Who’s competing for power in 2023?

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  • Introduction

    Patrick de Courcy 14 April 2023 Hits: 2733

    For the second year in succession, it is a an unusually quiet year for elections in Latin America, but the ones that are being held are important and challenging.

    Paraguay is the first to go, on 30 April, with Efraín Alegre of the Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (PLRA) trying for the third time in succession to break the stranglehold on power of the Asociación Nacional Republicana-Partido Colorado (ANR-PC), which is fielding former president Horacio Cartes’ chosen candidate Santiago Peña as its flagbearer. An unknown factor in the election will be the effect on voting intentions of the perceived interference in the electoral process by the United States, which has sanctioned Cartes for “rampant corruption that undermines democratic institutions in Paraguay”. Some voters will resent the US intrusion; others will be put off voting for the candidate of a party whose president is accused of rampant corruption. The opinion polls give no clear indication of which way it will go. With no second-round vote, the performance of a number of lesser candidates could prove decisive in the outcome. Independent voters might switch to Alegre as election day approaches if polls suggest he is the only viable alternative to the ANR-PC.

    Next up is Guatemala, on 25 June with a run-off on 20 August if there is no outright winner in the first round. There has been controversy over the exclusion of some candidates by the electoral authority, and the inclusion of others despite apparent constitutional impediments. The current frontrunners are Zury Ríos, the daughter of the late dictator Efraín Ríos Montt (1982-1983) of the ultra-right wing Valor, and former First Lady (2008-2012) Sandra Torres of Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE). Both face doubts over the legality of their candidacies. It seems unlikely that the election will do much to reverse the perception that Guatemala’s democracy is increasingly fragile.

    The Argentine election, on 22 October, which pits the ruling Frente de Todos (FdT) coalition (led by the Peronist Partido Justicialista – PJ) against the main opposition centre-right Juntos por el Cambio (JxC), takes place against the background of an increasingly angry electorate. A massive 92% say they are “totally dissatisfied” with economic policy. A key date will be the 13 August primaries to select the candidates for the presidential election. An unusual complicating factor will be the emergence of a third-party challenge in the shape of the far-right La Libertad Avanza (LLA), led by the anti-establishment Javier Milei, an admirer of former US president Donald Trump and Brazil’s former president Jair Bolsonaro. Between the beginning of March and 4 April a total of 20 opinion polls were published. On average these gave JxC 30% support, with the ruling FdT on 26% and LLA on 19.3%. Looking back over time, the gap between JxC and FdT has been narrowing. While LLA is in third place it has been growing steadily and is positioned to play a key role, particularly if there is a second-round run-off in November.

  • PARAGUAY: Alegre in third attempt to break ANR-PC ascendancy

    Patrick de Courcy 14 April 2023 Hits: 3027

    Date: 30 April

    Type: General election: presidential, legislative, and gubernatorial.

    Main contenders: Asociación Nacional Republicana-Partido Colorado (ANR-PC); Concertación para un Nuevo Paraguay (a broad coalition comprising more than a dozen political parties of different political hues led by Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico [PLRA] and including factions of the left-wing Frente Guasú [FG] led by former president Fernando Lugo [2008-2012]); Cruzada Nacional; and Movimiento Nueva República.

    Cartes and corruption

    The 2023 general election in Paraguay will be the seventh since the country regained democracy in 1990. Since 1948, the ANR-PC has had a stranglehold on power, except for a single five-year term when former Catholic bishop Fernando Lugo, of FG, came to power, although he was impeached in 2012 and his term was completed by his vice president Federico Franco, of the PLRA. The ANR-PC has won the two presidential elections since then, with the PLRA’s Efraín Alegre defeated on both occasions, by Horacio Cartes in 2013 and Mario Abdo Benítez in 2018.

    Alegre is standing once again, only this time the PLRA has forged a broad coalition, Concertación para un Nuevo Paraguay. Cartes is not competing in the elections but he is, without question, one of the main protagonists. His handpicked presidential pre-candidate, Santiago Peña, won the ANR-PC party primary elections on 18 December. Peña, who had previously belonged to the PLRA and only joined the ANR-PC after taking over as finance minister in 2015 in the Cartes administration, won 51.7% of the vote, defeating Arnoldo Wiens, representing Abdo Benítez’s faction of the party, by eight percentage points. Cartes won the internal elections to become party president, seeing off a challenge from Abdo Benítez.

