Who’s competing for power in 2021?

Introduction

LatinNews 28 January 2021 Hits: 2851

The 2021 election calendar for Latin America opens on 7 February with presidential and legislative elections in Ecuador where the ruling Alianza País (AP) is likely to be punished for the failings of President Lenín Moreno’s outgoing administration. Despite a record 16 candidates for the presidency, there are two main contenders: 35-year-old economist Andrés Arauz (who has been endorsed by his mentor, left-wing former president Rafael Correa) and 66-year-old businessman (and two-time runner-up) Guillermo Lasso.

El Salvador follows on 28 February with legislative elections in which President Nayib Bukele is likely to strengthen his position through success for Nuevas Ideas (NI), thus confirming the breakdown of the country’s traditional duopoly.

Presidential and legislative elections in Peru will be held on 11 April, with a run-off on 6 June if required. Ever since Alberto Fujimori’s 1990 victory, outsiders have fared well in Peru, and the beneficiary of this could be George Forsyth, a former goalkeeper in the Peruvian football team, who is running for right-of-centre Victoria Nacional. The congressional elections are even more open.

The 6 June midterm legislative elections in Mexico will be a referendum on President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s term so far. In 2018 his Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (Morena) won majorities in both chambers, but the unprecedented ‘Va por México’ electoral alliance should mount a stiff challenge.

Haiti is scheduled to hold legislative and presidential elections on 19 September, with a second round on 21 November. The elections are intended to end the political gridlock, but the opposition has called for a ‘general uprising’ on 1 February to reject the elections and a constitutional referendum set for 25 April.

The midterm federal legislative elections in Argentina on 24 October will be a test for the newfound unity of the Partido Justicialista (PJ, Peronists) and their ability to retain the congressional majority won in 2019. There are some signs that Peronism is once again becoming divided, and this could undermine the PJ’s prospects and provide main opposition alliance Juntos por el Cambio (JxC) with a chance to take away control of congress from the PJ.

The presidential and legislative elections in Chile, scheduled for 21 November, look to be wide-open. Chileans have rejected incumbent parties in the past three presidential elections, and they seem likely to do so again this year.

Presidential and legislative elections will also take place in Nicaragua (7 November) and Honduras (28 November). In Nicaragua, President Daniel Ortega looks set for a fifth term (his fourth in a row) amid doubts as to the integrity of the electoral process. The Honduras presidential election will at least deliver a new president as Juan Orlando Hernández will not be seeking a third term. A CID Gallup survey in June showed 49% did not identify with any political party, while 29% identified with the ruling Partido Nacional (PN), 13% cited the Partido Liberal, and 7%, Partido Libertad y Refundación (Libre).

ECUADOR: Correa’s protégé leads the pack

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Date: 7 February. A second round will be held on 11 April if none of the presidential candidates secures 50% of the valid votes, or 40% with a 10 percentage-point lead over their closest rival.

Type: Presidential, legislative.

Main contenders: Andrés Arauz of the Unión por la Esperanza (Unes) coalition, comprising Centro Democrático (CD) and Fuerza Compromiso Social (FCS); Guillermo Lasso of Movimiento Creo, in coalition with the Partido Social Cristiano (PSC); Yaku Pérez of Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik.

A likely two-horse race

Ecuador’s presidential contest looks likely to come down to a two-horse race between candidates at opposite ends of the spectrum when it comes to political experience. 35-year-old economist Andrés Arauz currently tops the polls and is hoping to become the youngest president in Ecuador’s history, while 66-year-old businessman Guillermo Lasso is fighting to avoid his third consecutive runner-up finish. The only other candidate with any prospect of spoiling the party is indigenous activist Yaku Pérez. While his chances of breaking into the top two appear to be slim, Pérez could end up playing kingmaker should a second-round run-off be required between Arauz and Lasso.

There will be no shortage of options on the presidential ballot – a record total of 16 candidates have been registered – but few are expected to make much of a mark on this election. Former president Lucio Gutiérrez (2003-2005), running with the Partido Sociedad Patriótica (PSP), has failed to win any substantial support for what will be his fourth tilt at re-election since leaving the Carondelet presidential palace, while the relative anonymity of Ximena Peña – the nominee for the ruling Alianza País (AP), and the only female candidate in the contest – is testament to the intense unpopularity of President Lenín Moreno’s outgoing administration.

Arauz’s sudden political prominence can be attributed largely to the endorsement of his mentor, left-wing former president Rafael Correa (2007-2017), under whom Arauz served as minister of knowledge co-ordination between 2015 and 2017. Correa has been exiled in Belgium since leaving office, in light of the corruption charges filed against him, and his hopes of running for vice president alongside Arauz were thwarted by the culmination of legal proceedings in 2020, with the former president sentenced in absentia to eight years in prison; a decision seemingly fast-tracked through the courts in order to prevent his participation in February’s vote. Arauz will instead be joined on the ticket by journalist Carlos Rabascall.

Lasso, who briefly served as Ecuador’s economy minister back in 1999, has lost out to Correísta candidates in each of the previous two elections. He was comprehensively beaten by Correa himself in 2013 but took it to a run-off in 2017 against Moreno, Correa’s former vice president (2007-2017) who shifted dramatically to the right once in the top job. Lasso has thus positioned himself as something of a continuity candidate on this occasion (perhaps bravely, given that Moreno’s approval ratings have repeatedly dipped below 10% in recent years), pledging to maintain policies of fiscal austerity and economic liberalisation, in stark contrast to Arauz’s focus on fiscal stimulus and state intervention

Economic differences

The economy has been a major battleground in this election campaign, with the shadow of the US$6.5bn credit agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), signed by Moreno in August 2020, looming over the upcoming vote. Arauz has been an outspoken critic of the programme of economic reforms demanded by the IMF in exchange for these emergency funds (of which US$4bn have already been spent), and will likely seek to renegotiate these terms, as well as to restructure Ecuador’s vast debt burden more generally. Lasso, by contrast, can be expected to continue the public spending cuts that have seen much of the country turn against Moreno in recent years.

Pérez, a former prefect of Azuay province (2019-2020) and president of Kichwa indigenous confederation Ecuarunari (2013-2019), was something of a controversial choice for the Pachakutik candidacy, edging out Jaime Vargas, the president of Ecuador’s umbrella indigenous organisation Conaie (of which Pachakutik is the political wing). Pérez is best known for his fight against the country’s mining industry, and alongside the presidential and legislative elections, voters in Cuenca (Ecuador’s third-largest city, in Azuay province) will also take part in a referendum on whether to ban medium and large-scale mining in areas surrounding the city, a long-standing ambition for Pérez.

