Andean Group - March 2026

On 29 January a Lima court partially upheld a complaint brought by Cosco Shipping Ports Chancay Perú (CSPCP), the Chinese state firm which operates the Chancay megaport that opened in November 2024 [EB-24-12]. The court ruling restricts the influence of Peru’s national transport infrastructure regulator (Ositran) over the port. China’s new foothold on South America’s Pacific coast was already regarded with apprehension by the US, which warned in response to the verdict that Peru is ceding its sovereignty in return for Chinese-built infrastructure.

The Chancay port was constructed largely through Cosco funding, with the Shanghai-headquartered conglomerate holding a 60% stake in the port project; the remainder is held by Peruvian mining company Volcan. The port serves as a major new gateway linking South America to the Chinese market, reducing the shipping route from Peru to China by 10 days, with a resultant fall of around 20% in logistics costs, according to the Peruvian association of shipping agents (Apam). Shipping through Chancay also removes the need for vessels to make stops at US or Mexican ports.

Peru’s foreign trade ministry announced in November that during Chancay’s first nine months of operations, 62% of China-bound agro-exports passed through the port, while 78% of the total goods that left Chancay were destined for China. Meanwhile, the Chinese market is fuelling a years-long boom in Peruvian exports, which hit an all-time high for a fifth consecutive year in 2025, bringing in US$90.1bn – up 21% on 2024. Exports to China, Peru’s main trading partner, were up 30% year-on-year and accounted for 36.2% of all exports. 

The reduced shipping time to China has allowed for increased exports of perishable food products, and also means exporters are less exposed to price swings. Meanwhile, Chinese e-commerce platforms such as Alibaba, Shein, and Temu are well-placed to take advantage of shorter shipping times to expand into the South American market, potentially edging out US competitor Amazon by offering comparable delivery times at cheaper prices.

The port has an initial annual capacity of 1m twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), although this is expected to be expanded to 3.5m TEUs by 2032, which would make Chancay the third largest port in Latin America after Brazil’s Santos (4.3m TEUs) and Mexico’s Manzanillo (3.7m TEUs), and the second largest on Latin America’s Pacific coastline. Meanwhile, Chancay’s deep 17.8-metre draft allows the port to accommodate higher-capacity vessels than other ports in the South Pacific. It can currently receive New Panamax and Post-Panamax vessels with a capacity of up to 18,000 TEUs, surpassing competitors such as Guayaquil port in Ecuador and Valparaíso in Chile.

Discussions are underway to expand Chancay’s infrastructure connections that would give Chinese business interests even greater access to the South American continent. In July 2025 China and Brazil signed a strategic partnership in which they agreed to assess the viability of a railway connecting Chancay to Brazil. A Brazilian government statement said that “the proposal seeks to reposition the country in international trade, promoting logistical, economic, and environmental improvements, especially for Brazilian exports to the Asian market”.

Whilst the megaport has been a success for Peru-China trade, its management and oversight have caused concern in other quarters. The January court ruling – which Ositran has appealed – means that the regulator cannot audit, supervise, or impose penalties on Chancay. The case was brought by Cosco, which argued that such activities infringe on its constitutional rights.

Ositran’s president, Verónica Zambrano, had previously described Cosco’s legal claim as “unprecedented”, saying in November that “there’s never been an appeal from a supervised company asking for the law not to apply”. However, the court took the view that the port should be classified as ‘private property, for public use’, as it was developed entirely with private capital and does not have any state concession contract. The port is therefore not legally considered a public domain asset, and thus it is not subject to the full regulatory regime. Cosco’s representatives have been clear, however, that multiple state entities maintain an operational presence at Chancay, including the national port authority (APN), customs authorities (Sunat), coastguard (Dicapi), and environmental regulators.

In response to the ruling, on 11 February the US State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs declared that it was concerned that Peru “could be powerless to oversee Chancay” which it claimed is “under the jurisdiction of predatory Chinese owners”. The statement finished with the warning that “cheap Chinese money costs sovereignty”. A spokesperson for the Chinese foreign ministry issued a statement condemning these comments.

For the time being, although there are some in Peru who are concerned about the potential loss of sovereign control over the port and its operations, the fact remains that it is playing a crucial economic role for the country, with the potential for this to develop still further if inland transport links come to fruition. While the US balks at the influence Cosco has over Chancay, it is ultimately up to the Peruvian authorities to decide how to respond, and there has been little sign of concern from the three presidents who have held office since the port opened 16 months ago.