Who's competing for power in 2025?

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  • Introduction

    Patrick de Courcy 28 January 2025 Hits: 4365

    A bumper year for elections, 2025 will see voters go to the polls in no fewer than six Caribbean nations, while Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Honduras will also be staging presidential and legislative elections. With the notable exception of Ecuador, which will hold elections on 9 February, the majority of the electoral contests are likely to be held towards the back end of the year (although snap elections are possible in several of the Caribbean contests). This makes predicting the outcome of the elections challenging, not least because uncertainty still surrounds some candidates and prospective alliances. That said it is possible to discern shifts in voter sentiment and evaluate the likelihood of different eventualities.

    It is not difficult to identify the frontrunners in Ecuador’s electoral race.  Although 16 presidential candidates are participating in the contest, pollsters suggest that incumbent President Daniel Noboa and Luisa González of the left-wing opposition Revolución Ciudadana (RC) have distanced themselves significantly from the chasing pack (albeit voter indecision is high). Neither candidate is likely to clear the threshold required to win in the first round, however, meaning that a run-off in April is likely. The concurrent congressional elections will be important as the victorious president could be hobbled by a weak presence in the national assembly in an atomised party political system.

    The acrimonious infighting within the ruling left-wing Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in Bolivia between President Luis Arce and former president Evo Morales (2006-2019) could pave the way for the right to win August’s elections. Early indications are that the opposition is trying to rally behind a unity candidate to strengthen its chances of dislodging the MAS.

    The broad consensus is that Chile’s President Gabriel Boric, the youngest head of state in the country’s history, has underwhelmed. The results of the regional and municipal elections in 2024 and early polls ahead of the presidential contest suggest the majority of voters are shifting to the centre ground rather than the populist extremes after the left-wing Boric faced off against the far-right José Antonio Kast in 2021. Evelyn Matthei, a veteran politician running for the traditional right-of-centre coalition Chile Vamos, is the favourite.

    Profound disillusionment with the right-wing Partido Nacional (PN) prompted Honduran voters to elect the country’s first female president, Xiomara Castro, in 2021 but her left-wing Libertad y Refundación (Libre) party has been beset by scandals of its own, leaving the 2025 race wide open. The newfound oil wealth in Guyana and Suriname makes these arguably the most important elections to win since independence. Elsewhere, ruling parties are favourites to retain power in Belize, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad & Tobago, while Jamaica’s elections are more up in the air.

  • ECUADOR: Noboa’s to lose

    Patrick de Courcy 28 January 2025 Hits: 2919

    Date: 9 February. If no presidential candidate secures an absolute majority of the valid votes in the first round, or 40% with a 10-percentage-point advantage over the second-placed candidate, a second round run-off will be held on 13 April.  

    Type: Presidential, legislative (151 deputies to be elected to a newly enlarged national assembly).

    Main contenders: Daniel Noboa, the incumbent president running for election (Acción Democrática Nacional [ADN]). Luisa González (left-wing Revolución Ciudadana [RC]). Foremost among the other 14 presidential candidates are Henry Kronfle (traditional Partido Social Cristiano [PSC]); Francesco Tabacchi (right-of-centre Movimiento Creo); Henry Cucalón (right-of-centre Movimiento Construye); Andrea González, centre-left (Partido Sociedad Patriótica [PSP]); Leonidas Iza (Pachakutik, the political arm of the umbrella indigenous group Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas [Conaie]); Jimmy Jairala Centro Democrático [CD]); and Víctor Araus (nominally centrist Pueblo Igualdad y Democracia [PID]).

    President Daniel Noboa has not been a resounding success. Elected in 2023 to complete the truncated term of Guillermo Lasso (2021-2023), who jumped before he could be pushed, the youthful Noboa promised to throw out the “old politics” and start anew. His immediate challenge was to improve a rapidly deteriorating security situation, earning Ecuador the highest murder rate in the region. He has brought it down but it remains sky high and there is a long way to go. Meanwhile, the economy has tanked, contracting for three straight quarters in 2024, in part because of a massive energy crisis, with recurrent blackouts, due to acute water shortages. With this poor record on paper, it might seem that Noboa would struggle to win re-election. And yet he heads into the first round of elections on 9 February as the favourite. How is this possible?

    President Noboa talks a good game. Because he has only been in power for 18 months and inherited a parlous security situation from Lasso, he has been able to lay the blame for the country’s predicament on his predecessors, saying he has not had sufficient time yet to turn things around. His government is relentlessly highlighting small improvements in security, although in absolute terms the situation still looks bad. On the economic front, Noboa claims that he has planted the seeds for growth but they have not yet had time to germinate.

    • Economic travails

    Ecuador’s GDP contracted by 1.5% in the third quarter of 2024, following contractions in the first two quarters, according to the most recent report by the central bank (BCE) published on 15 January. This makes the BCE’s forecast of 0.9% growth for 2024 appear highly optimistic. It is not an optimism shared by the World Bank, which predicted an annual contraction of 0.7%, in a report published on the following day, albeit with a projected bounce back to 2% growth in 2025.

