Caribbean & Central America - September 2026

From 16-19 August, Organization of American States (OAS) Secretary General Albert Ramdin and Caribbean Community (Caricom) Secretary General Carla Barnett led a high-level delegation to Haiti to discuss, inter alia, improving security and preparations for Haiti’s first general elections since 2016, which are due to be held on 13 December. Just days after the conclusion of the visit, in a reminder of how far Haiti is from establishing a secure environment for elections, at least 47 people were killed in a gang attack on Kenscoff in the hills above the capital Port-au-Prince. Nevertheless, despite the stark security environment, openly expressed concerns over the electoral timetable, and uncertain political outlook, it is possible that the recent refocusing of economic development away from Port-au-Prince, as exemplified by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)’s Medium-Term Recovery and Development Plan for 2025-2030, holds more promise than is yet being recognised.

The 23-24 August violence in Kenscoff was attributed to the powerful Viv Ansanm coalition of gangs, whose most prominent public figure is Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier, and the attack was immediately seen as a sign of increasing gang ambitions. Control of Kenscoff would give Viv Ansanm another access route to the strategic location of Pétion-Ville where the government is relocating ministries as one of the last areas of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area not under gang control. There were earlier attacks on Kenscoff between 4 and 9 July.

The day after the Kenscoff attack, the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (Binuh) released its latest quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti which counted at least 1,408 people killed and 656 wounded during the second quarter of the year. An accompanying UN News article stated that the number of casualties was actually 14% down on the previous quarter, but noted that this “modest decline” masked “starkly different realities across the country”, and cautioned that the gangs “continued to push into new territory”. The report suggested that there was evidence that in some cases security operations have “displaced violence rather than suppressed it”.

The struggle to reestablish security is being led by the UN-backed Gang Suppression Force (GSF), which has replaced the largely unsuccessful Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission which was underfunded and never deployed more than 40% of its envisaged 2,500 strength. The GSF had around 1,000 personnel on the ground as of June, according to reports cited by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The stated aim was to have 2,000-2,500 personnel deployed by the end of August with the full deployment of 5,500 in October.

However, on 1 September, GSF spokesperson Igor Rugwiza said that logistical constraints meant that the force would not be fully deployed by October. This admission followed comments at an emergency UNSC meeting on 28 August to discuss the Kenscoff attack during which Panama’s representative warned that the election schedule seems “not to be realistic”.

Although it might still be too early to write off the efforts of the GSF and its supporting actors, such as the private US military company Vectus Global (headed by Blackwater founder Erik Prince), to establish sufficient security by December to hold elections, the possibility of failure, or at least partial failure, does keep the prospect of negotiations with the gangs alive. Certainly, some form of negotiations with the gangs, in conjunction with a strong security strategy, are viewed as a necessity by the Brussels-based NGO International Crisis Group (ICG) [SSR-26-04].

As far back as March 2024, when former prime minister Ariel Henry (2021-2024) was blocked by gangs from returning from an overseas trip, Jimmy Chérizier commented: “As long as [the gangs] are not at the table, the country will never be at peace”. And on 1 January 2025, the 221^st anniversary of Haiti’s independence, Chérizier announced that Viv Ansanm had created a political party, although it wasn’t one of the parties subsequently approved by the electoral council for the 2026 elections.

Then, in August 2025, Chérizier sent a letter to the UN Secretary General’s representative in Haiti, Carlos Ruiz Massieu, approving the Colombian model of talking to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc) guerrilla movement and stressing that Haiti’s crisis could only be solved by dialogue (from 2019-2025 Ruiz oversaw the implementation of the 2016 peace accords with the Farc).

In a December 2025 report, the ICG concluded that if the GSF begins to gain the upper hand, then “conditions for fruitful talks might emerge”, and that if that did happen then “the government should stand ready to open channels of dialogue with gang leaders and propose a clear roadmap for progress”.

It would seem certain that if Viv Ansanm were to enter into talks with the government that it would demand, at the very least, an amnesty and protection from prosecution. This poses two difficulties. The first is that Viv Ansanm is formally under UN Security Council sanctions and is listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US. Secondly, public opinion would seem to be strongly against this.

An opinion poll commissioned by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), a British foreign policy think tank, which was conducted in May and published in full on 25 August, found that 66.9% of respondents opposed amnesties for gang members, with 64.5% supporting prison time for gang leaders and members. An even more significant 83.4% opposed a role in government for gang leaders and members.

A smaller survey of highly violence-affected Haitians conducted by the Institute for Research and Action for Peace from October-December 2025 also found strong resistance to accommodation with the gangs. When asked directly about dialogue, only 36% were in favour, with 46% opposed, while 60% opposed reduced sentences in return for collaboration.

The continuing security crisis in Port-au-Prince and its surrounding areas has had adverse consequences for the World Bank’s Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment (RCIA) programme for Haiti, which focuses on the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and Artibonite department. It was launched in May 2024 “to develop an investment plan to support the recovery of Port-au-Prince”, but it was substantially revised a year later because of the continuing security difficulties in its focus areas.

The original plan had four priority ‘axes’: economic recovery, diversification, and institutional strengthening; rehabilitation of infrastructure; promotion of access to public services, social inclusion, and food security; and the rule of law. The revised plan, covering 2026-2027, retained the same geographical focus and the same four priority axes, but it was more realistic about what was implementable. The number of programmes deemed to be implementable by mid-2027 was dropped from 149 to 107.

