Who's competing for power in 2024?

Items

  • Introduction

    Patrick de Courcy 29 January 2024 Hits: 2571

    There will be six presidential elections in Latin America in 2024, of which one, that in Venezuela, cannot be considered to be a free contest. Of the five remaining elections, two will almost certainly be won by the incumbents (Luis Abinader in the Dominican Republic and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador) and one has every chance of being won by the continuity candidate (Claudia Sheinbaum in Mexico). Given that in Uruguay President Luis Alberto Lacalle Pou would probably win if he were able to stand for re-election, the only country where the usual Latin American anti-incumbency factor is prevalent is Panama. This is remarkable. Incumbents have a terrible record in Latin America, winning just five of the 32 free and fair presidential elections since 2015 (that is excluding those in Venezuela and Nicaragua).

    In many ways this is an encouraging development. It shows that if politicians deliver then they can prosper. Certainly, this is the case in the Dominican Republic. Since his election victory in 2020, Luis Abinader has delivered on the economic front, on his anti-corruption promises, and in response to the crisis in Haiti. A Gallup poll in October showed that 64% approved of his presidency.

    Bukele’s achievements in El Salvador are more controversial, but significant nonetheless, and wildly popular – indeed sufficiently so for the electorate to overlook some blatant constitutional legerdemain in order to allow him to stand for re-election. It is Bukele’s crackdown on gangs, which began in March 2022, that has earned him an extraordinary level of popularity, giving him an astonishing 92% support in a CID-Gallup poll in November despite international concerns over breaches of human rights.

    As recently as 2015, El Salvador had one of the world’s highest murder rates, with over 100 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants that year. The latest police (PNC) figures released on 3 January showed 154 homicides were committed in 2023, down from 496 in 2022. The 2023 figure translates into a homicide rate of 2.4 per every 100,000 inhabitants, compared with 7.8 per 100,000 in 2022. This success clearly trumps, in the public mind, the concerns over human rights and Bukele’s chequered economic policies, including the making of bitcoin legal tender in the country.

    Meanwhile, in Mexico, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s approval rating remains at an enviable 60%, and it seems likely that Sheinbaum will win election on the popular outgoing president’s coattails. So 2024 looks set to be the year in which Latin America bucks its anti-incumbent reputation, even if only temporarily.

  • EL SALVADOR: Bukele set to romp home

    Patrick de Courcy 29 January 2024 Hits: 2609

    Date: 4 February 2024. Presidential run-off to be held on 3 March, alongside municipal elections and elections to the Central American parliament (Parlacen), if no candidate obtains 50%+1 of the vote in the first round.

    Election type: Presidential and legislative elections (60 seats in the unicameral legislative assembly).

    Main contenders: Nuevas Ideas (NI), Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Arena), Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), Vamos, Nuestro Tiempo (NT), Gran Alianza por la Unidad Nacional (Gana), Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), Partido de Concertación Nacional (PCN).

    President Nayib Bukele is the overwhelming favourite to win the presidential elections. He enjoys sky-high popularity due to his success at reducing violent homicides and crime in El Salvador. The path was cleared for Bukele to seek re-election, in spite of the fact that this is outlawed in no uncertain terms in several articles in the constitution, by the constitutional chamber of the supreme court. Magistrates decided that Bukele could stand after all provided that he step aside for the final six months of his term. He duly took leave of absence on 1 December and appointed his private secretary to keep his seat warm for him.

    El Salvador’s long-established political duopoly, comprising archrivals, the right-wing Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Arena) and left-wing Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), has been eviscerated by Bukele. Until Bukele’s election in 2019, no other party had held power in the previous three decades. His polarising brand of politics exploited public disillusionment with the corruption and cronyism that discredited both parties. In the February 2021 legislative elections, Bukele’s Nuevas Ideas (NI), a self-proclaimed non-ideological political movement crafted in his own image, won a thumping two-thirds majority, with 56 of the 84 seats in the legislative assembly. This left Arena and the FMLN in the unprecedented position of being denuded of power and influence.

    Bukele used his party’s two-thirds majority to stack the country’s institutions with loyalists, most importantly the constitutional chamber (SC) of the supreme court, which had won plaudits for preserving its independence in the face of political pressures. The new look SC, however, did Bukele’s bidding, interpreting the constitution in September 2021 in such a way as to circumvent an unequivocal constitutional ban on presidential re-election and allow him to stand again. Any lingering possibility that the supreme electoral tribunal (TSE) might refuse to register Bukele’s candidacy was removed in November 2023 when the country’s top electoral authority went along with the SC’s ruling.

    As such Bukele will be the first president to stand for consecutive re-election in El Salvador since the military dictatorship of Maximiliano Hernández Martínez in 1935. Standing against him will be Manuel Flores of the FMLN and Joel Sánchez of Arena, along with three others.

    • Presidential candidates

    The other three candidates competing in the presidential elections are Luis Parada of the liberal Nuestro Tiempo (NT), which was formed in 2019; Javier Renderos, an obstetrician, for Fuerza Solidaria (FS), a party formed in 2022 by former members of Arena and the Gran Alianza por la Unidad Nacional (Gana), a right-of-centre offshoot of Arena which provided the electoral vehicle for Bukele to come to power in 2019; and Marina Murillo for the small right-wing Fraternidad Patriota Salvadoreña (FPS).

