Mexico - April 2026

Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum began an electoral reform drive on 4 March, submitting a 10-point constitutional reform bill to congress. This was rejected after failing to garner the support of the ruling party’s typically dependable congressional allies. Seemingly unfazed by this, Sheinbaum presented a ‘Plan B’ reform on 12 March – the day after the lower chamber rejected her original proposal. In this second bill, what was initially an ambitious restructuring of the political system narrowed into a more calculated and politically viable initiative, but one that still carries significant consequences for the balance of power ahead of the 2027 mid-term elections.

One of the fundamental aims of President Sheinbaum’s electoral reform is to reduce costs. According to Spanish newspaper El País, Mexico operates one of the most expensive systems of political financing in Latin America, with public funding for political parties amounting to roughly M$2.6bn (US$146m) in 2026 alone. This funding model, administered by the national electoral institute (INE), has produced powerful, well-funded party structures – particularly the ruling Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (Morena) and the main opposition parties, the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) and Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). However, it has also fuelled recurring criticism over costs and inequality. Both Sheinbaum and her predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018-2024), have railed against the costs of party financing and other electoral-related spending as wasteful and an affront to the ‘Republican Austerity’ they espouse.

It was against this backdrop that Sheinbaum unveiled her original reform proposal on 4 March. The initiative called for a 25% reduction in public funding for political parties and the elimination of ‘plurinominal’ seats, which are awarded by proportional representation from candidate lists drawn up by party leaders. These changes would have weakened smaller parties and curtailed the influence of party leadership over candidate selection. The government framed the move as both fiscally responsible and democratically corrective in a system widely criticised for its cost. However, the proposal faced immediate resistance, not just from the opposition but also from within the governing coalition.

Morena’s allies, the Partido Verde Ecologista de México (PVEM) and the Partido del Trabajo (PT) pushed back forcefully, as their reliance on public funding and plurinominal seats meant the reform threatened their existence. What was presented publicly as institutional efficiency was perceived internally as a redistribution of power favouring Morena. In a vote in the lower chamber on 11 March, only one of the PT’s 49 deputies and 12 of the PVEM’s 62 deputies backed the reform, which ultimately fell 75 votes short of the 334-vote threshold needed to pass.

Plan B

The speed of what followed was striking. On 12 March Sheinbaum presented her revised Plan B reform, submitting it to congress on 17 March. This signalled a strategic recalibration of the original reform. Stripped of its most contentious elements, the new proposal abandoned direct cuts to party financing and the elimination of plurinominal seats. Instead, it focused on advancing a series of austerity measures targeting institutional expenditure: caps on state legislative budgets at 0.7% of state spending, reductions in the size of municipal councils to a maximum of 15 councillors, and a mandated 15% budget cut for the federal senate over four years. Electoral officials, including those within the INE, would see their salaries capped below that of the president.

This redistribution of austerity – from parties to institutions – was key to restoring coalition viability. However, arguably the most consequential elements of Plan B lay elsewhere, in its boosting of citizen participation and reconfiguration of electoral timing and campaigning. The reform proposed allowing electoral issues such as party financing to be put to a referendum, opening the door to many of the changes from the original reform to be voted on by the public in the future. Morena’s popularity and mobilising ability, as well as its alleged use of electoral ‘cheat sheets’, has led to such public votes resulting in its desired outcome, as with the 2025 judicial elections [SSR-25-07].

Notably, the reform also proposed modifying article 35 of the constitution to allow the president to actively campaign during a presidential recall referendum. Additionally, it opened the door for that referendum to take place in the third year of a president’s term, meaning it could coincide with the mid-term elections in 2027, creating an unprecedented convergence of political events: federal legislative races, judicial elections, local contests, and a potential vote on the continuance of the president’s mandate. However, these changes were removed during discussions in the senate, when it became clear that the PT would only support the reform if the changes to the recall referendum were discarded. This allowed the reform to pass the senate on 25 March with 87 votes in favour to 41 against.

The implications of the changes would have been significant. By aligning the recall referendum with federal, local, and judicial elections, it would have created a ‘super election’, consolidating multiple democratic exercises into a single event. While the government presented this as a measure to reduce costs and voter fatigue, critics warned it could have magnified the presidency’s visibility and influence during the campaign period. Although Sheinbaum would have been barred from explicitly campaigning for her party’s candidates, her ability to highlight her administration’s achievements could have indirectly shaped voter behaviour across the electoral spectrum. Indeed, the PT argued that having the recall vote alongside the mid-term elections risked “distorting the democratic meaning” of both events.

The PT’s misgivings came despite the revised proposal having been initially welcomed within the governing coalition. By removing direct threats to party financing and representation, Morena thought it had secured the conditional support of its allies. However, the PT’s apparent change of heart, as well as it and the PVEM’s rejection of the original reform, indicated a potential shift within the ruling coalition. Rather than their support being a foregone conclusion, Morena’s allies have indicated they are prepared to stand their ground and negotiate if proposals are not to their liking. The PT’s leader and coordinator in the senate, Alberto Anaya, was clear that the disagreement did not indicate a weakening of the coalition, stating his party stood behind Sheinbaum and that the parties were united ahead of the mid-terms and 2030 presidential race. However, scrutiny will remain high on the dynamics within the alliance in future legislative processes.

The drive for electoral reform has illustrated both the ambitions and constraints of governance under Morena. The initial proposal addressed structural issues such as party financing, congressional composition, and nepotism, but its failure highlighted the challenges of enacting reforms within a coalition in which some parties are dependent on the targeted mechanisms. Plan B is more indirect, reshaping procedures while leaving core power distributions largely intact. This was designed to improve its chances of being approved but, ultimately, the initiative required further diluting. At the time of writing, the reform had passed to the lower chamber of deputies, with Morena hoping no further concessions would be necessary. Following approval in the lower chamber, the reform must be ratified by at least 17 state legislatures to be signed into law. (See our sister publication, LatinNews Daily, to track the reform’s progress).

Nepotism

The initial reform’s attempt to introduce anti-nepotism provisions – aimed at preventing immediate familial succession in elected office – also exposed deep fault lines in the ruling coalition. These measures threatened entrenched political networks, including among Morena’s own ranks and its allies. This aspect of the reform, initially slated to take effect in the 2027 elections, was postponed to 2030 following resistance linked to the family efforts of Morena’s coordinator in the lower chamber, Ricardo Monreal, to retain the Zacatecas governorship (currently in the hands of Monreal’s brother, David) and parallel dynastic ambitions by PVEM governor Ricardo Gallardo in San Luis Potosí, who is seeking to pass the office to his wife, Ruth González.

Plan B

The speed with which Plan B was presented, coming almost immediately after the collapse of the first proposal, has led some analysts to question whether the initial reform was ever intended to pass in its original form. The sequence has been viewed by some as part of a deliberate negotiating strategy: a maximalist opening bid, followed by a more moderate proposal calibrated to secure support.