With regard to the first of the RCIA’s priority axes, economic recovery, the revised plan deemed that critical support for the private sector could continue via the World Bank’s Private Sector Jobs and Economic Transformation (PSJET) line of credit, which could support vandalised firms in Port-au-Prince, but that “the risks of extortion and violence affecting loan recipients and procurement may limit the investment amounts that can potentially be disbursed”. Of the original 18 investment programmes, 13 were deemed implementable in the revised schedule.

For priority Axis 2, the rehabilitation of infrastructure, this could only occur in areas not affected by insecurity, and only nine out of the original 29 targeted infrastructure plans were now deemed to be implementable “mostly due to the difficulties in accessing and securing project sites, ensuring timely procurement, and monitoring activities”.

For priority Axis 3, the revised programme said “programs related to food security and shock response mechanisms remain possible and essential to implement”. Of the 31 original programmes, 20 were deemed to be implementable.

And for priority Axis 4, the rule of law, the revised programme said “interventions… remain largely implementable and a critical priority”. Of the original 71 programmes, 65 were retained.

The IDB’s Recovery and Development plan has a very different focus to that of the RCIA. Its aim is to bolster Haiti’s economy “through private-sector-led growth” that prioritises regional investment. “A key focus of the plan”, according to the IDB, is “to identify and prioritise critical investments for regions outside Port-au-Prince, establishing a roadmap for medium-term development and promoting alternative economic hubs to strengthen growth and drive sustainable development”.

The first regional focus for the IDB plan, which was officially launched in April 2025, was identified as the Grand Nord (encompassing the departments of Nord, Nord-Est, and Nord-Ouest), and this was formally validated in June 2026 following consultations with local government, business, and civil society representatives. At a national investment forum held on 29 June, the economy and finance ministry presented a plan with implementation costs of US$2.3-2.8bn, to be financed through a combination of Haiti government resources, multilateral development finance, public-private partnerships, and private investment.

Among the projects identified by the plan are the modernisation of the Cap-Haïtien International Airport; expansion of the Cap-Haïtien port; the rehabilitation of the port of Port-de-Paix; and the improvement of a number of key roads. The aim is to develop the corridor linking Cap-Haïtien with Ouanaminthe on the Dominican Republic border so that it becomes a vibrant trade and industrial corridor mostly independent of Port-au-Prince, with the Caracol industrial park playing a key role. Agriculture and tourism will also play an important part. The plan envisages a Northern Corridor Development Council to help coordinate projects and monitor implementation.

The plan is intended next to extend to the Grand Sud (covering the departments of Sud, Grand’Anse, Nippes, and Sud-Est), where the emphasis will be on agriculture, tourism, and fisheries, with key improvements planned for the Antoine-Simon airport in Les Cayes and main roads.

Although a formal plan is yet to be validated, investments in the Grand Sud are already being brought forward. For instance, on 24 June the IDB approved US$69m in grant financing to modernise Antoine-Simon airport and upgrade sections of the RN2 highway, which connects Les Cayes with the capital.

In another, albeit small, indication of the way in which there is an increasing focus away from Port-au-Prince among planners and lenders, on 18 August the International Fund for Agricultural Development (Ifad) reported on how it is helping to develop coastal communities in Haiti with blue economy investment projects. Along the northern coast on the Bay of Fort-Liberté, Ifad is helping small-scale fish vendors develop profitable businesses. Ifad says that nearly 23,000 participants have benefited from the US$26.6m Inclusive Blue Economy Project (I-BE) which it launched in Haiti in 2022, and it says that by 2028 closer to five times that number will have benefited.

At the end of his 16-19 August visit to Haiti, OAS Secretary General Ramdin said that he “soon” intended to organise a delegation of business leaders to Haiti to discuss investment projects. He said the mission would be organised jointly with the Latin American Business Council (CEAL, in the Spanish acronym). However, Ramdin gave few details of the proposed mission in his 3 September report to the OAS Permanent Council although he did confirm that the OAS would promote a private-sector delegation to explore investment opportunities and promote employment opportunities, particularly for young people. No date was mentioned, or details of the private-sector businesses likely to participate, or target projects.

On the face of it, the prospects do not look encouraging. The GSF has yet to make any significant progress in restoring order in Port-au-Prince and Artibonite, and even if it does, and elections are successfully held, there is no guarantee that economic recovery will follow at any great pace. In its May 2026 report, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) noted that “economic conditions remain dire”, and it predicted that following seven consecutive years of GDP contraction there will be another retreat of -1.7% in the current fiscal year.

The IMF also noted unhelpful US policy on preferential access for the apparel industry. The February 2026 extension of the HOPE/HELP trade programmes that had expired in September 2025 was then cancelled out by the US administration’s 20 February decision to impose a 10% import surcharge. The apparel and textile industry accounted for 90% of Haiti’s goods exports from 2023-2025, according to the IMF.

The best that the IMF can offer with regard to economic recovery is that medium-term real GDP growth rates will “gradually converge to potential” which it puts at a pedestrian 1.5% per annum. Inflation, in the meantime, is expected to end FY2026 at 22.0%. Near-term downside risks include a further deterioration in security conditions, higher global oil prices, and immigration policies that could impact the flow of remittances. In adverse conditions, the IMF can see a contraction of 2.6% in FY2026 and -0.6% in FY2027.

Nevertheless, the prospects of an OAS/CEAL business delegation visit to Haiti may not be as forlorn as they might seem at first glance. If insecurity is the principal immediate obstacle to investment, then the focus of the IDB’s Recovery and Development plan away from Port-au-Prince will make good sense to would-be investors. It seeks to ensure that recovery can begin in parallel with the renewed efforts to restore order in Port-au-Prince and not await a declaration of victory.