    Noboa is also assisted by the lack of a popular alternative. He beat Luisa González in 2023 and the RC is fielding her as its candidate again. Her core support is solid, elevating her above the other challengers in a highly fragmented race but the party of former president Rafael Correa (2007-2017) is highly polarising and she has been unable to distance herself from the corruption that dogged his mandate. Her high rejection rate means that Noboa is likely to repeat the feat and defeat her in a second round in April should this most likely scenario come to pass.  

    Presidential debate

    A presidential debate on 19 January did nothing to advance González’s cause. In fact quite the reverse. Because of the volume of candidates, the debate was held in two parts, with Noboa and González kept apart. Noboa was relatively untroubled by the other seven candidates in his pool. González, by contrast, was not only deprived of the opportunity to try and land some blows on her rival but she was also put in a pool including the PSP’s Andrea González, the most fleet-footed performer in the debate, who left her floundering on more than one occasion.

    It is unlikely, however, to be enough for a different González to make it on to the second round ballot paper. The PSP candidate has a lot of ground to make up in the polls. Although the most recent electoral surveys do not take into account the debate, they suggest that Noboa and González should coast through to a second round showdown by securing comfortably the most votes in the first round contest.

    A survey released by the local pollster Cedatos the day before the debate gave Noboa 32.1% and González 20.6%. None of the remaining 14 candidates succeeded in attracting more than 3.1% of the vote. Two other surveys, by Comunicaliza and Informe Confidencial, had the top two closer, separated by between three and five percentage points, but found a similarly low level of support for third party candidates. Andrea González had just 1.2% in the most recent Cedatos poll, less than the 2.2% margin of error, although this by no means left her at the back of the field. In fact, 10 candidates received even fewer voting intentions.

    In spite of this, with 60% of voters undecided ahead of the debate, according to Cedatos, there was still all to play for. After all, Noboa had less than 4% of voter intentions before the 2023 presidential debate after which he suddenly shot into contention and ended up winning, swaying many of the undecided voters to back his candidacy. Andrea González’s performance notwithstanding, however, the debate did not produce much in the way of policy proposals, being characterised more by empty promises, often either uncosted or unplanned.

    Luisa González called for an improvement in state efficiency, stronger institutions, and incentives to fight against corruption and criminal groups. She said she would overhaul the government’s financial analysis unit (Uafe), for instance, to trace money laundering, and investigate judges and prosecutors for illicit enrichment.

    In theory, it sounded like a reasonable enough proposal but when Andrea González reminded her Correa was responsible for reckless spending, hollowing out state institutions and fled into exile in Belgium to avoid serving an eight-year prison sentence for corruption in 2020, she was pushed on to the backfoot. Her proposed investigation of judges and prosecutors suddenly looked more like a vendetta than a considered reform.

    In an interview with the national daily El Universo, a few days before the debate Luisa González, made some trenchant criticism of Noboa she would have loved to have been able to make to a wider audience in the debate. She accused Noboa of violating electoral rules by refusing to take leave of absence for the duration of the campaign, instead taking short temporary leaves of absence for rallies, while circumventing constitutional constraints by appointing his own replacement vice president because of a huge falling out with his own elected vice president Verónica Abad. Noboa was concerned that Abad would sabotage his electoral bid by using the office of the presidency to campaign for his rival. Opponents have challenged this before the electoral disputes tribunal (TCE).

    Congressional contest

    Whoever wins the election will be keen to expand their party’s presence in the national assembly. Noboa’s ADN, in particular, has just 14 seats in the 137-seat assembly, forcing him to seek alliances to advance his legislative agenda. The party political system is deeply fragmented, reflected in the plethora of presidential candidates seeking election.

    There will be more seats up for grabs in these elections too. The national assembly is being expanded from 137 to 151 seats. The additional 14 seats are being added as a result of a census in 2022, which showed that the national population had increased in size by 2.5m to 16.9m since the previous census in 2010.

    Noboa’s controversial actions

    President Noboa has not only played fast and loose with electoral rules. He also rode roughshod over the principle of inviolability of diplomatic missions by ordering the storming of Mexico’s embassy in Quito in April last year to extract Rafael Correa’s former vice president Jorge Glas (2013-2017), who has been convicted of corruption.

  • BOLIVIA: The MAS tears itself in two

    Patrick de Courcy 28 January 2025 Hits: 2861

    Date: 17 August. A second round run-off will be held on 19 October if no candidate receives more than 50% of the vote, or 40% with a lead of at least 10 percentage points over their closest rival.

    Type: Presidential and legislative (36 seats in the senate and 130 in the lower chamber).

    Main contenders: President Luis Arce (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS), Evo Morales (MAS), Carlos Mesa (Comunidad Ciudadana), Luis Fernando Camacho (Creemos), Manfred Reyes Villa (Autonomía para Bolivia-Súmate), Jorge Quiroga (independent), Samuel Doria Medina (Unidad Nacional), Vicente Cuéllar (Cambio 25), Amparo Ballivián (independent).