    Bukele stepped down on 1 December in order to stand for re-election next February in compliance with the SC’s interpretation of the constitution. He designated Claudia Juana Rodríguez de Guevara, his private secretary and a longstanding member of his family’s inner circle, to take over the reins of power, at least in theory. In practice Bukele has not left power at all. The decree approved by the legislative assembly even expressly stated that while Bukele would “no longer exercise the function or administrative activity that the post of president entails…this will of course be without forfeiting the position that he holds and the prerogatives associated with it”, including use of the presidential residence.

    Polls suggest Bukele will cruise to victory. He is the most popular leader in Latin America, with a CID-Gallup poll in November last year giving him 92% support. A poll by the Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (Iudop) of the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA) in the same month found that 70% of respondents backed Bukele’s re-election bid despite only 49% viewing it as constitutional. A total of 61.7% said they would vote for Bukele. His closest rival was the FMLN’s Flores on just 2.6%, with 14% of respondents undecided and 16.5% either not responding or determined not to vote. Another survey conducted by the Centro de Estudios Ciudadanos (CEC) and released on 16 January, gave Bukele 70.9%, with none of the other candidates gaining more than 3%.

    Bukele’s NI also looks set to increase its two-thirds majority in a legislative assembly downsized from 84 to 60 seats. The amended electoral boundaries, and a change to the methodology for calculating how seats are assigned, should concentrate even more power in the hands of NI. In the Iudop poll, 81.2% of respondents said they would vote for NI in the legislative elections, with the FMLN its closest challenger on 5.5%, and then Gana, a government ally, on 3.9%, and Arena on 3.6%.

    The CEC survey suggested the NI would win 57 of the 60 seats in the legislature, with the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), a government ally, winning one, and Arena two. This would ensure that Bukele’s legislative initiatives continue to be rubberstamped by the legislature. Redrafting the constitution would be possible. Despite his assertions to the contrary, Bukele could then legitimately stand for re-election again, consolidating his authoritarian stranglehold on power.

  • PANAMA: Martinelli, the frontrunner amid legal woes

    Patrick de Courcy 29 January 2024 Hits: 2900

    Date: 5 May 2024

    Type: Presidential, 71 seats in the unicameral legislature, 77 mayors and other local government officials.

    Main presidential contenders: Ricardo Martinelli (Realizando Metas); Martín Torrijos (Partido Popular); Rómulo Roux (Cambio Democrático); José Gabriel Carrizo (Partido Revolucionario Democrático); Ricardo Lombana (Movimiento Otro Camino); Zulay Rodríguez (independent); Maribel Gordón (independent); Melitón Arrocha (Partido Alternativa Independiente Social).

    No government in more than five decades has won immediate re-election in Panama (and the constitution stipulates that a president may not be elected for the same office in the two presidential terms immediately following). The ruling Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD) which, founded in 1979 by the late social reformist dictator Omar Torrijos (1968-1981), is Panama’s biggest party, looks set to continue this tendency. The government led by President Laurentino Cortizo remains deeply unpopular; Panama has faced some of the worst unrest in decades over the rise in living costs (which saw major protests between July and August 2022) and, more recently, the approval of a revised contract for a major mining project on which the government was forced to backtrack after nationwide blockades in October/November 2023. This has left the PRD candidate, Vice President José Gabriel Carrizo, trailing on 4% according to a Gallup Panama poll released in late October.

    In both cases of unrest, public anger was inflamed by long-running complaints with the government’s perceived failure to make inroads on tackling institutional corruption. International anti-corruption NGO Transparency International (TI) described the July/August 2022 unrest as “an organic response to public institutional corruption and unjustified growth of the government payroll”. TI’s latest Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published at the end of January 2023 notes that Panama’s 2022 score of 36 out of 100, unchanged on its 2021 score, is a decline of two points on the CPI since 2012.

    In a further blow to Carrizo’s already minimal chances, in November 2023 the government was forced to perform a major U-turn over the revised contract with the Panamanian subsidiary (Minera Panamá SA) of Canadian mining company First Quantum Minerals regarding Cobre Panamá, the country’s biggest mine. Renegotiated after a 2017 supreme court (CSJ) ruling struck it down, the revised contract was fast-tracked through congress, with minimal input from the public, fanning suspicions of clientelism. Its approval on 20 October prompted nationwide protests, over the lack of transparency surrounding its passage through the legislature and multiple environmental and other concerns. This compelled Cortizo to leave the decision in the hands of the CSJ which duly struck it down on 28 November, citing 25 articles in the constitution. Cortizo then announced the mine would be closed. This is set to have major implications for the incoming government: the copper mine, which was permitted to continue operating while the contract was being renegotiated, accounted for some 5% of Panama’s GDP. Hernan Arboleda, the director of public policies at the economy & finance ministry, told Reuters in December that the country’s GDP growth might be 1%-2% next year, down from a previous estimate of 5%.

