Andean Group - February 2026

Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa has taken a page from President Donald Trump’s foreign policy playbook by slapping a tariff on Colombian imports in the hope of getting Bogotá to do more against criminal groups operating along their border.

On 21 January President Noboa announced a “security tax” of 30% on imports coming from Colombia starting 1 February. “This measure will remain in place until there is a real commitment to jointly confront drug trafficking and illegal mining along the border, with the same seriousness and determination that Ecuador is currently showing,” he said.

This triggered a tit-for-tat trade war, with Colombia imposing a reciprocal 30% tariff on 73 Ecuadorean imports and announcing a suspension of electricity exports to its southern neighbour in order to “guarantee domestic supply”. Quito upped the ante by imposing a 900% increase to the price it charges for transporting Colombian crude oil through Ecuadorean pipelines.

The border region has long been a stronghold for criminal gangs and armed guerrilla factions that are involved in contraband, drug and arms trafficking, and illegal mining. For some time, Ecuador has alleged that the administration of President Gustavo Petro is being too soft in confronting these groups. In May last year, 11 Ecuadorean soldiers were massacred while carrying out an anti-mining patrol in the border region, with the authorities blaming the Colombian guerrilla group Comandos de Frontera.

Noboa claimed in a social media post that “while we’ve insisted on dialogue, our soldiers continue to fight criminal groups linked to drug trafficking along the border without any cooperation”. Colombia has denied being negligent in policing its southern frontier, citing increased drugs and arms seizures in recent years. At the same time Colombia’s coca production has been rising steadily for years, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and it is now at an all-time high.

The move by Noboa mirrors some of the tactics employed by Trump to pressure trade partners in order to achieve foreign policy objectives or simply economic advantages. For nearly a year the Trump administration has rattled sabres against Colombia and Venezuela over the trafficking of drugs to the US, including the decertification of Bogotá as a counter-narcotics ally and the extraction of Venezuela’s former president Nicolás Maduro (2013-2026) to stand trial in New York.

Beyond the attempt to pressure Colombia’s government to take more aggressive action against organised crime along the border, there may have been other calculations behind Noboa’s move. Playing ball with Trump in the anti-narcotics fight may strengthen the image of Ecuador as an ally rather than a problem in the region. Also, with Petro’s term coming to an end in August, Noboa will have the chance to hit the reset button with his successor, potentially reducing the risk of souring bilateral trade relations in the long run.

But Noboa’s strategy comes with risks. For one, the suspension of electricity imports from Colombia exposes Ecuador to potential power rationing if droughts once again hit its hydroelectricity production. This was a recurrent problem from 2023-2025, severely affecting Ecuador’s economic output. Then there is the potential impact on trade itself, which totalled US$2.2bn between January and October last year, according to the Colombian government. The 23 categories of products that Colombia hit with tariffs are mostly in fishing and agriculture, including processed fish, palm oil, and rice, but also include chemicals, plastics, and metal products. Overland imports of Ecuadorean rice were banned entirely.

However, the bulk of Ecuador’s exports to Colombia are non-perishable and could be re-routed to alternative markets. While only 5% of Colombian oil is exported via Ecuador, a prolonged trade spat may turn out to be more painful for Colombia, which dominates the bilateral balance of trade with a trade surplus of around US$1bn last year.