    Bolivia’s 2025 elections will be dominated by a man who is currently barred from competing – former president Evo Morales (2006-2019), who faces steep legal barriers in his efforts to return to power and is also under mounting threat from criminal charges. Although a Morales comeback looks like a long shot, he could still derail the re-election efforts of his former ally President Luis Arce as they compete for the candidacy of the ruling left-wing Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). The right-of-centre opposition is attempting to unite in order to capitalise on this unprecedented dysfunction within the MAS.

    The rupture in the MAS began in 2022, two years into President Arce’s tenure, as attention began to turn to the 2025 election. Over the past three years Morales has launched an intensifying barrage of attacks on the government with the goal of discrediting Arce and replacing him as the MAS candidate. These broadsides have not abated despite a December 2023 constitutional court ruling which effectively dashed Morales’ plan to return to power by establishing a firm limit of two presidential terms, regardless of whether these are consecutive or not.

    Morales, who claims that this and other adverse court rulings are part of a campaign of judicial ‘lawfare’ aimed at bolstering Arce, continues to insist that he will stand as a candidate. His best route back into contention is through the judicial elections that were held in December 2024, in which the constitutional court was replaced, paving the way for a reconsideration of presidential term limits. Even if Morales is allowed to compete, it is questionable whether he will be able to do so under the MAS banner, after Arce’s faction won control of the party in November last year following bitter legal wrangling.

    Regardless of whether or not he is allowed onto the ballot, Morales remains the biggest threat to Arce’s re-election. If the new constitutional court does allow him to enter the election, then the left-wing vote is likely to be divided roughly in two. This could result in a three-horse race, with Arce and Morales pitted against each other on the left and a conservative candidate aiming to exploit these divisions. Even if Morales remains excluded from the election, Arce could still suffer a significant draining of support if Morales encourages his supporters to vote for a proxy candidate.

    Despite winning a thumping victory in the 2020 election with a 27-percentage-point victory over his nearest rival, Carlos Mesa of the centre-right Comunidad Ciudadana (CC), Arce is heading into the 2025 election on far shakier ground. As well as having to contend with bitter divisions in the MAS, he will also need to defend his government’s management of the economy. The past two years have seen a precipitous decline in Bolivia’s reserves of US dollars, largely caused by the dwindling of the country’s gas fields that fuelled a long boom under Morales. Meanwhile, fuel shortages have caused disruption for business and agriculture, while inflation, which remained notably low in the aftermath of the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic, has surged since July, brushing double figures in December.

    Can the opposition sustain a united front?

    Amidst these various challenges facing the MAS, the opposition has sensed the opportunity for its first presidential victory since 2002, notwithstanding the disputed 2019 election which resulted in Morales going into exile and interim president Jeanine Áñez (2019-2020) assuming office. Dislodging the MAS will be a monumental undertaking despite the problems facing the government.

    The opposition has long been divided between CC – the main centre-right faction led by Mesa – and Creemos, the hard-right party led by the imprisoned Luis Fernando Camacho. Whilst CC enjoys moderate levels of support around the country, it has never been received with any real enthusiasm by voters. Meanwhile, Creemos has deep roots in its eastern stronghold of Santa Cruz department but has struggled to gain traction in the rest of Bolivia. The reluctance of Mesa and Camacho to work together contributed to the scale of Arce’s victory in the 2020 election, when the conservative vote was divided between Mesa, who took 28%, and Camacho, who took 14%, while Arce romped home with 55%.

    This time, the opposition is aiming to present a much more united front. Aspiring candidates ranging from the centre to the far-right have grouped together under the banner of the Bloque de Unidad – a so-far informal alliance that, if the deep rivalries within the opposition can be calmed, could enable anti-MAS voters to rally around a single candidate. The alliance includes Mesa, Camacho, former president Jorge Quiroga (2001-2002), cement tycoon Samuel Doria Medina, economist Amparo Ballivián, and the rector of the Universidad Autónoma Gabriel René Moreno in Santa Cruz, Vicente Cuéllar.

    There are strong reasons to doubt the longevity of this alliance, which Mesa has played the leading role in assembling. Although Mesa, Doria, Quiroga, and a representative of the imprisoned Camacho announced with some fanfare on 18 December that there would be a “sole opposition candidate” in 2025, Quiroga already appeared to have doubts about the endeavour. Just two days earlier he had announced his own presidential campaign, declaring his intention to seize the “once in a lifetime” opportunity to “change the destiny” of the country. Quiroga then renounced his candidacy before the launch of the alliance.

    The Bloque de Unidad could also face competition from another old hand on the Bolivian right – Manfred Reyes Villa, mayor of Cochabamba, who ran unsuccessfully in the 2002 and 2009 elections. Reyes Villa has ruled out joining the Bloque de Unidad, dismissing it as a “junta”. However, as of late January he was facing legal barriers, with the supreme electoral court (TSE) preparing to issue a ruling on whether his Súmate grouping should be allowed to compete, as it was previously registered as a civil organisation rather than a political party.