Mining referendum

In September 2020, Ecuador’s constitutional court (CC) approved a referendum initiative to restrict mining projects in areas surrounding the five rivers that provide water to the city of Cuenca. As prefect of Azuay, Pérez twice had petitions for a province-wide referendum turned down by the CC; he has pledged to take action against the country’s mining sector more broadly if elected, responding to concerns about the destruction of local environments. While Pérez’s presidential prospects remain slim, the citizens of Cuenca look likely to approve the mining ban, a move that could set a significant precedent both within Ecuador and beyond.

Correa and Vargas are not the only high-profile names that will not be on the ballot come 7 February. Former vice president Otto Sonnenholzner (2018-2020), long-time Guayaquil mayor Jaime Nebot (2000-2019), and five-time former presidential candidate Álvaro Noboa had all topped the polls at various points over the past 12 months, but all three will be absent, albeit for very different reasons: Sonnenholzner’s brand ultimately appeared to have been tainted by his association with Moreno, while Nebot stepped down to secure an alliance between his PSC and Lasso’s Movimiento Creo, and Noboa’s candidacy was rejected by Ecuador’s electoral council (CNE).

The exclusion of Noboa caused particular controversy and sparked a legal battle that looks set to continue long past election day. The CNE’s initial rejection of his candidacy back in August 2020 was overturned by the electoral disputes tribunal (TCE) in December, only for the CNE to refuse to heed this decision, sparking a prolonged institutional stalemate. Noboa has continued to fight his case, and on 6 January the TCE issued a further ruling dismissing four of the CNE’s five members – however, the appeals process for this decision is ongoing, and with the ballots having already been printed it seems unlikely that any resolution will arrive in time to save Noboa.

Looking to the polls

Beyond any damage done to the credibility of the CNE, the main impact of Noboa’s exclusion has been to reduce Arauz’s chances of an outright first-round victory, which had seemed a strong possibility while Noboa and Lasso looked set to split the right-wing vote. Polling results have varied quite substantially – and Arauz has been quick to draw comparisons with the October 2020 election in neighbouring Bolivia, in which his left-wing ally Luis Arce surpassed all projections to claim a decisive first-round victory – but most surveys have suggested that a run-off in April is the most likely outcome.

Arauz has broadly been tipped to receive between 35% and 42% of first-round votes, while Lasso is forecast to receive between 30% and 37%. While some polls suggest that Pérez could still pip Lasso to second place, most have put the Pachakutik candidate at between 12% and 19%. The not-insignificant proportion of undecided voters could still throw up a surprise on election day – but if a run-off between Arauz and Lasso does come to pass, the redistribution of Pérez’s votes would be all-important. On paper, Pérez has far more in common with Arauz than with Lasso, but the Pachakutik candidate was a fierce critic of Correa for many years and will be reluctant to endorse his old rival’s protégé.

Polls on the legislative vote have been few and far between, but the available data suggests that a fragmented national assembly could be on the cards. CD looks set to be the largest party (benefitting from the exclusion of coalition partner FCS from the legislative vote), while Lasso’s support will be split between Movimiento Creo and PSC. Without a legislative majority, whoever wins the presidential contest could struggle to implement their policy agenda, with Pachakutik unlikely to play the role of passive coalition partner. Ecuador is at a difficult juncture, facing a deep economic crisis and an impending ‘second wave’ of the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic – for whoever wins this election, it seems likely that the real challenge is yet to come.

EL SALVADOR: Bukele poised to strengthen his presence

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Date: 28 February.

Type: Legislative (all 84 seats in the unicameral national assembly) and municipal (all 262 mayoral seats in 14 departments).

Main contenders: Nuevas Ideas (NI); Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN); Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Arena); Gran Alianza por la Unidad Nacional (Gana); Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN); and Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC).

The end of the duopoly

President Nayib Bukele, a businessman and former FMLN mayor of San Salvador (2015-2018), won a first-round victory in the February 2019 presidential election, becoming the first candidate to break the duopoly of the right-wing Arena and left-wing FMLN since the end of the 1980-1992 internal conflict. Corruption exposed within successive Arena and FMLN governments had fuelled voter distrust of the political establishment which Bukele was able to exploit. NI was not formed in time to participate in the 2019 presidential election, so Bukele ran on the ticket of Gana, which won just 10 deputies in the last (2018) legislative election to 37 and 23 for Arena and FMLN, respectively.

The February 2021 legislative and municipal elections are expected to deliver a convincing victory for Bukele and NI. Widely considered a populist demagogue by his critics, Bukele remains popular in part due to a reduction in crime, which he attributes to his security plan ‘Control Territorial’. Police statistics cited by the government tallied 1,322 homicides in 2020, or 3.67 per day on average, down from 2,398 in 2019 which averaged 6.6 a day. Yet doubts persist as to the true causes of this reduction, and there is no doubt that the decline stems in part from measures implemented to stop the spread of the coronavirus (Covid-19) which resulted in fewer people on the streets.

Gang dealings?

In September 2020 investigative media El Faro published an incendiary report which alleged that, since taking office in June 2019, Bukele’s government had been involved in private negotiations with one of El Salvador’s main street gangs, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). Allegations of dealings between government officials and mara street gangs to reduce violence and secure political support are nothing new in El Salvador, and Bukele himself faced similar allegations from El Faro while serving as San Salvador mayor. However, these were the first to emerge since Bukele assumed the presidency.

A pre-electoral survey by Universidad Centroamericana's Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (Iudop), published on 8 December, showed 64% of 1,265 respondents saying they would vote for NI in the legislative election while just 6.3% said they would vote for Arena and 5.4%, for FMLN. As regards the municipal election, 44% said they would vote for NI, compared with 10% for Arena, 7.1% for Gana, and 6.3% for FMLN.

Bukele would seem poised for a major victory, which would remove what has been a significant check to his authority. Yet he himself has cast doubt on the integrity of the election with baseless suggestions of fraud. The electoral authority (TSE) has also denounced further acts of intimidation by NI against its magistrates. This all highlights questions over President Bukele’s commitment to the democratic process and rule of law, questions that have persisted throughout his tenure. These doubts notably emerged in February 2020 with Bukele’s deployment of security forces to congress to pressure legislators into approving funds for security. Dubbed ‘9F’ the event was widely condemned and sparked fears regarding the police independence in particular.

These doubts have been further fuelled by the government’s response to the pandemic which has been dominated by clashes between Bukele on the one hand and the legislature and judiciary on the other, where he has repeatedly disregarded orders from the country’s top court, prompting international condemnation. A letter penned by six US Republican legislators to Bukele in September warned of “a slow but sure departure from the rule of law and norms of democracy”. The same month Salvadorean judges wrote to United Nations special rapporteur Diego García-Sayán requesting his intervention, citing “grave violations to judicial independence”.

PERU: Outsider in pole position

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Date: 11 April 2021. Run-off to be held on 6 June if no candidate obtains 50%+1 of the vote in the first round.

