Andean Group - August 2009 (ISSN 1741-4466)

President Alvaro Uribe's government is pulling out every stop to secure final approval of the re-election referendum bill before its self-imposed end-August deadline. Following a major setback in late July, when the government failed to secure backing for its preferred candidates in elections for the presidencies of congress, President Alvaro Uribe has, for the first time, thrown his full weight behind the referendum project. The final text of the bill was approved on 18 August by a special bicameral reconciliation committee, with the backing of 32 of the committee's 50 members. The government now seems likely to pull off an eleventh hour rescue of the bill.

The final text of the bill now needs to be approved by a simple majority in both houses - both of which are dominated by Uribe's multi-party coalition. The senate is slated to vote on the initiative on 19 August. The government's big challenge will be to secure the backing of the lower house, which is expected to vote before the end of August.

As recently as the end of July, it appeared that the referendum was doomed. On 25 July the well-respected and widely read news magazine, Semana, ran a lead editorial arguing that the referendum bill was “dead". The magazine reported that “there is not a single Urbista who believes privately that this corpse [the referendum bill] can be revived". Two days later the leader of the government-aligned Partido de la U (the 'U'), Luis Carlos Restrepo, said that the referendum was “not politically viable".

The final straw for the bill, Semana argued, was the congressional leadership elections, which took place when congress returned from recess on 20 July. The government failed to secure backing for its preferred candidates, after factions of Uribe's multi-party coalition united with the opposition to push their own candidates, breaking with the pact agreed by coalition parties after the last elections, in 2006 (see sidebar).

Congress has been dragging its feet over the bill since it was passed by the senate on 19 May. Lower house approval is likely to be more difficult to secure for two main reasons: first due to jitters over a supreme court investigation into the 86 lower house deputies that voted last December to approve the referendum bill while it was still under scrutiny for alleged irregularities in its financing (although sceptics mutter that a number of legislators are in fact using the supreme court's investigation as an excuse to stall for time while they put pressure on the government to grant bureaucratic favours); and secondly because the text of the bill originally approved by the lower house provided for Uribe's re-election in 2014, after a term out of office, and not in 2010.

Nevertheless, the government remains quietly confident that the bill will be passed. On 18 August a deputy from the feverently Uribista Partido de la U, Roy Barreras, told national daily El Tiempo, “In the lower house we need 84 votes and we have 94. In the senate we need 51 and we'll have 63...With the majorities that we have in congress Uribe will be a candidate, and through the votes of the Colombian people he will be president".

Since its 20 July setback the government has gone all out to persuade its coalition and, crucially, the members of the bicameral committee, to back the referendum. According to Semana, the executive has even offered to provide lawyers to defend coalition legislators, should the supreme court pursue its case. On 11 August Uribe himself met representatives of his ruling coalition to ask them to back the bill. Although he stopped short of saying that he will stand again if the referendum is passed, his third-term aspirations seem clear. Senator Juan Carlos Vélez, who was present at the 11 August meeting, said that “if the referendum is approved, we are sure that he [Uribe] will stand for re-election". Another senator, Marco Alirio Cortés, described “Uribe's clear determination to continue in the presidency".

If both houses rubberstamp the bill, it must then be rushed through the constitutional court. A likely sticking point is the ongoing investigation by the National Electoral Court (CNE) into the financing of the petition, signed by over 4m Colombians, which called for the referendum.

Plan B
Uribe's staunchest supporters are muttering about alternatives should the referendum bill fail. The government is rumoured to be considering the use of article 104 of the constitution, which states that the president, with the support of all of his ministers and the approval of the senate [i.e. without full congressional approval], can call a referendum “on decisions of national significance" and that “the decision of the people is binding". Constitutional experts have already questioned whether an - as yet unprecedented - article 104 referendum could be used to reform Colombia's constitution.

If Uribe does not run, he will nevertheless play the role of kingmaker. All of his likely successors come from within his coalition and have pledged to continue his enduringly popular “democratic security" polices, which have improved Colombia's security situation dramatically and encouraged investment. According to recent opinion polls, Uribe's former defence minister, Juan Manuel Santos - who will only run if Uribe steps down - would be his most likely successor and could even pull off a first round victory. A Santos presidency would likely lead to a deterioration of already abysmal relations with the governments of Ecuador and Venezuela, both of whom loathe the former defence minister.

• Congressional presidencies

According to the 2006 pact, the two candidates who should have been elected were: Gabriel Zapata, of the small pro-Uribe party Alas Equipo Colombia, for the senate presidency; and, for the lower house, Migel Amí­n, of the fiercely Uribista Partido de la U. Instead, Javier Cáceres, of Cambio Radical (whose leader, Germán Vargas, is openly opposed to Uribe's re-election) was elected almost unanimously by the upper house; and, most surprisingly, Edgar Gómez, of Convergencia Ciudadana, took the lower house. It should be noted, however, that while the successful candidates are not staunch Uribista loyalists, they are nevertheless both at least nominally members of Uribe's coalition, and both voted in favour of the re-election referendum.

• New defence minister

Gabriel Silva Luján was named Colombia's new minister of defence on 27 July 2009. Since 2002 he has served as chief executive of Colombia's powerful National Coffee Growers Federation. Silva's appointment brings a managerial approach to the defence ministry, arguably the most important position in President Alvaro Uribe's cabinet. Silva will be tasked with advancing, and evolving, the government's so-called “Strategic Jump" ('salto estratégico') operation aimed at pushing the Farc to “the point of no return" and consolidating advances made thus far. At the same time, he will have to reassure Colombia's neighbours that under his watch the country's armed forces - and the mooted US military presence (see pages 1-2) - do not pose a threat to regional peace. Silva also faces a new wave of violence from emerging armed groups, made up of demobilised paramilitaries and other criminal organisations, funded by drug-trafficking and organised crime.