Caribbean & Central America - April 2026

Power blackouts, a collapsing economy, and intense US political pressure all point to one thing: Cuba is likely to experience major change or even social upheaval this year. In this article, written at the end of March 2026, we look at four possible scenarios.

Many analysts have been mapping out future scenarios for Cuba. In March for example, the US-based Robert Lansing Institute published a report on the country which outlined three future options: one, “regime hardening” (which it considers most likely and will involve increased censorship and repression); two “controlled economic reform”; and three “elite driven political transition”. Newsweek magazine had its own big three, namely “controlled purge at the top”, “sudden rupture and move to democracy” and “slow decline, mass exodus”. Carlos Manuel Rodríguez Arechavaleta, a Cuban academic at Universidad Ibero-Americana in Mexico, has come up with five scenarios, including one labelled “total collapse and radical reconfiguration”. Other specialists have produced their own lists of options for the future.

A few comments about scenarios may be helpful. The first is that the sudden proliferation of lists of outcomes involving Cuba likely reflects a real sense that after decades of immobility, change is on the way. That seems to have been picked up by betting markets, with one of them, Polymarket, registering in late March a nearly 40% probability that “the Cuban regime falls in 2026”.

Scenarios, of course, even when assigned percentage probabilities, are not hard and fast predictions, but the hope is that they may create a useful framework for discussing the direction and dynamics of change. In this piece, written in late March 2026, we outline four major potential scenarios for Cuba in 2026 incorporating our own views and those of other analysts. They are first, regime survival, second regime reform, third the “Delcy model”, and fourth, regime collapse and transition to democracy.

Regime survival – 20%. It is necessary to consider the possibility that nothing will really change, even though we may say that scenario has a low probability. In this view, despite the economic meltdown, the Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC) will keep its tight authoritarian control on the country just as it did in the 1990s during the “special period in times of peace” after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some street protests have begun but they are small scale, local, and so far easily controllable. Critically, the regime appears to retain the loyalty of the army, the intelligence services, and the police.

Although some new personalities may yet emerge, Cuba lacks national opposition leaders comparable to people like María Corina Machado in Venezuela. José Daniel Ferrer and Berta Soler, among others, are prominent Cuban activists, but they have limited mobilising power. Mass emigration has also played a part in dulling opposition morale.  It is calculated that around 10% of the population has left the country in the last five years, with the young leaving the more elderly behind. It is true that the disastrous state of the economy will make “regime survival” difficult, but in this scenario Cuba may limp by, on a mixture of public suffering, humanitarian aid, and very limited help from ideological allies such as Russia and China. If US President Donald Trump becomes further bogged down in Middle East wars, there is a chance that Washington might dial down the pressure on Cuba which would also offer the regime something of a breathing space.

Regime-led economic reform – 25%: To most independent analysts one fact is increasingly clear: Cuba’s public sector-dominated economy is dysfunctional and requires major structural reform. Decades of tinkering and a limited opening to the private sector have completely failed to deliver economic recovery or to attract vitally needed investment. This is where the US, one of the world’s richest economies, lying only 90 miles from Cuba, comes into play. The US has the power to solve the Cuban economic crisis. President Trump has eased the oil embargo for Cuban private sector importers and spoken of US interest in acquiring ports and other infrastructure. Cuba also has a significant strategic value: Trump would for example probably demand the closure of Chinese electronic surveillance facilities on the island.

• US dependence

A US embrace, while solving the economic problem, will come at very high cost for Cuba’s existing leadership. In its history the island has been a subsidised client state of the US in the 1950s, of the Soviet Union until the early 1990s, and of Venezuela until 2026. Now it would come full circle to be back in the US orbit again. Ricardo Herrero of the US-based non-partisan Cuban Study Group spells it out. “The strategy here is to show the Cubans and the world that the only lifeline that Cuba has left is the United States… that means leave it clear that they have become a de facto dependency of the United States.”

The Delcy model – 40%. In the early days of January, the US used military force to “decapitate” the Venezuelan regime, capturing former president Nicolás Maduro (2013-2026) and putting his former Vice President, Delcy Rodríguez, in power instead. The Rodríguez government has offered the US privileged access to its oil and mineral reserves. While Rodríguez has reshuffled some ministerial positions and the military high command, the core elements of the authoritarian Venezuelan state remain unchanged. There has been some political liberalisation, but the main opposition remain outside the government and no commitment has been made to free elections or the re-introduction of democracy.

For some, what happened in Venezuela could be a model for what may happen this year in Cuba. Analyst James Bosworth says “by the end of 2026 the most likely scenario is that Cuba’s regime becomes ‘Delcy-like’ in its willingness to welcome and work with the Trump administration.” Bosworth says that unlike Venezuela this scenario will not require US “boots on the ground”. He adds “this is not regime change or democratisation”.

Under this scenario it is likely that President Miguel Díaz-Canel will be removed and replaced by someone better able to act as a “bridge” between the existing state and the new US hegemon. With US-Cuba talks going on in the background there is speculation over who might be that figure. It would likely have to be someone approved by Raúl Castro, the 94-year-old former president who holds no official government position but is still a key decision maker. Possibles include current Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz, a technocrat linked to Grupo de Administración Empresarial SA (Gaesa), the military holding company said to be responsible for 40% of Cuban GDP. Also mentioned is Vice President Salvador Valdés Mesa, as well as Raúl’s grandson, Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro.

Regime collapse and transition to democracy – 15%. For over 60 years many Cubans have campaigned to end the rule of the one-party state and in favour of democracy and free elections on the island. However, we consider this scenario to have a low probability of happening over the next 1-2 years. This is because neither of the two main players in discussions on the island’s immediate future (the Trump administration and the Cuban political leadership) seem to seek or value a democratic outcome. For strategic and economic reasons Trump may want a client state like he has attained in Venezuela; the Cuban leadership for its part is focused on survival. Other factors already mentioned – such as the lack of a united opposition - also play a part; in any case, Cuba’s crumbling infrastructure would make it difficult to run a modern electoral campaign. However, looking beyond the next 1-2 years, it is possible that the democratic option will gain support.

The options facing Cuba will likely change over coming months. There may some mixing and matching between the four scenarios outlined here. But on the basis of the information discussed there is a clear conclusion that the political and institutional status quo is unlikely to emerge unchanged from the current crisis.