Type: Presidential and legislative elections (to a 130-seat unicameral congress).

Main contenders: George Forsyth (Victoria Nacional); Keiko Fujimori (Fuerza Popular [FP, Fujimoristas]); Verónika Mendoza (Nuevo Perú); Julio Guzmán (Partido Morado [PM]); Yonhy Lescano (Acción Popular [AP]); former president Ollanta Humala (2011-2016) (Partido Nacionalista Peruano [PNP]); César Acuña (Alianza para el Progreso [APP]).

More instability seems likely

Huge uncertainty surrounds the outcome of the presidential and congressional elections in Peru on 11 April. The political tumult of the last five years, especially the tail end of 2020 when there were three presidents in the space of a week, makes predictions particularly challenging. But certain trends can be discerned. Further political instability is more likely than a long period of stability. Disillusionment with the political class is deep and deepening. The few established political parties that Peru has are discredited and unpopular. This favours outsiders and fringe parties. Whoever wins the presidency is more likely to face a fragmented congress than to secure a majority. This will complicate the next president’s plan of governance prospects for serving a full term.

Many adjectives could be employed to describe the last five-year term: uneventful is not one of them. After pipping Keiko Fujimori to the presidency in 2016 but confronted by an obstructionist congress dominated by her Fuerza Popular party, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski faced a tall order to govern. After becoming ensnared in the regionwide Odebrecht corruption scandal, Kuczynski resigned before he could be impeached in March 2018.

Kuczynski’s vice president Martín Vizcarra took over and launched an anti-corruption crusade as part of sweeping political and judicial reforms. This helped him become the most popular politician in Peru, but he was confounded by FP’s stalling tactics until the right-wing party overplayed its hand in October 2019 and presented him with the opportunity to disband congress. The public backed his decision to convene fresh congressional elections for 26 January 2020.

These elections did not produce the change Vizcarra was looking for. FP was vanquished but public disenchantment with the political class and a lack of faith in any one party resulted in a new atomised congress which was no easier to work with for Vizcarra and continued to thwart his reform agenda, ultimately voting to impeach him for moral incapacity last November. In a bitter irony he was accused of corruption by various members of the congress being investigated for much more serious allegations of money laundering, corruption, and other crimes for which there was more abundant evidence than the comparatively tenuous accusations against Vizcarra.

Vizcarra’s impeachment elevated the head of congress, Manuel Merino, to the presidency. Merino lasted just five days. Assailed by accusations of orchestrating a power grab, Merino faced protests which built in size and volume by the day, undermining his weak legitimacy. Merino’s position became untenable after his cabinet resigned en masse in the wake of the heavy-handed police response to these protests, which led to two fatalities.

Francisco Sagasti was sworn-in as Peru’s third president in the space of one week on 16 November. Sagasti made it one of his top priorities to oversee this April’s elections, promising neutrality in the electoral process. More than 20 presidential candidates registered for the election, a new record, indicative of the openness of the contest and the public repudiation of established parties.

Electoral surveys suggest that none of the options has really captured the public’s imagination. Peru does not operate a first-past-the-post system, with victory in the first round requiring more than 50% of the vote. This points to the near certainty of a second-round run-off on 6 June, pitting the two lead candidates against one another. Profound public disillusionment with the political class should also result in the eventual victor facing another fragmented congress with all of the associated governability problems that have been in evidence over the last five years ranging from frustrating the incoming administration’s legislative agenda to impeachment, although the president could also opt to dissolve congress. There is a higher probability of more political instability in the short-term than a long period of political stability.

Who is favourite to secure the presidency?

George Forsyth, a former goalkeeper in the Peruvian national football team, is the presidential frontrunner. He has led polls since mid 2020. Ever since Alberto Fujimori’s victory in 1990, outsiders have fared well in Peru and that axiom is as true as ever right now. Forsyth is running for Victoria Nacional, a right-of-centre party only founded in December 2020 to succeed the evangelical Restauración Nacional. He is not a political neophyte, having served as a councillor in La Victoria in 2010, before going on to become mayor of the district, one of the most populous in Lima, in 2018. He is not a populist authoritarian in Fujimori’s mould. He would most likely adopt an orthodox pro free-market economic position, while taking a tough stance on crime and corruption.

Despite enjoying a commanding lead in electoral surveys, Forsyth enjoys the support of fewer than one-fifth of the electorate. He would need to fall significantly in the polls, however, to miss out on a place in a second round. These polls put Fujimori’s daughter Keiko in second place, but she enjoys just single-digit support, meaning that at least a dozen candidates are in striking distance. The most prominent are Julio Guzmán of the centrist Partido Morado (PM) and Verónika Mendoza of the left-wing Nuevo Perú (NP) who are joint third in the polls.

Guzmán was polling strongly in the 2016 presidential race before being barred from competing, accused of a technical error in the registration of his candidacy. He is in with a shout, but polls suggest the novelty has worn off and he could suffer by association with the interim government led by Sagasti, who had been going to stand as his running mate, which is falling in popularity. Mendoza, a former member of congress for Cusco who benefitted from Guzmán’s withdrawal to finish third in the 2016 elections with 19% of the vote, advocates more-modern left-wing politics but she is hampered by disunity on the left. The left does not have a strong track record in Peru, with the exception of Ollanta Humala (2011-2016), who diluted his leftist discourse significantly to win election in 2011 after missing out when espousing more radical politics in 2006.

If Forsyth could handpick his run-off opponent, he would most likely choose Keiko or Humala. They both have some hardened supporters, but their rejection rate is sky high, in Keiko’s case in excess of 70%, which is even higher than the previous two elections when she was defeated in the second round, where she faced a ‘No to Keiko’ vote. Keiko, who has reversed her previous position and vowed to grant a humanitarian pardon to her imprisoned father Alberto if elected, may yet be barred from participating in the elections. Special prosecutor José Domingo Pérez, a member of the Lava Jato anti-corruption team investigating her for campaign-finance irregularities, is appealing a ruling last December allowing her party to take part in the elections.

Congressional elections

As many as one in four voters are either undecided or intend to cast blank ballots in the presidential contest, according to opinion polls. The congressional elections are even more open. As congress as an institution enjoys an even lower public approval rating than usual, parties are trying to improve their image by putting forward fresh faces. Of the 3,026 candidates for congress, very few have first-hand experience: only 42 candidates have ever served as deputies, with a further 150 having worked in an advisory capacity to previous legislators.

Acción Popular

Before the impeachment of Martín Vizcarra, the centrist Acción Popular (AP) was the most popular party in Peru. It was the big winner in regional elections in October 2018, and it won more seats than any other party in congress in last year’s elections to replace the legislature dissolved by Vizcarra. But AP has been weakened by internal divisions and will struggle to dissociate itself from the deeply unpopular impeachment of Vizcarra, not least because the interim president of five days, Manuel Merino, belonged to the party.

