Andean Group - March 2008 (ISSN 1741-4466)

On 1 March Colombia awoke to the news that its air force had killed Raúl Reyes, the second-in-command of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc). For a few hours the government and its many supporters celebrated the most significant single blow that the Farc has ever suffered, but this jubilation was soon replaced by concern at a rapid deterioration in Colombia's ties with Ecuador, upon whose territory Reyes was killed, and Venezuela, whose President Hugo Chávez was outraged at the incursion and at the "murder" of "a good revolutionary". Colombia responded to accusations that it had violated Ecuador's sovereignty by claiming to have discovered documents on Reyes' computer showing that both Ecuador and Venezuela were cooperating extensively with the Farc.

Surgical strike or a massacre?

Reyes, whose real name was Luis Édgar Devia Silva, was killed alongside another senior Farc leader, Guillermo Enrique Torres (alias Julián Conrado), and 15 other guerrillas at a camp almost two kilometres inside Ecuadorean territory. Two Brazilian-made Super Tucano ground attack aircraft dropped cluster bombs on the camp at 1.30 am in what the Colombian government hailed as a high-tech, high-precision operation.

The Colombian government initially lied about the nature of the raid, claiming that its plan was to bomb a Farc camp within Colombian territory. According to this version of events, the Colombian military only discovered the existence of the camp over the river in Ecuador when guerrillas at this second camp shot at helicopters who were attempting to secure the site of the first bombing, on the Colombian side of the border. The air force was then called back to launch a second bombing raid on the site in which Reyes was killed.

This is what Colombia's President Álvaro Uribe told his Ecuadorean counterpart, Rafael Correa, who took the news without too much drama. However, Correa's outlook changed completely when his own security personnel arrived in the area, replacing the Colombian forces who had stayed behind to secure the site and help remove Reyes' body. Correa was informed that the dead guerrillas were in their underwear and had obviously not been taking pot shots at distant helicopters.

"They were bombed and massacred while they slept," Correa stated, adding that there was "no hot pursuit" - Colombia's customary excuse for launching attacks across the border. "President Uribe was either ill-informed or he shamelessly lied to the Ecuadorean president," Correa averred.

It soon emerged that the latter was the case. Reyes' death was the result of an operation that had been awaiting the green light for a few days and that Uribe knew all about. A combination of radio intercepts and tip-offs had revealed

the location of Reyes' camp inside Ecuadorean territory and the Colombian military had been monitoring the site in preparation for the strike, which was delayed by poor weather in the area. One Colombian soldier was killed in the operation; he died when troops at the bomb site clashed with the surviving rebels who tried in vain to prevent Reyes' body being taken away.

Was it worth it?

Uribe's blatant violation of Ecuador's sovereignty has destabilised the Andean region and left Colombia isolated in Latin America as a whole (see page 3). His attempts to justify the attack after the event by suggesting that Ecuador was giving refuge to Reyes (see page 5) have only made matters worse and might not hold water. The storm raised by the raid begs the question of why Uribe considered Reyes worth the risk.

Reyes was the Farc's spokesperson and its most visible leader. He led the guerrilla group's negotiating team during the three-year peace process with Uribe's predecessor, Andrés Pastrana, which collapsed in 2002. He even travelled to Europe during the peace process. Moreover, he was a member of the Farc's secretariat - the guerrilla group's high command, which before his death comprised its seven most senior leaders.

Before Reyes' death, the military had never killed a member of the secretariat. The raid on 1 March therefore sent the message that no-one in the Farc is safe any more, and that the military's superior intelligence, superior weaponry, and superior technology mean that it can pick off whomsoever it chooses.

This is only part true. There is little doubt that Colombia's security forces are leagues stronger than they were when Uribe took office: billions of dollars of US military aid, arms and assistance have transformed all aspects of the Colombian military, as has a change in the command structure which has resulted in closer cooperation between the armed forces (RA 05-05). Even before Reyes was killed the Farc had learned all about the combined capabilities of the air force and the intelligence service: in recent months several senior guerrillas have been killed by precision air strikes, including Negro Acacio, J.J, and Martí­n Caballero.

But this does not mean the military can kill Farc leaders at will. Reyes was a relatively easy target insofar as sources claim that he had used the same base in Ecuador for more than a year (he rarely ventured into Colombia), and that he had received numerous visitors including foreign volunteers and media. It seems Reyes unwisely assumed that he was safe simply by dint of being on Ecuadorean soil.

More importantly, being able to target previously unreachable Farc leaders does not guarantee victory over the group as a whole. The Farc is a highly organized guerrilla group divided into a number of fronts across the country that are capable of operating without instruction from an overall leadership. Uribe's top advisor, José Obdulio Gaviria, claimed recently that "the secretariat no longer exists" and that the Farc relies on a "virtual cohesion" achieved via the internet.

Killing Reyes was a symbolic victory but it does not win the war against the Farc. There are still 8,000 guerrillas who are prepared to continue the fight against the government; they remain difficult to find and harder to eliminate. After all, if the military did know the Farc's every move there is no way the guerrilla group would still be able to hold Uribe to ransom with 40 hostages, who now look less likely than ever to be freed alive. But by killing Reyes on Ecuadorean soil, Uribe has proved that he will do whatever it takes to defeat the Farc, regardless of what Colombia's neighbours think about it.

Reyes replaced

The Farc announced on 4 March that Joaquí­n Gómez will replace Raúl Reyes in the guerrilla group's seven-man secretariat (its high command). Gómez, whose real name is Milton de Jesús Toncel, will not fulfil as prominent a role as Reyes. His promotion is logical insofar as he is a key military commander of the Farc's forces in the south of Colombia, which were previously under Reyes' control. The so-called Bloque Sur is the Farc's strongest front.