    Cartes was designated by the US Department of State in July last year for “involvement in significant corruption” and sanctioned by the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (Ofac) in January this year for “involvement in the rampant corruption that undermines democratic institutions in Paraguay”, along with his tobacco company Tabacalera del Este SA (Tabesa) and wider holding company Grupo Cartes, which includes some two dozen businesses.

    ANR-PC Senator Silvio Ovelar accused the US government on 3 April of openly intervening in Paraguay’s election campaign, branding the US ambassador in Asunción, Marc Ostfield, “a political operator”, charged with driving his party out of power. He predicted that Paraguayan voters would bitterly resent this alleged interference and return the ANR-PC to power in spite, or indeed because, of it.

    This is the big question. While some voters may well resent the alleged electoral interference by the US, it is also probable that some voters, even from among the ANR-PC’s traditional support base, will resent the alleged involvement of the party president in “rampant corruption”, particularly when there is high inflation; when the cost of living crisis is biting; and when more Paraguayans are falling into extreme poverty.

    A total of 24.7% of Paraguayans were living in poverty in 2022, some 1.82m people in absolute terms, according to a survey published by the national statistics institute (INE) on 3 April. While this figure was 2.2 percentage points lower than in 2021, extreme poverty increased by as much as 1.7 points to 5.6% in 2022. Although inflation, which erodes the purchasing power of the poor, did fall back to an annualised rate of 6.4% in March, its lowest level since December 2021, it remains high.

    Divergent polls

    It is difficult to discern from electoral surveys published by local pollsters precisely what impact this has all had on Paraguayan voters because their findings have differed radically. One by Grau & Asociados conducted from 24-25 February, for instance, suggested that Peña would romp home with 41% of the vote to 24.7% for Alegre. Another by Ati Snead on 6 February gave Peña a margin of victory in excess of 20 percentage points. Yet another, by a consultancy, Multitarget, from 15-25 March, had Peña winning comfortably and Alegre not even the runner-up, finishing on 18.8% behind Paraguayo Cubas of Cruzada Nacional on 20.9%.

    A poll by GEO for the Asunción-based El Independiente carried out on 27 February, meanwhile, put Alegre on 39.7%, just ahead of Peña on 35.3%. Another by the consultancy Datos gave Alegre 33.6% and Peña 30.5%. Yet another, conducted from 1-4 April by AtlasIntel, gave Alegre a narrow lead of 38%-36% over Peña, followed by Cubas on 14%. All of these are in or around the margin of error, suggesting a very tight contest.

    While the Multitarget survey is a bit of an outlier, and appears to have inflated the appeal of Cubas, a media personality who was elected to the senate in 2018 but suspended for physical and verbal assault in the upper chamber shortly afterwards, he is consistently polling in excess of 10% in the other electoral surveys. This level of popular support for a third candidate is unusual in Paraguay. That one of Cubas’ main electoral promises is to introduce the death penalty for corruption suggests that the allegations against Cartes have had some impact on voters.

    The rise of third candidates

    But Cubas is not the only outsider to be performing well in the polls. Euclides Acevedo, a political analyst who served as interior and foreign affairs minister in the present government before launching his Movimiento Nueva República party, is polling between 4%-9%. Foremost among a number of minnows in the race is José Luis Chilavert, a popular former goalkeeper in the national football team and ultra-right-winger, who is polling between 0.5% and 2.5%.

    While these outsiders are not going to win the election, they could have a significant influence on the outcome. If Alegre could win the backing of their supporters, that would enable him to surpass Peña’s total in any of the electoral surveys published in recent months. The problem Alegre has is that the fact that they enjoy strong support is in part because a significant number of independent and floating voters do not view Alegre as offering the change they want.

    • Candidate for change?

    Efraín Alegre has been damaged by attacks from some within former president Lugo’s FG, some factions of which have pulled out of his Concertación coalition. FG Senator Sixto Pereira, for instance, questioned whether Alegre was a genuine option for change after he selected Soledad Núñez, who was a cabinet minister under Horacio Cartes, as his running mate.

    Independent voters might switch to Alegre as election day approaches if polls suggest he is the only viable alternative to the ANR-PC. But the Grau & Asociados poll found that 52% of voters classifying themselves as ‘floating’ opted for Cubas or Acevedo and just 8.3% and 7.7% for Peña and Alegre respectively. Given the big differences between the various surveys, the accuracy of this finding could be subject to debate but what is not is the importance of these floating voters to Alegre in order to unseat the ANR-PC.