    Legislative elections

    The legislative elections, which will take place on 17 August alongside the first round of the presidential election, will also have major implications for future governance. Despite the MAS having comfortable majorities of 21 out of 36 seats in the senate, and 75 out of 130 seats in the lower chamber, the government has frequently struggled to pass economic legislation due to hostility from Morales’ faction of the MAS, which has sided with the opposition on crucial votes.

    It remains to be seen whether the Morales-Arce rupture will result in the MAS breaking into two separate parties ahead of the election. If it does, the growing fragmentation of the legislature will increase. The era of MAS presidents enjoying sweeping dominance in congress appears to be over even if the party, or a breakaway faction, can hang on to the presidency.

    Morales facing possible arrest

    Former president Evo Morales has come under mounting legal pressure since late 2024 that could further imperil his efforts of a comeback. Prosecutors in Tarija department have charged Morales with human trafficking in relation to an alleged relationship with an underage girl. An arrest warrant was issued for Morales in December but has not been executed – allegedly due to concerns over police safety. Morales claims that the case is part of a politicised effort to prevent him from challenging President Arce for the presidency.

    Morales mulls forming new party

    Former president Evo Morales said on 8 December that he is considering forming a new party, after the constitutional court issued a ruling in November last year that handed the party leadership to an ally of President Arce, Grover García, following a long-running legal battle between the two factions. Morales mulled a number of names for this potential new party, some of which bore a suspicious resemblance to his own name – underlining the increasingly personalist nature of his movement. Suggestions included Erradicar a los Violentos Opositores (EVO), Evolución Oriente-Occidente (Evooo), and Estamos Volviendo Obligados por el Pueblo (Evo-Pueblo).

  • CHILE: Candidates jostling for position

    Patrick de Courcy 28 January 2025 Hits: 2850

    Date: 16 November 2025. If no presidential candidate secures an absolute majority of the valid votes, a run-off will be held on 14 December.  

    Election type: Presidential and legislative elections (23 senators and 155 deputies).

    Main contenders: Parties in the left-wing government alliance, currently consisting of the Frente Amplio (FA), produced from the merger of Convergencia Social (CS) and Revolución Democrática (RD) in July 2024; Socialismo Democrático (SD), the centre-left allied bloc comprised of the Partido Socialista (PS), Partido por la Democracia (PPD), Partido Radical, and Partido Liberal (PL); Partido Comunista de Chile (PCCh); Federación Regionalista Verde Social (FRVS); and Acción Humanista (AH). The opposition consisting of the right-of-centre Chile Vamos coalition, currently made up of Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI), Renovación Nacional (RN), and Evópoli; the far-right Partido Republicano (PR); the conservative Partido Social Cristiano (PSC); and the far-right Partido Nacional Libertario (PNL), which is still being formed. Other parties to note are the centre-left Democracia Cristiana (DC) and the leftist Partido Progresista (PRO).

    Although Chile’s presidential elections are not due to take place until the end of this year, an idea of what the race may look like has already started to emerge, particularly in terms of candidates running for right-wing opposition parties. Candidates on the left of the spectrum running for parties in President Gabriel Boric’s ruling coalition or those allied to it have yet to come forward in similar numbers. There is a still a long way to go before the primaries in June and many on the left may hope that Boric’s government, beset by scandals in recent months, will see a boost in popularity before then to prevent their candidacies from being tainted by the current administration’s perceived failings.

    Beleaguered Boric

    Under Chile’s constitution, presidents are not eligible for immediate re-election. Even if he were able to run, the odds would not be looking good for President Boric, whose term in office has been marred by two failed attempts to rewrite Chile’s constitution, low economic growth, and rising concerns over public security. In recent months, his government has been hit by its mishandling of the rape allegations that emerged against former deputy interior minister Manuel Monsalve (2022-2024) in October; historical sexual harassment accusations against Boric himself; and a botched attempt to purchase the residence of former president Salvador Allende (1970-1973). All this has contributed to disapproval ratings of over 60% in January, according to a survey by local pollster Cadem released on 12 January.

    The unpopularity of the government has likely damaged the presidential ambitions of some key members of Boric’s team. Chief among these is the interior minister, Carolina Tohá, who is reportedly being urged to run for the presidency by members of her party, PPD. Tohá has not ruled out the possibility but is biding her time. Tohá’s approval ratings have plummeted due to the Monsalve case, with only 32% of respondents approving of her in a November Cadem poll - the worst rating of any government minister.

