Andean Group - September 2009 (ISSN 1741-4466)

The referendum that would pave the way for President Alvaro Uribe's re-election for an unprecedented third term in May 2010 has cleared its final congressional hurdle. Uribe's third term bid now hinges on the decision of the constitutional court.  Legally, the timetable is extremely tight and, in constitutional terms, the measure highly controversial; Uribe, however, has in his favour massive popular support and mounting political momentum. In recent weeks, the government's row with its regional neighbours, and most prominently with Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez , over Colombia's proposed military base deal with the US has only boosted Uribe's cause.

Estado de Opinión
On 1 September, some 12 months after the measure was first introduced to congress, the lower house voted narrowly to approve the final text of the bill - with 85 votes in favour to five against, only one more than the simple majority of 84 the government needed. The two main opposition parties, the Partido Liberal and the Polo Democrática Alternativo, abstained. Uribe's supporters called the result a triumph for democracy. The Uribista line is that the referendum, and the important constitutional reform it implies, is legitimate because it is backed by a majority of Colombians. Colombia, the government holds, is an 'Estado de Opinión' or 'Opinion State', a concept to which Uribe has repeatedly referred in recent months [the local politics monitor, La Silla Vacia, has counted a total of 103 public references by Uribe to the so-called Estado de Opinión since the referendum bill was introduced to congress, although never in direct reference to re-election].

Public opinion is certainly overwhelmingly in the president's favour. For thousands of Colombians Uribe has become synonymous with security and public order as a result of his government's successful campaign against the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc) and - in the short term at least - its taming of paramilitary violence. Uribe has also astutely, and successfully, channeled a resurgent sense of national pride into support for his political movement. Every time Chávez , whose disapproval rating in Colombia hovers around 90%, lashes out at Colombia, Uribe benefits domestically. Recent polls show that Uribe's approval rating has climbed from 71% to 74% since the latest row with Venezuela kicked off (it has averaged 72% over his two terms in office). Around 50% of Colombians say that they would vote in favour of his re-election if a referendum is held, while there is talk of mass protests if the court fails to approve the initiative.

Fierce opposition to re-election is, however, increasing among Colombia's so-called ruling classes - its political, business and church leaders, academics, NGOs and the media.  Meddling with term limits for the benefit of one person, opponents argue, represents a dangerous erosion of the country's constitutional checks and balances, which have traditionally been highly skeptical of executive power. The government's exaltation of participative democracy - and the 'Estado de Opinión' - could easily be interpreted as a byword for populism, which would put Uribe in the same camp as Venezuela's Chávez , who has succeeded in abolishing term limits entirely. 

A third term for Uribe would also likely do little to endear him to the US President Barack Obama administration, which appears more inclined to deal with President Lula da Silva of Brazil (who, despite high approval ratings, has very publicly eschewed amending the constitution to allow for his third consecutive re-election). When Obama met Uribe back in June he gently reminded him that, although “each country...has to make these decisions on their own",  “our experience in the United States is that two terms works for us and that after eight years, usually the...people want a change".

What next?
The constitutional court now has three months to rule on the measure. The electoral authorities have said that they will then need at least a further three months to organise the vote. This means that the uncertainty surrounding Uribe ´s re-election is likely to drag on for another six months. There is certainly no way that Uribe can adhere to the legal deadline for declaring his presidential candidacy: according to the so-called Ley de Garantí­as, he should register by 30 November, or six months before the elections. Uribe's supporters are likely to argue that a referendum vote outranks common legal stricture.

The opposition will now focus on derailing the referendum on just such legal grounds. The constitutional court will be expected to scrutinise both the text of the bill itself and various irregularities in the way in which it was passed by congress. This will include the change made by the upper house to the ambiguous wording of the text to clarify that the it referred to re-election in 2010, rather than 2014 (as approved by the lower house). The court is also awaiting the results of an investigation by the electoral authorities into alleged abuses in the financing of the petition calling for the referendum. Perhaps most controversially, it must consider whether to ignore a ruling by the constitutional court judges who were responsible for approving the reform which allowed Uribe's re-election for a second term in 2006. At the time, the court decided that although re-election for two terms would not be damaging to the constitution, a president should be prevented from serving more than two consecutive terms.

The opposition complains that the court is in Uribe's pocket. After his near eight years in office, he has had a say in nominating all nine of its judges, one of whom, Jorge Pretelt Chlajub, has published a book entitled “Why I voted yes in the referendum" (in relation to the 2003 referendum on 15 reforms proposed by Uribe, which was actually defeated). Nevertheless, while the court's support is likely, it is by no means guaranteed. With such an important - and high profile - issue at stake, its judges are under pressure to demonstrate their independence from Uribismo.

If the court gives the green light to the referendum, the government must then persuade 25% of the electorate - or 7.3m people - to turn out to vote, at least 50% of whom must be in favour of re-election. Should Uribe run again, he will almost certainly win. As the Farc continue to be pushed back, he will then be under pressure to demonstrate that his 'Democratic Security' policies are able to respond to pressing social and economic as well as military challenges. 

• Exodus to Uribismo

Thanks to a package of political reforms passed by congress in July, legislators had until 14 September to change political party without incurring penalties. This arrangement has significantly swelled the membership of the two main Uribista parties. A total of 20 legislators changed party to join the fervently Uribista Partido de la U (the 'U'), making it the largest party in congress (with 72 seats). A further 10 legislators have joined the Partido Conservador (PC), the second coalition force (now with 58 seats). Crucially, the two main Uribista parties have secured the membership of hundreds more regional and local politicians (the 'U' with some 830 new adherents, the PC with at least 350). It is these representatives who mobilise Colombians to vote at a local level, and who are therefore often pivotal to the outcome of the national vote.