Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

It is easy enough to be so mesmerized by the unfolding events in the Middle East as to overlook important developments elsewhere. In our view, not enough attention has been paid to the escalation in hostile rhetoric in February and March between Russia and Japan over the Kurile Islands. The significance is not that Russia and Japan are heading towards conflict, or anything like it, but what it says about Russia’s relationship with China .

Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union a number of thoughtful strategists have argued that Russia’s strategic interests would be best served by a close alliance with Japan, with Japan providing the money and the technology to best help Russia develop its energy resources and acting, ultimately, as a balance to the threat of Chinese encroachment in Russia’s Far East. It has not happened, and the litmus test of Russia’s desire (or not) for closer relations with Japan has always been the Kurile Islands. These islands were seized by the Soviet Union in the dying days of World War II and are claimed by Japan.

Back in September, the analogous dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands flared up anew when a Chinese fishing vessel collided with two Japanese coastguard patrol boats near the disputed islands. The Japanese coastguards boarded the trawler and arrested its crew and captain. Following the incident there were anti-Japanese demonstrations in Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Shenyang; Chinese tourist groups returned from Japan; expatriate Japanese workers in China were arrested; and Beijing suspended the export of vital rare earths to Japan.

But what was really interesting was that less than a month later, on 1 November, Russia chose to turn the knife some more, reinforcing Japan’s feeling of isolation, with a provocative visit by President Dimitriy Medvedev to the Kuriles. The juxtaposition of this visit with the flaring up of the China-Japan dispute will not have been coincidental.

And the escalation of the row over the Kuriles has continued. On 2 March, Japan issued a rebuke to Russia over its plans to deploy anti-ship cruise missiles on the disputed islands. Japan’s chief cabinet secretary, Yukio Edano, described the move as “very regrettable” while former Japanese defence minister Shigeru Ishiba called the move “extremely problematic...[with] significant political implications”.

Moscow responded by summoning Japan’s charge d’affaires and complaining about “extremists” who had been allowed to demonstrate outside the Russian embassy in Tokyo on 7 February. A spokesman for the Russian foreign ministry accused the Japanese government of “conniving in extremist anti-Russian actions”.

The BRICS connection

The contrast between this and the warmth in Russia and China relations on display at the recent BRICS summit (bringing together Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) was obvious. In an interview with China’s official Xinhua news agency on 13 April, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov talked about the “qualitative build-up of economic and trade cooperation” between Russia and China “with the goal of imparting a strategic character to it”. The construction of an oil pipeline to China was completed at the beginning of the year, and talks have reached the final stages over pipeline deliveries of Russian natural gas to China. The two sides have also begun implementing the joint “Programme of Cooperation” between the regions of Russia’s Far East and Eastern Siberia and Northeast China.

On the same day as Lavrov’s interview, the US-China Economic Security and Review Commission (USCC) was holding hearings on China’s foreign policy which included evidence on China-Russia relations. The commission heard that relations “are perhaps the best they have ever been”. The basis of the close relationship is a shared view on non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, opposition to any US plans to militarize outer space and to develop missile defence, and a common view on the need to stabilize Central Asia through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

This is not to say that all is perfect between China and Russia (China has not recognized the pro-Moscow breakaway mini-states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the Caucasus, for instance), but the level of cooperation and strategic direction are clear and in stark contrast to the nature of Russia-Japan relations. The possibility of a divergence between Russia and China remains, given the fundamental imbalance that Russia is the largest country in the world in terms of territory while China has nine times as many people. But, on the other hand, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer while China is the largest energy importer, and for the moment that is driving the relationship in a positive direction.

The present upheavals in the Middle East could also be pushing Russia and China into closer collaboration to support the Central Asian autocracies through the SCO. That this closer Russia-China collaboration is at the expense of Japan was demonstrated by Medvedev’s Kurile Island visit. It could also be at the expense of the United States if the two begin cooperating on, for instance, technology to overcome US ballistic missile defences.

Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov, speaking on 15 April in Berlin after a session of the Nato-Russia Council, called once again for a unified Russia-Nato missile defence system, describing cooperation over European missile defence as “a test of the real preparedness of us all for strategic partnership and the consideration of the lawful security interests of each other”. But the call was quickly rejected by Nato General Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who said: “We are thinking about two systems – one Nato’s and one Russia – that will cooperate and exchange information to make us more secure.”

Another Nato diplomat said that there was too great a level of distrust between Nato and Russia. He said: “When we ask the Russians what they can contribute to the possible future shield, they don’t talk.” If this is really the way the wind is blowing for Nato (and sentiment towards Russia will not have been improved by increasing criticism from Moscow of Nato’s intervention in Libya), then the fears expressed at last week’s USCC hearings about possible Russia-China collaboration to counter the US’s anti-missile defence programme would seem to be well placed. JdeC.