    With no second round of elections, this also explains why Alegre is sounding out an alliance with Cubas to try and prevent a split in the opposition vote allowing Peña to sneak home. But Cubas is not keen to step aside, not least because he believes his strong performance in the polls owes to his decision to distance himself from the country’s traditional political class. While he remains in the race he is the biggest threat to Alegre’s hopes of defeating Peña. In spite of this, Alegre is unlikely to have a better chance of winning election: the ANR-PC is divided and tarnished by corruption. The ANR-PC retains a formidable electoral machinery, however, and it will be hoping that this clicks into gear in the closing stages of the election campaign.

    China and Taiwan

    The result of Paraguay’s elections could have a significant impact on international diplomacy. Efraín Alegre has promised to switch Paraguay’s longstanding allegiance from Taiwan to China should he win election. Santiago Peña would preserve the status quo. Paraguay is the only country in South America that still recognises Taipei over Beijing.

  • GUATEMALA: A discredited electoral race

    Patrick de Courcy 14 April 2023 Hits: 2797

    Date: 25 June 2023. If a presidential candidate fails to win 50% +1 of the votes, a second-round run-off will take place on 20 August.

    Type: Presidential, legislative (all 160 seats in the unicameral legislature), municipal (340 mayoral seats in 22 departments).

    Main presidential contenders: Zury Ríos (Valor-Unionista); Sandra Torres (Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza, UNE); Edmond Mulet (Cabal); Rafael Espada (Partido Republicano); Manuel Conde (Vamos).

    Since the 1996 Peace Accords ending Guatemala’s 36-year civil war, no party has won consecutive presidencies in Guatemala. The political class remains badly discredited due to corruption, with parties considered little more than vehicles for clientelism and private business interests. Since the 2019 closure of the United Nations (UN)-backed anti-impunity commission in Guatemala (Cicig), anti-corruption efforts have unravelled, a process which has intensified under the conservative Vamos government led by President Alejandro Giammattei, a former prison chief, acquitted in May 2011 of involvement in a criminal ring inside the interior ministry and police. In July 2021 Giammattei, who is constitutionally barred from seeking another term, was forced to publicly deny having received bribes from Russian nationals. His May 2022 reappointment for a four-year term of discredited attorney general María Consuelo Porras, who was sanctioned in 2021 by the US for obstructing investigations into corruption, raised eyebrows.

    With the foreign community having repeatedly expressed alarm about attacks and reprisals targeting anti-corruption officials (a February 2023 report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR] documented a 71.43% rise in such attacks compared to 2021), the July 2022 arrest of José Rubén Zamora, the founder of leading national investigative newspaper elPeriódico, also set off alarm bells. The latest Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by NGO Transparency International released on 31 January singled out Guatemala as one of the worst performers in the Americas while in June 2022 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) added Guatemala to its list of countries committing serious human rights violations, along with Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. This has had an impact on development indicators; in its report the OHCHR notes Guatemala’s human development index is 0.627, a decrease of six points from 2015 to 2021.

    Against this backdrop there are major concerns regarding the integrity of the electoral authority (TSE) which, like the judiciary, is one of the institutions affected by the democratic backsliding. With 23 presidential candidates registered to compete in the 2023 contest, the electoral process has been overshadowed by controversy over TSE rulings on candidates such as its exclusion of Roberto Arzú (Podemos), the son of former president Álvaro Arzú (1996-2000), a right-wing contender, and Thelma Cabrera of left-wing indigenous Movimiento para la Liberación de los Pueblos (MLP) who stood in the 2019 presidential elections, taking some 10% of the vote. Cabrera’s running mate, former human rights ombudsman Jordán Rodas, was associated with anti-impunity efforts. On 30 March UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk expressed concern regarding the TSE’s rejection of these candidacies on “seemingly arbitrary grounds”.

    Candidates in the running.

    Recent polls have shown Zury Ríos, the daughter of the late dictator Efraín Ríos Montt (1982-1983), as a frontrunner. A survey published on 14 March by Mexican pollster TResearch showed her on 23.3% of voting intentions, ahead of former First Lady (2008-2012) Sandra Torres of the main opposition Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE), on 17.7%.

    A far-right politician, Ríos is a four-term legislator, serving from 1996 to 2012. She was barred in 2019 from seeking the presidency by the constitutional court (CC) which invoked Article 186 of the 1985 constitution, which bars relatives of former coup leaders running for the presidency. This despite Ríos having been permitted to run in the previous (2015) election where she came fifth with some 6% of the vote. She is calling for a hard-line approach to security and has cited the state of emergency invoked by El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele to tackle gangs – which has been strongly condemned by rights groups and the foreign community due to multiple rights violations - as a “model of reference”. This is likely to stoke fears among human rights watchers that a Ríos presidency could further dispense with democratic and constitutional guarantees in Guatemala.