    • Mine’s closure

    Cobre Panamá’s closure has major implications for Panama’s economy at a time when it is facing other challenges such as the drought impacting the Panama Canal. It also deals a major blow to the country’s hitherto investor-friendly image, with international credit ratings agencies Standard & Poor’s and Fitch having already downgraded Panama’s outlook while Moody’s has also downgraded Panama’s debt to its lowest investment-grade rating. On 29 November FQM announced plans to begin arbitration proceedings. Experts cited by Reuters in a December article calculated that Panama would have to pay at least US$50bn if it loses the case, equivalent to nearly 70% of GDP.

    This has left other candidates such as conservative former president Ricardo Martinelli (Cambio Democrático, CD, 2009-2014), who is seeking re-election for his new electoral outfit Realizando Metas, well placed to capitalise. The October Gallup poll gave Martinelli 59% of voting intentions. However, his candidacy is subject to doubt after he was convicted in July 2023 over the so-called ‘New Business’ case, involving alleged money laundering linked to the 2010 acquisition of a media conglomerate, Editora Panamá América (Epasa), which he is appealing. Martinelli, who was sanctioned by the US in January 2023 for “involvement in significant corruption”, is also due to face trial for the case involving Brazilian construction and engineering firm Odebrecht – one of the biggest corruption scandals in Panama’s history, and related to which his sons Luis Enrique and Ricardo Alberto have served prison sentences in the US. In 2018 TI estimated that as much as 1% of Panama’s GDP, (some US$600m), may have been lost to corruption schemes during his presidency.

    Yet Martinelli remains popular due to his association with key infrastructure projects carried out under his term such as the Panama City metro, and more general perception that he gets things done. Panama’s economy expanded significantly under his watch, posting growth of 1.2% in 2009, 5.8% in 2010, 11.3% in 2011, 9.8% in 2012, 6.9% in 2013, and 5.1% in 2014, and enjoyed high levels of foreign investment, driven by large investments in the mining and energy sectors, among others.

    The Panamá Cobre mine dispute could impact on the electoral race, with candidates who took a tougher line on the mine set to benefit. While Martinelli called for the contract to be renegotiated, others who called for mine’s closure, such as former president Martín Torrijos (PRD, 2004-2009), the son of Omar Torrijos, could see a bounce in their popularity. The Gallup poll showed Torrijos, who is running for the Partido Popular, third with 11% of voting intentions, behind 2019 presidential candidate Rómulo Roux (CD), a former foreign minister (2012-2013), on 12%. Lawyer and journalist Ricardo Lombana, who came third in 2019 when he ran as an independent (he is now running for Movimiento Otro Camino, MOCA), is on 9% and could also benefit from his perceived independence from the discredited political class. Other candidates include three independents, Zulay Rodríguez (a PRD deputy) (4%), leftist Maribel Gordón (1%), and former trade minister (2014-2015) Melitón Arrocha.

    Migration

    Another key issue facing the incoming government is that of irregular migration northwards, through the Darién Gap, a roadless expanse of jungle on Panama’s border with Colombia. On 7 December the United Nations (UN) International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) highlighted that an unprecedented 500,000 refugees and migrants were expected to have crossed the Darién jungle in 2023 – more than double the crossings in 2022. The Cortizo government has warned that the situation is threatening a humanitarian crisis and has decried a lack of international cooperation regarding the issue.

  • DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Abinader poised for re-election

    Patrick de Courcy 29 January 2024 Hits: 2690

    Date: 19 May 2024. If a presidential candidate fails to win 50% +1 of the votes, a second-round run-off will take place on 30 June. (Municipal elections are also due on 18 February).

    Type: President and legislative (for the 32-seat senate and 190-seat lower chamber).

    Main contenders: Luis Abinader (Partido Revolucionario Moderno, PRM), Abel Martínez (Partido de la Liberación Dominicana, PLD), Leonel Fernández (Fuerza del Pueblo, FP), Miguel Vargas (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, PRD).

    President Luis Abinader’s 2020 election victory for the centre-right Partido Revolucionario Moderno (PRM) ended the centre-left Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD)’s 16-year stranglehold on power. Abinader’s 2020 victory owed to public anger with corruption as well as a divided opposition: in 2019 the PLD split between a faction loyal to former president Leonel Fernández (1996-2000; 2004-2012), who has since established his own political party, Fuerza del Pueblo (FP), and that loyal to Fernández’s successor, Danilo Medina (2012-2020). The opposition has launched an electoral alliance ahead of the May 2024 election (for some legislative seats and municipal posts for the February contest but not the presidency). However, divisions persist and it is unlikely to pose much of a threat to President Abinader, who is seeking re-election and remains very popular due to his solid management of the economy and perceived progress on combating corruption.

    A survey released at the end of October 2023 by Gallup showed 55.2% of the 1,200 respondents would vote for Abinader, whose PRM broke off from the traditional Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) in 2014. Second, with 27.4% of voting intentions, was Fernández (FP), followed by the PLD’s candidate, Abel Martínez, the mayor of Santiago de los Caballeros (Santiago province), on 13.5%. Vargas, the PRD candidate, did not feature.

