India/Pakistan: Water is the critical issue
The Indus Water Treaty (IWT) of 1960 has recently become a bone of contention between India and Pakistan. While relations are already poor, the breakdown of this accord would signify a new low, and herald the emergence of new security and humanitarian crises on a grand scale.
The Treaty, signed at a relative high point of Indo-Pakistani relations and against the backdrop of water regulation reform in India, sets out which country has the right to access and control the various rivers that feed into the Indus River, and the Indus itself. Since the two countries were largely split along religious fault-lines, rather than obvious geographic boundaries, and part of the River in question is in the still disputed Kashmir region, access to this vital resource has always caused argument between the two.
Despite their differences the importance of the resource, the largest irrigated area of any one system in the world, led to a surprising amount of co-operation, highlighted by the fact that the treaty is still in force and (until now) relatively well respected. This level of co-operation has deteriorated recently, however, with a number of factors putting pressure on both sides and adding to the mutual distrust and political acrimony surrounding Indo-Pakistani relations. Both countries have been rehashing old arguments that have lain dormant for over 50 years, with Pakistan claiming that India has become greedy and is attempting to take more than its fair share of water. India tends to see the IWT as fairly flexible, with changes allowed so long as they are within the spirit of the treaty or which could prove to be mutually beneficial for both countries. Pakistan, on the other hand, tends to be more dogmatic and rigid in its interpretation of the treaty. This is the root of many of the current disagreements.
The key water-use issues comprise drinking water, agriculture, commercial industrial use, electricity generation through hydro-electric dams and navigation. The problems arising from the mutual exclusivity of agriculture and hydro-electricity generation are of particular concern. Hydro-electric dams built upstream, in this case in India, would be able to store large amounts of water behind them in order to ensure a continuous and regular flow. This has the knock on effect of reducing the flow of water further downstream, in this case in Pakistan, thereby reducing the amount of water available for irrigating agricultural land.
Under the IWT India was granted control over the uppermost parts of the Indus River, whilst Pakistan was granted control over roughly 75% of the water. Canals were built from east to west to ensure that Pakistan received all the water it needed. Both parties are required to seek permission from the other to make any substantial changes and a cross-country committee, the Permanent Indus Commission, with representatives from both sides was set up to monitor and resolve arguments. The Commission is currently involved in the resolution of three major disputes, all of which involve Indian Hydroelectric dams potentially restricting the flow of water into Pakistan. The Kishanganga dam row is the first to be referred to international arbitration under the treaty after the two countries failed to come to an amicable agreement. The Kishanganga dispute is of particular importance because Pakistan is also vying to construct its own project – the Neelum-Jhelum hydro scheme – on the Pakistani side of the Neelum River. This dam would be rendered significantly reduced in capability if the Indian dam was built above it, and the effect that two dams would have on the flow of the river further downstream in Pakistan is considerable.
Under the terms of the IWT, whichever country manages to complete its building projects first will have priority rights over the rest of the river. Pakistan’s projects were initially scheduled to finish first but they have been so beset by internal power struggles and administrative and financial difficulties, whilst (due to its larger and more flexible economy) India has been able to channel extra man-power and resources, that India’s projects are due for completion before their Pakistani counterparts. In total, India has planned 33 new dams on its parts of the rivers, which have the potential to withhold significant amounts of water to the agricultural regions of Pakistan during dry seasons or in the sowing period of April-June before the yearly rains come when water is most needed.
