Tackling corruption

A new way of doing politics

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Following the emergence of large-scale corruption scandals implicating Brazil’s political and business elites, brought to light through the sprawling ‘Lava Jato’ (Car Wash) investigation, the PT became synonymous with corruption in the eyes of many. Bolsonaro exploited this public anger, presenting himself as the clean antithesis to the corrupt political establishment and promising to overhaul a political system which has not just allowed corrupt habits to flourish, but is built on these very practices.

In line with his image of political renewal, Bolsonaro’s talk of rooting out the so-called ‘old politics’ dominated his first few months in office. He repeatedly pointed out that he had declined to make political appointments in his cabinet in exchange for party-support and that he planned to govern without depending on horse-trading with party benches in congress.

In practice, this ‘new’ way of doing politics translated into an unsteady and fractious relationship between the executive and the legislature, slowing the government’s efforts to pass legislation and forcing it to have recourse to traditional negotiating techniques, such as the release of certain parliamentary funds (‘emendas parlamentares’), to secure congressional support on important reforms. Nevertheless, the scale of this favour-trading has remained comparatively small, with Lucas de Aragão, a partner at the Brasília-based political consultancy Arko Advice, referring to it as “emergency pork-barrelling”.

The lack of a governing coalition in congress and the new style of negotiation are two of the points which most distinguish the Bolsonaro executive from previous administrations, says De Aragão. And through this, Bolsonaro has kept his promise made to the electorate of not engaging with the corrupt political practices of the past – even if it comes at the cost of governability.

Moro and Lava Jato

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Since 2014, the visible face of Brazil’s anti-corruption crusade has been Sérgio Moro, who as a federal judge on the Lava Jato investigation put political and business big shots behind bars and attained hero-like status for many Brazilians. After accepting Bolsonaro’s offer for the position at the head of the newly created justice & public security ministry, Moro became the face of the new government’s fight against corruption. When questioned about how he would tackle the white-collar crime, Bolsonaro would usually refer back to Moro, as if his mere appointment as justice minister was a guarantee of the government’s commitment to anti-corruption efforts.

Moro has so far failed at his mandate. Attempts to pass legislation which would facilitate investigations and toughen sentences for corruption, presented as part of a wider security bill known as the ‘anti-crime package’, have floundered (see following chapter on security). Moro’s difficult relationship with congress has contributed to hindering these efforts, as has the emergence of the so-called ‘Vaza Jato’ scandal, leaked messages that show Moro as having acted with impropriety, collaborating closely with prosecutors, during his time as a judge on the Lava Jato case.

The credibility of the Lava Jato investigation has been further damaged in the eyes of its critics by these leaks, as well as by the release from prison of former president Lula in November. Lula still faces convictions for corruption, but a supreme court (STF) ruling allows him to remain free while he appeals. Although Moro is no longer directly concerned with the Lava Jato investigations, his reputation remains closely bound up with it, and any setback to the anti-graft probe is taken as a personal affront to Moro’s agenda. Yet he remains Bolsonaro’s most popular and trusted minister, and is the cornerstone for the president’s support amongst ‘lavajatista’ Brazilians.

The independence of institutions

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Bolsonaro has not only failed to credibly deliver progress in the fight against corruption, but actually overseen a number of setbacks in this area during his first year in office. In the last months of 2019, international organisations such as NGO Transparency International (TI) and the working group on bribery in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) raised concerns over this, listing actions by the judiciary, legislature, and executive which have weakened existing frameworks.

From the executive, this has come principally through structural changes to federal agencies, leading to reservations over the guarantee of their independence and transparency. The case of the Conselho de Controle de Atividades Financeiras (Coaf), the government financial regulator, illustrates this. Early last year, Bolsonaro moved the Coaf from the economy ministry to the justice ministry; a decree in September then transferred it to the central bank under a new name, with the stated aim of taking the monitoring of financial crimes out of the political game (congress has since ratified the decree, but maintained the Coaf’s original name). But these changes occurred after findings by the Coaf served as the basis for an investigation into one of Bolsonaro’s sons, and many fear they actually leave the door open for the politicisation of appointments.

