Andean Group - June 2026

The Caribbean has been a central diplomatic priority of Venezuela’s President Delcy Rodríguez since she took office in early January. Her first two trips abroad as president were to Barbados and Grenada, and the third trip, to the Netherlands, was to testify in a territorial dispute with Guyana – a key player in the Caribbean Community (Caricom). A visit to Caracas by the foreign minister of Suriname swiftly followed. The Essequibo dispute with Guyana is undoubtedly a factor in Rodríguez’s efforts to shore up Venezuela’s Caribbean ties. Other motivations are also at play, however. Lacking widespread diplomatic support in the region, Rodríguez will be hoping to rebuild some of the Caribbean alliances that were forged by her predecessors Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) and, to a lesser extent, Nicolás Maduro (2013-2026), and which for a while made the Caribbean a key bastion of support for Venezuela’s ruling Chavismo movement.

Commentary on Venezuela’s diplomatic realignment following the US capture of Maduro on 3 January has understandably focused on President Rodríguez’s swift embrace of Washington. The burgeoning US-Venezuela relationship, and the diminished importance of Venezuela’s relations with Russia, China, and Iran, have overshadowed a concerted effort by the Rodríguez administration to build a web of support in the Caribbean.

Despite being minor players on the global stage, Caribbean countries offer important diplomatic rewards for Caracas. From 2005-2019 the PetroCaribe soft diplomacy scheme saw Venezuela supply subsidised oil to allied Caribbean governments, turning the region into a pillar of support for Chávez and, until his descent into open authoritarianism, Maduro.

The Venezuela-led regional left-wing bloc Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Alba) still consists primarily of Caribbean islands, which account for seven of Alba’s nine members – Antigua and Barbuda, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, and St Vincent and the Grenadines.

• Cuba

  Cuba has been notably absent from President Rodríguez’s Caribbean engagements. Under US pressure she has dropped Venezuela’s longstanding support for Havana by ending oil shipments to the island. Aside from reportedly saying on 15 January that “we have a right to have diplomatic relations with China, with Russia, with Iran, with Cuba,” and leading a memorial service for the 32 Cuban bodyguards who were killed attempting to repel the US raid to seize Maduro, Rodríguez has largely avoided mentioning Cuba in her public comments.

Caricom remains an important target market for Venezuela’s oil sector, and energy cooperation has been central to Rodríguez’s conversations with Caribbean leaders. At the same time, stronger relationships with Caribbean nations could help Venezuela in votes in multilateral organisations, at a time when, with the exception of Colombia’s outgoing President Gustavo Petro, Latin American leaders have been slow to engage with Rodríguez.

Rodríguez’s 27 April visit to Barbados for talks with Prime Minister Mia Mottley was largely focused on energy issues. A joint statement emphasised both governments’ “shared interest in strengthening energy cooperation to enhance energy security and affordability” and announced plans to “invest jointly in oil and gas fields to boost production” and “explore cooperation opportunities in renewable energy”. Rodríguez and Mottley also agreed to advance cooperation in other areas, including food security, fisheries, tourism, and aerial and maritime transport connections.

This followed a 9 April visit by Rodríguez to Grenada for a meeting with Prime Minister Dickon Mitchell. In a social media post, Mitchell’s office said that Rodríguez’s visit marked “an important moment of engagement and dialogue” between the two countries and “provided an opportunity to strengthen diplomatic ties, explore areas of mutual interest, and continue fostering partnerships that support development and cooperation”.

The dispute over the Essequibo region, which comprises around two-thirds of Guyana’s internationally recognised landmass but is claimed by Venezuela, is a key sub-plot in Rodríguez’s Caribbean overtures, even if it did not feature in official statements during her visits to Barbados and Grenada. Caricom backed Guyana when Maduro dramatically ramped up tensions over the issue in 2023 [SSR-24-01], although Rodríguez will be hoping to soften the bloc’s support for Georgetown. Tensions resurfaced following Rodríguez’s trip to Barbados, where she wore a brooch showing the Essequibo as part of Venezuela.

In response, Guyana’s President Irfaan Ali issued a veiled criticism of Mottley and Mitchell’s engagement with Rodríguez. In a 28 April letter to the chair of Caricom, St Kitts and Nevis’ Prime Minister Terrance Drew, he wrote that although “Guyana fully respects the sovereign right of Caricom member states to conduct bilateral relations with all partners… the use of Caricom engagements to project or promote a territorial claim against a member state risks being interpreted as acquiescence or tolerance”. He added that “Caricom’s principled support for Guyana must be reflected not only in declarations, but also in the context and conduct of official engagements”.

The Essequibo dispute is approaching some form of resolution following the conclusion of oral proceedings at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. Rodríguez travelled to the Dutch city on 11 May to present Venezuela’s closing arguments in the case, although she insisted that her country never consented to submitting the dispute to the ICJ’s jurisdiction, raising doubts over whether Venezuela will respect an adverse verdict. She told the court that “for us, the Guayana Esequiba [as the Essequibo is known in Venezuela] is not reduced to mere economic and commercial interests” but “it forms part of our inalienable historical legacy.” Venezuela has long rejected an 1899 arbitration agreement which awarded the Essequibo to the UK (the colonial power in Guyana until 1966) and instead points to a 1966 agreement with London which set out a path for the dispute to be renegotiated.

Presenting Guyana’s closing arguments, the country’s Attorney General Mohabir Anil Nandlall countered that “generations of Guyanese… have grown up under the long and threatening shadow cast by Venezuela’s claim to nearly three quarters of our country”. He said that if Guyana were to lose the Essequibo, “the country as we know it would cease to exist”.

On 16 May Rodríguez received a visit from Melvin Bouva, the foreign minister of Suriname, which has its own territorial dispute with Guyana over the 15,600km² Tigri region, which is controlled by Guyana. Venezuela’s Foreign Minister Yván Gil said that the Surinamese delegation had discussed “all areas of cooperation”, including energy, aerial and maritime transport, agriculture, fishing, and tourism. He said that “in the coming weeks” a roadmap would be established towards creating a bilateral commission to formalise agreements in these areas. Bouva, meanwhile, said that Suriname and Venezuela were heading towards an “advanced relationship”, in remarks translated by Venezuela’s state television channel VTV.

Trinidad and Tobago tensions

Relations between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago remain icy despite the potential for the mutually beneficial development of the offshore Dragon gasfield, which lies between the two countries. Maduro suspended energy cooperation in October 2025 in response to the vocal support of Trinidad’s Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar for US military strikes on alleged Venezuelan drug trafficking boats, foiling hopes that production could soon begin on the project, which is run by British firm Shell and Trinidad’s National Gas Company (NGC). There has been no sign of a rapprochement between the two governments since Rodríguez replaced Maduro in January.

Drug trafficking expected to continue unabated

In a 25 February report, specialist website Insight Crime said it expects drug trafficking out of Venezuela to “continue unfettered” under Rodríguez. Insight Crime highlighted record levels of cocaine production in neighbouring Colombia; the presence of Colombian guerrilla group Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) in at least eight of Venezuela’s 24 states, where it is heavily involved in the drug trade; the fact that Europe has overtaken the US as the principal cocaine market, raising Venezuela’s importance as a trafficking hub; the emergence of Venezuela as a cocaine-producing nation with “industrial-sized” coca fields and processing laboratories; the presence of an established drug smuggling infrastructure in Venezuela, including the presence of international buyers; and the fact that all organs of the Venezuelan state have been penetrated by corruption.