    The same Gallup poll showed that 64% of respondents approved of the presidency of Abinader, whose PRM has 17 seats in the 32-member senate, giving it 18 with ally, Dominicanos por el Cambio (DXC), and 88 seats in the 190-member lower chamber, along with a further 13 from its allies. The Gallup survey suggests various factors contributing to Abinader’s high approval rating, not least the country’s economic stability, cited by 11.5% of respondents as his chief achievement. The country continues to post one of the strongest GDP growth rates in the sub-region. The latest (December 2023) update by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America & the Caribbean (Eclac) forecasts that the Dominican Republic’s GDP growth will come in at 4.1% in 2024, second only to Panama (4.2%). Inflation closed 2023 at 3.57% within the central bank’s target range of 4.0% +/-1. Meanwhile the latest official poverty figures show progress in poverty reduction, with the poverty rate falling to 24.4% in the third quarter of 2023, down four percentage points year-on-year – the lowest level for this quarter since 2016.

    Also key to Abinader’s popularity is perceived progress in the fight against corruption (cited by 7.6% of Gallup poll respondents), with major operations launched into past impunity. Among others, these include Operation Calamar, announced in March 2023, and Operation Anti-Pulpo in November 2020, in relation to which former PLD heavyweights have been arrested. While the opposition has decried selective justice, efforts to tackle past corruption have been welcomed by the public: the Gallup poll showed 46.2% of respondents consider there to be less corruption in the current government than the previous PLD administrations of Medina and Fernández, 26.7% thought there was the same, and 25.3%, more.

    The Abinader government has also won international plaudits for its fight against corruption. The latest (January 2023) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by Transparency International (TI) notes that the Dominican Republic has gained four points in the CPI in the last two years by strengthening the independence of its justice and oversight bodies, enhancing transparency in public procurement, and enacting an asset forfeiture law. Attorney General Miriam Germán Brito is well regarded: her appointment in 2020 was welcomed by civil-society groups, and in July 2022, she received the European Union’s European Human Rights Award for her “professional career dedicated to guaranteeing justice and democracy in the Dominican Republic and her tireless fight against corruption”. In contrast on 11 December 2023 the US State Department designated her predecessor Jean Alain Rodríguez (2016-2020) for his “involvement in significant corruption by misappropriating public funds intended for state-financed infrastructure projects and government institutions”, making him ineligible for entry to the US.

    Opposition alliance

    On 10 October 2023, the opposition PLD, FP, and PRD announced an electoral alliance, ‘Alianza Opositora Rescate’, ending months of speculation. Vargas, the PRD’s presidential candidate, explained it would cover 145 of the country’s 158 mayoralties, spanning “voters in 91% of the country, equivalent to 88% of the electorate”. The new opposition alliance will compete in key municipalities such as the provincial capitals, San Juan de la Maguana (San Juan), San Francisco de Macorís (Duarte), Higüey (La Altagracia), Moca (Espaillat), San Pedro de Macorís (San Pedro de Macorís), Santo Domingo Norte and Santo Domingo Oeste (Santo Domingo), Santiago de los Caballeros (Santiago), and Distrito Nacional (DN) which encompasses Santo Domingo. The parties will also field candidacies in 16 provinces (out of 31 and DN) for the May legislative elections.

    Haiti

    President Abinader’s solid popularity is also attributed to his strong stand on Haiti. Bilateral relations have significantly worsened as Haiti has descended into further crisis since the July 2021 murder of former president Jovenel Moïse (2017-2021). In September 2023, President Abinader announced the closure of the joint border in response to the construction of a canal in Dajabón province, which was diverting water from the shared Dajabón river (also known as Rio Masacre), and which the Dominican government complained violates three international treaties. In October he announced it had been reopened to allow some trade but not the movement of people. The Gallup poll cited 82.6% of respondents as saying Abinader had been consistent in denouncing the Haiti issue before the United Nations and international fora; 67.9% of respondents said national sovereignty was more important than bilateral trade.

  • MEXICO: Big boots to fill

    Patrick de Courcy 29 January 2024 Hits: 3049

    Date: 2 June 2024

    Type: Presidential, federal legislative, gubernatorial, state legislative, and municipal.

    Main presidential contenders: Claudia Sheinbaum of the ruling Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (Morena), Xóchitl Gálvez of opposition coalition Fuerza y Corazón por México (comprising the Partido Revolucionario Institucional [PRI], Partido Acción Nacional [PAN], and Partido de la Revolución Democrática [PRD]), and Jorge Álvarez Máynez of the leftist opposition Movimiento Ciudadano (MC).

    Mexico is embarking on its biggest-ever electoral year in 2024. At the federal level, a new president and both chambers of congress (500 deputies and 128 senators) will be elected. Concurrently, all the country’s 32 states will hold elections for local seats including eight governorships and the head of Mexico City (CDMX) government, state legislators, and municipal positions. Together, 20,263 posts will be up for grabs – over five times the 3,416 positions elected in 2018’s elections. In another first, Mexicans will likely elect their first-ever female president, given the two frontrunners are women.

    The elections are also the first real indicator of how Morena may live on beyond its founder, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who is constitutionally limited to a single six-year term. The vote will mark the tenth anniversary since Morena was registered as a political party. Its rise since then has been spectacular, due in large part to the enduring popularity of López Obrador, who swept the party to power with a landslide victory in 2018. The party now holds a simple majority in both chambers of congress with the help of allied parties, 21 state governorships (with two more in allied hands), and a majority of seats in 21 state congresses. Meanwhile, López Obrador’s approval rating has hovered around 60% for almost all his presidency.   