MEXICO: Referendum on López Obrador and Morena

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Date: 6 June.

Type: Midterm federal legislative elections, all 500 seats in the chamber of deputies to be renewed; state and municipal elections, 20,311 elected posts up for grabs including 15 states governorships.

Main contenders: Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (Morena), Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), Movimiento Ciudadano (MC).

A mid-term test for AMLO

The elections will mark the midpoint of the six-year term (sexenio) to which President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) was elected in 2018 for Morena. Although López Obrador is not competing, the election is being dressed as a referendum on his presidency so far. In 2018 Morena won majorities in both chambers of the federal congress. This has allowed López Obrador to advance his legislative agenda. Morena and López Obrador will be hoping to retain the majority in the chamber of deputies and capture more state governorships. But this will be no mean task given that the political opposition has complained that Morena’s majority means that congress is unable to provide the necessary counterweight to López Obrador, to the detriment of Mexico’s democracy.

Having a congressional majority means that the López Obrador executive has been able to fully implement its preferred policies to date. It also means that the López Obrador administration can be held responsible for Mexico’s poor performance in practically every area in the past two years. The López Obrador administration has not only failed to deliver on the president’s promise to pacify the country with over 60,000 homicides reported between 2019 and 2020; it has also presided over one of the longest and deepest economic recessions in Mexico’s history. The economy contracted (by 0.1%) in 2019 for the first time in a decade and GDP is estimated to have fallen by a further 9% last year. Moreover, the government’s handling of the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic is also seen as deficient, with Mexico having the world’s fourth highest Covid-19 death toll.

These poor results would make it difficult for any political party to fight an election. However, Mexico’s political opposition was so soundly defeated in 2018 that it remains weak. But the sense that Mexico is regressing and the fear that López Obrador’s authoritarian streak is weakening Mexico’s democracy has led the opposition to unite against Morena. Three of the four main opposition parties - PAN, PRI, and PRD - have agreed to back a common list of candidates in the federal legislative election and some, but not all, in the state elections.

This unprecedented ‘Va por México’ (‘Let’s go for Mexico’) electoral alliance should mount a stiff challenge. Morena is defending a 252 majority in the federal chamber of deputies. But the centre-right PAN and the centrist PRI are Mexico’s most traditional and established parties, they each have a broad electoral base and well-established party structures. The PAN is currently the second largest party in the chamber of deputies, with the 77 seats. The PRI has 48 seats, and the PRD has 12. Under the alliance, the Va por México members have agreed to present a consensus list of candidates for federal deputies in 190 of the 300 federal electoral districts. The idea is to back the strongest set of candidates in these contested districts to defeat Morena candidates, the remaining districts are considered safe for one of the alliance’s members.

The potential downside for the Va por México parties is that the unnatural alliance could alienate their respective support bases. The PAN and the leftist PRD forged a ‘Stop the PRI’ alliance in the 2015 midterm elections in a bid to prevent the-then ruling PRI from gaining full political control of the country. The PAN-PRD alliance was relatively successful, and the two parties have maintained a working relationship since then. But traditional rivals PAN and PRI rarely see eye to eye and have a long history of confrontation. Notably, the Va por México alliance has been derided by López Obrador and Morena as confirming that the three parties are politically conservative and economically neoliberal; inherently hostile to Morena’s left-wing progressive politics; and that their main objective is to thwart its administration at all costs.

The remaining leading opposition party, the MC, decided against joining Va por México. The leftist MC did engage in negotiations with the PAN, PRI, and PRD but its party leadership ultimately decided against taking part in the alliance, arguing that it could cost it votes. The MC currently has 27 seats in the chamber of deputies after capitalising on the PRD’s shift to the centre since 2015. The MC won more legislative seats than the PRD for the first time in the 2018 election. The MC believes that it can attract an even larger proportion of the leftist vote by distancing itself from Va por México. This could allow MC to make gains, but it would also likely play into Morena’s hands by dividing the anti-Morena vote.

However, the PAN, PRI, and PRD have concluded that only by joining forces can they defeat Morena and hope to get a congressional majority. The three parties believe that this is critical for defending Mexico’s pluralist democracy and stopping the entrenchment of an autocratic government by offsetting the near total power currently enjoyed by the López Obrador executive.

More to lose

Morena has also struck its own electoral alliances. But these are with much smaller parties, most of which had joined the winning coalition set up to contest the 2018 election. Any gains in electoral support deriving from the alliances struck by Morena will be marginal, and the ruling party has more to lose than what it can gain. Morena’s aim is to maintain its strong majority and, if possible, reach a qualified two-thirds majority in its own right (Morena can currently muster a two-thirds majority with its allies). The charismatic López Obrador remains popular, with an approval rating of over 60%. The challenge for Morena is to translate López Obrador’s personal approval into support for Morena candidates, who by and large lack the president’s charisma and for the most part are not well known.

Questionable candidates

Being a young political party (registered only in 2014), Morena’s pool of affiliates with experience of holding public office is limited. This has resulted in many politically inexperienced figures, whose main merits seem to be that they are close to President López Obrador, seeking the party’s nomination in some key contests. The most egregious example of this is Paloma Aguilar Correa, López Obrador’s former bodyguard, who is hoping to become Morena’s gubernatorial candidate in San Luis Potosí state. Meanwhile Senator Félix Salgado Macedonio has been selected as the party’s gubernatorial candidate in Guerrero state, even though he faces multiple rape accusations. Salgado’s nomination produced internal party divisions, but his candidacy has received López Obrador’s blessing.

It is worth noting that while López Obrador’s personal approval remains high, the approval of his government is significantly lower at around 30%. This helps explain why Morena gets just 32% support in voting intention polls for the federal legislative election. The voting intention polls give the PAN 17% support, the PRI 16%, and the PRD 4%. This suggest that the combined level of support for the Va por México alliance is comparable to Morena’s. The alliance is potentially in a strong position to wrest control of the chamber of deputies from the ruling party and provide a counterbalance to President López Obrador for the remainder of his term ending in 2024.

Roles reversed in gubernatorial races

In contrast to the legislative elections, it is the opposition that holds power in virtually all the 15 states that will be holding gubernatorial elections (Baja California state being the sole exception). The incumbent opposition parties are focused on retaining control of the states that they hold but particularly on stopping Morena from concentrating even more political power. That the Va por México parties have sealed electoral alliances in some state elections underlines this. Notably, this is the case in Baja California where the goal is to unseat Morena from one of the few states it governs. Meanwhile Morena’s objective is to retain Baja California and take a few gubernatorial seats from its opponents to consolidate and increase its presence at state level.