    Other potential candidates from the ruling alliance include twice former president Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010, 2014-2018) of the PS; Tomás Vodanovic (FA), who was re-elected mayor of Santiago’s Maipú commune by a landslide in October 2024; and Claudio Orrego, who won re-election as governor of the Metropolitan Region of Santiago (RM), Chile’s most populous, as an independent candidate in November. Bachelet is currently performing the best out of potential ruling alliance candidates in the polls, while Vodanovic and Orrego have proven their popularity in Santiago while distancing themselves from federal government failings. However, all three have so far ruled out running for the presidency. Vlado Mirosevic, a federal deputy for the Partido Liberal (PL), is the only candidate from parties in the ruling alliance to formally announce his candidacy so far.

    The question of which leftist parties will go head-to-head in primaries on 29 June also remains unknown. Alberto Undurraga, a federal deputy and leader of the centre-left DC, which is not part of the governing alliance, has informally expressed his intention to run and has reportedly stated he would be prepared to compete in primaries with the SD and the FA, but not with the PCCh. Such divisions risk splitting the leftist vote, potentially providing a boon for the right-wing opposition, which is already capitalising on the government’s woes.

    The opposition

    The race looks slightly clearer for the opposition. On 11 January the RN’s general council voted for Evelyn Matthei, the former mayor of Santiago’s Providencia commune, to be its presidential candidate. The UDI - Matthei’s own party and the senior partner in Chile Vamos – also confirmed Matthei as its pick a week later, paving the way for her to become the coalition’s candidate. The UDI’s Rodolfo Carter, former mayor of the Santiago Commune of La Florida, has also expressed his intentions to run for the presidency and to compete in primaries against Matthei.

    Matthei is currently leading opinion polls. The latest (12 January) poll released by Cadem showed Matthei on 23% of voter intentions, down 3% from its previous (December) survey. In all run-off scenarios tested by Cadem, Matthei triumphed, beating Bachelet by four percentage points, Tohá by 38, and Orrego by 18. A December survey by pollster Criteria similarly showed Matthei leading intentions on 27%, followed by Bachelet on 11%, while a November poll by Pulso Ciudadano put Matthei on 26%, ahead of Bachelet on 13%.

    The far-right

    Cadem’s most recent polls suggest that Matthei’s closest rivals may currently come from the far-right. José Antonio Kast, the PR leader who lost to Boric in the run-off in 2021, has confirmed he intends to run again. Cadem’s November and December polls showed him in second place behind Matthei, with 14% and 8% of the vote respectively. However, in the January survey, he had slipped into third, overtaken by federal deputy and YouTuber Johannes Kaiser, an estranged member of the PR. Kaiser has announced he is running for the PNL, a party he founded that is under construction. Kaiser has grown in popularity in Cadem’s polls in recent months, from 4% of intentions in November to 10% in January, second behind Matthei.

    Kaiser has said he is willing to compete in primaries with Chile Vamos although Kast is unlikely to do the same. The emergence of a new alternative on the far-right is likely to take votes away from Kast, who would be embarking on his third attempt at the presidency, particularly given the PR’s poor performance in October’s local and regional elections. Kaiser’s libertarian discourse is similar to that of Argentina’s far-right President Javier Milei, with an emphasis on downsizing the role of the state and promoting personal freedoms. His rhetoric also includes an emphasis on guaranteeing security and public order, which may well appeal to a society increasingly concerned by violent crime rates.

    Indeed, Boric’s government has moved to respond to concerns around insecurity, creating a new public security ministry, boosting spending, expanding the powers of police, clamping down on the border, and deploying more security personnel. The politicisation of public security is likely to reach new heights in the coming months as the topic looks set to be a key campaign issue.

    Other potential candidates

    Other potential candidates on the left include former president (1994-2000) Eduardo Frei and the former leader of the Partido Progresista Marco Enríquez-Ominami. Frei stated he is not planning on running, despite pressure from within the DC. Enríquez-Ominami, who would be embarking on his fifth attempt at the presidency, has not ruled out running, with reports that the Partido Radical is eyeing him up as a potential candidate.

    Local and regional elections

    Evelyn Matthei was vocal in celebrating the good performance by Chile Vamos in October’s local elections. The coalition won 122 of the country’s 345 communes (municipalities), including in the Santiago communes of Ñuñoa, a traditional stronghold of the left, and Santiago Centro, where changes in the political colour have traditionally been seen as an accurate indicator of who will win the next presidential elections. However, Boric’s left-wing coalition performed better in the second round of gubernatorial elections in November, notably clinching a win in RM. Matthei had pitched the RM race as the ultimate battle, with some analysts suggesting this took away somewhat from what she had gained by championing the municipal wins. 

  • HONDURAS: Race wide open

    Patrick de Courcy 28 January 2025 Hits: 3086

    Date: 30 November

    Type: Presidential, legislative (128 national deputy candidates representing the country’s 18 departments), local (298 mayoral candidates, 298 vice mayoral candidates and more than 2,000 town councillors), plus 20 candidates for the Central American parliament (Parlacen).

