Mexico - March 2026

Mexico’s state of Sinaloa has been undergoing a sustained wave of violence since September 2024, driven by an internal conflict between rival factions of the Cártel de Sinaloa. While the government continues to blame violence in the state on this feud, recent high-profile incidents have highlighted the multifaceted nature of violence in Sinaloa, pointing to the potential for an escalation in political violence in the run up to gubernatorial and local elections next year, as well as the risks facing multinational companies wishing to profit from the state’s agriculture, mining, and fishing industries. Public Security Minister Omar García Harfuch visited Sinaloa on 4 February to review the government’s security strategy as it tries to combat the ever-more complex insecurity crisis in the state.

The bloody dispute within the Cártel de Sinaloa began following the arrest of two alleged leaders of the cartel by the US in July 2024 [SSR-24-09]. This served to splinter the group, exacerbate internal rivalries, and create a power vacuum. The fallout from these arrests and the impact on security in Sinaloa may serve as a warning to the state of Jalisco, where Nemesio ‘El Mencho’ Rubén Oseguera Cervantes, the leader of the country’s most powerful drug cartel, Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), was killed during a security operation on 22 February, triggering a wave of violence across the state and much of western Mexico. For more information on the fallout from El Mencho’s killing, see our sister publication, the Latin American Weekly Report, and next month’s edition of the Security & Strategic Review.

• El Mencho

Mexican authorities confirmed the death of Nemesio ‘El Mencho’ Rubén Oseguera Cervantes on 23 February following a DNA test. The CJNG leader died while he was being flown to Mexico City, succumbing to injuries sustained during his capture in the town of Tapalpa. His killing triggered a wave of violence in Jalisco and neighbouring states, with the CJNG setting up roadblocks across large swathes of the country. The federal public security minister, Omar García Harfuch, announced on 23 February that 25 members of the national guard (GN), one state prosecutor, one prison guard, and one civilian were killed in Jalisco after El Mencho’s capture, as well as 30 members of the CJNG. This adds to 11 members of the CJNG who were killed during the operation, and four in neighbouring Michoacán state following the operation.

Harfuch’s visit to Sinaloa came in the wake of an armed attack on two federal deputies for the left-wing opposition Movimiento Ciudadano (MC) in state capital Culiacán on 28 January, and the kidnapping of 10 mining workers from a site in Concordia municipality on 24 January. In response, the federal defence ministry announced the deployment of almost 2,800 troops, including 360 members of the special forces, to the municipalities in question. The authorities also acted swiftly in making arrests, detaining four individuals in relation to the miners’ disappearances on 3 February as well as one suspect in the MC deputies case. Nevertheless, the incidents serve to demonstrate the breadth and severity of Sinaloa’s insecurity crisis, signalling that much work remains to improve conditions in the state.

Canadian mining company Vizsla Silver Corp alerted the Sinaloa state attorney general’s office (FGE) to the disappearance of its workers on 24 January. According to family testimonies and local media reports, the individuals were kidnapped on the morning of 23 January from a residential complex by an armed group. The job profiles of those kidnapped varies, reportedly including engineers, environmental specialists, geologists, and security guards. They were all working on a silver and gold mining project called Panuco. On 9 February the federal attorney general’s office announced that bodies of five of the miners had been identified, after human remains were found in the locality of El Verde.

The authorities announced the arrest of four people in relation to the disappearances on 3 February, while Harfuch has noted that a cell of Los Chapitos, one of the rival feuding factions of the Cártel de Sinaloa, is active in the area. However, the motive remains unknown. One theory is that the kidnapping is related to extortion. Criminal groups often charge companies ‘cobro de piso’, a regular fee to be permitted to operate in the area. The workers may have been taken in retaliation for the company failing to make such a payment.

Alternatively, a criminal group may have kidnapped the employees as punishment for the company paying extortion quotas to a rival. Another theory is that the kidnappings are linked to a dispute over control of the area for illegal mining or other illicit activities. Two miners who said they were colleagues of the disappeared workers told a local radio station they had all received threats from criminal groups warning them to stop working in the area. The miners said they believed the kidnappings were a retaliation for failing to heed this warning.

On 10 February Harfuch stated that initial statements made by the four suspects arrested in relation to the case had indicated that the workers had been “mistaken” by their kidnappers for members of a rival group. Harfuch confirmed the suspects belonged to Los Chapitos, the faction of the Cártel de Sinaloa led by the sons of imprisoned former drug kingpin Joaquín ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán Loera, noting the faction is feuding with another faction known as Los Mayos, suggesting the miners were confused with members of that group. This theory has raised some eyebrows given the workers were taken from a residential complex for employees of the mining company.

The second incident took place on 28 January, when two local MC deputies were attacked while travelling in a vehicle in Culiacán. The deputies, Sergio Torres and Elizabeth Montoya, were seriously injured and underwent hospital treatment. This points to the spectre of political violence that is always looming in Mexico. The incident is even more significant given Torres’ role as MC’s state coordinator in Sinaloa and the fact that gubernatorial and other local elections are due in the state next year. Again, Harfuch has attributed the attack to Los Chapitos. On 3 February he announced the arrest of an individual allegedly responsible for planning the logistics of the attack.

Politicians are often targeted in the run-up to elections in Mexico by groups seeking the success of candidates they think they can control [SSR-24-07]. Torres is a veteran figure in local politics in Sinaloa, serving a long career in the centrist opposition Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), during which time he served as mayor of Culiacán (2014-2016), before switching to MC in 2020 and running as its gubernatorial candidate in the state in 2021. While motives for the attack remain unknown, Torres’ relatively high-profile in the local area may well have been a factor.

These are just two recent examples of the violence that has been plaguing Sinaloa. The state registered the fourth highest number of murders last year with 1,663, behind only Guanajuato (2,539), which frequently ranks as Mexico’s deadliest state, and the northern border states of Chihuahua (1,791) and Baja California (1,714). Contrary to the national trend, which saw murders down 22% last year as compared to 2024, they rose by 67% in Sinaloa. Other high-impact crimes that saw a drop at the national level, such as femicides (-15%) and kidnapping (-21%), were also up year-on-year in Sinaloa. This indicates that the state will continue being a priority for the government as it works to crack down on criminal groups and violent crime.

Both the results of the government’s efforts to tackle crime in Sinaloa and its methods are likely to come under renewed scrutiny. On 3 February the Mexican branch of global human rights NGO Amnesty International issued a statement expressing its “deep concern” over violence in Sinaloa. It added that it was worrying that the response to this wave of violence was the deployment of military forces to the state, saying militarised public security strategies in Mexico have led to human rights violations such as arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial executions, and torture while failing to reduce violence. While Sheinbaum has frequently denied her government’s security strategy is based on militarisation, the increased military presence in Sinaloa is likely to ring alarm bells among rights groups.

Culiacán

On 11 February Mexican civil society organisation Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y Justicia Penal (CCSPJP) published its 2025 list of the world’s most violent cities. Sinaloa state capital Culiacán was the most highly ranked Mexican city and the sixth worldwide, with nearly 104 murders per 100,000 residents. Seventeen Mexican cities were among the top 50, making Mexico the country with the highest number of cities on the list. Other Mexican cities featured on the list were Ciudad Obregón (Sonora), Manzanillo and Colima (Colima state), Zamora and Uruapan (Michoacán), Acapulco (Guerrero), Irapuato and Celaya (Guanajuato), Ciudad Juárez (Chihuahua), and Tijuana (Baja California).