    Another major contender is Torres, who lost convincingly to Giammattei in the 2019 presidential run-off (by 57.95% to 42.05%) in a contest marred by nearly 60% abstention – the highest abstention rate in two decades. Torres made her name as first lady during the UNE administration led by her late ex-husband Alvaro Colom (2008-2012), heading up various social welfare programmes. She was also defeated in the 2015 presidential run-off by his predecessor Jimmy Morales (2016-2020) while her previous bid to run in 2011 (after divorcing Colom to sidestep a constitutional prohibition) was thrown out by the courts. In late November 2022, Torres’ path to run in 2023 appeared cleared after a judge threw out a case against her relating to illegal campaign financing allegations dating back to 2015. Her associates have similarly faced corruption allegations. Her late former husband, Colom, featured on the US State Department’s 2021 ‘Engel List’ of ‘corrupt and undemocratic actors, as did Gustavo Alejos, Colom’s chief-of-staff, and another UNE member, Jorge Estuardo Vargas Morales.

    While proposing to relaunch social welfare initiatives, Torres’ manifesto also calls for a hard-line approach to security, pledging to strengthen the military, construct four maximum security prisons, and life sentences for “murderers, extortionists and rapists” among other things. In a nod to the apparent conservatism of the electorate, Torres has picked evangelical pastor Romeo Estuardo Guerra Lemus as her running mate. Torres benefits from the party machinery of the UNE which, founded in 2002, is one of Guatemala’s oldest parties – a symptom of the country’s notoriously weak political party system. She also struck an apparent pragmatic alliance last year with Giammattei which could benefit her given the politicisation of the country’s institutions. Yet, like Ríos, she faces doubts over the legality of her candidacy: the choice of Guerra as her running mate would appear to defy a constitutional ban on religious leaders running for the presidency and vice presidency.

    TSE

    A report by US-based NGO Freedom House released in 2022 notes that in March 2020, after months of delay, congress elected new TSE magistrates (2020−2026) in a session featuring little transparency. Several of those elected are “reportedly associated with officials accused of corruption and drug trafficking and have been accused of falsifying their academic titles”. In its report on the 2019 elections, the Organization of America States electoral observer mission (OAS-EOM) highlights the “judicialisation of elections”, noting that 416 petitions for nullity against decisions on registration of candidates were presented in contrast to 269 presented in 2015.

    Dubious candidates

    The inclusion of candidates accused of corruption, while hardly new, has similarly raised fears about the integrity of the electoral process and the TSE. Various politicians seeking re-election have been sanctioned in the US over corruption. Examples include former congress president Allan Rodríguez (2020-2022) (Vamos); Felipe Alejos (Todos); and Sofía Hernández, who was elected for Unión del Cambio Nacional (UCN), which was disbanded by the TSE last October, and is seeking re-election with Vamos.

    Mulet

    The TResearch poll showed septuagenarian former diplomat Edmond Mulet of centre-right Cabal in third place on 16.5% of voting intentions. Widely considered a capable moderate, Mulet ran in the 2019 presidential contest for Partido Humanista, receiving 11% of the vote. A former legislator (1982-1993) for the now-defunct centrist Unión del Centro Nacional, he previously served as ambassador to the US in 1993, a post from which he resigned following the 1993 coup d’état in Guatemala. While in congress, he was involved in the peace talks ending the civil war. He went on to hold senior positions in the UN including as head of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (Minustah) in 2010-2011 and Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (2011-2015). However, Mulet, who has publicly spoken out against the democratic backsliding in the country, is facing uncertainty over his candidacy: the AG’s special anti-impunity unit (Feci) has announced that it requested that Mulet’s immunity from prosecution, which he enjoys as presidential candidate, be lifted for alleged early campaigning and “obstruction of justice” after Mulet questioned the judicial process launched against Zamora.

  • ARGENTINA: Voters angry and volatile ahead of October polls

    Patrick de Courcy 14 April 2023 Hits: 3044

    Date: 22 October 2023

    Type: General election: presidential, legislative

    Main contenders: Frente de Todos (FdT) coalition, which is led by the ruling Partido Justicialista (PJ, Peronists). The main opposition coalition is Juntos por el Cambio (JxC), which includes parties such as Propuesta Republicana (Pro), Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), and Coalición Cívica-Afirmación para una República Igualitaria (CC-ARI)

    A growing lack of trust

    For 40 years since the restoration of democracy in 1983, Argentine elections have been orderly, continuous, and relatively predictable, with the winners alternating between coalitions of the centre-left and the centre-right. But 2023 might change at least some of that, given an intense economic crisis, and signs that voters are turning away from the traditional political establishment.

