Caribbean & Central America - June 2026

Guatemala’s now former attorney general (AG) María Consuelo Porras (2018-2026) “politicized justice like no other AG had done in 41 years of democratic rule”. This was the assessment by former US ambassador to Guatemala (2008-2011), Stephen McFarland, of Porras, whose eight-year tenure ended on 17 May. Blacklisted by over 40 countries, Porras was the most visible face of the ‘pacto de corruptos’ network of institutional corruption which President Bernardo Arévalo, whose assumption of office in January 2024 represented a break with the discredited political establishment, had pledged to root out. With Arévalo’s anti-corruption agenda hitherto hobbled by Porras’ continuance in post, his appointment of Gabriel Estuardo García Luna, an adviser to the prosecutor general’s office, has been hailed by the president and pro-democracy groups as a turning point for the country, although challenges persist.

Porras was first appointed in May 2018 by former president Jimmy Morales (Frente de Convergencia Nacional, 2016-2020), who shuttered the United Nations (UN)-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (Cicig) in 2019 after 12 years in the country following its calls for him to be investigated over allegations of illegal campaign finance. She was then reappointed in 2022 by Morales’ successor, Alejandro Giammattei (Vamos, 2020-2024), who faced bribery allegations and was blacklisted soon after leaving office by the US and European Union (EU), among others, and who oversaw a major backsliding in democracy and the rule of law in Guatemala.

While concerns about Guatemala’s judiciary were hardly new, the particular role played by Porras’ office in the unravelling of democratic institutions, through what the EU and others have described as the “instrumentalisation of the justice system”, drew particular attention. For instance, a report released in March 2026 by a high-level international delegation, the International Mission of Jurists (IMJ) for Guatemala, cites available information which “consistently indicates” that Porras’ office “has acted in a systematic manner to protect interests linked to corruption networks and certain power groups, through the arbitrary and selective use of the criminal justice system”.

These practices included: “selective criminal prosecution for political or electoral purposes… the criminalisation of human rights defenders, justice operators, lawyers and Indigenous communities… and, on the other hand, in guaranteeing impunity through inaction, case dismissal, or lack of diligent investigation in cases involving powerful actors, as well as in cases where victims or complainants are justice operators, human rights defenders or Indigenous communities, which are quickly dismissed without proper investigation.”

Another report released last year by Argentine think tank Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales y Sociales (Inecip) and Guatemalan civil society platform Alianza por las Reformas, which evaluated the performance of the attorney general’s office under Porras, found that its efficacy dropped from 14.03% in 2018-2019 to just 6.44% in 2024-2025, with impunity in high-impact cases such as homicide, femicide, gender violence, corruption, and organised crime reaching 93.69% under her watch.

As regards attacks against justice officials, in its latest (January 2026) report on Guatemala, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) registered at least 1,375 attacks by State and private actors against 29 justice officials and lawyers in 2025 alone, and documented criminal proceedings against 66 justice officials brought by Porras’s office. Meanwhile the IMJ report tallies at least 54 justice operators out of 157 people involved in the defence of human rights in Guatemala who are currently in exile. Examples include Juan Francisco Sandoval, the former head of the AG’s special anti-impunity unit (Feci), which collaborated with Cicig, whose dismissal by Porras in July 2021 sparked outrage and resulted in international sanctions for the now-former attorney general [SSR-21-09]. Others include Porras’ predecessors as AG, Claudia Paz y Paz (2010-2014), Thelma Aldana (2014-2018), and high-profile judges such as Miguel Ángel Gálvez and Erika Aifán.

Having unsuccessfully attempted to overturn Arévalo’s remarkable electoral victory [WR-23-50], Porras has repeatedly sought to strip the president and his allies of immunity from prosecution so that they can be investigated for charges widely considered spurious. Examples include deputy energy and mining minister Luis Pacheco, a former leader of indigenous organisation 48 Cantones De Totonicapán, and the organisation’s former treasurer Héctor Chaclán, who both played a leading role in the massive protests which upheld Arévalo’s victory, who have been in prison on terrorism charges since April 2025 [SSR-25-06].

While Arévalo technically had the authority to remove the AG, a 2016 legal amendment stipulates that this may only take place in the event of a conviction in court, and institutions such as the constitutional court (CC) have obstructed the president in his efforts to cut short Porras’ term [WR-24-19], ultimately forcing him to wait it out until it ended on 17 May.

Despite initial fears that the process of naming Porras’ successor may be derailed, Arévalo’s 5 May appointment of García Luna, a professor at the private Universidad Rafael Landívar in Guatemala City who served as chair of the judicial disciplinary board between 2016-2023, has been received with optimism by civil-society groups. One local NGO, Movimiento pro Justicia (MPJ), said that his appointment was the choice for which it had been “hoping”, as García Luna was the “only one of the six candidates without blemishes or worrying links as far as it was known”.

• Process intact

President Arévalo’s appointment of García Luna was made from the second shortlist provided by the nominating committee after it was forced to resubmit the list following the acceptance by the newly elected CC of an appeal from Raúl Amílcar Falla Ovalle, of local far-right lobby group, Fundación Contra el Terrorismo (FCT). Like Porras and Giammattei, Falla has previously been blacklisted by the US and is aligned with the ‘pacto’. The revised shortlist omitted one of the candidates tipped to be picked by Arévalo – Zoila Tatiana Morales Valdizón, and the CC’s decision to accept the appeal was condemned by the OAS and EU. The CC’s subsequent decision announced on 12 May to reject various appeals against García Luna, including one from FCT, does, however, provide one source of hope for the president.