    Main contenders (presidential pre-candidates): Rixi Moncada, Rasel Tomé (Partido Libertad y Refundación, Libre); Nasry Asfura, Ana Rosalinda Carías, Carlos Urbizo, Jorge Zelaya Munguía (Partido Nacional, PN); Jorge Cálix, Salvador Nasralla, Maribel Espinoza, Luis Zelaya (Partido Liberal, PL).

    Broken promises open door to political alternatives

    In 2021, Xiomara Castro of the ruling Libre party came out on top in a hotly contested presidential election, replacing Juan Orlando Hernández (2014-2022) of the PN. Castro became the country’s first-ever female president, while Hernández, who had ruled for two consecutive four-year terms in contravention of a constitutional ban on presidential re-election, was convicted in March 2024 in the US of drug and weapons-related charges and in June was sentenced to 45 years in prison. 

    Despite promising to overhaul Honduran politics and society after 12 years of PN rule, Castro has had only limited success in enacting her agenda. Attempts to deal with day-to-day concerns such as street crime, public services, and welfare programmes have a mixed record: while the government has expanded the popular Red Solidaria social programmes and improved access to healthcare, Castro’s security policies have come under fire. 

    A controversial state of exception first imposed by the Castro government in 2022 has remained in place and has failed to tackle extortion as promised. In fact, a report by local civil society group Asociación Para una Sociedad Más Justa published 3 December revealed a rise in the number of households affected by extortion, with 11.6% of the population affected in November 2024, up from 11.1% in November 2023. And while the government highlights a fall in the homicide rate from 41.7 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2021 to a projected 26.8 per 100,000 in 2024, it remains the highest in Central America while the state of exception has been linked with alleged human rights abuses by security forces.

    Voters have also become disillusioned by a lack of progress in delivering on the lofty promises with which Castro entered office, such as restoring constitutionality and clamping down on corruption by implementing a proposed anti-corruption commission backed by the United Nations (UN) known as CICIH. This can be partly explained by legislative paralysis in congress, as Castro’s fragile legislative coalition fell apart soon after she came to power, leading to gridlock. With the opposition PN as the largest single party, holding 43 of 128 seats, Castro has sought controversial alternative methods to force through policies. For example, the government turned to the supreme court to annul the legal basis for special development zones known as ZEDEs after failing to pass the necessary legislation in congress.

    Castro has not made the same kind of efforts to implement a CICIH, and in December the UN criticised the government over the slow pace of necessary legal reforms. One possible explanation is that Castro is dragging her feet to avoid putting her allies at risk of prosecution. The president is herself part of the country’s political elite: she is married to former president (2006-2009) Manuel Zelaya, who was forced out in a coup in 2009 and who is part of an extended political clan. A recent scandal linking members of her extended family to illicit campaign financing from drug traffickers has raised further questions about her anti-corruption bona fides. 

    With relations with the US already strained over issues such as the controversial appointment of attorney general Johel Zelaya in 2023, and establishment of diplomatic relations with China in 2022, Castro’s handling of the revelations also further damaged ties with Washington, after the president cancelled a longstanding extradition treaty shortly after the scandal broke. This led to accusations of hypocrisy as observers speculated that the move was designed to protect members of her family from facing justice in the US, which Castro had applauded in the case of her predecessor, former president Hernández.

    The suggestion of links between Castro’s family and organised crime have fed into growing disillusionment with politics in Honduras, particularly as the president presented herself as an anti-corruption crusader. Polling undertaken in February-March 2024 by Jesuit research team Equipo de Reflexión, Investigación y Comunicación (ERIC-SJ) revealed that 78% of respondents had little or no interest in politics, and recent scandals have not led to the kind of mass protests that the country has seen in years past.

    Despite this feeling of apathy, there is still a heightened risk of political violence as election day approaches. There were 64 documented cases of electoral violence from October 2020-November 2021, and a series of reforms designed to strengthen independence and transparency of electoral institutions have still not been implemented, meaning that similar conditions remain in place this time around. US officials have requested permission to observe the primary elections which are due to take place in March, as they did in 2021.

    Castro has resisted calls for her to resign in the wake of recent scandals, maintaining the ability to use her office to help the cause of her chosen successor Rixi Moncada, a lawyer by training who was named defence minister in September 2024. 

    Libre’s election hopes will undoubtedly be affected by Castro and her family’s alleged links to drug traffickers, but Moncada will benefit from being a fresh face. There is still time for Castro to make some moves towards her promise to create a CICIH, thereby creating a positive narrative around anti-corruption efforts by the party. 

    Her economic record is also relatively strong, with the latest (December 2023) estimate by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Eclac) projecting that Honduras posted 3.6% GDP growth in 2023, above the 3.1% average for Central America and Castro earned praise from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in October, for agreeing to implement “prudent” macroeconomic policies as part of a funding agreement.

    GDP growth has proven “broadly resilient,” said the IMF, which also highlighted improved economic management and lent its support to Castro’s proposed Ley de Justicia Tributaria tax reform, which has caused tensions with the country’s private sector. Libre officials will be hoping that this record, as well as increased social spending, will be enough to outweigh continued concerns over corruption in the minds of voters.

