Brazil & Southern Cone - May 2006 (ISSN 1741-4431)

Over 150 people have been killed following simultaneous riots in prisons in the state of São Paulo between 12 and 16 May. The violence spread to the streets, with gangs attacking buses, banks, government buildings and police headquarters. The police retaliated with a brutal counteroffensive. As expected, the violence provoked a public debate, but once again the wrong questions are being addressed. Instead politicians seem satisfied to fling their customary accusations of blame.

At least 150 people lost their lives and several were left wounded following numerous street-attacks by gangs of criminals and synchronised riots in São Paulo's state prisons. The Brazilian media described the riots as the worst wave of organised crime in the country's history and compared São Paulo to Baghdad. Crucially, the violence seen in the streets of São Paulo underlined the weakness of Brazil's internal-security apparatus, prompting fears that other synchronised gang attacks may happen and spread all over the country. 

This time most of the violence centred in the metropolitan region of the state's capital. Yet - worryingly - inmates in jails in five other states also staged mutinies "in solidarity" with their fellow prisoners. Schools as well as shops (including shopping centres) closed. Buses and trains did not function normally, leaving 5m people without transport and creating a 212 km-long traffic jam on 15 May. The city's domestic airport closed for two hours following an anonymous bomb threat. Most bars and restaurants did not open in the evening as paulistas decided to live under a curfew.

The PCC

The violence was triggered after inmates discovered that the state's government was planning to transfer hundreds of members of the criminal faction Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), including its leader, Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho who is better known as Marcola, to a high-security prison away from the capital. The transfer, however, was delayed by Brazil's bureaucratic court proceedings and by appeals made by lawyers representing PCC members. 

More embarrassingly, it has now been confirmed that the PCC was alerted by Marcola's lawyers about the transfer plans after they bribed a congressional employee to record the secret testimony given by public-security authorities from São Paulo to a congressional committee investigating guns-trafficking. The two lawyers denied the allegations, but the employee told the police that he handed the recording of the testimony to them after taking R$200 (US$90). 

Upon receiving the information, captive PCC leaders used their mobile phones to start the mutinies and tell reporters that the rebellions were being carried out in protest against the breach of their constitutional rights. This reveals the PCC's uniqueness among other Brazilian criminal gangs: its political appeal. The gang's aim, its leaders state, is to "humanise" Brazil's prison system. The PCC takes monthly payments from its free members to assist captive members with lawyers and aid their relatives; and even, according to some reports, to fund law students in return for a commitment to represent the PCC.

Wrong questions addressed and accusations

One could say that the riots had a positive side: it brought violence back into the public arena after it had been brushed aside in the last twelve months by the corruption scandals embroiling the government and congress. Yet, once again, the authorities seem to be addressing the wrong issues while the press is failing to bring them to the surface, playing the politicians' game instead. 

The first day after the situation was brought under control showed politicians presenting a united front against crime. The senate rushed to approve a bill to combat organised gangs, ranging from obvious measures such as the prohibition of mobile phones in prisons to the creation of a special federal unit to investigate corruption inside the Brazilian penal system. Also, prisoners may now have their assets seized and the state will be allowed to use them to pay for damages caused during future uprisings.

Very quickly, the debate turned into mutual accusations of blame, revealing that Brazilian politicians continue to be more interested in exploiting the public-security issue for electoral gains rather than to get together to address the real causes of violence. Human rights groups rightly assessed the situation: the Brazilian penal system is overcrowded, inefficient and corrupt. While the prison population has more than doubled in the last ten years, prison facilities are not being built. It is estimated that currently there are 35% more inmates than space in Brazil's jails. It is not hard then to see why the PCC has prospered as a criminal fraternity devoted to improving conditions in the prisons. 

They also argue that despite Brazil's tough laws, courts are very lenient. Authorities do not set a good example by failing to prosecute white-collar crimes. For instance, all the 40 or so accused who were arrested by the federal police recently in connexion with a corruption scheme with the connivance of congressmen were ordered to be freed. At the same time, poor petty-criminals are sent to jail and - with no other real option - quickly fall under the influence of violent criminals. Yet instead of trying to address these questions the federal government and the opposition-led government of São Paulo preferred to exchange accusations. President Lula da Silva started by publicly suggesting that his main contender in the October presidential elections, the former governor of São Paulo Geraldo Alckmin, had left the state's penal system in chaos. Alckmin's answer was swift, reminding Lula that the federal government slashed the resources allocated for public-security spending in São Paulo (from R$223m in 2002 to R$29.6m last year). 

The public spat continued with the minister of institutional relations, Tarso Genro, accusing the government of São Paulo of rejecting the federal government's proposal to send a national force to halt the riots and of "preferring to negotiate with criminals" instead. Genro referred to reports that the authorities had reached an agreement with PCC leaders to stop the violence (it indeed stopped almost simultaneously at 4pm on 15 May, only a couple of hours after a meeting between authorities and PCC leaders). The rumours have been denied by São Paulo's authorities, who pointed out that the federal government's offer could not be fulfilled since the national force does not exist and troops would have to be pulled from the police of other states, leaving a dangerous security vacuum.

Lula is well-placed to benefit from the riots. Despite the 50% fall in the murder rate in São Paulo during Alckmin's tenure, the majority of the population believes the former governor is responsible for the violence. Even the PCC believes so, declaring on its blog that Alckmin's heavy-handed line against prisoners lead to the rebellions, and instructed its members to vote for Lula in October. The latest opinion poll published by Sensus on 24 May shows that the violence has indeed helped Lula: support for him increased from 37.5% in April to 40.4%, while Alckmin lost 1.9% support, which stands now at 18.7%. 

Meanwhile authorities in São Paulo admitted that only 79 of the 110 suspects killed by the police in the riots had "known connections" with organised crime. The human rights' NGO Movimento Nacional de Direitos Humanos says at least 30 people were assassinated by police death squads avenging the deaths of their colleagues. In one case, 12 young men with no criminal record were killed by "heavily-armed men dressed like ninjas" suspected of being police.