Similar concerns were raised about the autonomy of the federal public prosecutor’s office (MPF) after the appointment of a new federal attorney general in late September. Under the previous attorney general Raquel Dodge, the MPF had become vocal on questions of human and minority rights and frequently denounced government policies on these issues. Bolsonaro disregarded traditional nomination procedures to pick Augusto Aras to succeed Dodge at the head of the attorney general’s office (PGR), an appointment which raised eyebrows considering Aras’ self-professed alignment with the president’s conservative opinions. The new attorney general has kept a low profile over his first three months in the post.

Scandals

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Added to these concerns has been the emergence of suspicions of wrongdoing amongst Bolsonaro’s political and personal allies. Proving his superficial commitment to the anti-corruption fight, the president has refused to take responsibility for such allegations, largely ignoring or denying them.

The PSL

Some of these allegations have concerned the PSL, the party which Bolsonaro joined ahead of the 2018 election but has since left following disagreements (in part brought on by these corruption claims). In February 2019, national media reported that several PSL members were under investigation for embezzlement of party funds and the use of ‘front’ candidates during the 2018 election campaign.

Gustavo Bebianno, one of the two PSL members in government and implicated in the case, took the hit and resigned as secretary-general to the presidency in February after a messy fall-out with Bolsonaro. However the central figure in these investigations, tourism minister Marcelo Álvaro Antônio, has remained in his post despite new developments and accusations over the course of the year. Bolsonaro argues that Álvaro Antônio has yet to be proven guilty of any wrongdoing.

Flávio

A more damaging investigation for the president has been the one into his eldest son Flávio, now a senator. Flávio is suspected of having benefited from a salary splitting corruption racket, run by a former parliamentary aide, Fabrício Queiroz, during his time as a state deputy in Rio de Janeiro’s legislative assembly (Alerj).

The investigation, which launched just before Bolsonaro took office, has been proceeding slowly, but it picked up pace again in the last weeks of December and is likely to keep causing trouble for the president. Queiroz has evaded testifying; Flávio denies all wrongdoing; and Bolsonaro has oscillated between washing his hands of the case, saying it does not concern him, and lashing out at journalists who question him about it. Another of Bolsonaro’s sons, Carlos, faces investigations for the use of phantom employees in his municipal councillor office.

Such cases do taint Bolsonaro’s reputation, and erode the trust and confidence of those supporters for whom the anti-corruption agenda is paramount. However, Bolsonaro for the moment maintains their support. Caio Barbosa, a PhD candidate at the Universidade de São Paulo (USP) who is researching the new Right and Bolsonaro voters, notes that while Moro remains in government on the one hand, and in the absence of any viable alternative to Bolsonaro on the other, the president’s supporters will make excuses for his mistakes and failings, and continue to stand by him.

The judiciary

Brazil’s supreme court (STF), which is responsible for upholding the constitution as well as for putting high-level public officials on trial for white-collar crimes, has been frequently accused of taking on an overly political role in recent years. Such criticisms flared up again this year, notably in June, after the STF suspended a number of presidential decrees relating to indigenous rights and firearms legislation.

Relations between the executive and the judiciary have been tense at times, and the STF was a target of criticisms during pro-Bolsonaro demonstrations in May, with some of the president’s more radical supporters calling for the court to be shut down (congress, also seen as impeding Bolsonaro’s work at the time, was targeted too). Bolsonaro condemned these attacks.

He is due to appoint two new justices to the STF before the end of his term, one by the end of this year as the court’s dean, José Celso de Mello, will reach the compulsory retirement age of 75 in November. Bolsonaro previously floated the idea of appointing Moro to the STF, although he has more recently expressed a preference for a “terribly evangelical” justice. He is also due to appoint a judge to the supreme court of justice (STJ) and the high military court (STM) before the end of 2020.

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