    Although López Obrador will not appear on the ballot box, his influence and presence will be felt throughout the electoral period – and beyond. He is pushing to finish his flagship infrastructure projects such as the Tren Maya tourist railway and Dos Bocas oil refinery before the end of his term as tangible testament of his presidency. He also intends to present constitutional reforms in relation to the judiciary, public security, minimum wage, and pensions, among other things. Such reforms need approval from a two-thirds majority in both chambers of congress to pass. Obtaining such a majority - something which Morena is yet to achieve – will be another major aim of this electoral period.

    The favourite

    Morena’s presidential candidate is former CDMX mayor Claudia Sheinbaum (2018-2023). Sheinbaum’s clear campaign as a continuity candidate for the ever-popular López Obrador makes the race hers to lose, with most early polls putting her far ahead of the competition. Sheinbaum has been by López Obrador’s side since the start of her political career, cutting her teeth as CDMX environment minister when he was mayor of the city (2000-2006) and later as spokesperson for his failed 2006 presidential campaign, when he ran for the PRD. When López Obrador split from the PRD and founded Morena, Sheinbaum joined him.

    • Polls

    A survey published by national daily El Financiero on 4 January showed Sheinbaum had increased her lead over Gálvez. The poll showed that 52% of respondents would vote for Sheinbaum, against 30% for Gálvez. This gave Sheinbaum a 22-point lead, up from a 19-point lead in the previous (November) survey published by the newspaper.

    Nevertheless, there are indications that Sheinbaum will not be a carbon copy of López Obrador. For one thing, she has already shown herself to be far less socially conservative, supporting legislation to improve reproductive rights and attending LGBTQI+ rallies while mayor of CDMX. She has also made it clear that furthering women’s rights and tackling gender violence will be high on her agenda if elected.

    Another significant difference is in Sheinbaum’s environmental credentials. A climate scientist by training – she has a PhD in energy engineering from Mexico’s national university (Unam) - as CDMX mayor Sheinbaum promoted solar power and cycle and public transport infrastructure. She has also stressed the importance of developing renewable energy generation. This suggests that, if elected, Sheinbaum is likely to tap into Mexico’s potential for generating electricity using solar and wind power, rather than continuing López Obrador’s reliance on fossil fuels, a key tenet of his nationalist energy policies.

    However, proximity to López Obrador will only take Sheinbaum so far. López Obrador’s popularity is predicated on a largely personalistic style of politics and his ability to control the national narrative. Through his daily morning press conferences, he has successfully portrayed himself as a man of the people, blaming any faults of his government on ‘neoliberal’ governments of the past. Sheinbaum lacks López Obrador’s populist charisma and may well struggle to dominate the narrative to such an extent.

    The contender

    Strangely, the opposition coalition’s candidate, Gálvez, is in many ways more similar to López Obrador in style and temperament than Sheinbaum. Like López Obrador, Gálvez understands the importance of controlling the narrative. She launched her presidential candidacy amid a wave of media frenzy following a stunt in which she obtained a judge’s order to allow her to respond in person to criticisms from López Obrador. When she arrived at the national palace to do so, she was denied entry. Gálvez capitalised on this to posit herself as the perfect outsider candidate and antidote to López Obrador.

    Gálvez is also similar in her humble origin story. Of indigenous Hñähñu (Otomi) descent, Gálvez grew up in a small town in Hidalgo state and famously sold sweets on the street as a child to help make ends meet. She later gained a degree in computer science and founded two tech firms before entering politics as head of the national institute for indigenous people under Vicente Fox (2000-2006).

    Like Fox, Gálvez is affiliated with the right-wing opposition Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), for which she served as a federal senator from 2018-2023. However, she has never officially joined a political party. This is a strength and a weakness. It allows Gálvez to distance herself from the politics of the past and present herself as a vote for change. However, it also leaves her without a unified political identity, with much of her campaign focusing on criticising the current government rather than presenting new ideas. Gálvez must ensure the wave of momentum generated early in her candidacy does not peter out with over four months left in the race.

    A third option

    On 12 November, Samuel García, the young governor (36) of Mexico’s northern state of Nuevo León, announced his intention to run for the presidency for the left-of-centre Movimiento Ciudadano (MC) opposition party.

    García presented himself as the candidate for the future and appeared to gain traction, particularly among younger voters. However, chaos descended in Nuevo León with a dispute over who would serve as interim governor while he campaigned. With the threat of MC losing the governorship, García withdrew from the race and returned to his role as governor.

    On 9 January, the MC named Jorge Álvarez Máynez, its leader in the lower chamber, as its presidential candidate. At 38 years old, Álvarez Máynez is also much younger than the competition. This, and his closeness to García, will be used to try and attract the vote of young people disillusioned with the status quo.

    The local races

    Significant contests will also play out at state level, as new governors are set to be elected in Chiapas, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Morelos, Puebla, Tabasco, Veracruz, and Yucatán, as well as the all-important head of CDMX government. With both Sheinbaum and López Obrador having previously served as CDMX mayor, the seat is of large symbolic importance to Morena, as well as carrying heft in terms of size of budget, electorate, and potential campaigning power.