In an interview with Salvadorean investigative digital media outlet Focos TV, circulated on 8 May, former Feci head Sandoval, who described the change at the top of the AG as an “end to one of the darkest cycles for Guatemalan justice”, noted that García Luna had taken “brave decisions” while serving as chair of the judicial disciplinary board, while Cicig was in force, sanctioning judges linked to corruption and backing judges on so-called high-risk courts who have since been forced to flee the country. García Luna’s appointment has also been welcomed by members of the international community, including the Organization of American States (OAS) and EU, which both sent observer missions to oversee the appointment process of the AG as well as other key institutions up for renewal this year.

Other institutions at play

García Luna’s appointment undoubtedly represents a major boost for Arévalo’s anti-corruption efforts. How far he is now able to effect change remains uncertain, however, amid a wider institutional reset. The attorney general’s office is one of five key institutions up for renewal this year, along with the five-member electoral court (TSE); five-member CC; the rectorship of the Universidad de San Carlos (Usac), Guatemala’s only public university; and the comptroller general’s office (CGC). A 20 January piece by US think tank Atlantic Council describes these appointment processes as Guatemala’s “most consequential institutional reset since its return to democracy in 1986”.

With the CGC appointment still pending, in March new members were picked for both the TSE and CC. Elections to select the new Usac rector took place in April. These appointments have delivered mixed results for Arévalo in terms of rooting out those aligned with the ‘pacto’. As regards the TSE, whose members serve six-year terms and will be responsible for organising the 2027 and 2031 elections, MPJ hailed the exclusion of some of the more dubious candidates. Appointees included figures such as then-TSE secretary general, Mario Velásquez Pérez, who pro-democracy groups note was instrumental in defending ballot boxes amid raids on the TSE ordered by Porras amid her efforts to reverse Arévalo’s election victory [WR-23-40].

However, the new TSE also includes Roberto Morales Gómez, who, according to local media such as national daily La Hora, has ties to Sergio Roberto López Villatoro, a well-known businessman who is reportedly an influential behind-the-scenes figure in local politics, and was previously married to Zury Ríos, the daughter of late dictator Efraín Ríos Montt (1982-1983), whose 2019 presidential bid was struck down.

The appointment of the new CC, which sits for six years, similarly drew a mixed response from pro-democracy groups. These welcomed the appointment of Astrid Lemus, a former supreme court justice (1994-1999), and Anabella Morfín, a labour minister under former president Ramiro de León Carpio (1993-1996), who founded pro-democracy NGO Centro para la Defensa de la Constitución (Cedecon). Their three colleagues, however, were less well received. These notably include Zury Ríos’ 2019 running mate Roberto Molina Barreto, one of the judges to overturn Ríos Montt’s conviction for genocide and crimes against humanity in 2013.

Meanwhile the re-election on 8 April of Walter Mazariegos, Usac’s controversial rector, for a further four-year term, also dealt a blow to President Arévalo. With the process condemned by the OAS and EU observer missions due to irregularities, Mazariegos, who was blacklisted in 2023 by the US following his 2022 appointment for accepting the position following a “fraudulent selection process”, has been linked to the pacto de corruptos. The appointment is also crucial given Usac’s involvement in various institutional processes. An EU statement on the election process highlights that, via its superior university council (CSU), Usac has direct influence in over 70 state institutions. Yet Mazariegos’ future remains uncertain after a court authorised an appeal against his appointment, effectively suspending it on a provisional basis.

Appointment processes

In Guatemala only the constitutional court (CC) is elected directly, with the executive, legislature, supreme court (CSJ), bar association (Cang), and rector of the Universidad de San Carlos (Usac) each selecting a member. The supreme electoral court (TSE), attorney general (AG), and comptroller general (CGC) are selected from shortlists presented by nominating committees (temporary bodies comprising representatives from the judiciary, legal sector, and academia). The president makes the final decision with regard to the AG while in the case of the TSE and CGC, it is congress which has the ultimate say.

Other figures impeached in Honduras

Since Johel Zelaya’s impeachment, other officials aligned with the now-opposition Partido Libertad y Refundación (Libre) have met a similar fate. On 16 April the legislature voted to impeach Marlon Ochoa, a member of the national electoral council (CNE), Mario Morazán, a member of the electoral justice tribunal (TJE), and two TJE alternates, Lourdes Maribel Mejía and Gabriel Gutiérrez Peralta. Meanwhile on 25 March supreme court (CSJ) president Rebeca Ráquel Obando, a Libre pick, resigned the court’s presidency (although remains on the court) following the launch of impeachment proceedings against her.

Attorney general ousted in Honduras

The lengthy standoff between Arévalo and Porras stands in contrast with the situation in Honduras. There, President Nasry Asfura, of the conservative Partido Nacional (PN), who took office at the end of January, used the PN’s newfound strong legislative presence to impeach the attorney general Johel Zelaya (2023-2026), who is aligned with now opposition leftist Partido Libertad y Refundación (Libre), just two months after Asfura took office. Zelaya was accused of acting against the constitution, negligence, and incompetence, including in actions that he took during the controversial 2025 electoral process.

Zelaya’s removal was a first for Honduras since the impeachment process was codified in 2013 legislation. Earlier attempts to impeach top officials fell short of the requisite two-thirds majority in the 128-member unicameral legislature under previous congresses. While the PN secured 49 seats in the November election, it has strung together a loose legislative alliance with the main opposition Partido Liberal (PL), which won 41 seats, supplying it with the necessary threshold.

With other Libre allies since targeted, a 26 March statement by US-based human rights lobby group Washington Office on Latin America (Wola), along with 18 other civil society organisations, expressed “concerns over the improper use of impeachment proceedings” against justice and electoral officials in Honduras, warning that these are being carried out “in a manner inconsistent with international human rights standards and in a context of high institutional polarization following the recent change in government”.