Caribbean & Central America - October 2026

Nicaraguan lawmakers passed a raft of constitutional reforms on 1 September, designed to further cement the power of authoritarian co-presidents Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo, and secure a dynastic succession, drawing widespread international criticism.

The reform package, which requires approval in a second reading scheduled for 18 January 2027, amends more than a dozen articles of the constitution. Key changes include new provisions which exclude from elections those designated by the regime to be “coup plotters” and “traitors to the homeland” (terms employed by the Ortega-Murillo government to criminalise dissent), and for electoral authorities to cancel the legal status of any party found to be accepting foreign funding. Then there is the amendment to Article 12, which declares that no foreign law or resolution has validity or jurisdiction in Nicaragua, which appears to be an attempt to head off legal action by the US or the Organization of American States (OAS). Another is the extension of presidential and other senior office terms from six to seven years, which will be applied retroactively. This pushes the next scheduled election to 2028, as well as granting high-ranking members of the police and military another year in their posts. 

These changes advance attempts by co-presidents Ortega, 80, and his wife Murillo, 75, to secure a dynastic succession following years of deepening political repression and the progressive weakening of other branches of power. Murillo has been taking on greater responsibility and securing her own power base as Ortega’s health has been rumoured to be in decline in recent years, and the couple have also been positioning their son Laureano Ortega Murillo as their eventual successor. The reforms not only delay a possible electoral challenge for another year, they also secure the regime’s relationship with the current top brass in the security forces, which are a vital part of its repressive apparatus.

This appears to be the latest stage in the government’s careful management of relations with the security forces in order to maintain their loyalty. Notably, army commander General Julio César Avilés, who has been in the post since 2010, has spoken out in support of the reform. Avilés has become increasingly aligned with the regime in recent years, at the same time as a series of extensions to his term have been agreed, with the latest taking effect in February 2025, that would see him lead the armed forces for a total 22 years. Beyond the general himself, the army pension fund Instituto de Previsión Social Militar has become a significant business group with holdings in a range of economic sectors. A piece published on 15 September by exiled independent media La Prensa cites experts as saying that no audit has been made public since 1995, meaning there is little public information available on its activities or how its funds are distributed, but it seems likely that there are financial incentives for at least a certain number of senior officers to remain loyal to the regime.

As a result, the logic behind the reforms is easy to trace. However, the overall effect on the regime’s survival chances is less easy to measure. The reforms have elicited a strong reaction from the international community after years of limited attempts to halt Nicaragua’s slide into authoritarianism, and evidence of the regime’s abuses are increasingly well-documented and more difficult to ignore.

For example, in August and September the Office of the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and UN Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua (GHREN) respectively published damning reports detailing the “near-total dismantling of democracy in Nicaragua” as well as how the regime has “weaponized enforced disappearance to crush dissent and control the population.” There have been 161 forced disappearances since 2018 and 29 of those people are still missing, according to the GHREN. It also found that eight people who had been detained on political grounds had died in state custody in that time, including Ortega’s own brother Humberto Ortega, a former army commander who died in September 2024 under house arrest after the co-president effectively accused him of treason. Another emblematic case highlighted by the GHREN is that of Brooklyn Rivera, a community leader from the Miskito indigenous community, who was “held arbitrarily for nearly three years”, and died in May 2026. 

There is also growing evidence that the Ortega-Murillo government has extended its repressive apparatus outside Nicaragua’s borders, with its security forces allegedly involved in the June 2025 shooting of former army major turned political dissident Roberto Samcam in Costa Rica [SSR-25-08]. There have also been attacks on Nicaraguan dissidents living in exile in Costa Rica, including Joao Maldonado who survived two shootings in 2021 and in 2024, and more recently Reinaldo Picado Miranda, a former Contra who was shot three times on 14 September. 

These attacks, combined with deepening repression and a series of reforms that have concentrated power in the ruling couple’s hands, have resulted in growing attention from the US, which has become increasingly active in pursuing dominance in the Western Hemisphere during President Donald Trump’s second term. On 2 September Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that “dictatorships that deny the unalienable rights of their citizens should not enjoy the same economic or political benefits as governments committed to defending hemispheric peace and security,” in a statement responding to the reforms.

Concerns have been growing in Washington around Nicaragua’s rapidly strengthening relationship with China: there are two competing bills in congress calling for more sanctions on Managua; and in mid-September the US House Appropriations Committee directed Rubio to submit a report on US efforts to support a democratic transition in Nicaragua within 90 days of the enactment of the appropriations bill. The situation in Nicaragua has also been drawing attention in the diplomatic community. On 4 August 10 OAS member states held a meeting of consultation of regional foreign ministers – an extraordinary emergency mechanism reserved for threats to hemispheric peace and security. This was the first time the mechanism had been invoked to discuss a political crisis in Nicaragua since 1978, during the country’s revolution [SSR-26-09]. A further such meeting has been convened for 2 October.

However, the delay in acting against the regime increases the chances that it will survive even if international pressure increases. Ortega and Murillo have had years to deepen their control, hone their repressive apparatus and secure the loyalty of the security forces, as well as to deepen relationships with allies such as China and Russia. The co-presidents are apparently confident enough in the structure that they have built that they are willing to provoke the US and its allies by declaring that there will be no more elections, receiving rhetoric in return to this point.

Possible actions?

There are several vulnerabilities that remain, most importantly the possibility that the US could wreck Nicaragua’s economy by suspending the country’s membership of the Dominican Republic-Central America-US Free Trade Agreement (Cafta-DR) trade deal, but it is far from certain that Washington will risk setting off a wave of migration that could destabilise Central America more widely. The White House also has other pressing foreign policy priorities, not least the grinding conflict in the Middle East and the ongoing management of Venezuela’s new regime, and may be reluctant to take on another thorny problem as US mid-term elections approach. As a result Ortega and Murillo may feel that they are safe to continue on their current path, and continued delays will likely make it more difficult to dislodge the regime at a later date.