    Control of the capital is also key given CDMX was one of the few areas where Morena performed badly in the 2021 mid-terms, losing control of four of the 11 boroughs it won in 2018 while the opposition took control of nine. This split the capital in two with Morena controlling the poorer eastern half and the opposition the wealthier western half of the city.

    Morena’s candidate in CDMX is Clara Brugada, the municipal leader for Iztapalapa, a collection of low-income neighbourhoods on the eastern side of the city. Due to gender balance rules, Morena passed over the most popular candidate for CDMX in internal party polling, former police chief Omar García Harfuch, who saw much success serving as the city’s public security minister under Sheinbaum. The opposition is fielding PAN’s Santiago Taboada, the current mayor of CDMX’s Benito Juárez neighbourhood. Chosen without internal surveys, the selection prompted the PRI’s Adrián Rubalcava, who was also vying for candidacy in the capital, to renounce his party membership, adding to an ever-growing list of people to have abandoned the PRI.

    Other key races are in Yucatán, Guanajuato, and Jalisco, where Morena is looking to unseat opposition parties. The PAN currently governs in the first two states whereas Jalisco is governed by the independent Enrique Alfaro, who won the governorship for the MC but left the party in August amid differences with national leader Dante Delgado. Morena will also look to retain governorships in Chiapas, Morelos, Puebla, Tabasco, and Veracruz. If Morena achieves “the complete kayak” - López Obrador’s variation on the ‘carro completo’ (literally ‘complete car’, a phrase used to describe the PRI’s sweeping victories in the past at all levels of government) - it would take its governorship tally to 26, meaning over 80% of states would be in the hands of Morena and its allies.

    A loaded legacy

    The fact that a large proportion of Mexicans currently receive some form of cash handout from the government has contributed in no small part to López Obrador’s popularity. Any successor will likely struggle to keep this up as inflated spending plans for the year look to saddle them with the highest fiscal deficit in decades.

    Eduardo Verástegui

    The candidacy of far-right Mexican actor Eduardo Verástegui was over before it started. Verástegui failed to collect the signatures needed to run as an independent in the presidential race, which must equate to 1% of the electoral roll (some 960,000 signatures) from supporters in 17 of Mexico’s 32 states. Verástegui, who has aligned himself with right-wing figures including former US president Donald Trump (2017-2021) and former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2023), requested an extension for the period in which to collect the signatures. This was denied.

    Risks

    Political violence remains a big risk ahead of Mexico’s mammoth electoral year. According to local political risk consulting firm, Etellekt, 102 politicians including 36 candidates were killed in the run-up to the mid-term elections in June 2021. Given that 2024’s elections are significantly larger, with many more local contests, where candidates are most vulnerable, there is reason to believe this year’s electoral period will be even deadlier. Indeed, three opposition candidates competing for local seats were killed from 4-5 January in an indication of the violence that may lie ahead.

    Another risk concerns the democratic process itself. Although the actual threat to a peaceful transfer of power is relatively low, López Obrador has consistently worked to undermine the country’s main electoral bodies – the national electoral institute (INE) and federal electoral tribunal (TEPJF) – through budget cuts, proposed reforms, and verbal attacks. This has raised concerns of democratic backsliding, with the Economist Intelligence Unit downgrading Mexico from a “flawed democracy” to a “hybrid regime” under López Obrador.

    A related risk is the flaunting of electoral rules, which López Obrador and other prominent Morena figures have repeatedly done. Violations include campaigning outside of designated periods, spreading government propaganda during the electoral period, and exceeding campaign donation limits. Such rules are designed to ensure a balanced contest. Given the wealth of public resources and influence that López Obrador and Morena have at their fingertips, such rule breaking could tip the balance ever more in their favour.

  • URUGUAY: Another tight contest in prospect

    Patrick de Courcy 29 January 2024 Hits: 2588

    Date: 27 October 2024. Run-off to be held on 24 November if no candidate obtains 50%+1 of the vote in the first round.

    Election type: Presidential and legislative elections (99 seats in the chamber of deputies and 30 seats in the senate).

    Main contenders: Frente Amplio (FA); Partido Nacional (PN, Blancos); Partido Colorado (PC, Colorados); Cabildo Abierto (CA); Partido Independiente (PI); Partido de la Gente (PG).

    Uruguay will stage nationwide primary elections in June to define candidates for the first round of presidential elections in October. President Luis Alberto Lacalle Pou’s popularity has stayed consistently high, at around half of the electorate, for the majority of his mandate but he is constitutionally barred from standing for consecutive re-election and it is not clear who will succeed him. Five parties forged a multi-colour coalition in order to eke out a narrow victory over the long-ruling left-wing Frente Amplio (FA) coalition in 2019 and they would need to stay together to repeat the feat.

    An electoral survey published by the national pollster Factum in December gave the FA 42% of the vote, 16 percentage points clear of President Lacalle Pou’s centre-right Partido Nacional (PN, Blancos) on 26%. At some distance from the PN followed the other three parties in the multi-colour coalition: the right-of-centre Partido Colorado (Colorados) on 9%, the right-wing Cabildo Abierto (CA) on 7%, and the centre-left Partido Independiente (PI) on 3%, with the remaining 8% either determined to cast blank ballots or undecided.

