Andean Group - February 2026

Since being sworn in as Venezuela’s president on 6 January, Delcy Rodríguez has walked a fine line as she attempts to balance four competing interests – the US government, which now has effective control over the oil sector; hardline nationalists, who were outraged by the 3 January US operation to capture former president Nicolás Maduro (2013-2026); the democratic opposition, which is demanding a transition process; and her own family, as she attempts to retain the power that she wields along with her brother, national assembly president Jorge Rodríguez.

There is reason to suspect that Rodríguez may have had prior knowledge of the US military raid to seize Maduro. Whilst there has been no confirmation of this from Washington, and certainly none from within Venezuela, where Rodríguez is still professing outrage at the US attack, press reports from the past few months paint an intriguing picture. The Miami Herald reported on 16 October that secret negotiations were held between Venezuelan and US negotiators in Qatar in April and September 2025 to discuss the possibility of the Rodríguez siblings running Venezuela if Maduro were to be removed from power. The Associated Press claimed on the same day to have corroborated the Herald’s report, which Delcy Rodríguez attacked at the time as “the filth of psychological warfare against the Venezuelan people”.

A more recent article published by British newspaper The Guardian on 22 January shone further light on Rodríguez’s communications with the US, citing people involved in the discussions as saying that she and her brother said that they would welcome Maduro’s downfall and would cooperate with the US if they took power. They have certainly delivered on the latter point, with the national assembly poised to approve a reform to the hydrocarbon law at the time of writing on 29 January – a key demand of Washington after oil executives expressed doubts about investing in Venezuela given the country’s record of expropriations and its heavily politicised legal system (see our sister publication, the Latin American Weekly Report, for more detail).

Other press reports indicate that another crucial powerbroker in Venezuela may have been aware of the US plan to capture Maduro. A Reuters article published on 17 January stated that US officials reached out to Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello via proxies in the weeks before and after Maduro’s capture. Cabello, who is from the most hardline faction of the ruling Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV), wields great influence over the security forces and had a longstanding reputation as Maduro’s pitbull. Like Maduro, he is accused by US prosecutors of being a leading member of the Cártel de los Soles drug trafficking organisation, and he has a US$25m bounty on his head. A separate Reuters report from 7 January stated that the US contacted Cabello in the immediate aftermath of Maduro’s capture to warn him that he would meet the same fate if he did not cooperate with Rodríguez and ensure order on the streets.

Cabello does appear to be cooperating and, along with the defence minister, General Vladimir Padrino López, has professed the security forces’ loyalty to Rodríguez.

Rodríguez promises to ease repression – but by how much?

Flanked by Cabello and her brother Jorge, Rodríguez gave a short speech on 14 January in which she raised hopes of a loosening of the repression that characterised Maduro’s rule. At the same time, however, she appeared to warn pro-democracy activists against growing too emboldened by the changes taking place. “Venezuela is opening up to a new political moment that allows divergence and ideological diversity,” Rodríguez said. She added, however, that “this requires respect… Hate speech, intolerance, and violence will not be permitted – the law will be strictly obeyed”. This appeared to be a warning that pro-democracy demonstrations, which have been notably absent since Maduro’s downfall amid an intimidating presence of pro-regime militias on the street, would not be tolerated.

So far, Rodríguez has delivered on one key aspect of her promise to permit “ideological diversity”, by releasing a large number of political prisoners. As of 28 January the main opposition coalition Plataforma Unitaria Democrática (PUD) had verified the release of 303 political prisoners, saying that 809 remained behind bars. The gradual release process began on 8 January when Jorge Rodríguez announced that a “significant number of Venezuelans and foreigners” would be released with the goal of strengthening “national unity” and “consolidating peace”.

Whilst this process has been welcomed by the opposition, the PUD has criticised the lack of transparency, questioning the government’s claim that it has released over 600 people, and has called for the immediate liberation of all political prisoners. At the time of writing, most high-profile political prisoners remained in custody, with some exceptions such as Rafael Tudares, the son-in-law of 2024 opposition presidential candidate Edmundo González, and Rocío San Miguel, the president of the Venezuelan NGO Control Ciudadano.

Cabinet changes

In an attempt to consolidate her control, President Rodríguez has dismissed some cabinet members appointed by Maduro or moved them to less influential positions. Some changes may have been aimed at coup-proofing her government, such as the replacement of the head of the military counterintelligence directorate (DGCIM) and presidential guard, Major General Javier Marcano Tábata, who was replaced by General Gustavo González López. Other notable firings include industry and production minister Alex Saab, the alleged sanctions evasion mastermind who was detained for two years in the US, and transport minister General Ramón Celestino Velásquez. The minister of the presidency, Vice Admiral Aníbal Coronado, was transferred to the transport ministry and replaced by army Captain Juan Escalona. Maduro’s communications minister, Freddy Ñáñez, was rotated to the environment ministry and replaced by Miguel Pérez Pirela.