Hoping to remain in congress

According to the official records of Mexico’s chamber of deputies the vast majority of incumbent deputies have announced their intention to seek re-election. The records show that 444 deputies (90%) have officially expressed their interest in standing for re-election. Notifying the chamber about this is a legal requirement. According to the chamber’s records, 232 of the 252 Morena deputies have said they will seek re-election; 64 of the 77 PAN deputies; 44 of the 48 PRI deputies; and seven of the 12 PRD deputies. This suggests that voters could be presented with choices very similar to those they faced in the 2018 legislative election. Yet a recent opinion poll found that 22% of respondents wanted to change their congressional representatives.

HAITI: Elections mired in controversy

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Date: 19 September.

Type: First round of the legislative and presidential elections. The second-round of legislative elections and the presidential run-off are scheduled for 21 November, along with municipal and local elections.

Main contenders: Parti Haïtien Têt Kalé (PHTK), of President Jovenel Moïse; Ayiti An Aksyon (AAA); Fanmi Lavalas (FL), of former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide [1991; 1994-1996; 2001-2004]; Organisation du Peuple en Lute (OPL), an FL splinter group; Fusion des sociaux-démocrates; Inité; Secteur Démocratique et Populaire National; among others.

An attempt to break the political gridlock

Jovenel Moïse, an agricultural businessman and political novice, was inaugurated as president on 7 February 2017. This marked a return to constitutional order after Haiti had been without an elected president from February 2016 to February 2017 due to delayed elections. Political gridlock has ensued, resulting in the failure to hold legislative elections in October 2019. As of 13 January 2020, the terms of the 119-member chamber of deputies and two-thirds of the 30-member senate expired without newly elected officials to take their places.

The country is consequently without a functioning legislature, and President Moïse, who is constitutionally barred from seeking re-election, has been ruling by decree since then. He remains deeply unpopular, and over the past two years he has faced mass protests and calls to resign. This stems from alleged corruption (the alleged embezzlement of funds from Venezuela’s discounted oil initiative Petrocaribe); rocketing inflation; insecurity - including claims that the government has colluded with gangs; and perceived incompetence.

Staging the elections has been a key demand of the international community, and on 7 January the director of Haiti’s electoral commission (CEP), Max Délices, confirmed the electoral calendar. However, this remains contentious for various reasons. Opposition groups are demanding that Moïse step down this February rather than in February 2022 as the electoral calendar would appear to suggest, and a transition government take over. Presidential terms are five years, but these groups maintain that the current five-year term began on 7 February 2016 when Moïse’s predecessor Michel Martelly (2011-2016) officially stepped down.

The opposition also objects to the nine-member CEP tasked with overseeing the vote. In September 2020 Moïse appointed the CEP, but this proved controversial due to the fact that it did not include representatives of key sectors such as the Episcopal Conference and universities (as stipulated by the constitution). The other big controversy was its mandate which included organising a referendum on a new constitution set for 25 April. The opposition, legal experts, and human rights groups claim such a vote is illegal, citing Article 284.3 of the 1987 constitution which states that “any popular consultation which seeks to modify the Constitution by way of a referendum is formally forbidden”. Moïse’s advisers however insist that they are not reforming the current magna carta but creating a new one, making the ban irrelevant.

Such was the controversy over the new CEP - both its representativeness and its mandate - that the supreme court opted not to swear in its members, but Moise then installed it regardless. This has left even PHTK members warning the controversy will hinder the ability to prevent an electoral crisis. The opposition has already announced protests and a “general uprising” to begin on 1 February in rejection of the elections and referendum. The prospect of further unrest comes as the socio-economic situation exacerbated by the impact of the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic, which is forecast to shrink Haiti’s GDP by 3% in 2020, looks set to worsen.

Food insecurity

In October 2020 the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Food Programme (WFP) released an early warning analysis of acute food insecurity hotspots which included Haiti. Analysis conducted in September 2020 estimates the number of people in Haiti facing a food crisis or emergency between August 2020 and February 2021 at approximately 4m people (out of 11m), up from 3.67m in the October 2019-February 2020 analysis. A further increase to 4.4m is projected between March and June 2021.

ARGENTINA: A test for Peronism

LatinNews 28 January 2021 Hits: 1893

Date: 24 October.

Type: Midterm federal legislative elections, half of the seats in the chamber of deputies and a third of the seats in the senate will be renewed.

Main contenders: Partido Justicialista (PJ, Peronists), Juntos por el Cambio (JxC).

Testing the unity of Peronism

These elections will be a test of the Peronists capacity to maintain unity and retain the congressional majority won in the 2019 general election after two difficult years for the government led by President Alberto Fernández. Peronism united behind Fernández’s candidacy two years ago after it went into the 2015 general election deeply divided and lost to the opposition. But the PJ’s newfound unity looks uneasy, with moderate and radical party factions having different views on many issues. With Argentina suffering from a deep economic recession that has been exacerbated by the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic, the differences over government policy actions have become more pronounced.

The PJ’s 2018 electoral victory is largely attributed to former president Cristina Fernández (2007-2015), the leader of the radical leftist Kirchnerista PJ faction, agreeing to play second fiddle to Alberto Fernández and be his vice-presidential running mate. This brought Cristina Fernández’s breakaway Unidad Ciudadana movement back into the main PJ fold. Kirchnerismo has a solid electoral base, and harnessing this support is key for Peronism to win elections. The Frente de Todos coalition of the PJ and Kirchnerista movements delivered a comfortable victory for President Fernández and clear majorities in both houses of congress. The Frente de Todos has 41 senators in the 72-seat senate and 119 deputies in the 257-seat lower chamber. The centre-right JxC opposition coalition has 25 senators and 115 deputies, with the smaller parties making up the remainder.

The congressional majority has allowed the Fernández administration to pass emergency economic legislation and to renegotiate Argentina’s debt with foreign bondholders. However, this has not been enough to lift Argentina out of the recession it fell into in 2018, and the country continues to have a high fiscal deficit and a persistently high (double-digit) inflation rate. The exacerbation of the recession due to the pandemic has led to massive jobs losses and a sharp rise in the poverty rate (to around 40% compared with 33.6% in 2018).

The economic collapse has undermined public support for the government. A recent public opinion poll found that 65% of respondents disapprove of the Fernández government, with 76% unhappy with the situation in the country and 74% considering that the situation deteriorated in 2020 compared with 2019. President Fernández’s disapproval rating stands at 61% but more ominously for the PJ, 73% disapprove of the chamber of deputies and 71% of the senate. The dismal economic situation has also prompted criticism from withing the PJ’s ranks, particularly from the more radical factions. Vice President Fernández herself has publicly complained about the government’s macroeconomic management, condemning the rise in poverty and demanding more social spending despite the fiscal deficit and a still heady public debt (around 90% of GDP).

