Brazil & Southern Cone - 26 October 2004

Most political commentators are hedging their bets over the outcome of the presidential election to be held in Uruguay on 31 October. And with good reason: although the majority of polls show that the leader of the leftwing Encuentro Progresista-Frente Amplio (EP-FA), Tabaré Vázquez, has a commanding lead, he has lost the previous two elections from a strong position. As seasoned followers of Uruguayan elections will know, the EP-FA traditionally approaches the first round with a sizeable advantage only to be taken to a second round, at which point the right rallies behind one candidate.

Will Vázquez stumble before the finishing line again? This publication has chosen to tip Vázquez on the strength of two recent developments. Firstly, the electorate has not rallied behind either candidate from the right as election day gets closer. Guillermo Stirling is anathema to all but diehard Colorados after the incumbent Colorado president Jorge Batlle's disastrous mishandling of the economy. He is completely out of contention on about 14%. Jorge Larrañaga, the standard-bearer for the Blancos, has been falling away in the polls. He is hovering around the 32% mark.

Secondly, while Vázquez has been handling himself with calm assurance in recent weeks, some of the actions of the right smack of desperation. Uruguay's former Colorado president, Julio Sanguinetti, has been trying to stir up fears that former guerrillas that form part of the leftwing coalition 'have not turned their back on violence and are using democracy as a tactical stage'. The Tupamaros were subsumed into the Movimiento de Participación Popular (MPP), an umbrella movement within the broader EP-FA coalition.

Sanguinetti's comments are calculated to lure about 3%-4% of voters away from the EP-FA, which would leave Vázquez short of the 50% plus one threshold required for victory in the first round. He was referring to excerpts from a German documentary in which a number of prominent Tupamaros, recorded in 1996, displayed somewhat dubious democratic credentials. Tupamaro Senator José Mujica, for instance, said that 'just because you participate in the game of liberal democracy does not mean that you agree with it'. Eleuterio Fernández Huidobro said 'The Uruguayan system of democracy, what confidence can we have in that?'

Vázquez has refused to be drawn on the issue and, interestingly, Larrañaga has also distanced himself from Sanguinetti's scare tactics. He said that the country was fed up with dwelling on the past. However, some former Tupamaros seized the bait. Fernández Huidobro accused Sanguinetti of having been linked to the death squads. Ordinary Uruguayans seem unmoved. Paradoxically, this is bad for Vázquez. He has been out front in the polls for over two years. With the right failing to make any impression on his lead, he should sneak home in the first round provided that voter turnout is good. This is, however, a fairly big proviso. The electorate appears bored. Flags that would normally be draped from the balconies of apartments around Montevideo have been conspicuous by their absence.

It is to these people - the apathetic and the undecided - that Larrañaga must turn. He has been doing his best. On 11 October, he presented a list of 38 names from both within the party and outside it that would feature in his government if he wins. The names on his list include prominent figures from across the political spectrum, including (cheekily) Walter Cancela, an advisor to Vázquez, as well as Alejandro Atchugarry, a widely respected former economy minister in the Batlle administration who belongs to the Colorados. Abreu said that the Blancos wanted a government that sought national unity over party political rivalries.

It is a clever political ploy. The Blancos will need to shore up support from the Colorados in the event of a run-off between Vázquez and Larrañaga and there is no better way to do this than to offer positions to politicians from within the party. Larrañaga's mooted government of national unity is a clear attempt to woo Uruguay's undecided voters.

Larrañaga has also been trying everything he can to unsettle Vázquez. A day later, on 12 October, he accused his opponent of stealing his policies. He said that Vázquez's manifesto was just 'a bad copy' of his own programme, only 'without paying royalty fees'. He claimed that he had stood by the same policies - including giving emergency assistance to the 100,000 poorest Uruguayans, the dedollarisation of the economy, and a refocusing on the manufacturing sector - throughout his campaign. 'Where is the [EP-FA] manifesto? It doesn't exist,' he said.

This is unfair. Like Brazil's President Lula da Silva, who lost three elections in a row, Vázquez has made a point of appeasing the private sector by promising to adhere to the rules for investors, fiscal discipline, and a tight monetary policy based on inflation-targeting. If he wins, he will inherit an economy whose recovery is in decent shape (see below) although unemployment is creeping up. Vázquez will be under pressure to address this, while he will also need to work hard to improve the public perception of officialdom.