Caribbean & Central America - April 2026

In theory Haiti should have an elected government by the end of the year, but the odds are stacked against this long-sought transition happening smoothly and on schedule, if at all. In theory, the first round of the electoral process should take place on 30 August, with a second round, if needed, on 6 December. However, the new United Nations-backed 5,550-strong Gang Suppression Force (GSF) has only been operating for six months and will not be up to full strength until September, according to William O’Neill, the UN’s independent expert on human rights in Haiti. And, in any case, force alone is unlikely to be sufficient to create the conditions for a successful election. As the Brussels-headquartered NGO International Crisis Group (ICG) argued in an important paper published in December 2025, dialogue with the gangs is also necessary, albeit better conducted from a position of strength than weakness.

The good news is that things are happening, with movement in the right direction prompting O’Neill to tell reporters on 16 March, following a 10-day visit to Haiti, “We’re in a place now where… I think it can turn around.” The key development is the replacement of the largely unsuccessful Kenya-led Multinational Security Mission (MSS), which was underfunded, never fully deployed (counting only 40% of its envisaged strength of 2,500), and lacking a robust enough mandate, by the GSF. The GSF is intended to build up to its full 5,500 strength by September, having carried out its first limited anti-gang operations in October last year. Unlike the MSS, the GSF will be part funded by the UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH), which will cover the GSF’s fuel, food, water, accommodation, medical services, operational infrastructure, and strategic communications. Nevertheless, there will be a requirement for voluntary contributions to cover the full costs of the GSF.

Another significant, although controversial, development has been the operation since March 2025 of a special taskforce launched by Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé to counter the advance of the gangs. The taskforce is controlled from the prime minister’s office, under the leadership of the police inspector general, Vladimir Paraison, and is supported by the private military company Vectus Global. Vectus has been using armed drones to attack the gangs in places where they are otherwise hard to engage. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), at least 1,243 people were killed by drone strikes in 141 operations between 1 March 2025 and 21 January 2026. The effect on the gangs has been significant, but at the cost of innocent civilian lives (60 out of the reported 1,243 deaths, according to HRW). There is also a question over the legality of using lethal force against the gangs. HRW says that the legal position is that the deliberate use of lethal force “is permissible only when strictly unavoidable in order to protect the life of any person. Any use of force… should be both necessary and proportionate”.

Other important developments have included the signing on 23 February of a National Pact for Stability and the Organisation of Elections. Among the key elements in the pact is the revival of the national commission for disarmament, dismantling and reintegration (NCDDR) of gang members, particularly underage members. Another important milestone on the road to elections was the registration in March of 320 political parties seeking to participate, subject to formal approval, in the upcoming elections.

It is against this background that the UN’s O’Neill told reporters that he thought the crisis in Haiti could be turned around because, in his words, “at the end of the day, [the gangs] are not that powerful”. This is a bold assertion, and one that is hard to reconcile with the history and current reality of the gangs in Haiti. In its December report, Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance, the ICG says that Viv Ansanm, the main gang alliance formed in 2023, has now achieved a level of military might “far beyond anything previously seen among Haitian gangs”. Experts estimate that Viv Ansanm could have up to 20,000 members, of which 3,000 are heavily armed. Another unwelcome surprise has been the resilience of the Viv Ansanm coalition, which many thought could not last. Now, according to the ICG, “rivalries once thought irreconcilable have faded”.

The ICG report also argues that the gangs clearly have political ambitions. As the ICG puts it, “Viv Ansanm has sought to transform its public profile from that of a predatory criminal force into that of an ideological crusader. Crime bosses say their mission is to protect the poorest Haitians from rapacious elites and colonial powers that historically have oppressed this black Caribbean nation.”

The provenance of Haiti’s gangs can be traced back to the network of hired thugs created in the 1950s by dictator Francois ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier (1957-1971) to help him win the 1957 presidential election, which later become the feared Tonton Macoute militia. Since then both politicians and the business elite have used gangs to further their cause, including in the late 1990s the Fanmi Lavalas political party of former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide (1991, 1993-1996, 2001-2004), which was backed by the forerunners of today’s main gangs. What has happened more recently, though, is that the gangs have transitioned from being the servants of the political and business elite to being the overlords, and now they want, if not direct power for themselves, at the very least subservient allies to be part of the next administration.

When former prime minister Ariel Henry (2021-2024) was blocked by gangs from returning to Haiti from a diplomatic trip in March 2024 and talks were held on forming a transitional government, Viv Ansanm’s leader Jimmy Chérizier commented: “as long as [the gangs] are not at the table, the country will never be at peace”. He followed this up during the short-lived premiership of Garry Conille (June-November 2024) with an offer to disarm in order to “facilitate national dialogue and put an end to the mafia war”. On 1 January 2025, the 221^st anniversary of Haiti’s independence, Chérizier announced that Viv Ansanm had created a political party. And in August 2025, he sent a letter to the UN Secretary General’s representative in Haiti, Carlos Ruiz Massieu, approving of his previous role in Colombia implementing a peace agreement with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc) guerrilla group and stressing that Haiti’s conflict could only be ended by dialogue. Now Chérizier puts out almost daily videos commenting on political affairs.

The ICG concludes that, provided the GSF can enable Haiti’s security forces to gain the upper hand, perhaps forcing increasing desertions from the gangs, then “conditions for fruitful talks might emerge”. If that happens, the report concludes, then “the government should stand ready to open channels of dialogue with gang leaders and propose a clear roadmap for progress”. The key prerequisite, however, is for the government to gain the upper hand.

All the while, the crisis continues to take its economic toll. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Haiti’s GDP contracted by 3.1% in 2025, its seventh consecutive year of economic contraction, and is projected to contract by a further 1.2% in 2026. Inflation in 2025 was 29.4%. Furthermore, according to a December 2025 IMF report, recent US policy changes – including the revocation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitians, the termination of textile and apparel trade preferences, a new tax on cash remittances, and the re-evaluation and realignment of foreign assistance, including from the US Agency for International Development (USAID) are expected to reduce remittances and exports. “These developments”, says the IMF, “together with the 207,000 deportations of Haitians from the Dominican Republic since January 2025, are likely to compound the impact of the security crisis on domestic production, deepen the humanitarian and economic crisis, and increase fiscal pressures.”