These grumblings have raised speculation that Peronism is once again becoming divided. This could undermine the PJ’s electoral prospects and provide JxC with a chance to take away control of congress from the PJ, but to capitalise on this, JxC would also have to rediscover the unity it lost following the 2018 electoral defeat.

Abortion legalisation another vote-loser?

Another factor that could cost the Partido Justicialista (PJ, Peronists) votes in the midterm legislative elections is President Alberto Fernández’s controversial decision to push through congress a new law legalising abortion. While support for legalising abortion has increased in Argentina in recent years, particularly among the young, it still divides society and the PJ. Many Peronist voters are socially conservative Catholics and previous Peronist governments deliberately avoided pressing the issue. The approval of the abortion legislation in December 2020 was deplored by Pope Francis, himself a Peronist sympathiser, and the Argentine Episcopal Conference. Moreover, opinion polls show that most Argentines (over 50%) remain opposed to unrestricted abortion, suggesting that most of the electorate might be unhappy with the new legislation.

CHILE: A wide-open race

LatinNews 28 January 2021 Hits: 1958

Date: 21 November 2021. If no presidential candidate secures an absolute majority of the valid votes, a runoff will be held on 19 December.

Election type: Presidential and legislative elections (27 senators and 155 deputies).

Main contenders: The ruling right-of-centre Chile Vamos coalition, currently made up of Renovación Nacional (RN), Evolución Política (Evópoli), Partido Regionalista Independiente Demócrata (PRI), and Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI). The main alliances in the centre-left/left-wing opposition are: Convergencia Progresista (made up of the Partido por la Democracia [PPD], Partido Radical [PR], and Partido Socialista [PS]); the Frente Amplio which groups five parties and political movements, some recently set up (Comunes, Convergencia Social [CS], Revolución Democrática [RD], Fuerza Común [FC], and Movimiento Unir); and Unidad para el Cambio, set up in 2019 and currently composed of the Partido Comunista de Chile (PCCh) and Federación Regionalista Verde Social (FRVS). Other parties to note are the centre-left Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), the leftist Partido Progresista (PRO), and the far-right Partido Republicano (PLR).

Shifting alliances

Even before the events of the last two years shook Chile’s political landscape, political alliances had already started shifting, with notably the dissolution in 2018 of the leftist Nueva Mayoría coalition that former president Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010; 2014-2018) had formed during her second term. Incumbent President Sebastián Piñera’s term has since been marked by the social uprising which began in October 2019, the October 2020 referendum in which Chileans voted to rewrite the constitution, and the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic, all casting further uncertainty over Chile’s political outlook and the direction in which the electorate is leaning.

Chileans have rejected incumbent governing parties in the past three presidential elections, and there is a strong likelihood that they will do so again this year. In mid-January, Piñera’s approval rating stood at 17% according to Cadem, a pollster. His approval ratings had fallen as low as 9%-10% in the months that followed the October 2019 social uprising, before picking up slightly at various points during the pandemic, but never exceeding the mid-to-high twenties. With still over a year in office to go, the Piñera government appears to have already fallen into lame duck territory, with the demands of the Covid-19 pandemic, confrontation from the opposition, an electoral year, and internal divisions making it unlikely that it will make any noteworthy policy advances this year.

The government is also out of step with public opinion on a number of issues, as demonstrated by the result of the October 2020 referendum on whether to rewrite Chile’s dictatorship-era constitution, and by the issue of early pension withdrawals. In the case of the former, voters overwhelmingly favoured a new constitution while the government had chosen to remain neutral – in part because within Chile Vamos, the UDI was against rewriting the constitution. With the latter, the Piñera government fiercely opposed the widely popular measure allowing Chileans to make withdrawals from their pension pot, which was instituted by congress to help with the economic impact of the pandemic (although a number of Chile Vamos lawmakers sided against the government on the issue, causing frictions within the ruling coalition).

Adding to the general anti-incumbent and anti-establishment sentiment in Latin America, all this should conspire to give the leftist opposition a strong chance. However, the Chilean left is extremely divided, as demonstrated by the different lists which have been presented to the electoral authorities (Servel) for the election of the constituent assembly. If the opposition’s fragmentation in the April elections is reflected in the general election in November, it will be entering the fray with a weakened hand.

Primaries for the presidential elections will be held in July, and much could still change before then. However, a number of presumptive pre-candidates have emerged as possible frontrunners in recent polls. On the right of the political spectrum are Joaquín Lavin from the UDI – the most ring-wing party of the Chile Vamos coalition – who is mayor of Las Condes, an upscale district in Santiago; Evelyn Matthei, also from the UDI, a former lawmaker and currently mayor of Providencia, another Santiago district; José Antonio Kast, the president of the far-right PLR, who came an unexpected fourth place as an independent in the 2017 presidential election; and Sebastián Sichel, a former minister in the Piñera government who plans to run as an independent .

On the left are Pamela Jiles, currently a deputy for the left-wing Partido Humanista (PH), which broke away from the Frente Amplio alliance in 2019; and the PCCh’s Daniel Jadue, the communist mayor of the working-class Santiago district of Recoleta. Considering hypothetical scenarios for a possible second round, a Cadem poll from 11 January found Jiles to be the strongest bet on the left, and Lavin the best performer on the right.

Although they are by no means political outsiders, Lavin, Jadue, and Jiles have been described as touting a populist agenda. They, as well as other names topping opinion polls, represent political parties on the extremes rather than in the centre of Chile’s political system. Chile Vamos may yet put forward a strong pre-candidate from one of the more moderate segments of the coalition; centre-left parties may still pull together to form a coalition in the image of the now-defunct Nueva Mayoría (which had itself replaced the Concertación grouping which was founded at the end of the military dictatorship). But the current climate suggests that Chile’s election will be a divisive and polarising one, favourable to the emergence of more radical candidates.

Elections and the constituent process

Later this year, presidential candidates will begin campaigning while the constituent assembly elected on 11 April will be working on drafting a new constitution. In theory, the constituent assembly should not be subjected to the electoral and political pressures which shape the agenda of presidential candidates. However, there could be some crossover between the issues that dominate presidential campaigns and those being discussed by the constituent assembly. For example, police reform and a reform to the pensions system are two issues likely to be salient in the presidential campaign; there could be a desire within parts of the constituent assembly to enshrine rights in the magna carta which would then drive such reforms at a political level.

A busy election year, with a first test in April

Chileans will be going to the polls at least twice this year, with a first electoral test on 11 April when the 14.9m voters will elect regional governors (for the first time ever, as governors used to be appointed by the president), municipal mayors, and the 155 members of the constituent assembly tasked with writing a new constitution. The mayoral and gubernatorial elections were delayed from October 2020 because of the pandemic, while the election for the constituent assembly follows the result of the October 2020 referendum, when Chileans chose to elect new representatives to draft a new constitution rather than task existing lawmakers with the job.

