of shooting them down if they refuse to comply. Since the 2001 incident, the US has drawn up a much tighter identification protocol (at one point the resumed interdiction scheme was suspended after the FAC destroyed an aircraft without waiting for final US vetting).
The US-Peruvian interdiction programme was expected to have resumed last year too, but the US was unsatisfied with the Peruvian rules of engagement, to be embodied in the detailed regulations implementing interdiction legislation. Colombia's programme is already backed by domestic legislation. Brazil actually has its lei do abate [`shoot-down law'] on the statute books, but implementation has been held up because the detailed rules of engagement have not yet been added.
The Brazilian air force (FAP) has been quite vocal about the frustration this is breeding. They have been detecting and intercepting illegal flights over the Amazonian region, but the most they can do is fire warning shots and hope that the pilots will be scared enough to land. This rarely happens: the traffickers feel safe enough. A radio intercept by the federal police has a ground controller telling an intercepted pilot, `Just go on: they can only shoot with their cameras.'
Viegas had made it clear before the Tabatinga meeting that Brazil was hanging on the legislative work underway in Peru and wanted to discuss this with his Peruvian peer. In a largely unnoticed statement, he said, `We want a joint arrangement. Colombia already has a specific [interdiction] law and now Peru is negotiating.'
Brazil's surveillance net
The unmentioned part of this scheme is that Brazil is in a position to provide much of the relevant surveillance and electronic intelligence. The FAB is proud of its R-99, an airplane equipped with state-of-the-art detection gear, which its operators call, for now somewhat hopefully, `the terror of airspace invaders'. The Peruvians are well aware of Brazil's capabilities in this field: last year, at Lima's request, the FAB swiftly located the Sendero Luminoso unit that had staged a mass kidnapping of pipeline workers [SSR-03-00].
Backing up the R-99 is the huge Sistema de Vigilí¢ncia da Amazônia (Sivam), which combines satellite coverage of the whole Amazonian region with a network of 25 radars — the last one of which was commissioned recently in Guajaramirim, in the state of Rondônia, right up against the Bolivian border. The Brazilians proudly boast that the radar technology used is `100% national'. The scope of the Sivam's coverage goes well over the 11,000 kilometres of Amazonia's borders (with Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, Guyana, Suriname and Guyane).
The FAB has a fleet of 68 aircraft stationed at the airbases of Manaus, Boa Vista and Porto Velho which are said to be ready to respond rapidly to emergencies. Patrolling the Amazonian airspace is entrusted chiefly to the Tucano, designed and built in Brazil (and one of Embraer's star exports). In the current rearrangement of Brazil's defence priorities, the Amazonian airport commission has drawn up plans for the construction of a large number of new landing strips.
Brazil's army buildup
Whatever Uribe may believe about cooperating rendering unnecessary a troop buildup, Brazilian planners are gearing up for just that. General Cláudio Figueiredo, military commander of Amazônia, explains, `Until the 1980s our most important [defence] priority was the south. In the 1980s the army had 5,000 men in the region. International interest in Amazônia has become very great, and for that reason we have steadily been building up our strength in the region.' Army strength in the region has already reached 22,000 — and is still growing.
Units based in the south are being relocated. For instance, the second brigade of motorised infantry at Niterói, Rio de Janeiro, will end up transmuted into a new jungle infantry brigade at São Gabriel da Cachoeira, in the far northwest. General Figueiredo is involved in preparing the establishment of two new battalions on the Rio Negro, the affluent of the Amazon that descends from Colombia (one at Santa Isabel do Rio Negro, the other at Barcelos). With these additions, he expects total army strength in Amazônia to reach 25,000 by 2006.
Complementing this in-situ reinforcement, a special operations brigade with rapid-deployment capability has been set up in Goí¢nia, just southwest of Brasília.
Regional commanders have learnt the public-relations message well. Figueiredo is emphatic that all this movement does not mean that Brazil fears trouble with its Amazonian neighbours. `The neighbouring countries,' he says, `are as friendly as those in the Southern Cone. Our relations with them in military terms is the best possible: we exchange intelligence and work out how to coexist along our common borders.'
On 11 February, at Tabatinga, the Brazilian town on the Solimíµes branch of the Amazon that overlooks the points where the three borders meet, a memorandum of understanding was signed by Brazil's defence and justice ministers, José Viegas and Márcio Thomaz Bastos; Colombia's defence minister, Jorge Alberto Uribe; and his Peruvian peer, Roberto Chiabra. Also present on the Colombian side was the commander of military forces, General Carlos Alberto Ospina.
As underlined by Uribe, the accord was not about increasing the presence of the military in the area, but rather to extend the scope of cooperation between the three countries, specifically as regards fighting the drugs trade. `We believe,' he said, `that by improving coordination we will render unnecessary an increase of armed footing; with a united front we will strengthen our capability to confront the illegal traffic.' As defined by the memorandum, the common aim is to `combat the illicit traffic on border or common rivers, contributing to dismantle the criminal networks that threaten peace and security in the region.' The term `illicit traffic' embraces weapons and explosives as well as drugs and precursor chemicals.
Both Viegas and Chiabra said they did not envisage a threat from the Farc guerrillas entering Brazilian or Peruvian territory. Viegas said, `I don't believe that the Farc have any intention of approaching Brazilian territory, and if they did, they would get the reception they deserve.' This was less than candid, as both countries are already having to deal with cross border activities of the Farc.
