Andean Group - November 2006 (ISSN 1741-4466)

The obvious question about the Venezuelan presidential elections due on 3 December is whether Manuel Rosales, the opposition candidate, can beat President Hugo Chávez . If he can, what are his prospects for forming a stable government? If he fails, what will happen to the Venezuelan opposition and what new direction will the "Bolivarian Revolution" take?

The polls
On 24 October, a poll by Zogby International found support of 59% for Chávez , 24% for Rosales and 2% for Benjamí­n Rausseo, a comedian running for the Piedra Party. On this evidence, it appears Rosales' chances of victory are fairly slim. However, forty days before Brazil's presidential election, Zogby International gave Lula a 33 percentage point margin over his rival, Gerardo Alckmin. In the event Lula won 48.6% and Alckmin won 41.6%. William Lara, minister of communication and information, said that such drop in support for the incumbent was equally possible in Venezuela. It is worth noting, however, that the gap is still large, and polls which claim to show the two candidates are approaching parity tend to have a suspect methodology.

For example, on 2 November anti-Chávez news outlets picked up a poll published by the Caracas-based AKSA Partners which appeared to show Chávez 's lead over Rosales narrowing to just four percentage points. In fact, the poll, of 1,200 Venezuelans interviewed face-to-face, was somewhat sly: it did not actually ask respondents how they intended to vote. Instead Alfredo Keller, the chief pollster, organised the electorate into categories according to their view on certain policy matters, such as "should Venezuela be made into a Socialist country?". 

Based on their answers, Keller assigned voters into one of four categories: hardcore Chavista, softcore Chavista, softcore opposition or hardcore opposition. By this method he found that 22% of the electorate are hardcore Chavistas and 30% softcore Chavistas; thus, he concludes 52% will vote for Chávez . By the same logic, he combines those opposition leaning voters into one group and concludes they will vote for Rosales. Given the paranoia that pervades the electorate following the widespread dissemination of lists of citizens' voting histories, this method has the advantage of eliciting honest responses without fear, but it is a massive assumption to claim those opposed to key government policies will vote for Rosales.

Rosales in government
Under the Bolivarian Constitution promulgated by President Hugo Chávez and ratified by the constituent assembly in 1999, the presidency's powers were expanded to include the right to dissolve the national assembly under certain circumstances. Given the assembly is currently packed with deputies who are loyal to Chávez , if Rosales wins he says he will call new congressional elections "to escape the institutional crisis". The new national assembly would be elected according to a system of proportional representation. Rosales also said he would reduce the presidential period of office from six to four years, with only one immediate re-election allowed. 

On economic policy, the Zulia governor's flagship programme is the "Mi Negra" debit card which would grant working and middle-class families between Bs$600,000 (US$280) to Bs$1m per month from the country's oil profits, regardless of their political affiliation. Rosales has sought to distance himself from Chávez by promising that his government would be respectful of private property and seek to attract foreign investment. He also said there would be no backlash against the government or its supporters if he won.

The future of Bolivarianism
Whether Chávez 's supporters would be so magnanimous in the event of a Rosales victory is questionable. On 2 November the opposition released a video of the oil and energy minister, Rafael Ramí­rez, threatening workers at the state oil company Pdvsa who did not proselytise for President Hugo Chávez ahead of the presidential elections.

In the video, Ramí­rez says, "we are not going to allow anyone in the company to repress the expression of our people or our workers in support of President Chávez . […] Here we support President Chávez , who is the maximum leader of the revolution and whoever does not feel right about it should surrender his job to a Bolivarian. […] I am insulted that we find Ni-Nis in here, Chavistas light, that there are people who say that we need to open up this thing. 

No sir, anyone here who forgets that we are in the middle of a revolution will get hit hard by us." In the same 14-minute film, Ramí­rez said the Venezuelan government was going "to liberate Bolivia" from the US-sponsored coup threatening the government of President Evo Morales.

It is unclear who filmed the footage, and why it was distributed to the media. Although the proximity of the election has forced the government to unite, it has been unable to hide all the differences between those who want to accelerate the pace of the revolution and those content with its current speed. In the probable event of a Chávez victory such splits are likely to widen. This instability may well be exacerbated by a losing opposition increasingly frustrated with its inability to return to power via a democratic route.