Date: Legislative elections on 13 March. Presidential election on 29 May. If no presidential candidate secures an absolute majority of the valid votes, a run-off will be held on 19 June.
Type: Presidential and legislative elections.
Main contenders: Gustavo Petro (Colombia Humana), Óscar Iván Zuluaga (Centro Democrático), Sergio Fajardo (Compromiso Ciudadano).
Mounting discontent
President Iván Duque, who is not permitted to run for re-election due to constitutional term limits, has badly dragged down the electoral prospects of the ruling right-wing Centro Democrático (CD) during his last year in office. Duque has been a divisive leader since his victory in 2018, but polarisation has now given way to deep unpopularity – this reached record levels in June 2021, when a Datexco poll put his disapproval rating at 79%, with just 20% of respondents considering that he was doing a good job. An Invamer poll published on 5 December showed him struggling to recoup the lost public support, giving him an approval rating of 25% and a disapproval rating of 69%.
Key to this mounting discontent was the wave of social unrest that swept Colombia between April and July. Initial protests against an unpopular tax reform ballooned into expressions of generalised contempt for the government after Duque oversaw a violent crackdown on demonstrators. The protests morphed into a condemnation of police brutality, and then to general frustration at the deep inequalities etched across Colombian society. Those social divisions have become more entrenched during the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic, and could be a deciding factor in the elections.
Beyond the intensified focus on inequality due to the protests, the usual issues will dominate campaigning. Crime and violence will rank highly among voter concerns, with CD likely to tout its security credentials by highlighting victories such as the October capture of Colombia’s most-wanted drug trafficker, Dairo Antonio Úsuga (‘Otoniel’), and the fact that 2020 saw the country’s lowest homicide rate since 1974.
In terms of Colombia’s internal conflict, however, the picture is far less rosy. The Duque administration’s objections to the amnesty provisions laid out in the 2016 peace agreement struck with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc) guerrilla group have put a serious strain on Colombia’s fragile peace, with continued assassinations of social leaders and massacres taking place in rural areas, particularly in the east, west, and south-west. The election will pit security hardliners on the right, who argue that a militarised response is the only viable solution to internal conflict, against more progressive candidates calling for increased state investment in Colombia’s hinterlands.
The continuity candidate – Óscar Iván Zuluaga (Centro Democrático)
Against a backdrop of discontent, CD candidate Óscar Iván Zuluaga will face a tough struggle to keep the party in the presidential palace. He benefits from being well-known by the Colombian electorate, having reached the run-off of the 2014 presidential election against Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) and served as finance minister under former president Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010).
Uribe casts a long shadow over the Colombian right, and, as with Duque’s campaign in 2018, ‘Uribismo’ is dominating Zuluaga’s election bid, with the pushing of hardline security proposals, warnings about the consequences of a leftist candidate gaining power, and a degree of scepticism regarding the benefits of the 2016 peace agreement. Zuluaga made clear his intention to fit the Uribista mould when he accepted CD’s nomination on 22 November, pledging to deliver “Democratic Security 2.0” – a reference to Uribe’s flagship security policy, which turned the tide against the Farc’s insurgency but which also saw systematic human rights violations.
Zuluaga has repeatedly said that he will respect the terms of the peace agreement if elected, although when questioned on its details he has spoken in favour of making “adjustments”. He has called for former Farc guerrillas accused of serious crimes to serve prison terms before taking up congressional seats, and for the Farc to increase its financial reparations to the conflict’s victims. These positions are likely to resonate with conservative voters, but will arouse fears of further backpedalling on the agreement if Zuluaga wins office.
In terms of business, Zuluaga has presented himself as the market-friendly candidate, highlighting his stewardship of the Colombian economy during the 2008 recession and emphasising his firm commitment to the country’s debt anchor, which limits government borrowing relative to income. He can be expected to amplify these business credentials if he reaches the election’s second round, in which he would likely face a leftist candidate.
Regarding the war on drugs, Zuluaga follows Duque’s example, calling for the resumption of aerial fumigation of coca crops with glyphosate. This practice was banned by Colombia’s constitutional court in 2017 on account of the risks it poses to the environment and public health, although in April the Duque administration set out plans to mitigate these harmful effects, raising the possibility of fumigation being resumed in the near future.
These proposals will play well with right-of-centre voters, but an uphill slog remains for Zuluaga even to make the run-off, with just 12.7% of respondents in the December Invamer poll saying they would vote for him.
The frontrunner – Gustavo Petro (Colombia Humana)
By contrast, left-wing Petro is the clear frontrunner. The Invamer poll put him on 42.1% of voting intentions, giving him a 23-percentage-point lead over his closest rival, the centre-left Sergio Fajardo (see below). Petro is in a significantly stronger position than he was in 2018, when he narrowly pipped Fajardo to the second round before losing to Duque by 53.9%-41.8%. An outlier in that election, Petro this time is in a very strong position to make the run-off again, and the key question is who he would face.
Colombia is not a natural homeland for left-wingers such as Petro. The country’s half-century internal conflict with the Farc has instilled a long-running suspicion of the radical left among voters, and centrist and right-wing parties have held a vice-like grip on national politics throughout Colombia’s history. Petro is well set to go a step further than his relative success in 2018, when he won more votes than any leftist candidate in history. His plan to bolster the peace agreement with the Farc and to oversee a transition to a more redistributive economic model resonated with many young and lower-income Colombians in 2018. However, Petro’s unexpected popularity was not enough to counterbalance Duque’s claims that Petro was a “Castro-Chavista” intent on introducing radical expropriations and anti-capitalist measures.
