Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

From the outset of the ‘Arab Spring’ we have urged caution about taking an overly optimistic view of the eventual outcome. The evidence supporting a pessimistic assessment is mounting.

Some of the most pessimistic assessments of the Mideast turmoil have been coming out of Russia, where the intelligence services believe that the current unrest could presage decades of instability. This pessimistic Russian view was on display again on Monday (18 April) – albeit in a different context.

As we discuss in this week’s main briefing, there had been much talk at last week’s Russia-Nato Council (RNC) meeting in Berlin about missile defence cooperation. Returning to this subject on 18 April, Russia’s permanent representative at Nato, Dmitriy Rogozin, argued that the rising visible danger to the south would make Nato step up its plans for missile defence – at the expense of Russia. Although Rogozin was making a point about Russia-Nato relations and not specifically about the Arab revolutions, his comments nevertheless revealed the level of pessimism in Moscow about the future of these revolts. Rogozin said that he believed Islamist radicals would eventually take over the Arab revolutions from radical leftists because of “the radicalization of political Islam”.

Not surprisingly, Israel is amongst the most cautious, and according to sources in Jerusalem the new plan of the Israel Defence Force (IDF), called Halamish, sees an increasing chance for war on multiple fronts. The plan, which is in the final stages of approval, is not thought likely to include a major public reassessment of the threat from Egypt, but that is undoubtedly the direction from which the increased risk is seen to be emanating.

Recent negative indicators from Egypt include the growing activity and confidence of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). With the previously dominant National Democratic Party (NDP) being disbanded, the change in tone from the MB has included talk by at least one prominent MB leader of introducing Sharia law (in an interview with the Egyptian newspaper al-Masri al-Yawm) and suggestions that it could win 75% of parliamentary seats despite previously having said it would not seek to win more than 33% (which would be just enough to block the passage of key legislation, as Hezbollah has been doing in Lebanon).

The Egyptian economy is in freefall, and radical Islamists are beginning to exploit the spread of criminality and anarchy. There are increasing reports of women being harassed, and Islamist extremists have been breaking into mosques and destroying the tombs of holy men of which they disapprove. As a former Israeli ambassador to Cairo, Zvi Mazel, put it this week: “The Arab Spring could turn into the Spring of Illusions, which would bring with it a long period of instability to the Middle East.”

Israel’s disquiet is increased by the fear that whatever the outcome in Syria, the end result will be bad. The survival of the Assad regime would mean an entrenchment of Iranian influence in Syria and Lebanon at a time when it is also increasing its influence in the Gulf Arab states and Iraq through the efforts of the Shiite Arabs. On the other hand, Assad’s downfall could lead to a Sunni regime aligned with a Muslim Brotherhood dominated Egypt.

Iran on the “offensive”

Then there is Iran itself. Intelligence analysts believe that President Mahmud Amadinejad’s Army Day address on 18 April showed a marked increase in confidence over the same address this time last year. Where last year’s speech could be categorized as “defensive”, this one was “offensive”. He spoke about self-reliance and self-confidence, and he talked about “using opportunities”. Clearly, the situation in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia is seen as an opportunity for Iran, but so is the change of regime in Egypt, where Iran has just appointed an ambassador for the first time in more than 30 years.

Also noteworthy is the extent to which Iran has been increasing its economic ties with Turkey despite UN sanctions against Iran. Trade volume between the two leaped by more than 70% in the first two months of 2011, having surpassed $11bn in 2011. The Turkish ambassador to Tehran said on 13 April that the aim is to increase bilateral to $15bn by the end of 2011.

And, curiously, even Turkey is now beginning to worry. It had been thought that Turkey’s Islamist-tinted democracy could provide the template and leadership for the post-revolutionary Arab states of the region, but now it is slowly beginning to dawn on Ankara that it is Egypt that will be returning to leadership of the Arab world – which may be why Ankara is seeking to deepen ties with Iran.

Looking only slightly further ahead, Israel is concerned that a majority of the United Nations General Assembly will vote in September to recognize a Palestinian state within the pre-1967 borders, and that a second-term Obama administration could significantly increase the pressure on Israel to make dangerous territorial concessions.