Caribbean & Central America - February 2011 (ISSN 1741-4458)

After weeks of impasse; much speculation and mounting international pressure, the provisional electoral court (CEP) announced its final results from the 28 November presidential vote this month. In line with the recommendations of the Organization of American States' (OAS) electoral report, the CEP reversed its preliminary results to give pop singer Michel Martelly ('Sweet Micky'), rather than Jude Célestin of President René Préval's ruling Inité, a place in the run-off to face Mirlande Manigat. The limited basis for the OAS conclusions and the perceived foreign interference, however, may raise questions over the domestic legitimacy of the eventual winner. Meanwhile the surprise reappearance of former dictator Jean Claude 'Baby Doc' Duvalier after 25 years in exile and the possible return of another exiled leader, the populist Jean-Betrand Aristide, adds further intrigue and uncertainty ahead of the 20 March second round.

The preliminary results released in December 2010 had been widely rejected by partial and impartial observers alike given the widespread evidence of fraud [RC-10-12]. This prompted Préval to call in an expert OAS mission to review the process, the findings of which were released officially on 18 January, having been leaked to the press days earlier [RC-11-01]. The main problem with the OAS report, however, was its recommendation that the CEP should simply reverse the placement of the second and third candidates without a full recount given that the study was based on a sample of 16.9% of ballots cast and accepted that irregularities took place but granted Martelly an even slimmer lead over Célestin than the CEP had granted Célestin over Martelly (0.3% vs. 0.64%). Without providing further explanation, the OAS claimed that a complete recount was not a “feasible option" as the “electoral law of Haiti does not have explicit provisions to conduct a physical recount of ballots". It also dismissed calls for a new election as it would “involve more contests and candidacies than the evidence warranted".

Initially the CEP, which is hand-picked by Préval, stood firm, claiming that the recommendation would be “taken into consideration in the framework of the treatment of legal complaints". However, this ultimately appeared untenable in the face of mounting international pressure, in particular from the US. On 21 January, the US ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, said that “sustained support from the international community, including the US, requires a credible process." The same day, the US State Department announced it was revoking visas for a dozen officials linked to Préval. This led the Inité to issue a communiqué four days later which stated that while Célestin had “earned the necessary number of votes to advance to the second round",   it agreed to see him “withdraw his candidacy" in “accordance with the politics of stability" and the threat of an “embargo" from the international community. Célestin's intransigence then prompted a one day visit to Haiti (on 30 January) by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who met Préval and the three presidential candidates. While she denied that international aid was contingent on the OAS recommendations being heeded, she was clear that she wanted to see them “acted upon". On 3 February, without providing any percentages, absolute voting figures or an explanation for its decision, the CEP followed suit.

With the Manigat-Martelly run-off now scheduled for 20 March, the CEP's ultimate willingness to toe the international line has allowed for a resolution of another problem: the question of what would happen beyond 7 February, the end of Préval's constitutional mandate. While the opposition had called for a transitional government, Préval had long rejected this idea, invoking instead a controversial ruling by parliament the previous year, allowing him to remain in power until 14 May [RC-10-05]. The international community has accepted this solution although Edmond Mulet, the civilian head of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (Minustah), did remark to the local press that “if the OAS's technical recommendations had not been applied_the political situation would have been different".

Returning from exile
The intrigue surrounding the elections has been exacerbated by the surprise re-emergence on the political scene of two highly divisive figures from Haiti's past. On 16 January, ex-dictator Jean Claude 'Baby Doc' Duvalier (1971-1986) returned to Port-au-Prince from France after 25 years in exile, a move which appears to have paved the way for another exiled former leader, Jean-Betrand Aristide (1991, 1994-1996, 2001-2004), to follow suit.
    The reappearance of Duvalier, who stands accused of corruption and human rights violations, perplexed local and foreign commentators alike. While Duvalier insisted that his return, facilitated through an expired diplomatic passport, owed to a desire to “help" Haiti, theories about his motivation ranged from the possibility that Préval had invited him back (to distract from the political crisis) to a crafty ploy by the former dictator to access some US$6m frozen in Swiss bank accounts. If the latter ultimately proved the more credible (see sidebar), it has badly backfired; within 48 hours, he was charged with “corruption, embezzlement, money laundering and assassination".
    While Duvalier's reappearance initially left the commentariat floundering, Préval's 8 February decision to grant Aristide a passport - previously cited as the main obstacle preventing his return from exile in South Africa - was less bewildering. Préval was reportedly furious at the perceived interference of the US and international community in the election. The issuance of a passport to Aristide, a former ally, whose return to Haiti has been long opposed by Washington, could be construed as a final act of defiance.
    Aristide, whose party, Fanmi Lavalas, has been excluded by the CEP from participating in recent elections on technical grounds, despite its popularity, has often expressed his hope of returning, most recently citing a desire to assist with education. Such a prospect was likely to rile the US and the international community - which Aristide has long maintained, assisted in his 2004 ousting and whose interest in keeping him out of the country was documented in the January WikiLeaks release of a US embassy cable dating from 2005. The cable alluded to “continued USG insistence that all efforts must be made to keep Aristide from returning to Haiti, or influencing the political process" on the grounds that he “does not fit in with a democratic political future" in Haiti.

• Legislative obstacles

On top of credibility concerns given the perceived interference by the international community, the eventual victor might also struggle to assert his/her authority given that, with 56 candidates through to the second round of legislative elections, the Inité could end up with a majority in both chambers of parliament; neither Martelly's Repons Peyizan nor Manigat's RDNP, competing under the banner of Plateforme des Patriotes Haí¯tiens (Plaph), look set to win more than a handful of seats. Notably, the legislature has the authority to ratify and remove the president-nominated prime minister.

• Duvalier law

With an estimated US$5m-US$6m in a frozen Swiss bank account, Duvalier's return has been linked to the so-called 'Duvalier Law' passed by the Swiss parliament in September 2010. The law took effect on 1 February and eases restitution of assets stolen by corrupt politicians to their home countries. Duvalier's apparent plan was to return to Haiti and remain there for a short time in the expectation that he would not be prosecuted. He could then use the absence of any charges against him to seek retrieval of his Swiss funds. With the Swiss government having since announced plans to start legal proceedings to confiscate Duvalier's assets, he now maintains they are not his but belong to a “foundation".