    This once again suggests that if all of the opposition parties preserve their electoral alliance then they are capable of defeating the FA in a tight contest, with the PN in pole position to select the presidential candidate to head the joint ticket, but separate surveys of the most likely candidates to stand suggest that the FA has a lead.

    Another poll published by Factum on 14 December showed that Yamandú Orsi is favourite to secure the FA presidential candidacy in primary elections. Orsi, the intendant (governor) of the department of Canelones since November 2020, and a member of the national leadership committee of the Movimiento de Participación Popular (MPP), the largest party in the FA, has been well out in front in a series of polls conducted throughout 2023.

    Orsi received 50% support, with his only real challenger being Carolina Cosse, a former cabinet minister and the incumbent mayor of Montevideo since 2020, on 36%. Another survey by local pollster Equipos Consultores gave Orsi a similar lead of 15 percentage points (46%-31%) over Cosse when only the four pre-candidates confirmed by the FA were included in the poll.

    Álvaro Delgado is favourite to win the PN primary elections, according to a separate Factum poll. Delgado, a former senator who resigned as secretary of the presidency on 21 December in order to concentrate on campaigning for the presidency, returned 52% support, 18 percentage points ahead of his closest challenger Laura Raffo, an economist and president of the PN Montevideo mayoral commission. Raffo, the daughter of former senator Juan Carlos Raffo, trailed by 37%-29% in the Equipos poll when non-contenders, such as President Lacalle Pou, were excluded.

    Despite the combined support for parties in the multi-colour coalition eclipsing that for the FA, Factum gave Orsi a 51%-41% lead over Delgado in a head-to-head contest. This suggests that the FA’s prospective candidate is more popular than his coalition.

    There is a long way to go until the primary elections, and Delgado will hope to make inroads into that lead after his campaign swings into gear. But if the polls continue to show a lead of this magnitude for Orsi by the time of the primary elections then there could be pressure within the multi-colour coalition to run behind one of the candidates running for the other parties. That said, there is no obvious alternative and the PN is the most popular party within the coalition by a distance.

    The overwhelming favourite within the PC is Pedro Bordaberry, although the veteran politician has said he will not run for the presidency again. If he is removed from the electoral survey then, according to the Equipos poll, little divides the top three candidates in the PC internal contest - Robert Silva (23%), Gustavo Zubía (20%), and Tabaré Viera (19%).

    The former commander of the army, General Guido Manini Ríos, has announced his intention to seek the CA presidential candidacy once again. But Senator Manini Ríos, who burst on to the scene as a right-wing populist in 2019, has lost some of his appeal now that he is no longer an outsider, in part because the public perception of security improved under the Lacalle Pou administration, with violent theft and robbery falling, although violent homicides are on the way up again. A scandal involving the Uruguayan drug trafficker Sebastián Marset, involving a passport obtained in 2021, has also been damaging for the government, ultimately leading to the resignations of the interior minister, Luis Alberto Heber, and the foreign minister, Francisco Bustillo, in November last year.

    Homicides

    There were a record 382 homicides in 2018, the last full year of the previous FA administration. Under the Lacalle Pou government annual homicides fell, reaching 306 in 2021. But they jumped back up to 383 in 2022 and stayed high, at 382, in 2023.

  • VENEZUELA: Opposition sees narrow route back into contention

    Patrick de Courcy 29 January 2024 Hits: 2591

    Date: Second half of 2024.

    Type: Presidential elections.

    Main contenders: President Nicolás Maduro is expected to stand for the ruling Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV). María Corina Machado is the chosen candidate for the opposition coalition Plataforma Unitaria Democrática (PUD) but is currently appealing a ban on her candidacy.

    This presidential election is on course to be the first since 2013 which will not be boycotted by Venezuela’s main opposition parties, which are now grouped under the PUD banner. But the PUD’s decision to participate appears to be based less on a genuine conviction that President Nicolás Maduro can be toppled at the ballot box, than on the evident failure of previous boycotts in the 2018 presidential election and the 2020 legislative election. Those boycotts, which came in response to the disqualification of leading opposition candidates, failed to dislodge Maduro despite sparking mass protests and prompting the introduction of a punishing US-led sanctions regime.

    A major loosening of US sanctions in October 2023, including on Venezuela’s all-important oil sector, has given the opposition some cause for hope. The détente came with some democratic strings attached; crucially, President Joe Biden’s administration demanded that disqualifications be lifted on all opposition candidates so that they can participate in an election which Maduro has said will be monitored by international observers, including a delegation from the European Union. If the bans on leading opposition candidates are lifted, then there is a chance that Venezuela could see a genuine electoral contest – although Maduro’s tight control over the country’s electoral institutions and media means that the playing field will be far from level.

    María Corina Machado

    The real test of Maduro’s claim to be participating in a fair election will be whether the Venezuelan authorities allow the PUD’s chosen candidate, María Corina Machado, to participate. Machado was disqualified by the comptroller general’s office in June 2023 as she surged ahead in polling for the PUD’s primary election. The timing and nature of Machado’s disqualification (an expired 12-month ban imposed in 2015, relating to alleged irregularities in her declaration of assets, was extended to 15 years just as she stormed to a wide lead in the polls) sparked accusations that the Maduro administration was running scared of Machado.

