Andean Group - January 2026

Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa was confident of victory in a 16 November referendum that included a proposal to allow the return of foreign military bases – so confident, in fact, that he invited US Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem to tour two prospective sites for US troops in the run-up to the vote. Noboa has now been left with egg on his face after voters resoundingly rejected the proposal by 60.82%-39.18%. Despite this setback, the arrival of US troops in December for temporary activities within Ecuador suggests that the two governments are finding a way to work around the referendum defeat.

Foreign military bases were banned in the 2008 constitution drafted under left-wing former president Rafael Correa (2007-2017), with US troops leaving their base in Manabí province when the lease expired the following year. This withdrawal, hailed by Correa as a victory for Ecuadorean sovereignty, has been slammed by President Noboa as a major impediment in the fight against drug trafficking groups. Amid a hardening of public attitudes on security issues, Noboa seemed to feel that the time was right to overturn the ban. Buoyed by a solid victory in the April 2025 presidential election, he submitted a constitutional reform bill to congress that was approved on 3 June [SSR-25-07].

The final remaining step was to win support for the constitutional change in a referendum on 16 November, in which the government made a further three proposals to voters. The Noboa administration suffered decisive defeats on all counts. As well as blocking the return of foreign bases, the public also voted against establishing a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution (61.80%-38.20%), ending State funding for political parties (58.30%-41.70%), and reducing the number of legislators in the national assembly (53.71%-46.29%).

For a president who has constantly sought to project an image of strength, and who has called for the rolling back of much of Correa’s legacy, the referendum result was a harsh reminder that the public is not as keen on his much-repeated vision for a “New Ecuador” as had been thought. Noboa’s political position has undoubtedly been weakened by the referendum, which not only dealt a major setback to his goal for a return of foreign troops, but also to his plans for much more expansive reform under a new constitution. Indeed, the consequences could go much further, with potential ramifications for Noboa’s ability to pass painful economic legislation that he views as essential for stabilising the public finances.

Noboa’s prized relationship with Washington could also now come under strain. The government was clearly overconfident going into the referendum, with Noboa taking Noem on a tour of two potential US bases from 5-6 November, just ten days before the vote. These were the US military’s old base at the Eloy Alfaro international airport in Manta, Manabí province, where it had stationed troops from 1999-2009, and another site in Salinas, Santa Elena province. Ecuador’s interior minister, John Reimberg, had said on 12 November that the Noboa administration was hoping that the US would use both bases, with one to be used by the military and the other by the Department of Homeland Security.

Having talked up the value of these sites to the US, Noboa found himself travelling to Washington for two presumably awkward visits in the weeks after the referendum. Very little public information was provided about either trip. On the first, from 18-20 November, Noboa was accompanied by the secretary for public integrity, José Julio Neira, who said that the president’s agenda was “confidential”. Noboa embarked on a second trip to the US from 27 November - 1 December, about which no further detail was provided.

These trips initially appeared to be an exercise in diplomatic damage control after Noboa overpromised in the run-up to the referendum. However, subsequent announcements indicate that Noboa was discussing the possibility for tighter military coordination despite the setback on foreign bases.

Finding alternative solutions

Some clues were provided on 17 December as to how the US and Ecuador might continue to pursue closer military ties despite the referendum outcome. In a social media post, the US embassy in Quito announced the arrival in Ecuador of US air force personnel for “a temporary operation with Ecuador’s air force in Manta”. It said that “the operation will improve the capacity of the Ecuadorean military to combat narco-terrorists, including by strengthening intelligence gathering and counter-narcotics capabilities”. It added that “this joint short-term effort is taking place as part of our long-term bilateral security strategy, in line with current agreements that conform to Ecuadorean law”.

The legal framework for the US deployment appears to be three military agreements that were signed under the government of Noboa’s predecessor Guillermo Lasso (2021-2023), two of which were later ratified by Noboa himself.

The first of these is a Status of Forces Agreement (Sofa), which was signed between the US and Ecuador in October 2023 and came into force in February 2024. This allows the US military to enter Ecuador for training and humanitarian purposes, military exercises, and for “cooperative activities to address shared security challenges” such as drug trafficking, terrorism, and illegal fishing. It also allows US aircraft, vessels, and vehicles to “enter, exit, and move freely within the territory of Ecuador”.

A September 2023 Agreement Concerning Counter Illicit Transnational Maritime Activity Operations, which came into force in February 2024, enables the US to carry out maritime operations in Ecuadorean waters with the permission of Ecuador’s defence ministry. More generally, it allows for greater cooperation between the two countries on maritime issues.

Finally, a May 2023 Aerial Interception Assistance Agreement, which came into force in October 2023, sets out a framework under which the Ecuadorean military will receive US intelligence to intercept aircraft suspected of drug trafficking. The agreement establishes which aircraft should be deemed suspicious and sets regulations including on the firing of warning shots against suspect aircraft.

Taken together, these agreements provide considerable licence for ongoing military cooperation between Washington and Quito despite the failure to regain a US base in Ecuador.

Peru’s congress authorises US troop presence

In early December Peru’s congress voted to allow US military personnel to be based in the country from 1 January–31 December 2026. Congress approved the resolution with 73 votes in favour, 25 against, and two abstentions. The troops will carry out training exercises with special forces and intelligence units from Peru’s armed forces and national police.

With the arrival of US troops in Ecuador and Peru, the raid on Venezuela’s capital to arrest former president Nicolás Maduro, and an expected return of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to Bolivia, the Andean region has been at the centre of US military policy in recent months. The US’ new, harder stance on counter-narcotics suggests that it will continue to remain a key military focus for the remainder of Trump’s term.

Los Lobos leader captured

The suspected leader of Los Lobos, one of the leading organised crime groups in Ecuador, was arrested on 16 November in Málaga, Spain. Wilmer Chavarría, alias ‘Pipo’, is believed to have faked his own death in 2021 and left the country, while continuing to direct criminal operations in Ecuador. Interior Minister John Reimberg said after his capture that Chavarría was “the most dangerous and wanted criminal in the region” and that, as well as his activities in Ecuador, he was also engaged in drug trafficking in Mexico, Colombia, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy.

Footballers killed

An Ecuadorean footballer, Mario Pineida, was murdered in a targeted attack in the port city of Guayaquil on 17 December. He was reportedly shot at from a motorbike while shopping with his mother. Pineida, who played for leading club Barcelona S.C as well as the national team, was the latest of several footballers to be murdered in Ecuador in recent months. Four players were killed between September and November – Jonathan González, who played for 22 de Julio; Maicol Valencia and Leandro Yépez, who both played for Exaproma Costa; and Miguel Nazareno, who played for Independiente del Valle.