    As regards voter preferences, polls suggest the race remains wide open. One survey published on 20 January by local pollster Paradigma shows that Moncada would face off against Asfura of the PN and Nasralla of the PL, with 16.0% of the 2,370 respondents saying they would vote for Nasralla if the elections were held that day, followed by 13.6% for Asfura and 8.7% for Moncada. However, the same poll also showed that 36.9% of those surveyed would not vote for any of the candidates, and 16.2% said they didn’t know who to vote for or didn’t answer at all, indicating a high level of uncertainty.

  • GUYANA: PPP/C can boast enviable, if fortuitous, economic record

    Patrick de Courcy 28 January 2025 Hits: 2822

    Date: By December 2025

    Election type: General election for the president and National Assembly.

    Main contenders: The ruling People’s Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) and the opposition People’s National Congress Reform (PNCR) and Alliance for Change (AFC), possibly combining as in the last election as A Partnership for National Unity-Alliance for Change (Apnu-AFC).

    The 2020 election was fiercely contested and heavily disputed, with then-president David Granger and the Apnu-AFC coalition taking five months to concede. The reason for the fierceness of the contest was the upcoming surge in oil money. Growth in 2020 was 43.5%, followed by 20.1% (2021), 62.3% (2022), 33% (2023), and an estimated 44% in 2024. In the final count for the 2020 election, the PPP/C won 33 seats to 31 for the Apnu-AFC coalition. A joint effort by Liberty and Justice Party, A New and United Guyana, and the New Movement won the remaining seat in parliament.

    President Irfaan Ali will lead the ruling PPP/C into the 2025 election, with Aubrey Norton leading the PNCR, the main component of Apnu. The AFC will be led by Nigel Hughes. Neither Norton nor Hughes have yet committed to running again in coalition. PPP/C is in the enviable position of defending a stellar, if fortuitous, economic record. PNCR and AFC are relying on allegations of corruption and favouritism for the PPP/C’s mainly East Indian voters. There are no reliable recent polls, but the PPP/C is saying publicly that it expects a “huge” victory. A lot could depend on opposition unity. Apnu-AFC lost in 2011 when competing separately but won in 2015 as a coalition.

  • SURINAME: A key election ahead of first oil

    Patrick de Courcy 28 January 2025 Hits: 2847

    Date: 25 May 2025

    Election type: General election for 51-seat National Assembly which will elect the president.

    Main contenders: The ruling Vooruitstrevende Hervormings Partij (VHP), the Nationale Democratische Partij (NDP), the Algemene Bevrijdings- en Ontwikkelingspartij (Abop), the Nationale Partij Suriname (NPS), Pertjajah Luhur (PL), Broederschap en Eenheid in de Politiek (BEP).

    Suriname in 2025 is in much the same position as Guyana in 2020: on the verge of transforming oil wealth (first oil from the hopefully prolific Block 58 will flow in 2028). This is the election to win. The VHP, under President Chandrikapersad Santokhi, goes into the election defending 20 seats, with its coalition partners Abop, led by Vice President Ronnie Brunswijk, holding eight seats, the NPS three seats, and the PL two seats. The main opposition party is the NDP, for many years led by former dictator Desi Bouterse, who died in December 2024. The NDP won 16 seats in the 2020 election. The BEP, aligned with the opposition, has three seats.

    The government is defending a reasonable economic record, with inflation down from 52.4% in 2022 to under 20% in 2024. Growth is estimated at 3.0% for 2024, and the debt-to-GDP ratio has fallen from 146.4% in 2020 to 85.7%. With limited polling data, and a new national electoral system, it is very difficult to predict the outcome of the May poll, but with unemployment remaining stubbornly high at 10.3%, disgruntled voters may move towards the more populist centre-left NDP, with some perhaps more willing to do so now that it is no longer dominated by the highly controversial Bouterse.

  • JAMAICA: Ruling JLP seeking a third term on mixed record

    Patrick de Courcy 28 January 2025 Hits: 3093

    Date: By November 2025

    Election type: General election for the 63-seat House of Representatives. The country has started the process of moving from a constitutional monarchy to a republic and it is hoped this process will be complete by the time of the 2025 election.

    Main contenders: The ruling Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People’s National Party (PNP). The JLP, under Prime Minister Andrew Holness, won 49 seats in the 2020 election. The PNP holds 14 seats and will go into the 2025 election with a new leader, Mark Golding.

    By the time of the election, the JLP will have completed two testing terms in power and will be challenged by the PNP under a fresh new leadership. Growth in 2024 was an estimated 1.3%, nothing to boast about, and crime remains a serious problem. In 2022, Jamaica had 1,508 murders, for a murder rate of 53.34 per 100,000 people, the highest homicide rate in the region. However, there has been a significant decline in murders in the last two years, with 1,139 recorded in 2024, a rate of 40.10 per 100,000 population. And, on the economic front, debt has been brought down from 110% of GDP in 2020 to 67.9% in 2024.