Almost 3,400 people have registered with Servel for the constituent assembly election. These include over 2,200 independents – including artists, pensioners, lawyers, ecologists, local community leaders, representatives from social organisations, sportsmen, academics, TV personalities, feminists, and indigenous candidates – as well as candidates from the established party system. Chile Vamos joined forces with the PLR to present just one list, thus unifying the forces of the right. In contrast, the left has splintered into several different lists. The parties from Convergencia Progresista have joined with the PDC, PRO, and the centrist Ciudadanos to present the Unidad Constituyente list, but the FA, the PCCh, and smaller left-wing parties will each be presenting their own lists also.

This fragmentation is mirrored in the alliances for the mayoral elections, where even the Unidad Constituyente – which was initially set up for the local elections as well as the constituent convention – has splintered, with Convergencia Progresista (the PPD, PR, and PS) presenting one list, and the PDC, PRO, and Ciudadanos presenting another.

A representative constituent assembly

The rules by which the constituent assembly will work will be established by the body itself after it has been elected. But some rules have already been laid out regarding its composition to ensure that it is a representative and democratic body. The assembly will be made up of an equal number of men and women, making it the first constituent assembly in the world to have gender parity. A minimum of 5% of party lists must be made up of people with disabilities. Another first for Chile, where the current constitution does not recognise indigenous peoples, is that a quota has been established for indigenous representatives, with 17 seats reserved for members of Chile’s different indigenous peoples.

NICARAGUA: Ortega set for another term

LatinNews 28 January 2021 Hits: 1741

Date: 7 November.

Type: Presidential, legislative (92 seats in the unicameral congress), 20 seats for the Central American parliament (Parlacen).

Main contenders: President Daniel Ortega (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, FSLN). At the time of writing, candidates had yet to be announced for Coalición Nacional (CN), Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC), and the other main opposition grouping Alianza Cívica por la Justicia y Democracia (ACJD)/Ciudadanos por la Libertad (CxL).

Towards a fifth term

In power since 2007, President Ortega won his third consecutive election and fourth presidential term in the last (November 2016) election, with 72.5% of the vote, taking 71 seats in the legislature. The main opposition PLC of disgraced former President Arnoldo Alemán (1997-2002), which took 15% of the presidential vote, had 14 deputies and the smaller parties made up the difference.

As with previous elections, questions were raised about the integrity of the electoral process. Ortega’s critics accuse him of having dismantled Nicaragua’s democratic institutions since taking power, including the electoral authorities (CSE), and reproducing the very caudillismo that he fought to overthrow in 1979 with the defeat of former dictator Anastasio Somoza (1967-1972; 1974-1979). The UK-based Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) for instance classifies Nicaragua as an ‘authoritarian regime’ while US NGO Freedom House rates it ‘not free’ in its annual study of political rights and civil liberties worldwide.

Concerns about democracy have intensified since April 2018 when an unprecedented show of unrest, prompted by protests over changes to the social security system (INSS), led the government to begin a crackdown on opponents, who it accused of trying to carry out a coup, which has continued.

Impact of repression

According to the OAS, the repression in Nicaragua has resulted in 328 deaths since April 2018 (though local human rights groups suggest the number is far higher), around 2,000 injured, over 770 imprisoned, over 100,000 fleeing the country, and over 90 journalists forced into exile.

The international community has taken a stand. In June 2020, Organisation of American States (OAS) General Secretary Luis Almagro announced he would request that OAS members declare a “rupture of the democratic order” in Nicaragua. This brought the Ortega government a step closer to facing sanctions which could include the suspension or termination of its member state status. In October 2019 the European Union established a framework for targeted sanctions which it extended a year later, citing the “ongoing deterioration of democracy and human rights in Nicaragua”. It sanctioned six officials in May 2020, and the US has also slapped a string of sanctions on key allies of Ortega including First Lady Rosario Murillo Ortega’s sons, Juan Carlos, Rafael, and Laureano Ortega, Commander-in-Chief of the Army Julio César Avilés Castillo, and police chief Francisco Díaz, among others.

Against this backdrop, the prospects for the opposition, which remains fractious, are not promising. In February 2020 a national coalition, the Coalición Nacional (CN), was launched, comprising seven members. These were: the civil-society groups ACJD; Unidad Nacional Azul y Blanco (UNAB); peasants’ movement Movimiento Campesino; and four political parties – PLC, Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense (FDN), Partido de Restauración Democrática (PRD), and indigenous party Yatama. Since then, the ACJD pulled out in October 2020, complaining the CN had failed to facilitate dialogue with other opposition groups, and has since formed a new alliance with another opposition group, CxL. In December 2020, the PLC was ejected amid concerns it still had links to the FSLN with which it forged a power-sharing arrangement, ‘El Pacto’, in 2000.

Further compounding these problems, the opposition has decried new legislation which it warns will further target them ahead of the elections. This includes a new law prohibiting anyone who has “led or financed a coup d’état, fomented terrorist acts, or incited foreign interference” from running in elections - all accusations levelled by Ortega at the opposition. Other contentious new legislation includes: a foreign-agents law requiring organisations and individuals that receive money from international governments and institutions to register as ‘foreign agents’ with the interior ministry; a cyber-security law; and a constitutional amendment which allows life imprisonment for ‘hate crimes’.

Major doubts also persist as to the integrity of the electoral process. Such were the concerns in 2016 that the FSLN government committed to electoral reform as part of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in February 2017 with the OAS. However, an OAS resolution passed in October 2020 indicated that this had not taken place and urged that “concrete electoral reform commitments, in particular modernization and restructuring of the Supreme Electoral Council, be in place before the State convokes general elections, or no later than May 2021”.

A survey by pollster CID-Gallup published in October 2020 showed support for the FSLN running at 20%-25%, a decline on previous years but no opposition grouping had emerged to capitalise on this. The survey also showed that Nicaraguans’ main concern is lack of employment (cited by 34% of the 1,202 respondents), followed by government corruption (17%), insecurity (16%), and the high cost of living (10%). This reflects the dire economic situation. Already impacted by the political crisis which began in April 2018 (GDP shrank 4.0% and 3.9% in 2018 and 2019, respectively on World Bank figures), this has since been compounded by the impact of both the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic and devastation wreaked by hurricanes Eta and Iota in early November. In October the central bank said it was forecasting that GDP would contract 4.5% in 2020 (within a ±1 percentage point range) due to the pandemic but this does not take into account the damage caused by Eta and Iota which preliminary government figures put at US$742m or 6% of national GDP.

HONDURAS: More of the same?