    Two recent incidents suggest that Argentine voters are in an angry mood. On 6 March television news channel Todo Noticias covered the funeral of a 12-year-old boy who had been caught in the crossfire in gun battles between rival drug gangs in Rosario, the country’s third largest city. The channel rolled with live pictures as local residents ransacked and looted the home of one of his alleged killers. In a separate incident on 3 April the security minister for Buenos Aires province tried to talk to striking bus drivers in La Matanza, who had called a strike after one of their fellow-workers had been shot dead by armed robbers. Rather than talk, the strikers punched and kicked the minister who, bloody and bruised, had to be rescued by police. Of course, two incidents alone don’t make any kind of a trend. Argentina has a solid reputation for managing peaceful elections. But opinion polls show there is a growing lack of trust in the ability of the political establishment to come up with solutions to problems such as inflation, unemployment, corruption, and crime.

    This year’s general elections will play out over three key dates. On 13 August the country will hold primary elections in 24 key constituencies (23 provinces plus the city of Buenos Aires). They are known by the acronym PASO which stands for open, simultaneous, and obligatory primaries (primarias abiertas, simultáneas y obligatorias). However, despite the name, some provinces still hold their own primaries on different dates.

    The second key date comes on 22 October when citizens cast their vote in presidential and legislative elections. At stake are the choice of president and vice-president, 130 of the 257 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 24 of the 72 seats in the Senate. Deputies are elected to four-year terms while senators serve for six years; legislative elections are staggered and held every two years. To win the presidency in the first-round ballot a candidate needs to gather at least 45% of the votes cast, or 40% while at the same time achieving a 10-percentage point lead over his or her closest opponent. If those metrics are not reached, a run-off second ballot will be held to decide between the two most-voted candidates on 19 November. The newly elected government will then take office on 10 December this year.

    Deeply unhappy voters highlight inflation and crime

    Opinion polls show voters are deeply unhappy over the state of the country. Despite the efforts of the current centre-left ruling coalition, the Frente de Todos (FdT), inflation has been rising sharply, breaking into three digits for the first time in February (when the 12-month inflation rate reached 102.5%, way above the IMF-set target of 60%). The country experienced hyperinflation in the 1980s and 1990s, but for most current voters it is an entirely new experience. A severe drought may also push the economy into recession this electoral year. Low foreign currency reserves mean a new foreign exchange crisis could add to the cocktail of problems playing out before the polls.

    A survey by Universidad de San Andrés published in early April asked voters about their views on government policy. A massive 92% said they were “totally dissatisfied” with economic policy, against 6% who said they were “totally satisfied”. Other areas with large dissatisfaction rates included security (89% dissatisfied), social policy (79% dissatisfied), and education (78% dissatisfied).

    An interesting point from the San Andrés survey is that supporters of the country’s two main coalitions seem to be somewhat in agreement over the country’s ills. Supporters of both the ruling FdT and the centre-right opposition Juntos por el Cambio (JxC, also known as Juntos) say inflation is the country’s number one problem. It is identified as such by 59% of FdT voters and by 67% of JxC voters. They also agree that “delinquency, robbery, and insecurity” is the number three problem (31% of FdT voters and 44% of JxC supporters). They disagree, however, over the Number 2 problem. Thirty-one percent of FdT supporters say it is poverty, while 50% of JxC voters say it is corruption. Both also worry over the state of the judiciary, politicians, drug trafficking, and foreign debt, among a range of other problems.

    The battle of three thirds

    To be electorally successful, any Argentine politician must do two things. First, he or she must be in the winning coalition. Second, he or she must find a way of being in the top faction within the top coalition, in other words winning what is called la interna. This year, making those calculations is particularly complex because the country seems to be transitioning away from a battle between two dominant coalitions to a new and potentially three-way contest.  

    In very broad terms, for the last 80 years Argentina has been split between centre-left populism on the one hand, characterised by Peronism (the Partido Justicialista founded in the 1940s by Juan Domingo Perón) and a range of centre right forces such as the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) on the other. The ideological division between these forces runs deep and is known as la grieta – the rift or fault-line. Of course, other actors (not least the armed forces) have played a part, but for the last 40 years the grieta has been a central feature of every election. If these were normal times, we might expect, given the current government’s poor performance and low popularity, that the elections would see a strong swing to the centre-right, favouring JxC.