Formally, the Tabatinga agreement incorporates Peru into an arrangement already struck between Brazil and Colombia last year, publicly visible in the presence of Colombia's then-minister of defence, Marta Lucía Ramírez, together with Viegas, at joint exercises of air, ground and river forces held in June 2003.
Interdiction: state of play
The presence of Brazilian justice minister Bastos at Tabatinga indicated that there was a very particular issue at stake: working towards a common policy on the interdiction of aircraft involved in drug trafficking or gunrunning. Not only is the area dotted with clandestine airstrips from which hundreds of light aircraft operate across the borders transporting drugs, or engaged in drugs-for-arms trades, but there have been incidents, like the one that provoked the downfall of Peruvian intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos, involving larger aircraft engaged in airdropping large shipments of arms to the Colombian guerrillas.
Colombia only resumed in August last year its US-backed aerial interdiction programme, after a two-year gap following the accidental downing of a civilian aircraft carrying US missionaries in Peruvian airspace. In mid-January the Colombian air force (FAC) reported that in the previous five months it had destroyed 34 aircraft, `some on the ground and some in the air'. Apart from these, another 23 aircraft were `immobilised', meaning that they were forced to land or seized on the ground. In 2002, when the US contribution was suspended, the FAC had destroyed five aircraft and `immobilised' another five.
Under the joint programme with the US, the latter use their radar and intelligence coverage to inform the FAC of illegal flights, and the Colombian air force scramble units to interdict them, aiming primarily at forcing them down but with the option of shooting them down if they refuse to comply. Since the 2001 incident, the US has drawn up a much tighter identification protocol (at one point the resumed interdiction scheme was suspended after the FAC destroyed an aircraft without waiting for final US vetting).
The US-Peruvian interdiction programme was expected to have resumed last year too, but the US was unsatisfied with the Peruvian rules of engagement, to be embodied in the detailed regulations implementing interdiction legislation. Colombia's programme is already backed by domestic legislation. Brazil actually has its lei do abate [`shoot-down law'] on the statute books, but implementation has been held up because the detailed rules of engagement have not yet been added.
The Brazilian air force (FAP) has been quite vocal about the frustration this is breeding. They have been detecting and intercepting illegal flights over the Amazonian region, but the most they can do is fire warning shots and hope that the pilots will be scared enough to land. This rarely happens: the traffickers feel safe enough. A radio intercept by the federal police has a ground controller telling an intercepted pilot, `Just go on: they can only shoot with their cameras.'
Viegas had made it clear before the Tabatinga meeting that Brazil was hanging on the legislative work underway in Peru and wanted to discuss this with his Peruvian peer. In a largely unnoticed statement, he said, `We want a joint arrangement. Colombia already has a specific [interdiction] law and now Peru is negotiating.'
Brazil's surveillance net
The unmentioned part of this scheme is that Brazil is in a position to provide much of the relevant surveillance and electronic intelligence. The FAB is proud of its R-99, an airplane equipped with state-of-the-art detection gear, which its operators call, for now somewhat hopefully, `the terror of airspace invaders'. The Peruvians are well aware of Brazil's capabilities in this field: last year, at Lima's request, the FAB swiftly located the Sendero Luminoso unit that had staged a mass kidnapping of pipeline workers [SSR-03-00].
Backing up the R-99 is the huge Sistema de Vigilí¢ncia da Amazônia (Sivam), which combines satellite coverage of the whole Amazonian region with a network of 25 radars — the last one of which was commissioned recently in Guajaramirim, in the state of Rondônia, right up against the Bolivian border. The Brazilians proudly boast that the radar technology used is `100% national'. The scope of the Sivam's coverage goes well over the 11,000 kilometres of Amazonia's borders (with Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, Guyana, Suriname and Guyane).
The FAB has a fleet of 68 aircraft stationed at the airbases of Manaus, Boa Vista and Porto Velho which are said to be ready to respond rapidly to emergencies. Patrolling the Amazonian airspace is entrusted chiefly to the Tucano, designed and built in Brazil (and one of Embraer's star exports). In the current rearrangement of Brazil's defence priorities, the Amazonian airport commission has drawn up plans for the construction of a large number of new landing strips.
Brazil's army buildup
Whatever Uribe may believe about cooperating rendering unnecessary a troop buildup, Brazilian planners are gearing up for just that. General Cláudio Figueiredo, military commander of Amazônia, explains, `Until the 1980s our most important [defence] priority was the south. In the 1980s the army had 5,000 men in the region. International interest in Amazônia has become very great, and for that reason we have steadily been building up our strength in the region.' Army strength in the region has already reached 22,000 — and is still growing.
Units based in the south are being relocated. For instance, the second brigade of motorised infantry at Niterói, Rio de Janeiro, will end up transmuted into a new jungle infantry brigade at São Gabriel da Cachoeira, in the far northwest. General Figueiredo is involved in preparing the establishment of two new battalions on the Rio Negro, the affluent of the Amazon that descends from Colombia (one at Santa Isabel do Rio Negro, the other at Barcelos). With these additions, he expects total army strength in Amazônia to reach 25,000 by 2006.
Complementing this in-situ reinforcement, a special operations brigade with rapid-deployment capability has been set up in Goí¢nia, just southwest of Brasília.
Regional commanders have learnt the public-relations message well. Figueiredo is emphatic that all this movement does not mean that Brazil fears trouble with its Amazonian neighbours. `The neighbouring countries,' he says, `are as friendly as those in the Southern Cone. Our relations with them in military terms is the best possible: we exchange intelligence and work out how to coexist along our common borders.'