Four years later, the public mood may have shifted. Where the 2021 protest movement harmed CD, it has lifted Petro. His calls for a more equitable economy have found greater traction in a year marked by economic hardship and anger at Colombia’s ruling political class. Having supported protesters’ demands for increased employment and training opportunities, a higher minimum wage, and a more redistributive tax model, Petro is hoping to portray himself as the leader of a broad social movement.
Nonetheless, Petro’s open support for the protesters could backfire. CD has attempted to link Petro with the violence and major economic disruption caused by the unrest, which alarmed many conservative and centrist voters. Candidates from the centre-left may also benefit from Petro’s identification with protesters, and will be able to present themselves as broadly in line with their demands whilst running less risk of alienating better-off Colombians.
Petro has argued for the modernisation and industrialisation of agriculture, stating in November that this would “imply a certain degree of protectionism”. He has called for increased taxes on unproductive private lands, and said that such a policy would boost agricultural production and employment. This would probably prove more palatable to voters than expropriations – frequently pointed to by right-wing opponents as the key danger of a Petro presidency.
Nonetheless, Petro’s calls for a progressive tax reform could be weaponised in similar fashion by the right, and he remains the candidate that incites the most hostile response from Colombia’s establishment.
The centrists
A cluster of centrist hopefuls are seeking to plot a course between the polarising candidacies of Zuluaga and Petro. Six of these are grouped under the Coalición Centro Esperanza banner, and have agreed to hold primaries to present a single candidate in the May first round.
Those primaries will be held on 13 March (the same day as the legislative elections), and will pit against each other Sergio Fajardo (Compromiso Ciudadano; centre-left), Alejandro Gaviria (Colombia Tiene Futuro; centre), Juan Manuel Galán (Nuevo Liberalismo; centre-left), Carlos Andrés Amaya (Somos Verde Esperanza; environmentalist), Jorge Enrique Robledo (Dignidad; centre-left), and Juan Fernando Cristo (Movimiento en Marcha; centrist). Of these, former Antioquia governor and Medellín mayor Fajardo currently appears the most likely nominee, generally beating his centrist rivals in the polls and enjoying strong name-recognition.
These candidates are pinning their hopes on the fact that many voters jaded with CD will not be eager to rush into the arms of Petro. With Petro enjoying such a strong lead in the polls, the winner of the centrist primary will aim to pip Zuluaga into the second round and then present themselves as a market-friendly yet socially progressive alternative to Petro. Even a centre-left candidate such as Fajardo could perform well with Colombia’s right-wing voters if Zuluaga failed to make the second round, given the right’s portrayal of Petro as an existential threat to Colombia’s economic model.
Congressional elections
The March legislative elections may prove as consequential as the presidential contest. Due to the large number of parties competing, none of the presidential candidates are likely to enjoy an outright majority in congress. The right may be particularly hampered – discontent with CD will likely lead to seat losses, whilst left-wing and centrist parties may improve their standing.
In the likely event that complex coalition negotiations ensue, a tacking to the centre may well be required if either Petro or Zuluaga wins office in order to avoid legislative gridlock. The risk of friction between the executive and legislative branches would be particularly high in the event of a Petro presidency, given his ambitions to lead Colombia in a dramatically different direction to his predecessors.
Rising inequality
The World Bank (WB) released a report on 27 October detailing the impact of the pandemic on inequality in Colombia, warning that wealth disparities have been both deepened and entrenched since March 2020. The report notes that Colombia’s Gini coefficient (a measure of inequality in which 0 indicates total equality and 1 equals maximal inequality) rose from 0.53 in 2019 to 0.54 in 2020, equating to a further 3.6m people living in poverty. Extreme poverty increased by 5.5 percentage points over the same period, with an additional 2.8m people unable to meet their basic needs compared with the pre-pandemic era. The report warns that this heightened inequality could persist in the long term, with the closure of schools exacerbating disparities that will continue into adulthood for many children.
ELN negotiations
Since the demobilisation of the Farc in 2016, Colombia’s primary insurgent threat has been from the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) guerrilla group. President Duque initially continued negotiations with the group that were launched under his predecessor, but broke these off following a January 2019 attack on a police academy in Bogotá. Since then, CD has pushed a hardline militarised response to the guerrilla group, and has shown little willingness to return to the negotiating table. Meanwhile, left-of-centre candidates Petro and Fajardo have called for a resumption of dialogue. Petro is vulnerable to accusations that he would be too soft on the ELN, with the government alleging that the guerrilla group hijacked the protest movement he championed last year.
Rodolfo Hernández – the wildcard
Rodolfo Hernández, a populist independent candidate, has been making savvy use of social media that has seen his anti-corruption message gain traction with younger voters. Hernández styles himself as belonging to neither the right nor the left, having both voiced support for Uribe and said that he would vote for Petro if his own election bid fails in the first round. Whilst he remains an outsider, Hernández’s approval rating increased by 70% between October and December to 17%, according to the pollster Invamer. Although Hernández continues to struggle with name recognition in comparison to Petro, Zuluaga, and Fajardo, his extensive social media campaigning and populist style could see him emerge as a contender for the second round.
