Andean Group - April 2011 (ISSN 1741-4466)

Hopes that the recent Bolivia-Chile rapprochement would result in a full restoration of diplomatic relations have foundered. Signaling a major reversal of efforts which gathered pace under both mandates of President Evo Morales, the Bolivian government announced in March that it would take Chile to international courts as part of efforts to recover access to the Pacific, which it lost in the 1879-1884 War of the Pacific. With Morales's approval ratings at an all-time low, cynics were quick to discern a domestic motive behind the timing of the government's decision to revive the historic demand.

Morales made the announcement, which reportedly came as a surprise to the government of President Sebastián Piñera, on Bolivia's annual “Sea Day" (23 March). He also said that the government would establish a special committee, Dirección Nacional de Reivindicación Marí­tima (DNRM), to put together Bolivia's case. The Bolivians look set to argue that Chile has failed to uphold the terms of the 1904 peace treaty - namely the provision that Bolivia has the right to free transit of trade through its territory and ports. Morales is also invoking a resolution by the Organization of American States (OAS, No. 426), passed in 1979, which supported Bolivia's claim to maritime access and recommended both sides reach an agreement over the issue.

On the one hand, the threat against Chile appears to signify a major shift in bilateral relations which have gathered pace in recent years, in the framework of a 13-point agenda established in 2006 aimed at restoring the diplomatic ties severed in 1978. Weeks before Morales announced the change of tack, Chile's foreign minister, Alfredo Moreno, had paid a visit to La Paz, the first official visit by such a high ranking Chilean official in 60 years [RA-11-03]. At the same time, it was hardly a surprise given repeated signs of intransigence over the sea issue by both sides. While Bolivia's 2009 Constitution (Art. 267) declares its (non-existent) access to the Pacific an “inalienable and imprescriptible right", Piñera had said repeatedly he would not grant Bolivia full sovereign access to the sea, despite appearing willing to consider more “creative" solutions such as allowing Bolivia access to Chile's northern Iquique port to boost exports.

Domestic gain
Vice-President Alvaro Garcí­a Linera said that the decision to take the case to the international courts was not a surprise but had been on the cards for months. This was also suggested in remarks made by Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca at the start of the year that the Bolivians had not ruled out international arbitration as a possible course of action although the subsequent show of outrage by the Chileans prompted some hasty back-peddling from the Morales government. The Piñera government, however, appeared to be caught off guard by Morales's latest reversal and was quick to accuse him of using Chile as a scapegoat at a time of domestic difficulty.

There is undoubtedly some substance to these accusations and little doubt that the decision to revive the maritime demand, one of the few issues capable of uniting the country, comes at an opportune point for Morales, whose popularity in February hit an unprecedented low of 32%, according to the monthly Ipsos Apoyo poll, less than half of what it was at the start of his second term in January 2010 and down from 48% in December 2010. This stemmed mainly from his failed attempt at scrapping fuel subsidies at the end of last year (the so-called gasolinazo) which had proved a major bone of contention with the unions and social organizations and has since lingered due to soaring food prices and inflationary concerns [RA-11-02]. The recent drug-smuggling scandal implicating top security advisor René Sanabria, also dealt a major blow to the credibility of his government and left him very much on the defensive [RA-11-03].

Morales himself was unashamed about the potential of the issue as a means of rallying the country and overcoming current divisions not only with the radical Left but also the Right. Urging the need for “national unity in relation to the maritime request" he secured pledges of support from the leaders of movements such as Confederación de Pueblos Indí­genas de Bolivia (Cidob) in the lowlands, the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) and the El Alto-based Federación de Mujeres Campesinas Bartolina Sisa (FMCBS), all of which had proved leading critics of the gasolinazo.

The threat to take the case before international courts also won backing from prominent political opponents such as Rubén Costas, the opposition governor of Santa Cruz, Juan del Granado, the leader of the left-wing Movimiento Sin Miedo (MSM) and former Presidents Jorge Tuto Quiroga (2001-2002) and Carlos Mesa (2003-2005).  Having used the issue of access to the sea as a key means of drumming up popular support during his administration, Mesa - who, in a further sign of Morales's efforts to appear conciliatory, has since been floated as a possible candidate to head up the DNRM - made it clear that he was at the “full disposal" of the Morales government to support what is a “national cause". The declared support of both former leaders was all the more striking as it came days after the two made public statements denouncing the “politicization of justice" in the country, in relation to the threat of legal action which both face (see sidebar).

The limits of the COB
The Chileans might well protest that the Morales government is exploiting the maritime demand for purely domestic gain. However, it is worth noting signs that Morales's popularity was already beginning to recover (the March Ipsos Apoyo poll, for example, put his approval at 38%). The weakness of Bolivia's main umbrella trade union, the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), which had also proved a major irritant for the government over the gasolinazo, has also once again come to the fore. A two-day strike called by the COB to protest Morales's proposed rise in minimum wage (of 20% and a further 10% for certain sectors) [RA-11-03] flopped and the government ratified the changes on 22 March. The episode served to expose internal divisions within the COB, (which represents some 2m workers from various sectors). Some members such as the factory workers' federation and Urban Teachers' Union of La Paz accused the union directorate of selling out to the government while other peasant groups such as the CSUTCB and FMCBS broke with the union line complaining that the leadership only looked out for the interests of salaried workers.
       As well as serving as the latest reminder of the limits of the COB, which lost much of its political power with the weakening of the mining sectors in the mid 1980s, the decline in unrest also owed to two other factors. One was a supreme decree passed by the government in mid March, which authorized local government to regulate transport tariffs while a general transport law is being prepared (fears that transport workers would increase public transport tariffs unilaterally had fanned the threat of unrest).
  The other was the impact of some of the worst floods, caused by the La Niña weather phenomenon, to hit Bolivia - and the capital in particular - in recent years. Morales declared a state of national emergency on 21 February in response to floods and landslides which have left a total of 54 dead and 24, 292 families affected in 115 of the country's 337 municipalities. La Paz, where opposition to Morales over the gasolinazo had proved instrumental in forcing his U-turn [RA-11-01] suffered what the Spanish daily El Paí­s described as the “worst urban disaster in its history," with some US$92m of damage to public and private infrastructure. Notably, the government mouthpiece Cambio recently cited a report by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) which put the total damage caused by natural disasters in Bolivia at US$10.8m between1996-2000; US$33.4m between 2001 and 2005; and US$60.3m between 2006 and 2008.

• Legal persecution?

Former Presidents Carlos Mesa (2003-2005) and Jorge 'Tuto' Quiroga (2001-2002) recently added to concerns regarding the state of justice in Bolivia. The two, who are to be investigated for signing “irregular" state contracts with oil companies that proved detrimental to the state oil company YPFB, said there was no “argument" for taking them to trial and that they would be prepared to appeal to international courts if their rights were violated. These complaints follow two recent reports - one by the government ombudsman and the other by the US-based NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) - which similarly warned of the “politicization of justice", citing Morales's appointment of key magistrates last year [RA-10-02].

• Land seizures

The government recently announced it had confiscated a total of 11,000 hectares of land from two members of the ruling Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS): a senator and former member of the constituent assembly, Juan Enrique Jurado and ex senator, Freddy Bersatti. In line with a key provision of the new 2009 constitution, which states that land can be expropriated if it does not serve an “economic or social function", this is the first time that MAS members have been targeted. Vice-President Alvaro Garcí­a Linera was quick to point to the move as evidence that no-one is exempt from the law. According to the head of the land reform institute (INRA), 4.1m hectares have been redistributed since 2005.