    But these are not necessarily normal times and a challenge to the two dominant coalitions has emerged – the libertarian far right, the party known as La Libertad Avanza (LLA) led by economist Javier Milei. Milei, who admires Donald Trump in the US and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, presents himself as an anti-establishment candidate who will close the central bank, slash government spending, privatise state-owned companies, and follow a deeply conservative social agenda including banning abortion. The candidate’s brash style is proving attractive to young voters and to those who want to punish the political establishment.

    If opinion polls are to be believed, over the last six months LLA has consolidated enough electoral appeal to at least begin to challenge the ‘establishment duopoly’ formed by FdT and JxC. Between the beginning of March and 4 April a total of 20 opinion polls were published. On average these gave JxC 30% support, with the ruling FdT on 26% and LLA on 19.3%. Looking back over time, the gap between JxC and FdT has been narrowing. While LLA is in third place it has been growing steadily and is positioned to play a key role, particularly if there is a second-round run-off in November. It is also important to note that, with the primaries due in four months’ time, and the first-round ballot coming up two months after that, the race at this stage is still wide open.

    Parties manoeuvre around the primaries

    Much will therefore depend on what happens in the August primaries. It is worth noting that in recent Argentine experience the primaries have performed at least two distinct functions. One is to settle the internal matter of who will run for which elected posts. The other is as a kind of early litmus test of voting strength which can be used to create a ‘bandwagon effect’ attracting floating voters.

    Within the ruling FdT the primaries are looking problematic. In an ideal world the coalition would have already reached an internal agreement on who to nominate as president and vice-president, as well as on its nominees for congress. This would then form a single list to be voted on at the PASO primaries which would send out a positive message of unity to its supporters and maximise the time available for campaigning. By early April however it had become clear that such an agreement was unlikely to materialise, thanks to the long-standing internal battle between President Alberto Fernández and Vice President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.

    The president had still not ruled out standing for re-election, a decision bitterly opposed by much of the coalition because of his high levels of unpopularity. The vice-president has also been somewhat unclear over her intentions. Facing a court-ordered prison sentence for corruption she was thought to favour running for the senate (which would preserve her immunity from prosecution) while endorsing one of her allies such as interior minister Eduardo ‘Wado’ de Pedro. Other potential candidates include economy minister Sergio Massa (somewhat overshadowed by the ongoing surge in inflation) and the current ambassador to Brazil, Daniel Scioli. The problem facing the party is that although Fernández de Kirchner is popular with her base (17.9% would vote for her as president according to an early April GOP/Trespuntozero poll) she also has very high rejection rates.

    In JxC, on the other hand, the recent decision by former president Mauricio Macri (2015-2019) to drop out of the 2023 race has helped thin out the field. According to opinion polls the front runners in this race are now the mayor of Buenos Aires, Horacio Rodríguez Larreta, and former security minister Patricia Bullrich (2015-2019), both members of the Propuesta Republicana (PRO) party. Other contenders for the JxC nomination include María Eugenia Vidal, the former governor of Buenos Aires province (2015-2019), and Martin Lousteau, an economist and UCR senator. Rodríguez Larreta and Bullrich are making clearly differentiated political pitches. Rodríguez Larreta wants to build bridges across the political centre-ground, appealing to moderate Peronist voters to build a consensual approach to economic and security policies. Bullrich in contrast has positioned herself as a hawk, promising a radical crackdown on crime and drug trafficking. In short, she hopes to attract floating voters that are currently aligning themselves with the far-right Javier Milei camp.

    Notably the Universidad de San Andrés survey places Bullrich in pole position as currently the most popular presidential contender with 40% of respondents giving her a positive image rating as either “good” or “very good”. Further down the list come Vidal and Rodríguez Larreta, (both with 37%). Milei comes fourth with a 34% positive rating. The best placed FdT figure in this poll is Fernández de Kirchner who comes 11th with a 22% positive rating; President Alberto Fernández trails in 19th place with a 13% positive rating.

    The outcome remains uncertain. It is worth remembering that opinion polls have been mistaken in the past. At this stage however the FdT ruling coalition looks the most likely lose (punished over inflation and crime); the far right looks set to capture more of the protest vote than ever before; and some version of the centre-right looks likeliest to be forming Argentina’s next government.