    The effort to keep Machado off the ballot only boosted her popularity; she refused to drop out of the PUD primary and scored a runaway victory with over 92% of the vote. Eight days later, the supreme court “suspended” the primary results, but not before Machado had emerged as the overwhelming favourite to take on Maduro. The government was left juggling its competing priorities of preventing her from participating in an election which she would be likely to win, whilst adhering closely enough to the democratic principles demanded by the US to avoid a snapback of sanctions.

    For now, the authorities are kicking any decision on Machado’s candidacy down the road. Just before a US deadline for the ban to be lifted, the supreme court announced on 30 November that it would consider appeals from disqualified opposition candidates. As of mid-January, no verdict has yet been reached on the appeals lodged by Machado or any other opposition candidates. But given the supreme court’s long-running subservience to the government, there is little expectation of a shock ruling in favour of Machado.

    A failure to allow her to compete would throw the opposition into disarray. There is no obvious choice to replace her, given that the two other best-polling candidates ahead of the PUD primary, Henrique Capriles Radonski and Freddy Superlano, have also been disqualified and both dropped out in the run-up to the primary vote. The PUD ticket could potentially pass to the candidate who came second in the primary, Carlos Prosperi. But Prosperi enjoys nothing like the popular support of Machado; he took just 4% of the vote, compared with Machado’s 92%. A lack of enthusiasm for Prosperi would be likely to drive up voter abstention and could see the PUD collapse into infighting – both of which would play to Maduro’s advantage.

    Early start to a deeply uncertain campaign

    In spite of the massive uncertainties surrounding her candidacy, Machado got her campaign off to an early start on 17 January even though there is still a lack of clarity over when the election will be held. The government has so far only indicated that it will take place “in the second half of 2024”. Machado’s campaign chief, Henry Alviárez, said that as the government had started its election campaign, “so we’ll start ours; in an organised, civic way…we’re going to unleash our force”. He added that Machado’s campaign would not be cowed by “repression” or “persecution”.

    Maduro has not formally announced the start of his own campaign. But the ruling PSUV rarely lets up on the electoral rhetoric. In a boosterish state-of-the-nation address on 15 January, Maduro announced a 43% pay rise for public sector workers in an effort to quell mounting protests over wages which have been hugely eroded by high inflation (the annual inflation rate was running at nearly 190% in December, according to the central bank, which nonetheless noted that this was the lowest figure recorded since 2015). Maduro ignored the opposition’s demands that he use the speech to announce a date for the election, but two days later he said that the PSUV was on course for a “great victory” that will “set us on the road to the 2030 election and beyond”. He added that elections will be held this year “with or without sanctions”.

    Machado’s privatisation plans

    Machado has argued that mass privatisations, including of the state oil company Pdvsa, will go a long way towards lifting Venezuela out of the economic mire. Her commitment to privatisation is so great that she has previously been described in the local media as the “Venezuelan Margaret Thatcher”. This desire to crack open Venezuela’s statist economy may in part be explained by her family background; she was born the heiress to Venezuela’s second-largest steel company, Sivensa, which was partially nationalised under Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chávez (1999-2013).

    Improving economic outlook

    Venezuela’s economy, whilst still hugely troubled, is showing signs of bouncing back from rock bottom. A gradual improvement had been seen since around 2021 and looks likely to accelerate in 2024 as long as the lifting of US sanctions is maintained. In his 15 January state-of-the-nation address, Maduro said that GDP growth surpassed 5% in 2023, adding that his government expects 8% GDP growth in 2024. He also celebrated his government’s success at reducing inflation, which stood at ‘just’ 189.8% in 2023 – no longer the highest in the region having been narrowly topped by Argentina.

    Maduro whips up Essequibo tensions in search of nationalist vote

    The looming election offers the most plausible explanation for Maduro’s otherwise bizarrely timed decision to ratchet up tensions with neighbouring Guyana. After weeks of increasingly warlike rhetoric, the government held a referendum on 3 December asking voters whether they supported the annexation of the disputed Essequibo region, which has been claimed by Venezuela for over a century but which lies within Guyana’s internationally recognised borders. Venezuelan interest in “reclaiming” the Essequibo has intensified since massive offshore oilfields were discovered there in 2015.

    Maduro’s provocative actions after the referendum questions were approved by voters, including creating a new regional military force dedicated to the Essequibo and ordering the state oil company Pdvsa to prepare to begin drilling in the territory, provoked a furious backlash from Guyana, the wider region, and the US. Given the major strides made by the Maduro administration regarding the lifting of US sanctions, it was a strange time to be raising tensions.

    The most likely explanation for this is Maduro’s desire to drive up voter turnout to give at least the appearance of a competitive election. Seeking greater support from nationalist voters offers one way of achieving this, as well as providing plenty of opportunities for Maduro to engage in flag-waving patriotic displays. Venezuela’s claim to the Essequibo is also one of its only points of agreement between the government and opposition, which was put in an awkward position by the referendum. Unwilling to condemn the vote for fear of being viewed as unpatriotic, but also hesitant to accept Maduro’s offer to join the referendum campaign in order not to offend its international allies, the PUD instead opted to sit on the sidelines.