Pakistan has cited India’s ability to withhold water from its agricultural areas as a major sticking point in current Indo-Pakistani relations, something that India has been keen to dismiss. India has pointed out that Pakistani irrigation systems are woefully inefficient, with as much as 40% of all water being lost before it reaches the roots of plants; also that the UN has awarded it a carbon grant to aid in the building of its dams, something the Pakistani authorities could have protested about before building had even begun, but chose not to. Pakistan is already classed as one of the driest countries in the world, close to falling into the UN’s category of ‘water scarce’ countries, and water availability per person per year has fallen from about 5,000m3 in 1947 to around 1,000m3 today. The majority of this drop has been caused by a large increase in population and a natural decrease in the amount of water coming from the rivers. Recent agricultural trends in Pakistan have also seen a shift towards more water intensive crops such as cotton. Pakistan received upwards of $18 billion in aid from the US alone in the decade following 9/11, a figure bolstered last year due to the extra aid provided to help counter the devastation caused by the floods. If Pakistan fails to address its agricultural and power issues the amount of aid required could increase dramatically, which would have significant budget implications for developed nations.
India is not in a significantly better position than Pakistan when it comes to abundance of water, with only slightly higher water availability per person per year of 1730 m3, predicted to decline to 1240 m3 by 2030. Agriculture accounts for roughly 90% of water usage in India – expected to decline to 75% by 2050. There is an adequate water supply to meet current needs, but the size of the population is expected to increase dramatically, and even to exceed China’s by 2040. India’s wheat and rice yield is predicted to drop by 30%-50% by 2050, whilst demand is expected to rise by 20%, meaning that imports, which are currently negligible, will become necessary to the tune of 12.5 million tonnes by 2050, which is likely to push the price of wheat up globally.
At the moment Pakistan is the country being more vocal in its objections to the treaty, while India remains happy with how it has been administered. This should be seen in the political context of the two countries, with Pakistani politicians keen to stir up anti-Indian sentiment for their own internal ends. It is important to remember that this is merely one strand in a long series of disputes between India and Pakistan. For example, there is unceasing acrimony over the nuclear issue, and tensions have been running particularly high since the Mumbai bombings of 2008. This leads to the question of whether either side, especially Pakistan who are expressing the most anger at developments, has properly considered the effects of the actions it is taking with regard to their water security, or whether they are simply using it as a proxy for more emotive issues.
As well as cross border disputes Pakistan faces an internal water crisis with a large disparity between the Punjab and the Sindh regions. The Punjab region is located upstream of the Sindh and has therefore been able to gain first access to the waters of the river Indus, leaving it little more than a trickle lower down and causing a severe lack of water availability in the Sindh region. By blaming India for ‘stealing’ its water the Pakistani authorities have been able to overlook this disparity and avoid taking responsibility themselves.
Provided sufficient water continues to flow in from India, Pakistan has the potential capacity to generate much of its required power through hydro-electric dams, with water already Pakistan’s third highest source of energy, behind only natural gas and oil. This has, however, been hampered by administrative and infrastructural problems, along with more inter-regional rivalry. Individual regions in Pakistan have taken a position on their own dams, each fearing that large areas may be flooded or deprived of water to provide power to another region. Pakistan’s own internal Inter-Provincial Agreement of 1991 has failed and each region is, ironically, expressing similar concerns to each other as the whole of Pakistan is expressing to India. It is illuminating that the Indian Inter-State Water Disputes Act of 1956 is still in force, yet Pakistan’s much more recent legislation has already collapsed into bickering and infighting. These disputes have allowed Islamic extremist groups to begin to use water as a ‘lightning rod’ to stir up dissent.
On a global scale, an outstripping of demand for wheat in India could drive wheat prices up and increase water reliance on the subcontinent. Pakistan faces a serious internal struggle to ensure it allocates sufficient water to each of its regions; failure to do so could cause a humanitarian crisis that would require large amounts of aid to resolve, impacting the budgets of developed nations and potentially creating large numbers of immigrants looking for safer climates. The willingness of first world countries to accept both of these is dissipating.
The current dispute over water between India and Pakistan must also be recognised as just one factor in an always volatile relationship, which could cause further crises in a region that is already unstable. It must also be considered whether either country has accurately assessed the problems they face, or are more concerned with scoring political points, leaving the problem of water scarcity unresolved until it is too late.