    In the local government elections in February, the JLP won more parish councils, but the PNP won the popular vote. An opinion poll published in October by the Market Research Services Ltd (MRSL) gave the PNP 39.3% support against 30.2% for the JLP. However, a significant 28.4% of respondents were recorded as ‘Don’t Knows’. Whatever the eventual outcome, it seems certain that the PNP will gain ground significantly from its 2020 result, which was its worst performance since 1980.

  • TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Kamla’s unpopularity to help PNM in quest for third term

    Patrick de Courcy 28 January 2025 Hits: 2119

    Date: By August 2025.

    Election type: General election for 41-seat House of Representatives. The leader of the party controlling a majority will be asked by the president to form a government and become prime minister.

    Main contenders: People’s National Movement (PNM); United National Congress (UNC).

    The ruling PNM under Prime Minister Keith Rowley won the August 2020 election in a close contest with the opposition UNC led by former prime minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar (2010-2015). The PNM won 22 of the 41 seats in parliament, one less than it obtained in the 2015 general election.

    The PNM will go into the 2025 election under a new leader, Stuart Young, who is of Chinese descent and the first non Afro-Trinidadian to lead the PNM, and he will have a difficult legacy to defend. Following the 9.1% contraction in 2020, growth did not turn positive until the lacklustre 1.5% uptick in 2022. This was followed by further less-than-stellar growth figures in 2023 (2.1%) and 2024 (2.4%). At the same time crime has continued to worsen with an unprecedented 623 murders recorded in 2024, or 41.3 per 100,000 inhabitants, leading to the imposition of a state of emergency at the turn of the year.

    Despite all this, though, the PNM remains favourite to win the 2025 general election. A poll from the North American Caribbean Teachers Association (Nacta), released in September 2024, suggested that the PNM could even increase its 22-19 majority. A key factor appears to be the unpopularity of opposition leader Persad-Bissessar.

  • BELIZE: PUP government well set for second mandate

    Patrick de Courcy 28 January 2025 Hits: 4663

    Date: To be called by November 2025 and held within three months

    Election type: General election for 31-seat House of Representatives. The leader of the party controlling a majority will be asked by the governor-general to form a government and become prime minister.

    Main contenders: Centre-left People’s United Party (PUP) and centre-right United Democratic Party (UDP).

    The 2020 election was won by the PUP under leader John Briceño who became prime minister. After three terms in power, the UDP under then-prime minister Dean Barrow (now led by Moses ‘Shyne’ Barrow), was soundly beaten by 26-5 seats. The PUP could hardly have returned to power at a more difficult time. The economy contracted by 13.7% in 2020, and the debt-to-GDP ratio was 103%. However, growth did return, with an average annual rate of 8% over the years 2021-2024, although a much lower estimated 3.4% in 2024. One of the PUP’s key manifesto pledges was to create jobs, and it has brought unemployment down from 13.7% to 3.4%.

    Security has also been a challenge, with two 90-day states of emergency being imposed in short order, the most recent in late June 2024 in response to a 45% increase in the murder rate since the previous year, with 58 murders from January to June 2024 compared with 40 in the same period in 2023. The upsurge was attributed to gangs fighting for control of marijuana markets.

    The PUP comfortably won a parliamentary by-election in October 2024, with 70% of the votes cast, following up on an equally impressive win in the March municipal elections.

  • ST VINCENT & THE GRENADINES: Comrade Ralph looking for unprecedented sixth term

    Patrick de Courcy 28 January 2025 Hits: 2853

    Date: By November 2025

    Election type: General election for the 15 elected seats in the House of Assembly. A further six members are appointed (four by the government and two by the opposition) to take the total to 21. The leader of the party winning the most elected seats will be asked by the governor-general to form a government and become prime minister.

    Main contenders: Left-wing United Labour Party (ULP) and moderate conservative New Democratic Party (NDP).

    The NDP once dominated SVG politics, winning four successive victories under the leadership of James Mitchell, from 1984-1998. Since then it has been in the wilderness, losing five successive elections to the ULP under Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves. In the most recent contest, in 2020, the NDP under the leadership of Godwin Friday, was beaten by 9-6 in the closest contest of the ULP’s long dominance.

    The ULP will go into the 2025 election with a number of disadvantages, including high unemployment (18.7% in 2023) and high crime. The murder rate, at 40.4 per 100,000 inhabitants, is higher even than Trinidad & Tobago (39.5) and second only in the region to Jamaica (53.3).

    Economic growth, on the other hand, has been reasonable, at 5.8% in 2023 and an estimated 4.9% in 2024, and, despite any natural desires for change, Gonsalves remains more popular than his opponent. Gonsalves has an approval rating of 35.2% against 32% for Friday. A recent poll by the Caribbean Institute for Governance and Policy Research put support for the ULP on 33.7% against 30.1% for the NDP.