Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

In our 20-27 April issue we focused on the strength of Russia-China relations, but we also noted that not all is perfect between China and Russia (China has not recognized the pro-Moscow breakaway mini-states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the Caucasus, for instance), and the possibility of a divergence between Russia and China remains. It has been interesting, therefore, to see Russia expressing concerns about Chinese competition in the global arms market. Chinese dependence on Russian weapons was at one stage a key driver in their relationship. That has been changing, and now they are in increasing competition in the export field.

According to Ruslan Pukhov, director of Russia’s Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), the problem is that Russia and China are focused on the same regional markets, that is large emerging markets that are keen to pursue a military-political line that is relatively independent of the West.

The problem for Russia is not so much in the quality of China’s weapons but in the fact that China’s economy is complementary to those of many of the countries to which it is seeking to export. Essentially, it buys raw materials from the countries to which it wishes to sell arms. Russia, on the other hand, is an exporter of raw materials. As Pukhov puts it: “China is becoming one of the main buyers of raw materials from the countries of the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, and it is constantly boosting its investment in these countries.”

The exception to this is Asia. According to Pukhov: “Chinese policy is giving rise to increasing fears among neighbouring states in Southeast Asia, which provides Russian exporters with new opportunities.” Vietnam, for instance, is one of Russia’s key partners in “military-technical cooperation”. Strengthening military-technical cooperation between China and Pakistan also helps the Russian cause in India.

Pukhov also sees some benefit to Russia in the fact that China’s military exports will more and more reflect China’s foreign policy priorities, thus reducing its flexibility and willingness to supply.