LatinNews 28 January 2021 Hits: 1938

Date: 28 November.

Type: Presidential, legislative (128 national deputy candidates representing the country’s 18 departments), local (298 mayoral candidates), plus 20 candidates for the Central American parliament (Parlacen).

Main contenders (presidential pre-candidates): Mauricio Oliva, Nasry Asfura (Partido Nacional, PN); Yani Rosenthal, Luis Zelaya (Partido Liberal, PL); Salvador Nasralla (Partido Salvador de Honduras); Xiomara Castro (Partido Libertad y Refundación, Libre).

The end of Hernández

President Juan Orlando Hernández will not be seeking a third four-year term for the conservative PN which has been in office since 2009. His second term was already subject to question: the Honduran constitution explicitly prohibits presidential re-election but a 2015 controversial ruling by the supreme court lifted the ban, allowing him to run again. The previous 2017 election was also widely slammed as fraudulent, prompting observers from the Organization of American States (OAS) to question whether the official results, which gave Hernández a narrow 42.9%-41.4% victory over Nasralla (then running for the Alianza de Oposición contra la Dictadura coalition), accurately reflected the people’s will. Both major opposition parties, Libre and PL, challenged the results and mass protests occurred. Post-electoral violence resulted in at least 23 dead, at least 16 of whom were shot by security forces according to the Office of the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

Such was the controversy that back in January 2019, the legislature approved a preliminary package of constitutional changes to partially reform the electoral process. These restructured the national registry office, dissolved the existing electoral authority, and created two new institutions: the CNE to organise and supervise electoral processes, and an electoral court of justice to settle electoral disputes. However, further legislation was pending which has not been approved . This means the institutional framework which gave rise to claims of massive fraud in 2017 has not been fully overhauled ahead of the election.

Failure to approve further changes

Further legislation was pending, in line with recommendations from institutions such as the OAS and UN. As well as seeking to bolster the party system, with an emphasis on women’s equal access to elected positions, these included guaranteeing organised electoral processes and election days, with trained electoral officials, standardised polling stations, and transparent ballot processing.

The PN, which holds 61 of the 128 seats in congress, has been able to control the legislative agenda with the ad-hoc support of several small parties and has benefited from the fragmentation of the opposition - and specifically the PL which fell apart in the aftermath of the 2009 coup which ejected President Manuel Zelaya (PL, 2006-2009). Under the successive PN administrations, the country has seen a weakening of anti-corruption efforts, culminating in the ejection in January 2020 of the OAS-sponsored Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (Maccih) after four years in the country. The latest (January 2020) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by NGO Transparency International revealed Honduras slid 14 places in 2019 to rank 146 out of 180 countries, the second worse score in Central America after Nicaragua (161). In October 2019, a US court convicted Hernández’s brother, Juan Antonio, on four counts, which included conspiring to import cocaine into the US. The verdict caused some discomfort for the president given that the court found millions of US dollars of drug proceeds had been funnelled to PN electoral campaigns to “impact” on presidential elections in 2009, 2013, and 2017.

Corruption concerns similarly cloud the pre-presidential line-up ahead of the scheduled (but non-obligatory) March primaries to select the candidates – presidential, congressional, and mayoral – for November. Leading PN and PL contenders have made headlines due to corruption allegations. Congress president Oliva (PN), a vocal opponent of Maccih, was named years earlier in connection with Maccih investigations. Most recently, in May 2020, a report by Central American investigative magazine Expediente Público alleged he had purchased various properties from a business associate at Inversiones Acrópolis, a company linked by the local media to Los Cachiros drug trafficking organisation. As regards Oliva’s main competitor in the PN primaries, Asfura, who is mayor of Tegucigalpa, in late October 2020 the attorney general’s office requested the removal of his immunity from prosecution in order that he be investigated for crimes including presumed abuse of authority and fraud.

The likely PL favourite is Yani Rosenthal, a former minister of the presidency (2006-2007) under Zelaya, PL legislator (2010-2014), and presidential pre-candidate (2012). Rosenthal returned to Honduras in August 2020 having served a three-year prison sentence after pleading guilty in 2017 to laundering money for Los Cachiros through a holding company controlled by his family, Inversiones Continental (Panama).

Unsurprisingly, a survey published in September 2020 by pollster CID-Gallup showed corruption was considered the top problem. The second voter concern is unemployment - indicative of the impact of the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic. Late last year Wilfredo Cerrato, the president of Honduras’s central bank, said that the pandemic, along with the impact of hurricane Eta, which devastated the country in November, was expected to result in GDP contracting between 8%-9% in 2020. However, this did not take into account the impact of hurricane 'Iota' which followed Eta. An earlier (June) CID Gallup survey revealed disillusionment with the political class. The survey showed 49% of respondents did not identify with any political party, while 29% identified with the PN, 13% cited the PL, and 7%, Libre.

ST LUCIA: UWP to face electorate after historic slump

LatinNews 28 January 2021 Hits: 1790

Date: By 6 June.

Type: General Election,

Main contenders: The United Workers Party (UWP), led by Prime Minister Allen Chastanet, and the St Lucia Labour Party (SLP) led by Philip Pierre.

UWP looking for second term

Since independence in 1979, power has been shared more or less evenly between the currently ruling UWP, with five terms in office, including a three-term stretch from 1982-1997, and the SLP with four terms in power.

When the UWP returned to power in 2006 after a two-term hiatus, it was widely expected to remain in power for an extended period, perhaps emulating its 1982-1997 15-year dominance. This hope was dashed by the 2008/09 global financial crisis, and it was the SLP that won the 2011 election, but, perhaps surprisingly, it was unable to hold onto power just as the economy was beginning to recover in 2016.

The problem for the outgoing SLP government was that although the economy was slowly beginning to recover (with 1.3% growth in 2015 after just 0.5% growth in 2014, near zero growth in 2013, and a 1.1% contraction in 2012) overall unemployment was still very high at 25%, with youth unemployment at over 40%. Public-sector debt had also escalated on the SLP’s watch, from 66.9% of GDP in 2011 to 82.4% in 2015.

Now the UWP is faced with defending its own record, which has been much damaged by the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. After its 2019 Article IV Consultation, the report for which was released in February 2020, the IMF was predicting 3.2% growth for 2020. It’s not just that this didn’t happen; it didn’t happen by a distance that no one could have predicted. The IMF estimates that St Lucia’s GDP contracted by 16.9% in 2020. It may not have been the UWP’s fault, but by any standards that is a difficult record to defend at the hustings.

The UWP goes into election year led by veteran Allen Chastanet; the SLP is now led by Philip Pierre who was promoted to party leader after the 2016 general election defeat. Pierre was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Infrastructure, Port Services and Transport in the 2011-2016 administration.

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